O presente trabalho investiga o conceito de Natureza sob uma perspectiva filosófica e de suas relações com o ensino de ciências. Embora seja um termo de uso corriqueiro, nas aulas de ciências, \"Natureza\" é um conceito de difícil definição e que, não raramente, comporta ambiguidades. As chamadas \"ciências da Natureza\" podem ser entendidas como forma de conhecimento sobre a Natureza. Assim, o entendimento que se faz do mundo natural é central para a compreensão do que vem a ser a própria ciência. Numa sala de aula de ciências, alunos e professores trazem suas visões de mundo, que podem ou não ser divergentes. Por um lado, a divergência nos entendimentos sobre a Natureza podem gerar dificuldades na compreensão da ciência por parte dos alunos. Por outro lado, o ensino da visão de mundo científica tende a excluir (intencionalmente ou não) as outras visões que os alunos possam trazer para a sala de aula, na medida em que são consideradas não válidas ou não legítimas pela ciência. Partindo dessa problemática, o presente estudo relata uma investigação das diferentes concepções de Natureza na história da filosofia, do século XVII até o presente, apontando como o conceito se transformou ao longo do tempo. Paralelamente, foram entrevistados quatro estudantes de licenciatura em Ciências Biológicas, com o intuito de se conhecer suas concepções sobre a Natureza. As entrevistas seguiram metodologia adaptada de Cobern (2000), com o uso de palavras e frases que estimulavam os entrevistados a falarem extensamente sobre sua visão de Natureza. As entrevistas foram gravadas em áudio, transcritas e categorizadas. Foram elaborados mapas conceituais que, por sua vez, orientaram a elaboração de narrativas em primeira pessoa construídas com falas dos próprios entrevistados obtidas das transcrições. Observamos que, embora haja características comuns entre as visões dos entrevistados, há também divergências marcantes. Os resultados corroboram a ideia de que há uma multiplicidade de conceitos possíveis relativos à Natureza. Propomos que o ensino de ciências não tenha como objetivo meramente a incorporação de uma visão de mundo científica. Tal visão pressupõe um conceito de Natureza, e seus significados, que não são absolutos. O ensino de ciências deveria proporcionar, ao aluno, uma nova perspectiva de conhecer e de apre(e)nder o mundo em que vive. / This work investigates the concept of Nature in a philosophical perspective and it\'s relationships with the science education. Although it is a term of everyday use in science classes, \"Nature\" is a concept of difficult definition and, not rarely, entails ambiguities. The so-called \"natural sciences\" can be understood as a way of knowing Nature. Thus, the conceptions one holds about what is the natural world and it\'s characteristics are central to the comprehension of what is science itself. Science students and teachers bring their worldviews to class, which may or may not be divergent. On the one hand, the differences among views of Nature may cause some difficulties in students\' comprehension of scientific concepts. On the other hand, the teaching of the scientific worldview tends to exclude (intentionally or not) other views that students may bring to the classroom, once they are considered not valid or not legitimate by science. Based on this problem, this study reports an investigation of the different conceptions of Nature in the history of philosophy, from the seventeenth century to the present, pointing out how the concept has changed over time. Also, we interviewed four undergraduate students who were about to obtain their qualification as Biology teachers in order to know their views on Nature. The interviews followed methodology adapted from Cobern (2000), using words and phrases that encouraged respondents to talk at length about his or her vision of Nature. The interviews were audio-recorded, transcribed and categorized. Based on that, we elaborated conceptual maps that, in turn, guided the development of first-person narratives constructed with lines of those interviewed obtained from the transcripts. We observed that, although there are common traits among the views of respondents, there are also striking differences. The results support the idea that there is a multiplicity of possible concepts related to nature. We propose that science education does not merely aim for the incorporation of a scientific worldview. This view presupposes a concept of Nature, and their meanings, which are not absolute. Science education should provide to the student a new perspective of knowing and apprehend the world in which he lives.

Nesta pesquisa estudamos alguns episódios da história da cosmologia no século XX, buscando episódios interessantes que permitiram a discussão de certos aspectos da natureza da ciência de forma explícita na formação inicial de professores de ciências. Um dos objetivos desta pesquisa é fornecer subsídios para que se possa ensinar cosmologia com uma abordagem histórico-filosófica, o que é sugerido pelos PCN no tema estruturador \"Universo, Terra e Vida\". Esta proposta busca contribuir para a introdução de conteúdos de história e filosofia da ciência nos cursos de formação de professores e consequentemente na educação básica. O episódio histórico escolhido foi a controvérsia entre a teoria do Big Bang e a do Estado Estacionário, que ocorreu a partir da segunda metade do século XX. Tendo em vista a possibilidade de analisar as influências religiosas sobre essa controvérsia, argumentamos sobre a importância de se discutir a relação entre ciência e religião nas aulas de física, utilizando episódios da história da cosmologia como tema motivador. São apresentados três personagens históricos envolvidos nas controvérsias cosmológicas da década de 1950: o Papa Pio XII, Fred Hoyle e Georges Lemaître, que escreveram textos sobre relações entre cosmologia e religião. Após este estudo teórico, foi realizada a aplicação e avaliação de uma sequência didática durante a disciplina História da Ciência, do curso de Licenciatura em Ciências Exatas da Universidade de São Paulo, campus São Carlos. Nessa aplicação, investigamos a viabilidade do uso dos episódios históricos estudados como forma de discutir questões sobre a natureza da ciência, como a existência de um método científico e questão das \"provas\" na cosmologia. Além disso, foram realizados debates sobre estratégias para lidar com eventuais conflitos entre ciência e religião durante aulas de cosmologia, tendo como base a leitura de textos escritos por personagens da história da cosmologia. Os dados de pesquisa foram coletados utilizando instrumentos típicos de pesquisa qualitativa, como resposta a questionários, análise das atividades realizadas durante as aulas, e de textos produzidos pelos alunos. A partir da análise destes dados, consideramos que as atividades propostas mostram-se uma boa forma de discutir sobre a natureza da ciência, já que os alunos puderam não só aprender conteúdos de cosmologia, mas também refletir sobre diferenças e semelhanças entre a ciência e outras formas de ver o mundo. / In this research we studied some episodes in the history of cosmology in the twentieth century, seeking interesting episodes that allowed the discussion of certain aspects of nature of science explicitly in preservice teacher training. One objective of this research is to provide subsidies for teaching cosmology with a historical-philosophical approach, which is suggested by the PCN (National curricular parameters) in the theme \"Universe, Earth and Life.\" This proposal seeks to contribute to the introduction of contents of history and philosophy of science in teacher training courses and consequently in basic education. The episode chosen was the historical controversy between Big Bang and Steady State theory, which occurred during the second half of the twentieth century. Given the opportunity to consider religious influences on this controversy, we argue about the importance of discussing the relationship between science and religion in physics classes, using episodes in the history of cosmology as a motivating theme. We present three historical characters involved in the controversies of the cosmological decade 1950: Pope Pius XII, Fred Hoyle and Georges Lemaître, who wrote texts on relations between cosmology and religion. After this theoretical study was performed an implementation and evaluation of a didactic sequence during the course History of Science, the course \"Higher education in Sciences\", in the University of São Paulo, São Carlos campus. In this application, we investigate the feasibility of using the historical episodes studied as a way to discuss issues about the nature of science, as the existence of a scientific method and the question of the \"proof\" in cosmology. In addition, discussions have been undertaken on strategies for dealing with conflicts between science and religion classes for cosmology, based on the reading of texts written by characters in the history of cosmology. Survey data were collected using typical tools of qualitative research, in response to questionnaires, review of activities during lessons, and texts produced by students. From the analysis of these data, we consider that the proposed activities prove to be a good way to discuss the nature of science, since students could not only learn content of cosmology, but also reflect on differences and similarities between science and other ways of seeing the world.

Orientador: Isabel Maria Frederico Rodrigues Loureiro / Banca: Marcos Barbosa de Oliveira / Banca: Maria Eunice Quilici Gonzalez / Resumo: Este trabalho apresenta a contribuição de Hugh Lacey para a tradição analítica na filosofia da ciência no que tange ao processo racional de escolha entre teorias rivais de uma perspectiva que envolve os valores, e fornece as bases para uma nova forma de ciência voltada para a resolução dos problemas sociais. Para o autor, a ciência se desenvolve de acordo com "estratégias de restrição e seleção" cujo papel é restringir as teorias a serem consideradas e selecionar os dados empíricos relevantes para o teste de teorias. A partir daí, dentro de cada estratégia, a seleção de teorias se dá em função dos valores cognitivos, tais como adequação empírica, simplicidade, poder explicativo, etc., de maneira tal que não permite interpretações relativistas. Uma estratégia é adotada pela comunidade científica com base em valores morais e sociais e a sua função é sintetizar as possibilidades dos fenômenos a fim de atender às perspectivas de alguma estrutura de valor. Segundo Lacey, a ciência moderna adota uma única estratégia, a estratégia materialista, responsável pela produção de teorias que representam o mundo em termos de leis, estruturas e processos subjacentes, sem levar em conta os contextos social, cultural e ambiental, isto é, gerando teorias pretensamente neutras que informam práticas tecnológicas, aplicáveis em princípio a quaisquer estruturas de valor. Esse ideal de racionalidade concebe a ciência como um empreendimento livre de valores morais e sociais, sendo aceito pela tradição analítica na filosofia da ciência como uma forma universalmente válida de produção científica. Porém, para Lacey, a ciência moderna não está livre de valores, uma vez que a estratégia materialista mantém uma relação de reforço mútuo com a supervalorização do controle da natureza (um valor social), dando origem... (Resumo completo, clicar acesso eletrônico abaixo) / Abstract: This work presents Hugh Lacey's contribution to the analytical tradition in the philosophy of science as regards the process of rational choice between rival theories from a perspective which involves values, and provides the bases for a new form of science concerned with the solution of social problems. In the author's view, science develops according to "constraint and selection strategies", whose role is to constrain the theories to be considered and select the empirical data relevant for the testing of theories. Then, inside each strategy, the choice of theories is made according to cognitive values, such as empirical adequacy, simplicity, explanatory power, etc., in a way that prevents relativistic interpretations. A strategy is adopted by the scientific community on the basis of moral and social values, and its function is to synthesise the possibilities of phenomena to satisfy the perspectives of some value structure. According to Lacey, modern science adopts only one strategy, the materialist strategy, responsible for the production of theories which represent the world in terms of underlying laws, structures and processes, without regard to social, cultural and environmental contexts, that is, generating supposedly neutral theories which inform technological practices, applicable in principle to any value structure. This ideal of rationality conceives science as an enterprise free from moral and social values, being accepted by the analytical tradition in the philosophy of science as a universally valid form of scientific production. However, for Lacey, modern science is not value free, since the materialist strategy has a mutually reinforcing relationship with the overestimation of the control of nature (a social value), giving rise to theories which are successful in technological practices...(Complete abstract, access undermentioned electronic address) / Mestre

Orientador: Alberto Villani / Banca: Roberto Nardi / Banca: Elisabeth Barolli / Banca: Jorge Megid Neto / Banca: Sonia Maria Dion / Resumo: A institucionalização da pesquisa sobre Ensino de Ciências (EC) teve início no Brasil no final da década de 1960 e apenas recentemente, no ano 2000, foi reconhecida como área pela Capes. Durante esse tempo, tivemos a produção de vários trabalhos que buscaram analisar sua história, descrevendo os fatores determinantes de sua constituição e sustentação. Em nossa pesquisa resgatamos alguns desses trabalhos, focando o olhar sobre os aspectos subjetivos que contribuíram para seu desenvolvimento. Elegemos como referências os trabalhos de Nardi (2005) e Villani, Pacca e Freitas (2002), bem como alguns conceitos psicanalíticos desenvolvidos por René Kaes sobre a vida psíquica de grupos e instituições. Esses elementos permitiram interpretar os eventos que marcaram a história da área de EC, considerando que todo grupo se constitui, se organiza e evolui de acordo com a configuração que reveste o sistema de representação de seus membros, da tarefa proposta, do grupo em si mesmo e do contexto social. Após identificarmos os quatro momentos organizadores no desenvolvimento dos vínculos intersubjetivos estabelecidos na instituição - o Momento Originário, o Primeiro, o Segundo e o Terceiro Organizador Grupal - buscamos pelos intermediários que marcaram os intercâmbios, os lugares, as atribuições, a atividade representacional e os afetos. Reconhecemos na História e Filosofia da Ciência (HFC) intermediários fundamentais em cada fase do desenvolvimento da área e buscamos elementos para entender melhos os papéis desempenhados pela HFC na pesquisa, principalmente, suas contribuições para a fundação e sustentação da área. Para obtermos informações com potencial mais subjetivo fizemos entrevistas com pesquisadores da área, cujas produções científicas revelaram aproximação com a HFC. A nossa interpretação avançou quando integramos um novo conceito no suporte... (Resumo completo, clicar acesso eletrônico abaixo) / Abstract: The establishment of research into Science Education began in Brazil in the end of the decade of the 1960's and only recently, in the year 2000, was it recognized as a field by Capes. During this time, many works tried to analyse its history, describing the determinant factors of its constitution and upholding. In our research we look back on some of these works, focusing on subjective aspects that contributed to its development. We chose as reference the works of Nardi (2005) and Villani, Pacca & Freitas (2002), and some other psychoanalytic concepts developed by René Kaes referring to psychic life of group and institutions. These elements allowed us to interpret the events that highlighted the history in the field of Science Education, taking into consideration that any groups is made up of, organizes itself and develops itself according to the configuration that overlays the representation system of its members, of the task proposed, the group itself and the social context. After we were able to identify the four organizational moments in the development of the intersubjective links existing in an institution which are - the arising moment, the first, the second and the third group organizer, we searched for the intermediates that highlighted the interchanges, the places, the attributions, the representational activities and the affection. One can recognize in the History and Philosophy of Science (HPS) the fundamental intermediary in each developing phase of the field and search for elements to better understand the roles played by the HPS in research, especially its contributions to the foundation and establishment in the field. To obtain more potential and subjective information, many researchers in this field were interviewed whose scientific works showed some proximity with the HPS. Our interpretation took a head start when we integrated a new concept to support... (Complete abstract click electronic access below) / Doutor

Neste trabalho apresentamos uma reflexão crítica sobre a formação de pesquisadores em física. Nossas perspectivas são em parte reproduzidas em uma proposta de ensino que é elaborada e analisadas sobre a ótica da obra de Bruno Latour, autor que se situa no campo dos estudos sociais da ciência. Essa proposta foi trabalhada com alunos dos terceiro semestre de Bacharelado em Física do Instituto de Física da Universidade de São Paulo (IFUSP). A intervenção educacional foi inspirada também na problematização do conhecimento segundo a perspectiva dos estudos de Paulo Freire. A proposta tem como eixo central um estudo histórico da relação massa energia, E=mc2. Esse estudo contempla obras de historiadores da ciência e de físicos, e se refere aos períodos pré e pós-relativísticos, além de buscar fazer uma ponte com a história da física nuclear. Um dos nossos objetivos é compreender melhor como a história da ciência pode ser um instrumento para estimular futuros pesquisadores a refletir sobre a prática científica. Como forma de enriquecer a análise e a proposta que fazemos, esse trabalho traz também algumas entrevistas com pesquisadores docentes do IFUSP. As entrevistas e sua análise constituem uma breve investigação sobre a relação entre ensino e pesquisa na universidade e sobre a presença ou não de reflexões sobre a prática e a natureza da ciência por parte destes pesquisadores docentes. Acreditamos que esse tipo de abordagem é importante nos cursos de bacharelado, pois ela pode favorecer a formação de um futuro pesquisador crítico, autônomo e consciente, que reflita sua prática, seus objetivos e os impactos de sua atividade. / The present record contains a critical reflection about research training programs in physics. Our purposes are in some measure supported on a teaching plan developed and analyzed under Bruno Latour\'s ideas, an author immersed in the social studies about science. This proposal was implemented with students of the third period of a physics graduation course of the Institute of Physics of the University of São Paulo. The education intervention was also inspired on Paulo Freire\'s idea of problematization of knowledge. The core of this proposal is a historical analysis about the relation mass-energy, E=mc². This study is based on works of historians of science and physicians and involves the period pre and pos theory of relativity. Furthermore, it intends to establish a relation with the history of nuclear physics. With all this, one of our objectives is to comprehend better how history of science can be a strategy to stimulate future reflections about scientific work by researchers. As a way to enrich this analysis and this proposal, this record also presents some interviews with researchers on physics of the Institute of Physics. The interviews and its analysis constitute a brief examination about the relation between teaching and researching in the university and the presence of considerations about scientific work and the nature of science in the arguments of these researchers. We believe that this kind of approach is important in physics graduation courses, since it can foster the formation of a critical, independent and conscious researcher that ponders over his actions, intentions and the impacts of his activities.

Nossa Tese visa explorar as implicações da hipótese de Werner Heisenberg na literatura segundo a qual na medida em que a Cosmologia progride no sentido da matematização e da axiomatização esse conhecimento vai se afastando do ser humano e transformando a idéia que ele sempre fez da própria natureza que o cerca. Assim, passaria a existir nesse homem uma verdadeira solidão referente ao estar no mundo. Num primeiro momento ele soube que a Terra não é mais o centro do Universo, (inversão copernicana) depois que poderia não ser mais filho de Deus (teoria da evolução) e, finalmente, nem mesmo pode ter uma idéia fiel da natureza, mas na realidade só lhe resta alcançar um conhecimento matemático que exprima essa natureza, muito diferente daquela na qual sempre viveu. (física subatômica). Poucos são os que tomam conhecimento dessas mudanças no mundo da Física em geral e da Cosmologia, em particular. No entanto, o grande pensador da Psicologia Social, Serge Moscovici, cria o conceito de Representação Social que explica o fenômeno identificável na literatura. O homem comum não estuda e não entende os meandros da Física ou da Cosmologia, mas esse conhecimento chega a ele, ainda que distorcido, trocado em miúdo, como representação social, transmitida pelos divulgadores com maior ou menor grau de entendimento, por intermédio de livros, cinema e comentários em geral; hoje em dia, até pela televisão, ou jornais. Essas mudanças no âmbito da ciência certamente são interpretadas, pela grande maioria dos estudiosos, como mudanças de paradigma. Mas nós adotaremos aqui, o conceito de paradigma de Gilles Gaston Granger. Para Granger, um exemplo típico de mudança de paradigma nas Ciências exatas é aquela que ocorreu na passagem da Física de Aristóteles à Física de Galileu. Aqui realmente há quebra de paradigma, descontinuidade e incomunicabilidade entre eles. Mudou o modelo de Ciência, mudaram todos os conceitos que foram redefinidos no âmbito do novo paradigma. Já as mudanças que ocorrem no domínio da Física, a partir de Galileu, quando se fala em mudança de paradigma, fala-se, em geral, em restrição de um conceito, ou se quisermos, ampliação de um conceito, mas não de ruptura completa ou de incomunicabilidade com o paradigma anterior. Tratar-se-ia então da criação de novos sub-paradigmas. Paradigma, na acepção kuhniana do termo, Granger aceita apenas para as proto-ciências, nas quais podemos falar de ruptura e de incomunicabilidade; como ocorre na Psicologia se considerarmos suas várias teorias. É preciso que se diga que com os avanços dos experimentos a incomunicabilidade começa a ser quebrada. Escolhemos a literatura como uma das formas de verificar o impacto da mudança cosmológica sobre a psique humana, mas poderíamos ter escolhido a arte pictórica ou outra expressão do homem na interpretação do mundo. Confrontamos obras clássicas com a visão aristotélica/ptolomaica e as obras literárias do século XIV com a visão de Copérnico e Galileu. Posteriormente procuramos mostrar o impacto do salto da idéia que o ser humano tinha da natureza com Kepler, Galileu e Newton para a representação da natureza com o advento da Física sub-atômica e sua repercussão em textos literários de significação consagrada pelos grandes críticos e analistas da literatura ocidental / Our Thesis aims to explain the implications of the Werner Heisenbergs hypothesis in literature, according to which this knowledge stands off from man in proportion to Cosmology progresses to mathematization and axiomatization and transforms the idea that he always had about the nature that surrounds him. Thus, it would exist in this man a true solitude feeling of being in the world. In the first moment he discovered that Earth isnt anymore the center of Universe (Copernican inversion), then that he could be no longer the son of the God (evolution theory) and finally that he could not even have a true idea of nature, but that in reality it only remains a mathematical knowledge which expresses this nature very different of that in which he had always lived (subatomic physics) - to be done. Few are those who take knowledge of these changes in Physics in general and Cosmology in particular. However, the great thinker of Social Psychology, Serge Moscovici, creates the concept of Social Representation, which explains the identifiable phenomenon in literature. The common man doesnt study and doesnt understand the meanders of Physics and Cosmology, but this knowledge reaches him, even though distorted, made simple, as social representation, transmitted by the scientific publicizers with more or less understanding through books, cinema and comments in general; nowadays, even through TV or newspapers. These changes in the extent of science certainly are interpreted by the great majority of experts as paradigm shifts. We will adopt here, however, Gilles Gaston Grangers concept of paradigm. For him, a typical example of paradigm shift in the Exact Sciences is the one that occurred in the passing from Aristotelian Physics to Galilean Physics. Here we actually have a paradigm rupture, discontinuity and incommunicability between them. The Science model changed, all the concepts changed, redefined in the scope of the new paradigm. About the changes that occur in the domain of Physics, since Galileo, when we discuss paradigm shift we discuss, generally speaking, a restriction of a concept, or, if we want, enlargement of a concept, but not of complete rupture or incommunicability with the anterior paradigm. It would be about the creation of new sub paradigms. Granger accepts the usage of paradigm in the kuhnian acceptation of the term only for the protosciences, for which we can speak of rupture and incommunicability; as it occurs in Psychology, if we consider its various theories. It must be said that with the experiments advances the incommunicability begins to be broken. We have chosen literature as one of the ways of verifying the cosmologic change impact upon the human psyche, but we could have chosen pictorial art or other human expression in the interpretation the world. We confront classic oeuvres with Aristotelian or Ptolemaic point of view and 15th century literary oeuvres with Copernican and Galilean point of view. Posteriorly we tried to demonstrate the impact of the leap of the idea that the man had about nature with Kepler, Galileo and Newton to the nature representation with the advent of Subatomic Physics and the representations about it in literary texts consecrated by Western Literature important critics and analysts

Considerando que a literatura atual da área de Educação aponta a necessidade de se ensinar sobre ciências, isto é, enfatizando a natureza histórica, humana e provisória do conhecimento científico, preocupamo-nos, neste trabalho, com a explicitação da estrutura \"lógica\" de algumas formas de inferência usadas na prática científica, com dupla intenção: investigar em pormenores os processos pelos quais se pode chegar a certas conclusões científicas, a fim de esclarecer aspectos lógico-epistemológicos desses processos, e apontar como e por que tais pormenores não podem ser excluídos das aulas de ciências. A principal forma de inferência investigada foi a da abdução que, na prática científica pode estar presente em situações onde o sucesso preditivo de uma teoria é apontado como evidência em favor desta, o que, a rigor, equivale a aplicar a falácia formal da afirmação do consequente. Encontramos dois modos de justificar essa inferência em uma abordagem probabilística da forma \"se há sucesso de uma previsão teórica, então a probabilidade de a teoria ser \'correta\' sofre um incremento quantificável\", com teoria de Probabilidades e o teorema da dedução: um aplicando o teorema de Bayes à hipótese de Stalnaker (ou a tese de Adams) e outro usando a tabela-verdade da implicação material, concluindo, em ambos, que a probabilidade de o sucesso da previsão E de uma teoria T poder ser usado como sinal em favor desta é uma função que cresce tanto com o valor da probabilidade de que a teoria resulte em tal previsão quanto com o valor da própria probabilidade de T e decresce com a probabilidade de E, o que está matematicamente de acordo com a expectativa intuitiva. Ao longo do texto, mostramos que a explicitação desse tipo de raciocínio constitui elemento útil para a formação dos educandos para que tenham efetivo entendimento da natureza do conhecimento e mesmo para embasar raciocínios aplicados à vasta gama de fenômenos do cotidiano, desde inferências simples até conclusões mais complexas como política ou moral. / Whereas the current literature in Education area points to the need to teach ABOUT sciences, that is, emphasizing the historical, human and provisional nature of scientific knowledge, we are concerned in this paper with the explanation of the \"logic\" structure of some inference forms used in scientific practice, in order to: investigate in detail and clarify logical-epistemological aspects of the processes by which we obtain certain scientific conclusions, and point out how and why this details can not be excluded science classes. We investigated the inference by abduction that in scientific practice may be present in situations where the predictive success of a theory is touted as evidence for this, which, strictly speaking, is applying formal fallacy of affirming the consequent. We have found two ways to justify this inference in a probabilistic approach of the form \"if there is success of a theoretical prediction, then the probability of the theory to be \'correct\' undergo measurable increase\" with Probability theory and the deduction theorem: one applying Bayes\' theorem to the hypothesis Stalnaker (or Adams thesis) and another using the truth table of material implication, concluding on both the probability of the success of prediction E of a theory T can be used as signal please T (or \"prob(E pleases T)\") is a function that increases both prob(from T deduces E) and prob(T) and decreases with prob(E), what is mathematically according to intuitive expectations. Throughout the text, we show that the identification of this kind of reasoning is useful element for the training of students to have effective understanding of the nature of knowledge and even to support reasoning applied to the wide range of everyday phenomena, from simple inferences to more conclusions complex as a political or moral

This thesis examines various reductive case studies in thermal physics. In particular, I argue that according to my account of reduction-as-construction, there are two suc- cessful examples of reduction. Thermodynamics reduces to statistical mechanics, and statistical mechanics reduces to the underlying microdynamics - be they quantum or classical. The reduction of a given theory alters that theory's scope, that is: its domain of applicability. The scope of thermodynamics will be central to this thesis - and I will argue for a narrower scope than some authors. This thesis consists of four Chapters, together with an introduction and a conclusion. In Chapter 1, I discuss how different levels of description relate to one another. I argue that a higher-level of description is reduced to the lower level, if the higher-level quantities and their behaviour can be constructed or captured by the lower-level theory. I claim that 'functionalism' can be helpful in securing reductions. In this Chapter I also argue that the aim of reduction is to vindicate, not eliminate, the higher-level theory. In Chapter 2, I tackle the reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics. I articulate the functional, or nomological, role of various thermodynamic quantities that are implicitly defined by the zeroth, first and second laws of thermodynamics: temperature, energy and entropy respectively. I then argue that there are quantities in statistical mechanics that realise these roles: though finding them sometimes requires us to focus on quantum, rather than classical, statistical mechanics. In Chapter 3, I consider the reductive relationship between statistical mechanics and the underlying microdynamics. I demonstrate how the irreversible equations of statistical mechanics can be constructed from the underlying microdynamics using what I label the 'Zwanzig-Zeh-Wallace' framework. Yet this framework uses a procedure called 'coarse-graining' which has been heavily criticised in the literature; so in this Chapter I offer a justification of coarse-graining. One upshot is that the time-asymmetry in statistical mechanics is weakly emergent. In Chapter 4, I consider a question about the domain of applicability of thermal physics. Namely: does it apply to self-gravitating systems, such as elliptical galaxies? Much controversy surrounds this question: some argue yes, others argue no. I deflate the dispute by claiming that thermodynamics does not apply, but statistical mechanics does. Thus, my delineation of thermodynamics and statistical mechanics earlier in this thesis not only makes headway with the question of reduction, but also sheds light on this dispute. I argue that this situation - statistical mechanics, but without thermodynamics - can be understood in terms of a central notion in thermal physics: the thermodynamic limit. But as I also discuss: justifying this idealisation has been philosophically controversial.

Social scientific measurement is much desired and much criticized. In this dissertation I evaluate one of the main approaches to social scientific measurement that has nevertheless been virtually ignored by philosophers - the psychometric approach. Psychometric measures are typically used to measure unobservable attributes such as intelligence and personality. They typically take the form of questionnaires or tests and are validated by statistical tests of properties such as reliability and model-fit. My thesis is two-fold. In the first, more critical part, I argue that psychometric instruments normally fail to fulfil plausible criteria for adequate measurement. To make this argument, I define and defend a conception of quantitative representation necessary for measurement. My definition is grounded in the Representational Theory of Measurement but avoids the main critiques this theory has faced. I then show that the typical psychometric process of measure validation fails to produce evidence of such quantitative representation. The upshot is that although a quantitative interpretation of psychometric data is common, it is largely unwarranted. In the second part, I argue that psychometric instruments are nonetheless apt for various other purposes. This argument hinges on a new outlook on how concepts should be formed for psychometric purposes. Philosophers have traditionally thought that concepts should cohere with intuitions and/or pick out so-called natural kinds, while many psychometricians argue that concepts should pick out real as opposed to constructed attributes. I argue that, when it comes to social scientific measurement, it is much more important to focus on the usefulness of the concept, where usefulness can take on different meanings in different contexts. Building on the defended outlook on concept formation, I show what useful functions psychometric instruments can serve even when they fail at quantitative representation.

In this dissertation I argue that artworks that mimic scientific experiments can transform our philosophical understanding of scientific experiment itself. The collection of artworks that form the basis of my case studies includes imaginary scientific instruments, responsive sound environments, genetic portraits and live scientific demonstrations. Despite their heterogeneity, each of these artworks embodies a certain idea of experiment through its physical form. I read these artworks as material representations of the logics and practices described by philosophers and historians of scientific experimentation. Much as scientific models mediate between theories and the real world, artworks, in my analysis, mediate between the philosophical descriptions of science and its material instantiations. Like models, artworks are not merely illustrations of preconceived ideas but also have lives of their own. The very idea of using artworks to explore the nature of experiment has its roots in Kant's theory of exemplarity, developed in his Critique of Aesthetic Judgment. Artworks are considered exemplary when they give sensuous embodiment to an idea that has not yet been fully formed in thought. To regard artworks as exemplary for the philosophy of science and technology is to regard them as generative of new ways of thinking about experimentation as a mode of material and conceptual practice that art and science share. My dissertation opens up a new archive for the philosophy of scientific experimentation in the form of what I call performative experiments--a term that I reserve for artworks that at once enact and query the logic of scientific experimentation. The dissertation is comprised of four chapters, each of which places one or more artworks into conversation with a set of philosophical questions that arise at the intersection of aesthetic theory, philosophy of science and philosophy of technology. Philosophers of technology have observed that tools, by their very nature, tend to recede into their context of use and in doing so become transparent and invisible to their users. My first chapter aims to recover the role of instruments in the epistemology of scientific experimentation through a close reading of Eve André Laramée's Apparatus for the Distillation of Vague Intuitions (1994-98), a glass sculpture installation that embeds within itself a virtual archeological record of continuity in instrumentation from alchemy to modern chemistry. The second chapter examines the methodology of so-called "natural experiments," in which investigators treat occurrent situations as if they were intentionally created for the purposes of controlled experimentation. Through my analyses of Natalie Jeremijenko's work Tree Logic (1999-present) and Stacey Levy's Seeing the Path of the Wind (1991), I argue that performative experiments dramatize how we export habits of seeing and patterns of inference from the carefully shielded conditions of the laboratory to the unruly world outside its walls. My third chapter investigates the use of molecular genetics as a new medium of portraiture and shows how the specific aesthetic possibilities and constraints of this medium transform the genre of portraiture so as to capture changing conceptions of personal identity, kinship and subjective temporality in the genetic age. Finally, the fourth chapter explores the ethical, political and institutional limits governing the transformation of experiences into the basis of experimental knowledge as these limits become sites of contest in IRB# G10-02-066-01 (2010), an artwork qua social psychology experiment for the artist Jennifer Gradecki failed to win approval from her university's ethics review board. Drawing, in part, on the primary data of my own repeated trials as a subject in this illicit experiment, titled "Social Interaction as a Function of Voluntary Engagement With a Shock Machine," I reflect on how the epistemic and social value of experiences are mediated by the institutional context in which research is regulated and legitimated. Throughout the dissertation, I demonstrate that artworks transform material and epistemological practices derived from the sciences into formal devices for directing perceptual attention and imaginative reflection. When practices of experiment are used to organize aesthetic responses in the context of the art museum or gallery, they draw attention to aesthetic and phenomenological dimensions of scientific practice that tend to escape notice in the context of science itself, and therefore to remain under-theorized within the history and philosophy of science. The emerging genre of performative experiments opens up a site of critical self-reflexivity within the methods and material of scientific practice itself, a site in which it is possible both to explore the cultural significance of scientific knowledge and to critique the empirical methods that are used to produce the scientific image of the world. Performative experiments are exemplary, in this respect, of a new form of critical literacy that arises at once within the sciences and the arts.