This thesis discusses epistemological and ethical issues in classifi cation and diagnosisof psychiatric conditions, and briefly discusses realism about psychiatric conditions. I use autism spectrum disorder (ASD) as a case study to examine whether the explanatory and predictive power of classi fication and diagnosis could be improved if psychiatry adopts a cause-based framework in place of a symptom-based framework. However, there is signifi cant debate regarding the sort of explanatory pattern that will adequately represent the complex causation involved in psychiatric conditions. I develop a preliminary list of criteria for adequate explanatory patterns in psychiatry, and use these criteria to analyze explanations of ASD. I show that explanatory patterns unable to meet these criteria limit the validity and reliability of diagnosis. However, I argue that an integrated pattern that includes biological, cognitive and social levels of explanation may meet the criteria. Thus, diagnosis of ASD could improve if psychiatry adopted a cause-based framework informed by an intergrated explanation pattern. More accurate diagnosis of ASD may allow earlier access to Intensive Behaviourial Intervention/Applied Behavioural Analysis treatment programs, which may increase the effectiveness of this treatment and reduce the amount of resources individuals with ASD require from governments over their lifespans. Explaining these conditions using an integrated pattern of explanation can further challenge myths regarding the causes of ASD, and may provide support for Canadian lawsuits petitioning for expanded public funding of IBI/ABA programs.

Russell’s claim that only structural knowledge of the world is possible was influentially criticized by Newman as rendering scientific discoveries trivial. I show that a version of this criticism also applies to the “structural realism” more recently advocated by Worrall, which requires continuity of formal structure between predecessor and successor scientific theories. The problem is that structure, in its common set-theoretical construal, is radically underdetermined by the entities and relations over which it is defined, rendering intertheoretic continuity intolerably cheap. I show that this problem may be overcome by supplementing the purely formal relation of intertheoretic isomorphism with the semiformal “Ontological Reductive Links” developed by Moulines and others of the German “structuralist” approach to the philosophy of science.

The Metaphysics Experiment attempts to explicate a theory and history of universalism in modern physics, through an analysis of its conception of nature. Understood as an axiomatic and hegemonic metaphysical premise through four hundred years of scientific and political history, universalism is defined in terms of its general and persistent claim to nature or truth as an ahistorical reality. Thus, I argue that universalism is directly implicated in, not opposed to, the (Christian) monotheistic conception of God. Moreover, universalism constitutes the logic according to which nature is differentiated from history, culture, and politics. It thus constructs both sides of the same ostensible oppositions in the so-called science and culture wars that determine much of today’s politics of nature. The scientific and political dominance of universalism is demonstrated through a history in five acts. Using the current Large Hadron Collider experiment in Geneva as a principal case study in Act 1, and drawing on contemporary philosopher of science, Isabelle Stengers, I consider four pivotal historical moments in the history of physics and metaphysics that determine the universalist claims of this contemporary experiment. In Act 2, the mid-20th century development of Albert Einstein’s General Relativity framework and Big Bang Theory is read against Martin Heidegger’s critique of identity logic. In Act 3, the mid-17th century emergence of the mathematical universe in modern science and philosophy, through Galileo Galilei and René Descartes, is read against Benedict Spinoza’s univocal metaphysics. In Act 4, the late 19th century invention of particle or quantum physics is read against Henri Bergson’s idea of mind-matter dualism. Finally, in Act 5, considering the contemporary use of natural constants in physics, the insights of Michel Serres, Bruno Latour, Peter Sloterdijk, Heidegger, Stengers and Spinoza are drawn together to problematize the modern historical role of physics and its metaphysical constitution of nature. Beyond these historical event-scenes, I also offer a theoretical explication of five logics, demonstrated individually Act by Act, that comprise different dimensions of science in action. Thus, physics is considered historically both as theoretical and experimental practice and as a form of political mobilization.

Axiomatic quantum field theory is one approach to the project of merging the special theory of relativity with that of ordinary quantum mechanics. The project begins with the postulation of a set of axioms. Axioms should be motivated by reasonable physical principles in a way that illustrates how a given axiom is true. Motivations are often grounded in the principles of the parent theories: ordinary quantum mechanics or the theory of special relativity. Amongst the set of axioms first proposed by Haag and Kastler in 1963 is the axiom of microcausality. Microcausality requires the observables of regions at space-like separation to commute. This thesis seeks to answer the question ‘What principles from the special theory of relativity or ordinary quantum mechanics motivate, or justify, accepting microcausality as an axiom?’ The first chapter will provide the necessary background to investigate this question and the second chapter will undertake that investigation. In conclusion, microcausality cannot be well-motivated by individual principles rooted in the special theory of relativity or ordinary quantum mechanics.

In this dissertation on Hilary Putnam's philosophy, I investigate his development regarding meaning and necessity, in particular mathematical necessity. Putnam has been a leading American philosopher since the end of the 1950s, becoming famous in the 1960s within the school of analytic philosophy, associated in particular with the philosophy of science and the philosophy of language. Under the influence of W.V. Quine, Putnam challenged the logical positivism/empiricism that had become strong in America after World War II, with influential exponents such as Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach. Putnam agreed with Quine that there are no absolute a priori truths. In particular, he was critical of the notion of truth by convention. Instead he developed a notion of relative a priori truth, that is, a notion of necessary truth with respect to a body of knowledge, or a conceptual scheme. Putnam's position on necessity has developed over the years and has always been connected to his important contributions to the philosophy of meaning. I study Hilary Putnam's development through an early phase of scientific realism, a middle phase of internal realism, and his later position of a natural or commonsense realism. I challenge some of Putnam’s ideas on mathematical necessity, although I have largely defended his views against some other contemporary major philosophers; for instance, I defend his conceptual relativism, his conceptual pluralism, as well as his analysis of the realism/anti-realism debate.

In the Western Australian agricultural region, an area of approximately 14 million hectares (70,000 square miles), widespread areas of native vegetation have been cleared and replaced with annual cropping systems, predominantly wheat. Only1.3 million hectares (10%) of small and scattered native vegetation remnants remain. By 2000 16% of land in the region was at risk from soil salinity and was largely unproductive for commercial agriculture. A new hydrological equilibrium affecting 33% of the Western Australian agricultural region is predicted to be reached between 2050 and 2300. The starting premise of this dissertation is that normal disciplinary science was adopted as the dominant intellectual influence on natural resource management policy and thus natural resource degradation was treated as a problem for science, extracted from its social, economic and historical contexts. The second premise of this dissertation is that natural resource problems are not isolated scientific or technical problems, and are exacerbated by human failure to predict the complex inter-relationships among the social, ecological and economic systems. This dissertation initially provides an analytical narrative on the Western Australian agricultural region between 1889 and 2003 (114 years) with the main finding being that in the years pre-1970 a development-driven Western Australian Government was responsible for extensive land clearing for agriculture, often contrary to scientific advice. In the 1980s and 1990s the severity and extent of soil salinity and the prognosis of future negative trends in other natural resource indicators caused a rapid proliferation and evolution of Federal and State policies designed to ‘solve the problem’. Nonetheless many natural resource problems remain intractable. The second part of the dissertation investigates the epistemology of the normal science paradigm as it was applied to natural resource management problems in the 20th century as a potentially contributing cause. The evolution of an alternative epistemology, post-normal science paradigm, is then examined for explicating our current understanding of ‘reality’. A research framework was constructed which defines the post-normal science paradigm; the systemic approach; the bodies of theory–organisational, ecology, resilience and system dynamics theory; the social-ecological system perspective; and the methods–resilience analysis and system dynamics. This framework provides a novel way in which to gain a greater understanding of the fundamental or root causes of natural resource management problems. Using the case study of the Western Australian agricultural region a dynamic model was constructed based on descriptive information. An examination of the historical events and processes of the Western Australian agricultural region reveals that over a 114-year history it has evolved through two interactions of the adaptive cycle. Further investigation reveals these two cycles were synchronous with the second and third economic long-wave cycles or Kondratiev Cycles, that show the behaviour over time of the evolution of modern industrial societies. The model suggests that the reasons for the dynamic behaviour of the Western Australian agricultural region lie in the interaction of the three production growth drivers of the international commodity system, which have resulted in a pathological system, the ‘Lock-in Trap’. Increased total commodity production, reinvestment and declining prices in real terms have tended to produce the unintended negative impacts of resource decline, environmental pollution and rural population decline. I suggest that the expansion of thresholds through the reinvestment in technology is a principle reason why there has not yet been a profound collapse of exploited renewable resources in the Western Australian agricultural region. Regional natural resource management strategies will need to take account of not only spatial cross-scale issues, in particular the linkages between the individual farmer and the international commodity system, but also the temporal variables, in particular the slowly emerging changes in ecological/physical variables, such as the hydrological cycle. This research can help to provide the information and heuristic metaphors to encourage natural resource policy makers to take long-term and whole system perspectives. It includes a powerful set of tools for communicating dynamic processes in an integrated method to inform policy and management decisions. The ideas in this interdisciplinary research are essential for making science relevant within a social and ecological context.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, San Francisco with the University of California, Berkeley, 2009. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-02, Section: A, page: . Adviser: Vincanne Adams.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Notre Dame, 2006. / Thesis directed by Phillip R. Sloan and Ahmad Dallal for the Graduate Program in the History and Philosophy of Science. "December 2006." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 259-278).

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Duquesne University, 2006. / Title from document title page. Abstract included in electronic submission form. Includes bibliographical references (p. 239-253) and index.

<p>In this essay I evaluate the legality of Karl Popper’s criticism against psychoanalysis, regarding this theory of Freud’s being pseudoscientific. Popper’s criticism is based on his theory of demarcation in which he states that an empirical theory must be possible to test by observations in order to be, as most important is, hypothetically possible to falsify based on other empirical statements – often in the form of new found facts that contradict the original statement/theory. In purpose of assessing Popper’s criticism I perform a modified idea analysis, based on a book by Evert Vedung (1977). By referring both to Popper and to spokespersons of psychoanalysis I structure the arguments pro and contra Popper’s criticism, in order to then weigh these arguments against each other. My main conclusion is that psychoanalysis, regardless of Popper’s criticism, is in fact an empirical theory since it can be internally validated based on the observations made by a psychoanalyst. But according to the theory of demarcation psychoanalysis can not be tested based on observations, probably because Popper by ”observations” meant only those that can be made and validated by independent scientists.</p>