by So Kwok Yu, Andy. / Bibliography: leaves 64-65 / Thesis (M.Ph.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1985

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2001. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 371-407).

The central doctrine of sufficientarianism is that there is a certain threshold below which people are said to be objectively "badly-off," and that providing benefits to people who fall into this category has a special moral urgency. A big part of sufficientarianism's success as a theory, then, relies on the ability to define the threshold in a manner that is non-arbitrary and that justifies a large difference in moral consideration between people who are on opposite sides of the threshold. This thesis examines some attempts to define such a threshold, and eventually concludes that no such threshold is available to us. However, while sufficientarianism may not work as a theory, sufficiency thresholds remain useful due to their practical ability to give useful instruction to policy makers in order to assist in resource distribution and the promotion of social justice. / Graduate

Human Genetic Enhancement (HGE) has the potential to provide great benefits to a large number of people in terms of alleviating inherited disease and disability and maximizing individual liberty. There are many arguments against research and application of this new technology based on a variety of grounds, including both deontological and consequentialist objections. In this thesis I examine arguments from both of these positions and argue that neither offers a satisfactory justification for prohibiting research into HGE nor do they demonstrate that the application of the knowledge gained from such research is necessarily wrong. I also suggest that there is a strong argument in favor of HGE in that it may offer a way to reduce the amount of disadvantage currently present in our society as a result of genetic disease and disability by addressing the genetic causes of these conditions. Further, I argue that the pursuit of HGE is necessary in order to promote individual liberty and promote equality of opportunity. Finally, I argue that by examining principles that require us to promote individual liberty we can establish the categories of enhancements which we should publicly fund and those that should merely be permissible. / Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2008-09-18 17:05:35.143

G.A. Cohen’s critique of John Rawls holds that it is insufficient to approach the problem of justice as one of principles governing laws and institutions alone. Instead, an appropriate social ethos must motivate the citizens to act from these principles in order to ensure that society is characterized by equality. The following will argue that Cohen’s concerns with Rawls are well-founded. However, even citizens motivated by a sense of justice will possess motives that are non-egoistic, yet inegalitarian in effect. Therefore, just citizens should not be expected to enact the same principles as just institutions. / Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2012-10-02 08:20:09.804

There is no abstract available for this dissertation.

Thesis (M.Phil.) - University of St Andrews, January 2007.

Thesis (M.A.)--Ohio University, November, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (p.87-88)

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Carleton University, 1992. / Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hong Kong, 2010. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 207-220). Also available in print.