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Cette thèse propose une étude des partenariats pour le développement en prenant pour exemple le cas du partenariat entre l’Inde et le Sénégal. La revendication de bénéficies mutuelles se trouve au cœur de ce partenariat. L’Inde et le Sénégal étant deux démocraties vibrantes, nous pouvons supposer que les dits bénéfices ont pour finalité d’augmenter le bien-être des citoyens de ces deux pays. Ainsi, cette thèse se fonde sur l’étude du développement dans la mesure où il contribue à l’augmentation des capacités, de la liberté et des perspectives du peuple dans les deux pays étudiés (comme le définit Amartya Sen 1999, 2002). Basée sur ces hypothèses, la thèse pose la question suivante : « Un partenariat revendiquant des bénéfices mutuels peut-il conduire à un développement mutuel ?». Le corollaire induit par cette problématique questionne l’équité dans la distribution des bénéfices aux partenaires, c’est-à-dire, est ce que le partenariat est équitable et juste comme il se revendique ? L’étude des acteurs, des motivations, des moyens, des instruments, des méthodes, de la nature et des finalités de ce partenariat feront objet de cette thèse. La thèse conclue en indiquant que les divergences, erreurs, l’ignorance, la malhonnêteté et même l’identification peuvent créer des désaccords en contradiction avec le comportement juste en faveur du développement. Néanmoins, en s’appuyant sur le travail de Froese (2001), Nussbaum (2011), Rawls (1999), Rousseau (2012) et Tocqueville (1981) la thèse soutient que le développement mutuel et juste est en faveur de la poursuite du partenariat. / Taking cue from Rawls’s (2012) work on distributive justice, the thesis studies development partnership through the case study of India and Senegal. Mutual benefits have been asserted time and again as the core element of this partnership. Being two thriving democracies, it shall be assumed that the ultimate beneficiaries of the ‘intended benefits’ are to be the people of India and Senegal. Hence, in this thesis we choose to see development as it should enhance capability, freedom and opportunity (as put forward by Sen 1999, 2002) for the citizens of the two countries being studied. With such beliefs, the thesis is naturally centred on the question, “Can a relationship based on mutual benefits lead to mutual development?” An important corollary to the problematic is the equity in the distribution of benefits adhering to the partners’ i.e. whether at all the partnership is equal and faire as it is claimed to be? It is hence, worth studying the ‘who’, the ‘why’, the ‘how’ and the ‘what’ of this partnership through the actors, the motivations, the means, the methods, the nature and the ‘ends’ of it. The thesis argues strongly in favour of equity for fair and sustainable development. The thesis argues that discrepancies, errors, identification, unawareness and unethical behaviour might lead to distortions from just behaviour expected in favour of development. However, drawing on the works of Froese (2001), Nussbaum (2011), Rawls (1999), Rousseau (2012) and Tocqueville (1981) the thesis concludes that fair, mutual development would be in the favour of the partnership.

The thesis analyzes some aspects of the theory of distributive lattices, particularly two representation theorems: Birkhoff's representation theorem for finite distributive lattices and Stone's representation theorem for infinite distributive lattices.

Many political theorists agree that an equal distribution of certain goods is a requirement of justice. However, they disagree about the types of agents that possess these distributive obligations, and about the range of agents who owe these obligations to each other. Are states primarily responsible for ensuring a just distribution of income? Or, is distributive justice also the responsibility of private individuals? Do agents – whether states or individuals – possess distributive obligations to foreigners? Or, is distributive justice only a requirement within national borders? I argue that the primary subject of distributive justice is the state’s relation to its citizens. States, and not private individuals, possess distributive obligations; and states only possess these obligations to their citizens, not to foreigners. I argue first that the state possesses distinctive distributive obligations to its citizens because of the way in which it exercises political authority over them. To exercise its political authority legitimately, that is, in a way that is consistent with the free and equal nature of its citizens, I argue, the state must secure a just distribution of civil liberties, political rights, income, and opportunities. I argue second that the subject of distributive justice does not extend beyond the state’s relation to its citizens. I argue first that principles of distributive justice do not apply to the private choices of citizens on the grounds that justice demands that citizens be free to decide what to do with their lives on the basis of their own conception of the good, and not on the basis of what is best for others. I argue second that because international organizations do not exercise political authority in the same way that states do, equality is not a demand of global justice.

Many political theorists agree that an equal distribution of certain goods is a requirement of justice. However, they disagree about the types of agents that possess these distributive obligations, and about the range of agents who owe these obligations to each other. Are states primarily responsible for ensuring a just distribution of income? Or, is distributive justice also the responsibility of private individuals? Do agents – whether states or individuals – possess distributive obligations to foreigners? Or, is distributive justice only a requirement within national borders? I argue that the primary subject of distributive justice is the state’s relation to its citizens. States, and not private individuals, possess distributive obligations; and states only possess these obligations to their citizens, not to foreigners. I argue first that the state possesses distinctive distributive obligations to its citizens because of the way in which it exercises political authority over them. To exercise its political authority legitimately, that is, in a way that is consistent with the free and equal nature of its citizens, I argue, the state must secure a just distribution of civil liberties, political rights, income, and opportunities. I argue second that the subject of distributive justice does not extend beyond the state’s relation to its citizens. I argue first that principles of distributive justice do not apply to the private choices of citizens on the grounds that justice demands that citizens be free to decide what to do with their lives on the basis of their own conception of the good, and not on the basis of what is best for others. I argue second that because international organizations do not exercise political authority in the same way that states do, equality is not a demand of global justice.

The problem of this investigation is to prepare a merchandise display manual that can be used by the teacher-coordinator, students of distributive education, other trainees, training sponsors, and salespeople.