<p>In this thesis, I take up two important issues for understanding neurobiological systems: normative functions and information. After introducing the topic and my methodology in chapters 1 and 2, chapter 3 contains an extended critique of the most prominent theory of biological functions, the selected-effects theory of functions. My arguments center on the influential recent selected-effects theory arguing that it has trouble accounting for certain cases and does not seem to capture the sense of malfunction employed in the neurosciences. Chapter 4 defends an alternative theory of normative biological functions that I label the statistical fitness theory. Roughly, this theory holds that tokens of a trait type have the normative function to do something y if it is typical for tokens of that type of trait to y and their doing y contributes to the inclusive fitness of the organism that possesses the trait. In turn, this theory defines malfunctioning trait tokens as those whose effects that typically make positive contributions to fitness fall below the "normal" range in the population. Chapter 5 argues that several other recently popular theories of normative functions have significant flaws. </p><p>Chapter 6 takes up the issue of a certain kind of information, namely natural, propositional information. I provide a general framework that explains when signals carry this kind of information about their signifieds based upon stable, perfect correlations holding between the two. Hence, I label this the "stable correlation theory". I also argue that there are good reasons to think that neurons in our brains carry natural, propositional information and that their ability to do so is also grounded in stable correlations.</p> / Dissertation

This study analyses the methodology of computational cognitive modeling as one of the ways of conducting research in cognitive science. The aim of the study is to provide an understanding of the place of computational cognitive models in understanding human cognition. Considering the vast number of computational cognitive models which have been just given to account for some cognitive phenomenon by solely simulating some experimental study and fitting to empirical data, a practice-oriented approach is adopted in this study to understand the work of the modeler, and accordingly to discover the potential of computational cognitive models, apart from their being simulation tools. In pursuit of this aim, a framework with a practice-oriented approach from the philosophy of science literature, which is Morgan &amp / Morrison (1999)&rsquo / s account, is employed on a case study. The framework emphasizes four key elements to understand the place of models in science, which are the construction of models, the function of models, the representation they provide, and the ways we learn from models. The case study Q-Soar (Simon, Newell &amp / Klahr, 1991), is a model built with Soar cognitive architecture (Laird, Newell &amp / Rosenbloom, 1987) which is representative of a class of computational cognitive models. Discussions are included for how to make generalizations for computational cognitive models out of this class, i.e. for models that are built with other modeling paradigms.

This commentary on article #19 of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's Discourse on Metaphysics is for the purpose of promoting the understanding of Leibniz on the role of teleology in physics. Understanding Leibniz on final causes is crucial to understanding his overall natural philosophy. If one approaches Leibniz with a bias regarding either final causes or protestant Christian theology, such that they ignore these aspects of Leibniz, such a person is in danger of completly misunderstanding this philosopher. Leibniz is a mix of natural philosophy, mechanical physics, and protestant Christian theology. The rationale behind this study is to cause the student of philosophy to consider a somewhat ignored side of Leibniz which stems from his combination of two politically incorrect words in academics today, "intelligent" and "design". Both of these words are found in #19. Both of these terms are employed in concert with the Christian idea of God, a combination which is highly charged in academics today, and most politically incorrect. To address the political incorrectness of this combination of terms, however, is to engage in the understanding of what it mean to think and argue in seventeenth century Europe. To wrestle with these terms in article #19, therefore, is to wrestle with those positions which caused great tensions in early modern culture. The approach taken for this work is a line by line exposition of the text, unearthing the arguments involved and those philosophers who made them. Once into this particular text, article #19 turns out to be enormous in its scope of Leibnizian thought. Its subject matter mirrors the thinking of Leibniz, and is background material for other projects Leibniz was involved in at the time, such as the laws of motion in optics. The significance of this work to the discipline is that Leibniz, one of the most intellectually gifted men in human history, no less the co-discoverer of the calculus, argues that reality is an intelligent design created by a loving person who only wants to be loved by the creation in return. This puts him at odds with pure mechanists in his day, and it puts him at odds with many in philosophy today. For all those in philosophy who argue that there is no reason for reality existing, at least not as it does, Leibniz provides a very clear counter argument. Leibniz's point in #19 is that there is a place for end purposes in calculating the laws of nature, and that those who dismiss end purposes do so for insufficient reasons.

Although Wilfrid Sellars's work holds a prominent place in recent analytic philosophy, little work has been done to situate his early approaches to normativity and the philosophy of language in their proper context. What little work has been done tends to emphasize Sellars's connection to a then dominant logical empiricism at the expense of marginalizing other American philosophical schools. On top of this historical issue, most scholars attempting to explain Sellars's systematic philosophy tend to ignore a developmental picture of Sellars's positions and focus on explicating the systematic character of his thought. My dissertation attempts to correct both of these tendencies by offering a historically situated account of Sellars's early papers that presents his views in relation to logical empiricism, the "Iowa School" of philosophy as embodied in Gustav Bergmann's and Everett Hall's writings, and some aspects of traditional American philosophy. By fleshing out the context of Sellars's early papers, it becomes clear that the "strong" normativist project present in his later essays developed out of his shift from his attempt to fit "traditional" philosophical problems into a formalist approach to language. My thesis acts as a "correction" to the previous interpretive points by presenting a more complex characterization of the contextual influences on Sellars's early papers and creating a foundation for a developmental account of Sellars's later views. I do this by examining evidence from Sellars's unpublished correspondence and works from a myriad of archival sources in conjunction with an analysis of his early publications.

The concept of time in physics underwent significant changes in the decades following World War II. This dissertation considers several ways in which American physicists grappled with these changes, analyzing the extent to which philosophical methods and questions played a role in physicists' engagement with time. Two lines of questioning run through the dissertation. The first asks about the professional identities of postwar American physicists in relation to philosophy, as exemplified by their engagement with the concept of time. The second analyzes the heterogeneous nature of time in physics, and the range of presuppositions and assumptions that have constituted this "fundamental" physical concept. The first chapter looks to the development of atomic clocks and atomic time standards from 1948-1958, and the ways in which new timekeeping technologies placed concepts such as “clock”, “second,” and “measure of time” in a state of flux. The second chapter looks to the experimental discovery of CP violation by particle physicists in the early 1960s, raising questions about nature of time understood as the variable “t” in the equations of quantum mechanics. The third chapter considers attempts to unify quantum mechanics and general relativity in the late 1960s, which prompted physicists to question the “existence” of time in relation to the universe as a whole. In each episode considered, physicists engaged with the concept of time in a variety of ways, revealing a multiplicity of relationships between physics, philosophy, and time. Further, in each case physicists brought a unique set of assumptions to their concepts of time, revealing the variety ways in which fundamental conceptsfunctioned and changed in late twentieth century physics. The result is a heterogeneous picture of the practice of physics, as well as one of physics’ most basic concepts. / History of Science

This dissertation has three parts. In "Quantum Entanglement, Bohmian Mechanics, and Humean Supervenience," I defend David Lewis's metaphysical doctrine of Humean supervenience, and traditional metaphysical reductionism more generally, against an alleged holistic threat encapsulated in the non-separability argument from quantum entanglement. I argue that, contrary to popular belief, realism about quantum mechanics is compatible with Humean reductionism. / Philosophy

Proponents of Middle Way (Sanskrit: Madhyamaka) Buddhist philosophy argue that all phenomena lack inherent nature. This dissertation provides an analysis of the meaning of inherent nature and the lack of inherent nature in the basic physical character of non-living physical phenomena as indicated by certain interpretations of ancient and contemporary Middle Way Buddhist philosophy, contemporary Western analytic metaphysics, philosophy of science, and physics. The primary intellectual focus in the dissertation is Madhyamaka. I explicate an interpretation of Madhyamaka that is both amenable to discourse and dialogue with the other disciplines, and also consistent with at least some extant Madhyamaka interpretations. The discourse and dialogue with other disciplines results in a revision of some of the arguments of Madhyamaka—specifically making it consistent with modern physics. However, that revision does not deny the foundational view of Madhyamaka that there is no inherent nature in phenomena, but rather supports it within the revised interpretation. Additionally, I also find that this foundational view provides at least heuristic guidance in development of a generic interpretive framework (‘contextualization’ and Physics Pluralism) that I then apply in criticism and revision of some arguments in modern analytic metaphysics and in philosophy of science.That generic interpretive framework is used within this dissertation in examination of Western analytic metaphysics and philosophy of science. While I find independent support for that framework within contemporary philosophy, the framework also reflects an interpretation of Madhyamaka that I develop as a variation of the classic two truths view of Madhyamaka. My interpretation of the classical expression of the two truths is that there is relative existence of inherent nature that may be reflected in our conventions of discourse and habit, while ultimately no inherent nature can be found when the phenomena are analyzed more fully. In my modified interpretation of the two truths that corresponds to modern physics, for some phenomena inherent nature is found within specific (‘local’) contexts of discourse or domains of physics theory applicability, yet when we take a ‘global’ view that acknowledges many domains and relationships between domains we find an ultimate relationality rather than inherent nature.

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This dissertation examines college student understanding and attitudes toward biological evolution. In ethnographic work, I followed a cohort of 31 students through their required introductory biology class. In interviews, students discuss their life history with the concept - in school, at home, at church, and in their communities. For some Creationist students, confronting evolution in class has meant confronting existential issues regarding both the basis of science and the basis of faith. For other Creationist students, claims of evolution's theoretical strength are eschewed for its direct challenge to their worldview. For most students, science holds minimal interest against other values in their lives. Faculty and policy makers decry this as poor American science literacy which demands change. This work illustrates the gap between "ideal science literacy", and the everyday practices which result in half of Americans rejecting evolution as sound science.

Paradigmos sąvokos išklaida chronologiškai sekant T. Kuhno minties raidą. Aptariami trys paradigmos sąvokos raidos etapai ir kai kurios implikacijos, pavyzdžiui nebendramatiškumas ir sąntykis su Karlo Popperio kritiniu racionalizmu. / Thomas Kuhn's concept of paradigm is expounded by chronologically following his publications. Three different stages of development of the concept are analysed and then compared to Karl Popper's critical rationalism.