Physicalism as universally construed is the thesis that everything in the world is either physical or a consequence of physical facts. Certain consequences of physicalism for free will, religion, and so on make it unpalatable to some. Physicalism should not be dismissed merely on its unpalatability. Nonetheless, we should be very sure it is true before accepting it uncritically (as much of science and philosophy now do). Physicalism is a contingent thesis, taken as true on the basis of strong inductive evidence and an inference-to-the-best-explanation that specifies it as the best theory over any of its competitors to provide an ontological account of the universe. So long as there is no contrary evidence to the claims of physicalism, then it stands relatively uncontested. I argue that there is a body of well-attested empirical evidence that falsifies universally-construed physicalism by violating an essential assumption of the theory – causal closure of the physical domain. I present a detailed account of this closure-violating evidence. So that those who are unfamiliar with the body of evidence on offer may judge its validity, I include brief summations of experimental designs, findings, and analyses, plus some controversies pertaining to the data and their resolutions. I then argue why this body of empirical evidence should count against universal physicalism, argue for the evidence’s scientific legitimacy, and discuss criticisms which have been lodged against it, then explain why these criticisms lack force. I conclude that the evidence I present is sufficient to falsify the universal construal of physicalism as supported by today’s and by foreseeable future understandings of the physical world. I acknowledge, though, that nothing can be guaranteed against an indefinite “wait-and-see” argument for some implausible “fully-realized” physics that may be able to reconcile the evidence I propose with such a fully-completed formulation of physicalism. I suggest that if this is the best physicalists can come up with, then their position is weak and the inference-to-the-best-explanation that until now supported universal physicalism should be turned around to tell against the theory. / text

Are health inequalities unjust, and if so, how should we measure and evaluate them? This thesis explores the central moral debates that underlie these sorts of questions about health inequalities, and it argues in support of one particular framework for measuring health inequalities. I begin by shedding light on the questions that need to be asked when attempting to determine which types of health inequalities are unjust. After explaining the complexities of several possible views of health inequity, I use these perspectives to inform my discussion of the debate about whether we ought to measure health inequalities in terms of individuals or groups. I evaluate the key tensions between these two opposing points of view. I then introduce a third possible view, which is Yukiko Asada’s idea that both individual and group-based measures of health inequality leave out important moral information, so it is therefore necessary to include both in order to get a full picture of a population’s health inequality. Next, I respond to objections that the proponents of using either a group or individual measurement of inequality on its own might make to the claim that neither measure is sufficient on its own. Finally, I propose some small changes to Asada’s measurement framework, which I believe will demonstrate why those opposed to her view actually ought to embrace it. I conclude that this approach is a promising solution to some of the difficulties defining health inequities that I have called attention to.

The role of the Anthropic Principle in astrophysics and cosmology is examined in two principal parts. The first (minor) part takes a chiefly philosophical perspective and examines the manner in which human cognition features into discussions on cosmic origins. It is shown that the philosophical questions raised by the Anthropic Principle and ‘fine-tuning of life’ bear resemblances to problems within the philosophy of mind and we seek a common origin for this surprising parallel. A form of ‘epistemic structural realism’ is defended and used to critique the physicalist identity thesis. It is argued that equating ‘reality’ with mathematical structures, which is the basis of the identity thesis, leads to incoherent conclusions. Similar reasoning is used to critique infinite Multiverse theories. In the second (major) part, we gradually transition into mainstream astrophysics, first presenting a new line of research to explore counterfactual universes using semi-analytic models (SAMs) and offering a preliminary study wherein the cosmological constant is varied and the effects on ‘advanced civilisations’ are examined. The importance of galaxy mergers is highlighted and leads to their study. We first try solving the pattern-recognition problem of locating mergers using the Galaxy Zoo database and produce the largest homogenous merger catalogue to date. We examine their properties and compare them with the SAMs of the Millennium Simulation finding good general agreement. We develop the Galaxy Zoo approach with a new visual-interface design and double the size of the merger catalogue of SDSS mergers in the local Universe.

Bayesian epistemology provides a promising framework for a theory of epistemic rationality. But the way in which this framework has been built upon thus far yields an unfortunately mechanical picture of rationality, on which rational agents are mere data crunchers who receive evidential input and spit out numeric credal output. This picture is rightly criticized, most prominently by Bas van Fraassen, for being too narrow and restrictive and thus failing to account for certain features which rationality plausibly has, such as a degree of permissiveness, and for certain unconventional rational phenomena, such as conversions. Unfortunately, van Fraassen’s apt criticism of mechanistic rationality overshoots its mark in seeking to topple the entire Bayesian framework. Bayesian epistemology suffers a guilt by association with the robotic picture. This dissertation aims to restore Bayesianism from the mechanistic but often implicit assumptions which corrode it, and to rebuild, from the Bayesian foundation, an alternative picture of rationality as a property of sentient agents who are capable of understanding and mentally engaging with the objects of their credences. Along the way I account for some basic Bayesian objects such as credence and evidential input. I also accord a central role to the ability of representational experiences, largely sidelined in many Bayesian discussions, to give rise to surprising evidence. On these building blocks I develop theory of rationality, Expansive Bayesianism, which evades the criticisms launched at the robotic picture and shows that Bayesianism itself is a fruitful and powerful framework for a theory of rationality.

In the wake of the 2001 anthrax attacks in the US, States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention started to discuss the potential malign application of biological research and technology. This thesis examines how this issue of dual-use has been developed, discussed, and how solutions have been proposed. In order to do so, the thesis follows a neopragmatist approach. As a neopragmatist methodology is largely underdeveloped, the thesis explores some of the key aspects of neopragmatism, specifically its openness to various methods and theories, by directly applying it to the topic. As a result of this approach, the thesis starts with exploratory empirical research, which follows Bruno Latour’s Actor Network Theory. This research reviews how the problem of dual-use has been discussed in three communities: politics and security, ethics, and science. One of the results is that dual-use has primarily been discussed in the security community while the other two were only marginally involved. The proposed solution to the problem by the security community is to place the burden of responsibility on the scientific community. The second part of the thesis then uses theory, Niklas Luhmann’s social systems theory and Martin Heidegger’s work on questioning technology, to critically challenge this solution developed in the security community. The thesis concludes by identifying approaches to help deal with the dual-use issue. It also examines how the adoption of a neopragmatist methodology has influenced and guided the thesis.

Modern psychiatry in the United States emerged at the same time as debate about slavery intensified and dominated public discourse, contributing to dramatic denominational schisms and to the greater visibility of women in the public sphere. as the only institution to accept slaves and free blacks as patients, and to employ slaves as attendants, The Eastern Lunatic Asylum of Williamsburg, Virginia, offers unique insights into the ways in which gender, race and religion transformed psychiatry from an obscure enterprise in the early nineteenth century to a medical specialty with wide-reaching cultural authority by the twentieth century.;Utilizing a variety of sources, including a collection of un-catalogued and largely unexamined papers, this dissertation employs interdisciplinary methods to explore the meaning of interracial medical encounters, and the role of the asylum in promoting rational religion and normalizing domestic violence.;The dissertation begins by examining the life and writings of asylum Superintendent John M. Galt, whose experience at the head of an interracial institution led him to reject proposals for separate institutions for whites and blacks and to promote the cottage system of outpatient care. The following chapter addresses the labor of enslaved attendants, without whom the asylum could not have functioned and for whom moral rectitude and spiritual equality appear to have been the ethical foundation of care-giving. Discussion of ethics and spirituality, in turn, prompts consideration of the role of religion in asylum care. The association of enthusiastic religion with slaves and with abolitionism contributed to the regulation of religious expression as a common feature of asylum medicine. Religious evangelism was viewed by hospital administrators as a symptom of insanity, while religious rationalism was enshrined as normative and, paradoxically, as secular.;Asylum medicine also normalized domestic violence by treating the social problem of violence, from wife beating to the rape of slave women, as the medical pathology of individuals. In so doing, the asylum undermined the religious authority from which many women derived comfort, meaning and purpose; and overemphasized the role of female sexual and reproductive organs as an alleged cause of insanity. Ultimately, the struggle over efforts to contain interracial alliances, women's autonomy and enthusiastic religious expression coalesced in the state's promotion of eugenics in the early twentieth century.

Orientador: Marcelo Carbone Carneiro / Banca: Regina André Rebollo / Banca: Ana Maria de Andrade Caldeira / Resumo: Muitas das vezes, o Ensino de Ciências e Biologia não apresenta os determinantes e contextos que estão envolvidos na construção de um conceito, mostrando-o de modo dogmático e memorístico. A perpetuação deste modelo deve-se, principalmente, ao processo de formação dos atuais professores, e a forma como o conteúdo presente no material didático utilizado por estes é apresentado. Visto que os conceitos são construídos de forma lenta, gradual, com avanços e recuos, pois expressam as tentativas de argumentação elaboradas ao longo da história; os fatores no Ensino de Ciências e Biologia acima citados tornam-se obstáculos para a inserção da História da Ciência no Ensino de Ciências e Biologia. O processo de construção dos conceitos sobre circulação sanguínea não expressa tentativa de entendimento do movimento do sangue no corpo humano. Além disso, o levantamento e pesquisa bibliográfica que realizamos caracteriza de forma exemplar, a construção de uma explicação científica e a influência do contexto social e religioso na produção de um conhecimento científico e, também, a resistência às mudanças por parte principalmente de indivíduos respeitados da época, evidenciam os percalços pelos quais a ciência passa. Enfrentamos diversas dificuldades ao realizar esse levantamento e pesquisa bibliográfica. Entre algumas, podemos citar a dificuldade de acesso às fontes primárias, barreiras lingüísticas e problemas na interpretação dos determinantes históricos. Essas barreiras são também enfrentadas por autores de livros didáticos e professores que desejam inserir a História da Ciência, respectivamente, no material didático e na prática docente. Assim, esse trabalho tem por objetivo produzir um texto didático para o ensino, apontando o dinamismo e a não neutralidade da ciência e, com isso... (Resumo completo, clicar acesso eletrônico abaixo) / Abstract: Frequently, Science and Biology teaching does not present the determinants and contexts involved in the building of a concept, showing it so dogmatic and rote. The perpetuation of such a model is due, mainly, to the process of training of current teachers, and how the content in the teaching material used by them is presented. Since the concepts are built on a slow, gradual, with advances and setbacks, because attempts to express the arguments made throughout history, factors in the Teaching of Science and Biology mentioned above become obstacles to the insertion of the History of Science in the Teaching of Science and Biology. The process of concepts construction expressed on blood circulation does not attempt to understanding the movement of blood in the human body. Moreover, the lifting and literature search conducted in this study features in an exemplary fashion, the construction of a scientific explanation and the influence of social and religious context in the production of scientific knowledge and also the resistance to change, mainly from respected individuals of the time , highlighting the mishaps faced by science. Various difficulties were faced to achieve this survey and literature search. Among some, we can cite the difficulty of access to primary sources, language barriers and problems in the interpretation of historical determinants. These barriers are also faced by authors of textbooks and teachers who wish to enter the History of Science, respectively, in the educational materials and teaching practice. Thus, this work aims to produce a teaching text for teaching, indicating the dynamism and non-neutrality of science and thereby, helping to minimize some of the difficulties found in integrating the History of Science in Science and Biology teaching. / Mestre

Esta dissertação de mestrado propõe analisar a seguinte questão: saber em que medida o habitus mostra ser um conceito relevante para as principais teorias sobre o conhecimento científico e tentar detectar quais são os fatores prováveis de sua omissão nas pesquisas em filosofia da ciência. No intuito de estudar a concepção de habitus científico e seus desdobramentos na história da filosofia, selecionei cinco pensadores consagrados que tratam do tema: Inicio com Aristóteles e sua teoria da hexis demonstrativa, passo ao estudo da negação do habitus científico na filosofia de Descartes; estudo a seguir, a posição de Hume que atribuía ao hábito à possibilidade de justificação do conhecimento científico; passo então pelas críticas de Kant à teoria humeana do hábito e, por fim, analiso as teorias contemporâneas sobre o conceito de habitus na sociologia da ciência de Pierre Bourdieu. / This master dissertation proposes to analyzes the following question: In what measure the concept of habitus is relevant the main theories of scientific knowledge and try to detect which are probable factors involved in its omission from philosophy of science´s researches. In order to study the conception of scientific habitus and its developments in the history of philosophy, I selected five philosophers which treat: I begin with Aristotle and its theorie of demonstrative hexis; I pass to the study of Descartes denial of a scientific habitus; I study Hume position, that attributed to habitus the possibility of justifying scientific knowledge; I pass through Kant´s critiques Hume´s of habit and finally I analyse the contemporary theories about the concept of habitus in Pierre Bourdieu\'s sociology of science.

A princípio, esta investigação versa sobre as teorias empiristas contemporâneas a partir do programa empirista estabelecido pelo filósofo da ciência Bas van Fraassen, a partir da década de 1980. Assim, o nosso problema de pesquisa parte do referido autor, em seus pontos fortes e fracos, para realizarmos um diálogo com concepções empiristas atualmente em desenvolvimento: o empirismo contextual crítico de Helen Longino e empirismo social de Miriam Solomon. Depois, traçamos um panorama da discussão entre filósofos e sociólogos da ciência, abrangendo o empirismo lógico e as várias propostas dentro da sociologia da ciência: o funcionalismo de Robert K. Merton, o Programa Forte, e as teorias microssociológicas de Karin Knorr-Cetina e Bruno Latour. Tal painel possibilita uma visão mais ampla dos fundamentos teóricos tanto do programa empirista de van Fraassen como das teorias empiristas de Longino e de Solomon. No mais, o exame da sociologia da ciência foi de grande valia pelos argumentos arregimentados em favor do caráter social do conhecimento: ponto este que é crucial na nossa defesa empirista. Em seguida, examinamos criticamente o projeto empirista de van Fraassen, para podermos cotejá-lo com as novas teorias empiristas de Longino e de Solomon, as quais também são analisadas nos seus pormenores. Então, com base nas questões específicas do empirismo de van Fraassen, verificamos de que forma as mencionadas teorias empiristas contribuem, ou até resolvem flancos teóricos do filósofo em tela. Por fim, elaboramos uma proposta empirista que tentou reunir de modo harmonioso e competente as teses mais importantes dos/as autores/as em questão, visando a construção de uma teoria da ciência empirista aplicada às ciências sociais, no caso, à teoria social atual. / Initially, this research deals with contemporary empiricist theories since the program established by the philosopher of science Bas van Fraassen, from the 1980s: constructive empiricism, empiricism as stance and structural empiricism. Thus, our research problem grounds on the author\'s strengths and weaknesses, to engage in a dialogue with empiricist conceptions currently under development: Helen Longino\'s critical contextual empiricism and Miriam Solomon\'s social empiricism. Then we draw an overview of the discussion between philosophers and sociologists of science, encompassing logical empiricism and the various proposals within the sociology of science: Robert K. Merton\'s functionalism, the Strong Program, and the micro-sociological theories of Karin Knorr-Cetina and Bruno Latour. Such a panel provides a broader view of the theoretical foundations of both the empiricist program of van Fraassen and the empiricist theories of Longino and Solomon. In addition, the examination of the sociology of science was of great value for the arguments put forward in favor of the social character of knowledge: this is a crucial point in our empiricist defense. Next, we critically examine van Fraassen\'s empiricist project so that we can compare it with the new empiricist theories of Longino and Solomon, which we analyze in detail. Then, based on the specific questions of van Fraassen\'s empiricism, we see how the aforementioned empiricist theories contribute, or even resolve the theoretical shortcomings in his views. Finally, we elaborated an empiricist proposal that tried to gather in a harmonious and competent way the most important theses of these philosophers, aiming at the construction of a theory of science applied to the social sciences, in this case, to the current social theory.

Chamamos caixa preta um conceito ou instrumento cujos detalhes de funcionamento e debates históricos (a seu respeito) são abandonados quando do seu uso. Um computador é um exemplo de objeto que é usado, em geral, sem que haja preocupação ou conhecimento com relação às nuances de seu funcionamento. O fato, já bem aceito, de que a fórmula química da água é H2O é outro exemplo de caixa preta, na medida em que alguém que afirma isso não precisa se preocupar em citar fontes ou remeter a discussões sobre a história da Química. Trabalhamos com a hipótese de que a ciência tornou-se, por si mesma, uma caixa preta. A forma como se evoca a autoridade do conhecimento científico nos meios de divulgação, em livros, diálogos e anúncios comerciais (onde frequentemente figuram fórmulas como \"eficácia cientificamente comprovada\") atesta um cenário atual onde a natureza da ciência e, em particular, a \"comprovação\" científica revelam algo que, estando carregado de poder, vem sendo veiculado, mesmo por cientistas, de maneira ingênua - sem passar por uma elaboração maior ou ignorando-se toda a complexa discussão, sobre esse assunto, presente na filosofia da ciência. Em nosso ensaio, discutiremos essa problemática, explorando uma releitura do conceito de caixa preta de Bruno Latour em termos de lógica, no qual o expandimos para representar hipóteses tácitas presentes em uma teoria; apresentamos um quadro de discussões teóricas a respeito de questões da filosofia da ciência; analisamos criticamente alguns enunciados (de livros e revistas de divulgação científica) que invocam a autoridade da ciência e problematizamos assuntos da Física. Dessa forma, ilustramos a abertura de algumas caixas pretas tradicionalmente fechadas nos cursos médios e superiores de Física. A fim de expressar diferentes posturas epistemológicas com as quais se pode apropriar de um tema científico, propusemos uma classificação de exercícios epistemológicos em três tipos: o científico (o trabalho do cientista normal), o crítico (o trabalho do cientista complementar, do historiador ou do epistemólogo) e o cético (o discurso de dúvida sobre a validade da ciência). Nossa tarefa residirá na postura do exercício crítico, uma vez que buscaremos transpor algumas caixas tradicionalmente fechadas. / A black box is a concept or a instrument whose details of operation and details the historical debates are abandoned when their use. A computer is an example of object that is used, in general, without concern or knowledge about the nuances of its operation. The fact, already well accepted, that the chemical formula for water is H2O, is another example of black box, as someone who says that does not have to worry about citing sources or refer to discussions about the history of chemistry. We hypothesized that science has become, in itself, a black box. The way it evokes the authority of scientific knowledge in media, in books, conversations and commercials (which often include formulas such as \"scientifically proven efficacy\") attests to a current scenario where the nature of science and, in particular, \" proven \"scientific reveal something that, being full of power, has been conveyed, even by scientists, naively - without going through a development more or ignoring all the complex discussion on this subject, present in the philosophy of science. In our test, we will propose to discuss this issue, and to this end, we explore the concept of black box by Bruno Latour - a concept that can be classified as the sociology of science - and proposed a reinterpretation of this concept in terms logic, which expanded to represent the unspoken assumptions present in a theory, we present a theoretical framework for discussions on issues of philosophy of science, critically examine some statements (of books and science magazines) that invoke the authority of science and discuss some problems that can be found in matters of physics. Thus, we illustrate the opening of some traditionally closed black boxes in the middle and upper courses of physics. In order to express different epistemological stances with which they can appropriate a scientific topic, we proposed a classification of types of epistemological exercises into three types (we will explain in detail in the body of the dissertation): the scientific (the normal work of the scientist) the critic (the complementary work of the scientist, historian or epistemologist) and skeptical (the discourse of doubt on the validity of science). Our task will reside in the posture of the critical exercise, since attempts to transfer some boxes traditionally closed.