Abstract: The old established description gunboat diplomacy has in modern time changed to a broader and more nuanced definition called maritime diplomacy. But what is maritime diplomacy and how is it described? This essay analyses the theories from the Englishman James Cable and the American Edward Luttwak. Both Cable and Luttwak represent nations which have a global security interests and deploy their maritime forces worldwide. The foundation for their theories is power politics. Is it possible to apply their theories in a small-state perspective?   Analyze of Cable and Luttwaks theories crystallizes three categories that can be defined in maritime diplomacy: naval presence, naval coercion and naval deterrence. By applying these three categories on a case study I want to scrutinize if the categories is applicable on a small state. The Swedish naval expedition to Aland in 1918 works as case study. The aim is to see if today’s theory of maritime diplomacy is applicable on how a small-state uses their maritime forces.   The conclusion is that naval presence is suitable for a small-state to use. Naval presence gives room for political maneuvers and god possibilities to have an influence on the situation. Naval presence also gives reasonable security to own forces due to the possibility to withdrawal if the situation deteriorates.   Naval coercion is also useful for a small-state, but the situation should be thoroughly analyzed in order to have control over the course of events. The political will together with proper guidance is important for succeeding in naval coercion.   Naval deterrence can be used but depends on the relation between forces. A small-state can only deter an opponent that has less ability of power projection.