In this paper I explore the philosophical implications of decision theory and deliberation on ethics, paying special attention to how vicious individuals yearn for a separate philosophical account. Drawing largely on Fricker, McDowell, Paul, and Nussbaum I discuss how transformative experiences open a window for understanding moral development in terms of habituation in the Aristotelian sense, and further how the vicious individual’s failure to deliberate may be remedied via a transformation through art.

Mathematik spielt im Physikunterricht eine nicht unerhebliche Rolle - wenn auch eine zwiespältige. Oft wird sie sogar zum Hindernis beim Lernen von Physik und kann ihr emanzipatorisches Potenzial nicht entfalten. Die vorliegende Arbeit stellt zwei Bausteine für eine begründete Konzeption zum Umgang mit Mathematik beim Lernen von Physik zur Verfügung. Im Theorieteil der Arbeit werden zum Einen wissenschaftstheoretische Aspekte der Rolle der Mathematik in der Physik aufgearbeitet und der physikdidaktischen Forschungsgemeinschaft im Zusammenhang zugänglich gemacht. Zum anderen werden Forschungsergebnisse zu Vorstellungen Lernender über Physik und Mathematik sowie im Bereich der Epistemologie zusammengestellt. Im empirischen Teil der Arbeit werden Vorstellungen zur Rolle der Mathematik in der Physik von Schülerinnen und Schülern der Klassenstufen 10 und 12 sowie Physik-Lehramtstudierenden im Grundstudium mit Hilfe eines Fragebogens erhoben und unter Verwendung inhaltsanalytischer bzw. statistischer Methoden ausgewertet. Die Ergebnisse zeigen unter Anderem, dass Mathematik im Physikunterricht entgegen gängiger Meinungen bei den Lernenden nicht negativ, aber zumindest bei jüngeren Lernenden formal und algorithmisch konnotiert ist. / Mathematics plays an important, but ambivalent role in the physics classroom. Often mathematics becomes an obstacle in learning physics and cannot reveal its emancipatory potential. This thesis provides two components of a well-grounded conception for handling mathematics in the learning of physics. In the theoretical part of the thesis epistemological aspects of the role of mathematics in physics are being processed and made accessible to the community of physics education researchers. At the same time, research data on learners’ epistemological beliefs about physics and mathematics are compiled. In the empirical part of the thesis a questionnaire was designed to collect data on beliefs about the role of mathematics in physics from pupils of grade 10 and 12 as well as undergraduate physics teacher students. Content-analytical and statistical methods have been applied in the processing of the questionnaires. The results revealed, among others, that mathematics in the physics classroom is not, against common belief, evaluated negatively by learners. Yet, at least younger learners perceive the use of mathematics in physics to be mainly formal and algorithmic.

Die vorliegende Arbeit versammelt zwei einleitende Kapitel und zehn Essays, die sich als kritisch-konstruktive Beiträge zu einem "erlebenden Verstehen" (Buck) von Physik lesen lassen. Die traditionelle Anlage von Schulphysik zielt auf eine systematische Darstellung naturwissenschaftlichen Wissens, das dann an ausgewählten Beispielen angewendet wird: Schulexperimente beweisen die Aussagen der Systematik (oder machen sie wenigstens plausibel), ausgewählte Phänomene werden erklärt. In einem solchen Rahmen besteht jedoch leicht die Gefahr, den Bezug zur Lebenswirklichkeit oder den Interessen der Schüler zu verlieren. Diese Problematik ist seit mindestens 90 Jahren bekannt, didaktische Antworten - untersuchendes Lernen, Kontextualisierung, Schülerexperimente etc. - adressieren allerdings eher Symptome als Ursachen. Naturwissenschaft wird dadurch spannend, dass sie ein spezifisch investigatives Weltverhältnis stiftet: man müsste gleichsam nicht Wissen, sondern "Fragen lernen" (und natürlich auch, wie Antworten gefunden werden...). Doch wie kann dergleichen auf dem Niveau von Schulphysik aussehen, was für einen theoretischen Rahmen kann es hier geben? In den gesammelten Arbeiten wird einigen dieser Spuren nachgegangen: Der Absage an das zu modellhafte Denken in der phänomenologischen Optik, der Abgrenzung formal-mathematischen Denkens gegen wirklichkeitsnähere Formen naturwissenschaftlicher Denkbewegungen und Evidenz, dem Potential alternativer Interpretationen von "Physikunterricht", der Frage nach dem "Verstehen" u.a. Dabei werden nicht nur Bezüge zum modernen bildungstheoretischen Paradigma der Kompetenz sichtbar, sondern es wird auch versucht, eine ganze Reihe konkrete (schul-)physikalische Beispiele dafür zu geben, was passiert, wenn nicht schon gewusste Antworten Thema werden, sondern Expeditionen, die sich der physischen Welt widmen: Die Schlüsselbegriffe des Fachs, die Methoden der Datenerhebung und Interpretation, die Such- und Denkbewegungen kommen dabei auf eine Weise zur Sprache, die sich nicht auf die Fachsystematik abstützen möchte, sondern diese motivieren, konturieren und verständlich machen will. / This book is a collection of two introductory chapters and ten essays that address questions concerning "experiential learning" in physics. Traditionally, physics education has been trying to convey a systematic picture of salient scientific knowledge, which would then be applied to selected experiments and phenomena. However, within such a framework, students' real life experiences and interests can hardly be related to. This problem is well known, but typical solutions within science education address merely the methods and conditions of learning, thereby treating symptoms and missing the underlying problem. For our discussion we have chosen a different point of departure: The fascination of science arises from its investigative nature, which allows us to relate to our world in novel ways. Accordingly, we should teach how to inquire nature, rather than giving canonical answers. What would be the practical consequences of such an approach, and what would the theoretical framework look like? These collected essays investigate a number of approaches toward this issue: phenomenological optics and its rejection of kinematic pictures, the distinction between mathematical reasoning and scientific evidence, the potential of non-conventional interpretations of science teaching, the meaning of "understanding" etc. This discussion merges into the current discourse about competence, while illustrating a kind of physics teaching that encourages "expeditions" into the realm of physics. Here, the key concepts, methods of investigation, and ways of reasoning are not simply based on the established edifice of physics, but rather serve to motivate, clarify, and elucidate its structures and practices.

Arguments from underdetermination take two forms, those from global sceptical underdetermination, global scientific underdetermination and local underdetermination. Arguments from global sceptical underdetermination bring into question all knowledge, they develop sceptical scenarios that purport to show that we cannot trust any knowledge that we obtain within the world. Arguments from local underdetermination aim to bring into question the nature of our knowledge and are geared against scientific realism. This thesis is an evaluation of the arguments that claim to do the latter, however it shows that these arguments are not arguments from local underdetermination but are from a type of global underdetermination that I call global scientific underdetermination. Based on this evaluation a new argument from local underdetermination is developed that attempts to show that nevertheless local underdetermination is indeed a problem for scientific realism. However, I argue that this argument also fails to undermine scientific realism. Recently Kyle Stanford has reintroduced an historical argument from underdetermination that he calls the argument from unconceived alternatives. Stanfords argument from unconceived alternatives is an inductive historical argument. It maintains that scientific theories are chosen from a non-exhaustive set of theories; claiming there is always at least one unconceived alternative that would better explain the empirical evidence. Stanfords new induction attempts to undermine scientific realism by arguing that our most successful theories will eventually be shown to be false. Various arguments against this induction will be considered. It will be shown that traditional scientific realism fails to address the argument from unconceived alternatives and the only form of scientific realism that can overcome this problem is structural realism.

We rely on science and other organized forms of inquiry to answer cardinal questions on issues varying from global warming and public health to the political economy. In my thesis, which is in the intersection of philosophy of science, social epistemology, and science and technology studies, I develop a social theory of knowledge that can help us tell when our beliefs and theories on such matters amount to knowledge, as opposed to mere opinion, speculation, or educated guess. The first two chapters discuss relevant shortcomings of mainstream analytic epistemology and the sociology of knowledge, respectively. Mainstream epistemology regards individuals, rather than communities, as the ‎bearers of knowledge or justified belief. In Chapter 1, I argue that typically, only an epistemic community can collectively possess sufficient justification required for knowledge. In Chapter 2, I present a case study in computer science that militates against the sociological understating of knowledge as mere interest-based agreement. I argue that social interests alone cannot explain the unfolding of the events in this case. Rather, we must assume that knowledge is irreducible to social dynamics and interests. In Chapter 3, I begin my positive analysis of the social conditions for knowledge. I explore the question of when a consensus is knowledge based. I argue that a consensus is knowledge based when knowledge is the best explanation of the consensus. I identify three conditions – social diversity, apparent consilience of evidence, and meta agreement, for knowledge being the best explanation of a consensus. In Chapter 4, I illustrate my argument by analyzing the recent controversy about the safety of the drug Bendectin. I argue that the consensus in this case was not knowledge based, and hence the deference to consensus to resolve this dispute was unjustified. In chapter 5, I develop a new theory of the logical relations between evidence and social values. I identify three roles social values play in evidential reasoning and justification: They influence the trust we extend to testimony, the threshold values we require for accepting evidence, and the process of combining different sorts of evidence.

Parsimony, sometime referred to as simplicity, is an effective criterion of theory choice in the case of Quantum Mechanics. The Copenhagen and Bohmian interpretations are rival theories, with the Bohmian interpretation being more parsimonious. More parsimonious theories have a higher probability of being true than less parsimonious rivals. The Bohmian interpretation should thus be preferred on these grounds.

We rely on science and other organized forms of inquiry to answer cardinal questions on issues varying from global warming and public health to the political economy. In my thesis, which is in the intersection of philosophy of science, social epistemology, and science and technology studies, I develop a social theory of knowledge that can help us tell when our beliefs and theories on such matters amount to knowledge, as opposed to mere opinion, speculation, or educated guess. The first two chapters discuss relevant shortcomings of mainstream analytic epistemology and the sociology of knowledge, respectively. Mainstream epistemology regards individuals, rather than communities, as the ‎bearers of knowledge or justified belief. In Chapter 1, I argue that typically, only an epistemic community can collectively possess sufficient justification required for knowledge. In Chapter 2, I present a case study in computer science that militates against the sociological understating of knowledge as mere interest-based agreement. I argue that social interests alone cannot explain the unfolding of the events in this case. Rather, we must assume that knowledge is irreducible to social dynamics and interests. In Chapter 3, I begin my positive analysis of the social conditions for knowledge. I explore the question of when a consensus is knowledge based. I argue that a consensus is knowledge based when knowledge is the best explanation of the consensus. I identify three conditions – social diversity, apparent consilience of evidence, and meta agreement, for knowledge being the best explanation of a consensus. In Chapter 4, I illustrate my argument by analyzing the recent controversy about the safety of the drug Bendectin. I argue that the consensus in this case was not knowledge based, and hence the deference to consensus to resolve this dispute was unjustified. In chapter 5, I develop a new theory of the logical relations between evidence and social values. I identify three roles social values play in evidential reasoning and justification: They influence the trust we extend to testimony, the threshold values we require for accepting evidence, and the process of combining different sorts of evidence.

Axiomatic quantum field theory is one approach to the project of merging the special theory of relativity with that of ordinary quantum mechanics. The project begins with the postulation of a set of axioms. Axioms should be motivated by reasonable physical principles in a way that illustrates how a given axiom is true. Motivations are often grounded in the principles of the parent theories: ordinary quantum mechanics or the theory of special relativity. Amongst the set of axioms first proposed by Haag and Kastler in 1963 is the axiom of microcausality. Microcausality requires the observables of regions at space-like separation to commute. This thesis seeks to answer the question ‘What principles from the special theory of relativity or ordinary quantum mechanics motivate, or justify, accepting microcausality as an axiom?’ The first chapter will provide the necessary background to investigate this question and the second chapter will undertake that investigation. In conclusion, microcausality cannot be well-motivated by individual principles rooted in the special theory of relativity or ordinary quantum mechanics.

Arguments from underdetermination take two forms, those from global sceptical underdetermination, global scientific underdetermination and local underdetermination. Arguments from global sceptical underdetermination bring into question all knowledge, they develop sceptical scenarios that purport to show that we cannot trust any knowledge that we obtain within the world. Arguments from local underdetermination aim to bring into question the nature of our knowledge and are geared against scientific realism. This thesis is an evaluation of the arguments that claim to do the latter, however it shows that these arguments are not arguments from local underdetermination but are from a type of global underdetermination that I call global scientific underdetermination. Based on this evaluation a new argument from local underdetermination is developed that attempts to show that nevertheless local underdetermination is indeed a problem for scientific realism. However, I argue that this argument also fails to undermine scientific realism. Recently Kyle Stanford has reintroduced an historical argument from underdetermination that he calls the argument from unconceived alternatives. Stanfords argument from unconceived alternatives is an inductive historical argument. It maintains that scientific theories are chosen from a non-exhaustive set of theories; claiming there is always at least one unconceived alternative that would better explain the empirical evidence. Stanfords new induction attempts to undermine scientific realism by arguing that our most successful theories will eventually be shown to be false. Various arguments against this induction will be considered. It will be shown that traditional scientific realism fails to address the argument from unconceived alternatives and the only form of scientific realism that can overcome this problem is structural realism.

<p>I argue that ethical convictions are crucial to the maintenance and transformation of social institutions. Moreover, since ethical convictions are sometimes corrigible and open to persuasive transformation, ethical persuasion can be a powerful source of social change. However, I observe that the dominant analytic techniques of the social sciences are ill equipped to understand the nature and import of ethical convictions, and even less well equipped to inform ethical persuasion. I argue this, in part, explains why social science research has often proved of little value in trying to address prominent social concerns.</p><p>This diagnosis raises a puzzle and a challenge. The puzzle is why some social scientists would wholly commit themselves to methods that cannot adequately deal with important dimensions of social structure. I show this is due to a misguided conception of science, one which seeks an "absolute perspective" that requires reducing or explaining away ethical convictions.</p><p>The challenge, once this vision of science is rejected in favor of a more pragmatic one, is 1) to understand the systematic limits of different methodological approaches and 2) to see how an account of ethics, rightly understood, can complement social scientific knowledge in service of better social outcomes. </p><p>I evaluate three dominant methodological approaches in the social sciences, namely, statistical modeling, formal modeling, and biological-behavioral research. Although all are useful within certain domains, I show that each has systematic limits relating to the dynamism of ethical convictions. I demonstrate how these methods can fail on their own terms and can blind researchers to important resources for social change, such as possibilities for persuasion.</p><p></p><p>Finally, I develop an account of the relationship between ethics, rationality, and persuasion drawing on the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Charles Taylor. This account rejects prominent "scientific" attempts to explain ethical allegiances as biologically hardwired or structurally determined, and it further challenges accounts of ethical naturalism and pluralistic neutrality. </p><p>I conclude by illustrating the constructive role that ethical persuasion has played in a number of development projects, which help demonstrate my thesis that debates about visions of "the good" matter profoundly for human flourishing.</p> / Dissertation