My dissertation studies three problems that threaten our functional explanatory practices. The first study, The Normativity Problem and Theories of Biological Function, attempts to explain how it is that biological tokens can perform their functions better or worse, and can retain their functions even when not currently performing them. Etiological theories can try to account for the normativity of functions by cumulative selection or by their contributions to fitness. I argue that neither strategy succeeds. Systemic theories hold that functions are the causal contributions of systemic components to the overall capacities of their containing systems. At first glance, systemic theories do not explain the normativity of functions either. I argue that adding a feedback condition to systemic theories can account for the normativity of functions. The second study, The Malfunction Problem and the Functional Individuation of Biological Traits, attempts to dissolve an apparent paradox about how, if biological traits are functionally individuated, it is possible for an organism to possess a biological trait that malfunctions. The malfunction problem articulates the apparent paradox: A ‘malfunctioning’ trait token seems to no longer belong to its functional type and hence cannot malfunction. I show that distinguishing between the functional type that a token instantiates and the current performance of its function dissolves the paradox. The third study, The Necessitation Problem and the Causal Relevance of Functional Properties, attempts to address a vacuity worry about causal explanation that seems to arise when a property referred to by a causal explanation is individuated by its very effects. Since functional properties are individuated by their functions, and functions are effects, it is hard to see how the ascription of functional properties can play an explanatory role. For the relevant explanations seem to be vacuous: the property that purportedly explains the effect is just the property of having that very effect. I argue that causally relevant functional properties are individuated by historical effects, whereas the effects that they causally explain are current. Since the effects individuating causally relevant properties are distinct from the effects that are causally explained, the vacuity worry does not arise. / Philosophy

The critical aim of this dissertation is to show the lack of explanatory value of typological generalizations in generative research paradigms, and the constructive aim is to propose an alternative conception of typology which gives a justifiable place to typological facts. My contention is that we cannot conclude that the human language faculty (HLF) lacks the means to generate a linguistic phenomenon from only the lack of such a phenomenon in the languages of the world. The temptation to do so arises from equivocation regarding the term Language as used within different generative paradigms: the classical generative paradigm, and the generative-parametric paradigm. The former characterizes Language, understood as HLF, the mental object which allows us to produce and understand languages. For the latter, however, Language also includes the distribution of linguistic structures in the world. HLF is a natural kind; the distribution of linguistic structures in the world is not. Equivocation of the term ‘Language’; occurs when one notion is exchanged for the other within an argument. The problem: only natural kinds support induction. The goal of characterizing HLF is discovering what is necessarily true of HLF. The distribution of linguistic phenomena in the world, although constrained by what HLF allows us to acquire, is also constrained by historical contingency. Generalizations based on these accidental factors are valueless in characterizing HLF: I show this in two case studies, which deal with syllable structure and verbal morpheme order. I argue that the study of the distribution of linguistic phenomena in the world is a historical science, which requires a different set of assumptions than an experimental science such as the classical generative paradigm. The alternative I offer is called ideal-typology. Ideal-typology replaces inductive inference based on natural kinds with pragmatic explanation based on ‘ideal-types’. Ideal-types are convenient fictions, purpose-built to manipulate our cognitive systems into understanding the diversity of historical-scientific data. I illustrate the practice of ideal-typology by showing how the diversity of Chinese tone systems can be measured and organized by the use of ideal-types. Beyond increasing understanding of the data themselves, ideal-typology yields hypotheses that experimental sciences can test.

The central issue in this study is the question of how insight into the relation between faith and science in the philosophy of CA van Peursen can contribute to the wide ranging faith-science debate in contemporary thought. The study is contextualized by asking how the resultant insight into the relation between faith and science can be brought to bear on the notion of a "Christian science" as it has developed within a specific philosophical tradition. It is argued that CA van Peursen's philosophy relies on the basic distinction between thought and reality, and more specifically, the interrelation between the two. Van Peursen utilizes a broad definition of rationality as networks of symbols with which human consciousness works, in order to facilitate an appropriate response to the challenges of its surroundings. At this point Van Peursen also makes use of the notion of "narrative" to emphasize the dynamic character of the symbolic networks that exist. Objective reality and subjective rationality can never be separated, but they are attuned to each other, and the one should, as it where, be "read off' against the other. A typology of the faith-science debate, that is developed in the initial stages of the study, is subsequently used as a heuristic instrument to draw out the implications of Van Peursen's philosophy for the question regarding the relation between faith and science. It is argued that Van Peursen's thought is consistently non-reductionist, in the sense that he grants both faith and science their own integrity. Faith and science are not equal, however. Faith constitutes a much broader, more immediate and concrete reaction to the challenges of reality than science does. Science strives towards objectivity and abstraction, and therein lies it's power, but it nevertheless always remains bound to the real world of everyday experience. Science therefore has a "relational autonomy". The insights gained into the relation between faith and science problematizes the idea of a separate Christian science that is construed as being antithetical to so called secular science. The notion of Christian science can be salvaged along two ways: Christian science may be seen as a commitment to good science, and it may be seen as a dialogue between the narratives of western science and Christian faith. / Thesis (M.A. (Philosophy))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2004.

<p> The qualitative phenomenological study described herein examined the meaning and essence of the lived psychospiritual and felt-sense experiences arising in individuals who are living with a life-threatening illness. The purpose of the study and the research question are described in this dissertation along with definitions of important terms, the theoretical lenses through which the research was conducted, and an autobiographical reflection describing the motivation behind the research. A historical background of early medical and spiritual practices and beliefs provides context for the study and precedes a review of pertinent literature. The literature review discusses existing germane research studies that support the need for the study. Research methods used to conduct this study are described, along with participant qualifications, recruitment processes used, and ethical considerations undergirding this study. This document includes references for the many citations appearing throughout this research, a chapter that discusses the results that arose from an examination of the data, along with a discussion of findings. It is my sincere hope that my words inspire greater interest in this topic and open a sacred space for the study to have deep and lasting meaning within the wider transpersonal and scientific community.</p>

This paper considers the philosophy of science that is central to Critical Realism (CR). Following a discussion of the foundational transcendental arguments of the movement, it reviews stratification, emergence, and the possibility of a unity between the natural and the social sciences. CR is broadly contrasted with other versions of scientific realism, empiricism, and idealism. the philosophy of psychology is considered as a test case in which critical realism can be demonstrated to be a workable theory of science. Specifically, a theory is propsed of social psychology that would be scientific in virtue of meeting the standards of a critical realist view of science. / i, 95 leaves ; 28 cm.

<p>Cognitive neuroscience is an interdisciplinary enterprise aimed at explaining cognition and behavior. It appears to be succeeding. What accounts for this apparent explanatory success? According to one prominent philosophical thesis, cognitive neuroscience explains by discovering and describing mechanisms. This "mechanist thesis" is open to at least two interpretations: a strong metaphysical thesis that Carl Craver and David Kaplan defend, and a weaker methodological thesis that William Bechtel defends. I argue that the metaphysical thesis is false and that the methodological thesis is too weak to account for the explanatory promise of cognitive neuroscience. My argument draws support from a representative example of research in this field, namely, the neuroscience of decision-making. The example shows that cognitive neuroscience explains in a variety of ways and that the discovery of mechanisms functions primarily as a way of marshaling evidence in support of the models of cognition that are its principle unit of explanatory significance.</p><p> </p><p>The inadequacy of the mechanist program is symptomatic of an implausible but prominent view of scientific understanding. On this view, scientific understanding consists in an accurate and complete description of certain "objective" explanatory relations, that is, relations that hold independently of facts about human psychology. I trace this view to Carl Hempel's logical empiricist reconceptualization of scientific understanding, which then gets extended in Wesley Salmon's causal-mechanistic approach. I argue that the twin objectivist ideals of accuracy and completeness are neither ends we actually value nor ends we ought to value where scientific understanding is concerned. </p><p>The case against objectivism motivates psychologism about understanding, the view that understanding depends on human psychology. I propose and defend a normative psychologistic framework for investigating the nature of understanding in the mind sciences along three empirically-informed dimensions: 1) What are the ends of understanding? 2) What is the nature of the cognitive strategy that we deploy to achieve those ends; and 3) Under what conditions is our deployment of this strategy effective toward achieving those ends? To articulate and defend this view, I build on the work of Elliot Sober to develop a taxonomy of psychologisms about understanding. Epistemological psychologism, a species of naturalism, is the view that justifying claims about understanding requires appealing to what scientists actually do when they seek understanding. Metaphysical psychologism is the view that the truth-makers for claims about understanding include facts about human psychology. I defend both views against objections.</p> / Dissertation

<p>This dissertation develops a theory of cognition, driven by recent developments in the electrophysiological investigation of the neuronal mechanisms that support adaptive behavior. In the first chapter, I situate the theory in the conceptual landscape of the philosophy of mind, distinguishing componential from systemic dynamical theories of cognition. In the second chapter, I analyze two case studies from electrophysiological cognitive neuroscience, arguing that cognitive neuroscientists are beginning to uncover the dynamical components of cognition. Drawing on the recent literature on mechanisms and scientific explanation, I propose a revised definition of a mechanism that accommodates these dynamical mechanisms, as well as making room for their implementation by physical mechanisms. In the third chapter, I argue that the investigation of a particular class of intelligent behavior begins with the construction of a formal model of the processing problem for that behavior, where this model is distinct from the physical device and the functions performed by the device's components. In the third chapter, I argue that the component dynamical mechanisms of cognitive systems are distinct from though implemented by physical mechanisms. These dynamical mechanisms are described by sets of differential equations, possess a set of organized components and activities that execute the formal models of processing, and are implemented by the physical machinery of the cognitive system, such as the brain. After I argue that these multiple interacting dynamical mechanisms are the components of cognition, defending this componentiality claim against several objections, I define the implementation relation that holds between dynamical and physical mechanisms. I next discuss the grounds for inferring the existence of dynamical mechanisms that are type distinct from physical mechanisms, their implementing substrate. In the fourth chapter, I argue that these dynamical mechanisms are reused: they can execute different formal models and be implemented by different physical substrates. I define this concept of reuse, situating it in the debate on theories of reuse, and illustrate how dynamical mechanisms are reused in cognitive systems.</p> / Dissertation

The central issue in this study is the question of how insight into the relation between faith and science in the philosophy of CA van Peursen can contribute to the wide ranging faith-science debate in contemporary thought. The study is contextualized by asking how the resultant insight into the relation between faith and science can be brought to bear on the notion of a "Christian science" as it has developed within a specific philosophical tradition. It is argued that CA van Peursen's philosophy relies on the basic distinction between thought and reality, and more specifically, the interrelation between the two. Van Peursen utilizes a broad definition of rationality as networks of symbols with which human consciousness works, in order to facilitate an appropriate response to the challenges of its surroundings. At this point Van Peursen also makes use of the notion of "narrative" to emphasize the dynamic character of the symbolic networks that exist. Objective reality and subjective rationality can never be separated, but they are attuned to each other, and the one should, as it where, be "read off' against the other. A typology of the faith-science debate, that is developed in the initial stages of the study, is subsequently used as a heuristic instrument to draw out the implications of Van Peursen's philosophy for the question regarding the relation between faith and science. It is argued that Van Peursen's thought is consistently non-reductionist, in the sense that he grants both faith and science their own integrity. Faith and science are not equal, however. Faith constitutes a much broader, more immediate and concrete reaction to the challenges of reality than science does. Science strives towards objectivity and abstraction, and therein lies it's power, but it nevertheless always remains bound to the real world of everyday experience. Science therefore has a "relational autonomy". The insights gained into the relation between faith and science problematizes the idea of a separate Christian science that is construed as being antithetical to so called secular science. The notion of Christian science can be salvaged along two ways: Christian science may be seen as a commitment to good science, and it may be seen as a dialogue between the narratives of western science and Christian faith. / Thesis (M.A. (Philosophy))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2004.

No description available.

Measurement is an indispensable part of physical science as well as of commerce, industry, and daily life. Measuring activities appear unproblematic when performed with familiar instruments such as thermometers and clocks, but a closer examination reveals a host of epistemological questions, including: 1. How is it possible to tell whether an instrument measures the quantity it is intended to? 2. What do claims to measurement accuracy amount to, and how might such claims be justified? 3. When is disagreement among instruments a sign of error, and when does it imply that instruments measure different quantities? Currently, these questions are almost completely ignored by philosophers of science, who view them as methodological concerns to be settled by scientists. This dissertation shows that these questions are not only philosophically worthy, but that their exploration has the potential to challenge fundamental assumptions in philosophy of science, including the distinction between measurement and prediction. The thesis outlines a model-based epistemology of physical measurement and uses it to address the questions above. To measure, I argue, is to estimate the value of a parameter in an idealized model of a physical process. Such estimation involves inference from the final state (‘indication’) of a process to the value range of a parameter (‘outcome’) in light of theoretical and statistical assumptions. Idealizations are necessary preconditions for the possibility of justifying such inferences. Similarly, claims to accuracy, error and quantity individuation can only be adjudicated against the background of an idealized representation of the measurement process. Chapters 1-3 develop this framework and use it to analyze the inferential structure of standardization procedures performed by contemporary standardization bureaus. Standardizing time, for example, is a matter of constructing idealized models of multiple atomic clocks in a way that allows consistent estimates of duration to be inferred from clock indications. Chapter 4 shows that calibration is a special sort of modeling activity, i.e. the activity of constructing and testing models of measurement processes. Contrary to contemporary philosophical views, the accuracy of measurement outcomes is properly evaluated by comparing model predictions to each other, rather than by comparing observations.