<p>The opposition between the realists and the anti-realists isas old as Western science. The question as to whether the“furniture of the world”we call the“things”is to be considered real or not hasconsistently been at the forefront in the debates about scienceand philosophy. This urgent interest is motivated by the closeconnection to another question–namely that of scientificobjectivity - an issue that seldom receives proper treatment.Objectivity has rather been taken for granted in thetraditional Newtonian paradigm with its well-known slogan: Thedetached observer is the objective one and the rational mind ofclarity.</p><p>It was impossible to continue with this dictum, which isresponsible for the cleft between the natural and socialsciences and still presents a ban on human feelings inscientific endeavours, after the findings of quantum mechanicsat the beginning of the 20th century. However the penetratingpower of this important insight has been astonishingly weak andwith the emergence of computer science in the middle of thecentury, Newtonian science’s self-assumed status ofobjectivity has been apprehended as both very doubtful and asevere hindrance in other areas outside the quantum domain ofscientific activity. The efforts of computer modelling andsimulation analysis revealed a pronounced observer-dependencyregarding investigation.</p><p>For these reasons this thesis will scrutinise the activityof science and the art of modelling–proposing the use ofa 2-step model of modelling (metamodel) to clarify andemphasize the involvement of the observer in the process ofobservation. This approach reveals that the object-orientedapproach (OOA), which has been the prevailing one since thedawn of Western science and is one of the basic tenets of theNewtonian paradigm, makes science unable to describe itsobjects of discourse in an observer-independent manner. Such ascience is at risk to be considered inconsistent, incompleteand non-objective and for that reason unfit for consensualscientific use.</p><p>The main claim of this thesis is that the object-orientedapproach is responsible for the genesis of Cartesian dualismand other inconsistencies, which are met in present dayscience. Such a claim is not novel however, but I will arguethat when science is dressed up as the Subject-orientedApproach to Knowledge (SOA) a long row of embarrassing andbewildering situations encountered in classical humanconceptualisation will vanish–in a way that, as far as Iknow, has never been explicitly explained before. This approachalso promises a unification of the different disciplines ofsciences so that e.g. the social sciences can be treated on anequal footing with the natural sciences–and thus thisembarrassing gulf of human knowledge can be removed. This is aprofound shift of paradigm in science and the re-orientation ofhuman thinking required is both considerable andtime-consuming.</p><p>For this reason this thesis is not a systematic presentationof the SOA, but rather tries, in Part 1, to pave the way for anunderstanding of this approach by an introductory discussionabout the means and scope of science and the essential role ofsymbolic modelling in this endeavour–and in particularthe way these activities will be influenced by the anticipatedchange of paradigm. Some historical aspects of this particularSOA are also given as a background and this section iscompleted by a brief survey of the modern trends in scientificmodelling.</p><p>Part 2 is collection of papers dealing with the principlesof modelling and simulation, and, rather more importantly, asequence of papers reflecting how the ideas of the SOA havedeveloped throughout the years due to the inconsistencies metwith in these and adjacent areas. To my mind they prove -beyond the point of any consensual doubt–that therealist’s position in science cannot be defended anylonger and that the“things of the world”by thescientific community must be considered merely privateallusions.</p><p>More important however is the insight that the Newtonianparadigm is unable to produce an observer-independentdescription of this world with its conceived things and theonly way out of this embarrassing dilemma seems to be theacceptance of the SOA–with its hitherto strictly bannedfeature of subjectivity. Using this approach, we claim, sciencecan be given a consensual and consistent foundation–andthe price to pay is the loss of scientific ontology. As alreadypointed out this thesis merely hints at the new path to take–instead concentrating on the reasons for the impendingdemise of scientific realism and need of a constructive systemsscience.</p>

Conservation science applies research in the natural and social sciences to practical problems of nature conservation, thus presupposing various goals and values. This dissertation examines normative roles for the decision sciences in biological conservation. I am primarily concerned with two philosophical problems that arise in applications of the decision sciences to biological conservation problems: commensurability of multiple values and cooperation between multiple agents. I argue that models from decision analysis should be used to construct preferences over complex tradeoffs, and game theoretical models should be used to identify situations in which multiple agents pursuing their own interests cause outcomes that are worse for everyone. While these models allow values to be made explicit for decision-making, in other situations conservationists’ goals and values are obscure. I discuss this distinct problem in the context of conservation biology, where the central concept of biodiversity is analyzed and shown to necessarily reflect the values of its users. The multiplicity of meanings of ‘biodiversity’ and measures of biological diversity raise risks for conservation biology and motivate multi-criteria approaches to conservation decision-making. Finally, the goals and values of conservation scientists and landscape managers may or may not reflect those of people who are affected by conservation policies. I argue that while decision science can aid in making values of various stakeholder groups explicit, facilitating reflection and learning, it cannot resolve ethical dilemmas on its own without input from normative and applied ethics, particularly in identifying legitimate stakeholders and weighing multiple biological concerns against concerns for rights, welfare, and social justice. / text

My dissertation studies three problems that threaten our functional explanatory practices. The first study, The Normativity Problem and Theories of Biological Function, attempts to explain how it is that biological tokens can perform their functions better or worse, and can retain their functions even when not currently performing them. Etiological theories can try to account for the normativity of functions by cumulative selection or by their contributions to fitness. I argue that neither strategy succeeds. Systemic theories hold that functions are the causal contributions of systemic components to the overall capacities of their containing systems. At first glance, systemic theories do not explain the normativity of functions either. I argue that adding a feedback condition to systemic theories can account for the normativity of functions. The second study, The Malfunction Problem and the Functional Individuation of Biological Traits, attempts to dissolve an apparent paradox about how, if biological traits are functionally individuated, it is possible for an organism to possess a biological trait that malfunctions. The malfunction problem articulates the apparent paradox: A ‘malfunctioning’ trait token seems to no longer belong to its functional type and hence cannot malfunction. I show that distinguishing between the functional type that a token instantiates and the current performance of its function dissolves the paradox. The third study, The Necessitation Problem and the Causal Relevance of Functional Properties, attempts to address a vacuity worry about causal explanation that seems to arise when a property referred to by a causal explanation is individuated by its very effects. Since functional properties are individuated by their functions, and functions are effects, it is hard to see how the ascription of functional properties can play an explanatory role. For the relevant explanations seem to be vacuous: the property that purportedly explains the effect is just the property of having that very effect. I argue that causally relevant functional properties are individuated by historical effects, whereas the effects that they causally explain are current. Since the effects individuating causally relevant properties are distinct from the effects that are causally explained, the vacuity worry does not arise. / Philosophy

The critical aim of this dissertation is to show the lack of explanatory value of typological generalizations in generative research paradigms, and the constructive aim is to propose an alternative conception of typology which gives a justifiable place to typological facts. My contention is that we cannot conclude that the human language faculty (HLF) lacks the means to generate a linguistic phenomenon from only the lack of such a phenomenon in the languages of the world. The temptation to do so arises from equivocation regarding the term Language as used within different generative paradigms: the classical generative paradigm, and the generative-parametric paradigm. The former characterizes Language, understood as HLF, the mental object which allows us to produce and understand languages. For the latter, however, Language also includes the distribution of linguistic structures in the world. HLF is a natural kind; the distribution of linguistic structures in the world is not. Equivocation of the term ‘Language’; occurs when one notion is exchanged for the other within an argument. The problem: only natural kinds support induction. The goal of characterizing HLF is discovering what is necessarily true of HLF. The distribution of linguistic phenomena in the world, although constrained by what HLF allows us to acquire, is also constrained by historical contingency. Generalizations based on these accidental factors are valueless in characterizing HLF: I show this in two case studies, which deal with syllable structure and verbal morpheme order. I argue that the study of the distribution of linguistic phenomena in the world is a historical science, which requires a different set of assumptions than an experimental science such as the classical generative paradigm. The alternative I offer is called ideal-typology. Ideal-typology replaces inductive inference based on natural kinds with pragmatic explanation based on ‘ideal-types’. Ideal-types are convenient fictions, purpose-built to manipulate our cognitive systems into understanding the diversity of historical-scientific data. I illustrate the practice of ideal-typology by showing how the diversity of Chinese tone systems can be measured and organized by the use of ideal-types. Beyond increasing understanding of the data themselves, ideal-typology yields hypotheses that experimental sciences can test.

The central issue in this study is the question of how insight into the relation between faith and science in the philosophy of CA van Peursen can contribute to the wide ranging faith-science debate in contemporary thought. The study is contextualized by asking how the resultant insight into the relation between faith and science can be brought to bear on the notion of a "Christian science" as it has developed within a specific philosophical tradition. It is argued that CA van Peursen's philosophy relies on the basic distinction between thought and reality, and more specifically, the interrelation between the two. Van Peursen utilizes a broad definition of rationality as networks of symbols with which human consciousness works, in order to facilitate an appropriate response to the challenges of its surroundings. At this point Van Peursen also makes use of the notion of "narrative" to emphasize the dynamic character of the symbolic networks that exist. Objective reality and subjective rationality can never be separated, but they are attuned to each other, and the one should, as it where, be "read off' against the other. A typology of the faith-science debate, that is developed in the initial stages of the study, is subsequently used as a heuristic instrument to draw out the implications of Van Peursen's philosophy for the question regarding the relation between faith and science. It is argued that Van Peursen's thought is consistently non-reductionist, in the sense that he grants both faith and science their own integrity. Faith and science are not equal, however. Faith constitutes a much broader, more immediate and concrete reaction to the challenges of reality than science does. Science strives towards objectivity and abstraction, and therein lies it's power, but it nevertheless always remains bound to the real world of everyday experience. Science therefore has a "relational autonomy". The insights gained into the relation between faith and science problematizes the idea of a separate Christian science that is construed as being antithetical to so called secular science. The notion of Christian science can be salvaged along two ways: Christian science may be seen as a commitment to good science, and it may be seen as a dialogue between the narratives of western science and Christian faith. / Thesis (M.A. (Philosophy))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2004.

<p> The qualitative phenomenological study described herein examined the meaning and essence of the lived psychospiritual and felt-sense experiences arising in individuals who are living with a life-threatening illness. The purpose of the study and the research question are described in this dissertation along with definitions of important terms, the theoretical lenses through which the research was conducted, and an autobiographical reflection describing the motivation behind the research. A historical background of early medical and spiritual practices and beliefs provides context for the study and precedes a review of pertinent literature. The literature review discusses existing germane research studies that support the need for the study. Research methods used to conduct this study are described, along with participant qualifications, recruitment processes used, and ethical considerations undergirding this study. This document includes references for the many citations appearing throughout this research, a chapter that discusses the results that arose from an examination of the data, along with a discussion of findings. It is my sincere hope that my words inspire greater interest in this topic and open a sacred space for the study to have deep and lasting meaning within the wider transpersonal and scientific community.</p>

This paper considers the philosophy of science that is central to Critical Realism (CR). Following a discussion of the foundational transcendental arguments of the movement, it reviews stratification, emergence, and the possibility of a unity between the natural and the social sciences. CR is broadly contrasted with other versions of scientific realism, empiricism, and idealism. the philosophy of psychology is considered as a test case in which critical realism can be demonstrated to be a workable theory of science. Specifically, a theory is propsed of social psychology that would be scientific in virtue of meeting the standards of a critical realist view of science. / i, 95 leaves ; 28 cm.

<p>Cognitive neuroscience is an interdisciplinary enterprise aimed at explaining cognition and behavior. It appears to be succeeding. What accounts for this apparent explanatory success? According to one prominent philosophical thesis, cognitive neuroscience explains by discovering and describing mechanisms. This "mechanist thesis" is open to at least two interpretations: a strong metaphysical thesis that Carl Craver and David Kaplan defend, and a weaker methodological thesis that William Bechtel defends. I argue that the metaphysical thesis is false and that the methodological thesis is too weak to account for the explanatory promise of cognitive neuroscience. My argument draws support from a representative example of research in this field, namely, the neuroscience of decision-making. The example shows that cognitive neuroscience explains in a variety of ways and that the discovery of mechanisms functions primarily as a way of marshaling evidence in support of the models of cognition that are its principle unit of explanatory significance.</p><p> </p><p>The inadequacy of the mechanist program is symptomatic of an implausible but prominent view of scientific understanding. On this view, scientific understanding consists in an accurate and complete description of certain "objective" explanatory relations, that is, relations that hold independently of facts about human psychology. I trace this view to Carl Hempel's logical empiricist reconceptualization of scientific understanding, which then gets extended in Wesley Salmon's causal-mechanistic approach. I argue that the twin objectivist ideals of accuracy and completeness are neither ends we actually value nor ends we ought to value where scientific understanding is concerned. </p><p>The case against objectivism motivates psychologism about understanding, the view that understanding depends on human psychology. I propose and defend a normative psychologistic framework for investigating the nature of understanding in the mind sciences along three empirically-informed dimensions: 1) What are the ends of understanding? 2) What is the nature of the cognitive strategy that we deploy to achieve those ends; and 3) Under what conditions is our deployment of this strategy effective toward achieving those ends? To articulate and defend this view, I build on the work of Elliot Sober to develop a taxonomy of psychologisms about understanding. Epistemological psychologism, a species of naturalism, is the view that justifying claims about understanding requires appealing to what scientists actually do when they seek understanding. Metaphysical psychologism is the view that the truth-makers for claims about understanding include facts about human psychology. I defend both views against objections.</p> / Dissertation

<p>This dissertation develops a theory of cognition, driven by recent developments in the electrophysiological investigation of the neuronal mechanisms that support adaptive behavior. In the first chapter, I situate the theory in the conceptual landscape of the philosophy of mind, distinguishing componential from systemic dynamical theories of cognition. In the second chapter, I analyze two case studies from electrophysiological cognitive neuroscience, arguing that cognitive neuroscientists are beginning to uncover the dynamical components of cognition. Drawing on the recent literature on mechanisms and scientific explanation, I propose a revised definition of a mechanism that accommodates these dynamical mechanisms, as well as making room for their implementation by physical mechanisms. In the third chapter, I argue that the investigation of a particular class of intelligent behavior begins with the construction of a formal model of the processing problem for that behavior, where this model is distinct from the physical device and the functions performed by the device's components. In the third chapter, I argue that the component dynamical mechanisms of cognitive systems are distinct from though implemented by physical mechanisms. These dynamical mechanisms are described by sets of differential equations, possess a set of organized components and activities that execute the formal models of processing, and are implemented by the physical machinery of the cognitive system, such as the brain. After I argue that these multiple interacting dynamical mechanisms are the components of cognition, defending this componentiality claim against several objections, I define the implementation relation that holds between dynamical and physical mechanisms. I next discuss the grounds for inferring the existence of dynamical mechanisms that are type distinct from physical mechanisms, their implementing substrate. In the fourth chapter, I argue that these dynamical mechanisms are reused: they can execute different formal models and be implemented by different physical substrates. I define this concept of reuse, situating it in the debate on theories of reuse, and illustrate how dynamical mechanisms are reused in cognitive systems.</p> / Dissertation

The central issue in this study is the question of how insight into the relation between faith and science in the philosophy of CA van Peursen can contribute to the wide ranging faith-science debate in contemporary thought. The study is contextualized by asking how the resultant insight into the relation between faith and science can be brought to bear on the notion of a "Christian science" as it has developed within a specific philosophical tradition. It is argued that CA van Peursen's philosophy relies on the basic distinction between thought and reality, and more specifically, the interrelation between the two. Van Peursen utilizes a broad definition of rationality as networks of symbols with which human consciousness works, in order to facilitate an appropriate response to the challenges of its surroundings. At this point Van Peursen also makes use of the notion of "narrative" to emphasize the dynamic character of the symbolic networks that exist. Objective reality and subjective rationality can never be separated, but they are attuned to each other, and the one should, as it where, be "read off' against the other. A typology of the faith-science debate, that is developed in the initial stages of the study, is subsequently used as a heuristic instrument to draw out the implications of Van Peursen's philosophy for the question regarding the relation between faith and science. It is argued that Van Peursen's thought is consistently non-reductionist, in the sense that he grants both faith and science their own integrity. Faith and science are not equal, however. Faith constitutes a much broader, more immediate and concrete reaction to the challenges of reality than science does. Science strives towards objectivity and abstraction, and therein lies it's power, but it nevertheless always remains bound to the real world of everyday experience. Science therefore has a "relational autonomy". The insights gained into the relation between faith and science problematizes the idea of a separate Christian science that is construed as being antithetical to so called secular science. The notion of Christian science can be salvaged along two ways: Christian science may be seen as a commitment to good science, and it may be seen as a dialogue between the narratives of western science and Christian faith. / Thesis (M.A. (Philosophy))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2004.