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<p>Bertrand Russell is one of the grandmasters of 20^th Century Analytic Philosophy. It is surprising, then, that his work fell out of fashion later in his career. As a result, very little has been discussed concerning Russell’s work from the period of 1927 – 59. This thesis provides an analysis of Russell’s philosophical work from this era. Our attention here is on Russell’s theory of perception and the underlying metaphysical structure that is developed as a result of his scientific outlook. Russell’s philosophy during this time focused almost exclusively on perception, knowledge, and the epistemic relationship humans have with the world according to science. It is these topics that are engaged with and explicated. We discover that, due to Russell's outright acceptance of that conclusion found in physics, metaphysically he defends a four-dimensional neutral monist event ontology; perceptually he defends a causal theory where one's perceptions must be understood as only being of one's brain; and epistemically he is a fallibilist, wherein justification can be found in a coherent set of beliefs founded on intrinsically credible individual propositions, but knowledge itself is ultimately a vexed and imprecise concept.</p> / Master of Arts (MA)

The periodic table poses a difficulty for both scientific realists and anti-realists. The anti-realist has difficulty accounting for the success of the table during a period in chemistry when many theories and concepts changed; the spatial relations of current tables in use do not show fundamental changes from the original tables proposed by Mendeleev. Yet, most versions of scientific realism are based upon the understanding that theories are some collection of written propositions or equations. The table as an image successfully functions very much like a theory: it is an organization of known facts, has been used to make predictions, and is plastic enough to accommodate unforeseen novel facts. Assuming the truth of the representational relations between the table and the world poses interesting issues for the realist. Ian Hacking's entity realism and the structural realism of several philosophers are both possible versions of scientific realism that fail to account for the table. Hacking's version fails in this case because the role of representation is central to understanding the history of the table; structural realism fails because it diminishes to much the role that first order properties have as they relate to the formulation of the second order relationships that comprise the table. Philip Kitcher of Science, Truth, and Democracy leaves himself open to two interpretations about the metaphysics of pluralism. One of these is indefensible; the other is quite well supported by the plurality of successful periodic tables. / Master of Arts

Esta dissertação caracteriza-se como um estudo de história da filosofia da ciência. O objetivo central é analisar e compreender a construção da filosofia da ciência não apenas a partir das apresentações da produção intelectual do matemático e polímata inglês William Whewell (1794-1866), como também de alguns elementos de sua biografia e de seu contexto histórico. Esse objetivo é complementado pela análise dos critérios e pressupostos filosóficos, científicos, teológicos, morais e educacionais empregados por Whewell no estabelecimento de uma distinção entre o processo de descoberta científica e os métodos de justificação de teorias distinção entre, em termos atuais, os assim denominados contexto da descoberta e contexto da justificação. Atualmente, filósofos e historiadores da ciência vitoriana consideram o tratado Filosofia das ciências indutivas, fundadas em suas histórias (1840 e 1847), de Whewell, como a primeira sistematização histórico-filosófica da ciência. Assim sendo, nada mais apropriado do que tomar em consideração a biografia intelectual desse autor (pouco conhecido do público brasileiro) para entender os passos de sua pr odução, bem como os seus propósitos, compromissos e algumas peculiaridades de sua personalidade. A importância deste trabalho é justificada não somente pela compreensão que proporciona a respeito da emergência da filosofia da ciência como ramo de investigação, disciplina especializada e discurso legitimador, mas também pelo tipo de abordagem que utiliza, a qual procura articular as motivações intelectuais e morais do autor com as suas circunstâncias culturais e institucionais. / This dissertation is a study in the history of the philosophy of science. The main objective is to analyze and understand the formation of the philosophy of science regarding the presentation of the intellectual production of the mathematician and polymath William Whewell (1794-1866), and concerning some of the features of his biography and his historical context. The objective of this work is complemented by an analysis of the philosophical, scientific, theological, moral and educational criteria and assumptions used by Whewell to establish a distinction between the process of scientific discovery and the methods of justification of theories (in current terms, the distinction between thus called context of discovery and context of justification). Nowadays philosophers and historian of Victorian science consider Whewells books History of the Inductive Science s, from the earliest to the present time (1st edition, 1837) and The Philosophy of the Inductive Science, founded upon their histories (1 st edition, 1840) as the first historical and philosophical systematization about the pure and empirical sciences. In this sense, it is important to investigate the intellectual biography of Whewell (usually unknown by the Brazilian academician and students) in order to better understand the steps of his production, as well as his purposes, commitments and some peculiarities of his personality. The importance of this work justifies itself not only because it provides a better understanding of the emer gence of the philosophy of science as a real field of investigation, as a specialized subject and as normative speech about the scientific thought and practice, but also for the kind of a pproach used in this work, which articulates most of Whewells intellectual, moral, cultura l and institutional motivations to his own historical and social circumstances.

Esta dissertação caracteriza-se como um estudo de história da filosofia da ciência. O objetivo central é analisar e compreender a construção da filosofia da ciência não apenas a partir das apresentações da produção intelectual do matemático e polímata inglês William Whewell (1794-1866), como também de alguns elementos de sua biografia e de seu contexto histórico. Esse objetivo é complementado pela análise dos critérios e pressupostos filosóficos, científicos, teológicos, morais e educacionais empregados por Whewell no estabelecimento de uma distinção entre o processo de descoberta científica e os métodos de justificação de teorias distinção entre, em termos atuais, os assim denominados contexto da descoberta e contexto da justificação. Atualmente, filósofos e historiadores da ciência vitoriana consideram o tratado Filosofia das ciências indutivas, fundadas em suas histórias (1840 e 1847), de Whewell, como a primeira sistematização histórico-filosófica da ciência. Assim sendo, nada mais apropriado do que tomar em consideração a biografia intelectual desse autor (pouco conhecido do público brasileiro) para entender os passos de sua pr odução, bem como os seus propósitos, compromissos e algumas peculiaridades de sua personalidade. A importância deste trabalho é justificada não somente pela compreensão que proporciona a respeito da emergência da filosofia da ciência como ramo de investigação, disciplina especializada e discurso legitimador, mas também pelo tipo de abordagem que utiliza, a qual procura articular as motivações intelectuais e morais do autor com as suas circunstâncias culturais e institucionais. / This dissertation is a study in the history of the philosophy of science. The main objective is to analyze and understand the formation of the philosophy of science regarding the presentation of the intellectual production of the mathematician and polymath William Whewell (1794-1866), and concerning some of the features of his biography and his historical context. The objective of this work is complemented by an analysis of the philosophical, scientific, theological, moral and educational criteria and assumptions used by Whewell to establish a distinction between the process of scientific discovery and the methods of justification of theories (in current terms, the distinction between thus called context of discovery and context of justification). Nowadays philosophers and historian of Victorian science consider Whewells books History of the Inductive Science s, from the earliest to the present time (1st edition, 1837) and The Philosophy of the Inductive Science, founded upon their histories (1 st edition, 1840) as the first historical and philosophical systematization about the pure and empirical sciences. In this sense, it is important to investigate the intellectual biography of Whewell (usually unknown by the Brazilian academician and students) in order to better understand the steps of his production, as well as his purposes, commitments and some peculiarities of his personality. The importance of this work justifies itself not only because it provides a better understanding of the emer gence of the philosophy of science as a real field of investigation, as a specialized subject and as normative speech about the scientific thought and practice, but also for the kind of a pproach used in this work, which articulates most of Whewells intellectual, moral, cultura l and institutional motivations to his own historical and social circumstances.

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