Cette étude porte sur un texte de l’Inde du IVe siècle, le Dharmadharmatāvibhāga (tib. chos dang chos nyid rnam par ’byed pa) et sur son application pratique. Elle propose une traduction française de la version tibétaine versifiée, celle des fragments sanskrits et celle du commentaire de Mipham. Elle offre ensuite un examen minutieux des stances, c’est-à-dire leur mise en contexte à l’aide des travaux de Bugault, de Mathes, de Brunnhölzl, etc. La question principale porte sur le constat de vacuité en tant que clé de l’adaptabilité de la pensée bouddhique, c’est-à-dire de sa capacité à « produire » du sens à travers le temps et pour diverses sociétés, particulièrement, en contexte occidental actuel, alors que des changements de fond prennent place. Pourtant, la notion de vacuité peut sembler beaucoup plus près d’une rupture de sens que d’une capacité d’en produire. En effet, on peut se demander à quoi peut servir la réflexion pointue qu’exige l’étude du DhDhV si tout est vide ; en d’autres mots, quel peut être le rôle de la pensée rationnelle devant un constat déjà établi, celui de vacuité ? / This study on the Dharmadharmatāvibhāga (DhDhV) looks at the practical aspect of this text. It provides a French translation of the versified version, of the Sanskrit fragments and of Mipham's commentary. It then provides an analysis of the stanzas giving historical and philosophical background according to the work of Bugault, Mathes, Brunnhölzl, etc. More precisely, these translations and analysis look at the Buddhist logical conclusion called 'emptiness' as a key to the adaptability of the Buddhist tradition through time and cultures. How can such a conclusion provide meaning, particularly at this critical time in which our societies are going through profound changes? Even though the idea of emptiness may seem closer to abort the search for meaning, even though the use of rational mind seems at odds with a conclusion already established, that of emptiness, this research shows that the DhDhV has something important to say about these questions.

Hans-Georg Gadamer rejects objectivism, the position that an interpreter may come to a single correct truth concerning any particular object, in favor of interpretive pluralism. What is not clear is how Gadamer grounds this position. This ambiguity leaves Gadamer open to multiple objectivist counters, ones which he would not wish to allow. The following argument, using a comparative and analytic approach, takes two concepts, pratītyasamutpāda (interdependence) and śūnyatā (emptiness), as they are deployed by Nāgārjuna to provide Gadamer with this much needed anti-objectivist foundation. Specifically, the new foundation is anti-realist in which interpreters and objects of interpretation are metaphysically empty, or devoid of independent existence, and are ultimately dependent on their “position” in a cultural and historical horizon. If there is no metaphysical object apart from the interpreter’s engagement with it, then there is no stable phenomenon to which objectivists may appeal.