This thesis examines the treatment of tax in investor-state arbitration of expropriation and national treatment protection. The root of the study is the special characterisation of tax in the sovereignty of the state and the consequent sensitivity of states to have their tax policies being the subject of private adjudication. Tax has in the past been characterised as a non-arbitrable matter, but that is true only if states have purposefully deemed them so under the international investment treaties that they are party to. Tax is generally arbitrable under the expropriation provisions of international investment treaties, but states are seldom found liable for tax expropriation. National treatment, on the other hand, is generally not arbitrable under international investment treaties, but when an investment treaty permits the arbitration of alleged national treatment tax violations, violations are affirmed in more cases than not. The reason behind the comparable success rates is the difficulty in proving the existence of expropriation by taxation whereas national treatment tax violations are comparatively easier to substantiate. This thesis establishes what constitutes a tax expropriation, and how the success rate of claims for national treatment tax violations justifies the general exclusion of the application of national treatment protection to tax matters for sovereignty retention. In order to achieve the foregoing, this thesis examines sovereignty and the sovereign power to tax; the relinquishment of tax sovereignty under international investment treaties; the arbitrability of tax and the reasoning behind the reluctance of states to submit tax disputes to arbitration; the capability of tax to be expropriatory; the fundamentals of the expropriation standard under customary international law and international investment treaties and how they are applied by arbitral tribunals in tax expropriation claims; and the fundamentals of the national treatment protection and how they are applied by arbitral tribunals in claims for national treatment tax violations.

葉立欽時期十多年的自由民主改革實踐，使俄羅斯陷入了嚴重的困境。在殘酷的現實面前，俄羅斯人民希冀政治權威的產生。 藉由觀察尤科斯集團的崛起以及日後的「尤科斯事件」，我們發現俄羅斯社會轉型時期金融寡頭集團勢力的形成有其深刻的社會因素。隨著金融寡頭們自身實力的不斷增強，其對社會的阻礙作用日益顯露。普京上台後欲推行權威政治改革，不斷的加強總統集權，然而他所面臨的挑戰之一即是俄羅斯金融寡頭問題。為此，普京企圖以打擊經濟犯罪為名，打擊金融寡頭，藉以收攬人心，從而裂解葉立欽時期所遺留下來的「家族」集團勢力，建立以國家安全團隊為主幹的執政團隊，以鞏固其政權基礎。 普京執政以來，放棄空洞的「民主」口號，在社會政治領域建立以總統集權為核心的「可控式民主」，為社會發展和經濟提升提供了有力的保障。觀察俄羅斯近來所舉行的議會選舉和總統大選顯示出俄羅斯的政治力量對比、社會情緒和社會意識型態已發生變化。總統普京的聲望亦達到頂點。俄羅斯政治將進入以可控式民主為特點的新時期。 關鍵詞：金融寡頭、尤科斯事件、葉立欽、普京、可控式民主 / More than ten years of free demorcratic reforms of the Yeltsin’s era made the Russia society get into serious trouble. In face of the ruthless reality, Russian people call for the return of political authority. Through observing the establishment of “Yukos Group” and the development of “Yukos Incident”, we know that at the beginning of Russia transition, the financial oligarch groups came into being for deeply social reasons. With amplifying in energy, the financial oligarch groups have hampered the social development more and more seriously. After coming into power, Putin wants to promote the authoritarian political reforms and enhance president’s absolute power continuously. However, one of the challenges he faced to is the problem of Russian financial oligarch groups. Because of this, Russian president Putin was attempted to wipe out some of these oligarchs in the name of combat against economic crimes, in order to rally the popular support, to wipe out the “Family” force left by Yeltsin’s regime and replace them with a new ruling command of national security elite, and to consolidate his own power. Since Putin took power from Yeltsin, he has dropped empty “ Democratic” slogans and instituted “ Controllable Democracy” in the socio- political field with presidential power as the core, providing powerful guarantee for socio- political development and economic rejuvenation. Through observing the recent parliamentary and presidential elections held in Russia, it shows that Putin’s power and influence have reached the climax with the change in the balance of political forces, social mood and social ideology in Russia. With this, Russia has entered into a new period featuring “ Controllable Democracy”. Keywords: Financial Oligarchs, Yukos Incident, Yeltsin, Putin, Controllable Democracy

Different interpretations of the New York Convention’s Article V(1)(e) have caused inconsistencies regarding how courts deal with applications for enforcement of annulled foreign arbitral awards. Court cases from various Contracting States display that the courts have adopted different approaches to this matter. With the rising number of challenges of awards, the issue has become increasingly important. The author examines international case law to analyze the issue of enforcement of annulled arbitral awards with the purpose of suggesting a possible Swedish approach. A number of aspects support the view that national courts have discretion when deciding whether to enforce a foreign arbitral award notwithstanding that has been annulled in the country of origin. Both the New York Convention and the Swedish Arbitration Act leaves narrow room for the court to exercise this discretion. The author suggests that enforcement of an annulled foreign arbitral award should be possible in Sweden under certain exceptional circumstances. If the competent authority in the country where the award was made annuls the award for reasons totally unacceptable from a Swedish point of view, the option to enforce the foreign arbitral award in Sweden should still be available. This approach is in line with the wording and purpose of both the New York Convention and the Swedish Arbitration Act. The suggested Swedish approach would not cause any serious uncertainty for the parties to the arbitration, but would create a necessary safety-valve for the courts to avoid having to refuse enforcement of a foreign arbitral award when it has been set aside for obscure reasons or by a corrupt court. As is evident from international case law, the interpretation and application of Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention varies depending on what country enforcement is sought. To avoid contributing to further inconsistencies, it is necessary for Swedish authorities and practitioners to consider the issues addressed in the study.

The absence of a relevant legal basis between huge commercial partners such as the EU as a single entity and the Russian Federation promoted the emergence of a legal vacuum. The long term cooperation between Russia and the EU has only one bilateral agreement - the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation signed in 1994, which is however obsolete, and does not meet the contemporary needs. The adequate legal basis for Russia-EU cooperation in the gas sector is still missing. The protection of investments in the gas sector is being realized by bilateral agreements between Russia and EU member states, soft law and general international agreements, without any specifications for those two partners. The only international instrument covering the energy relations of these two partners - Energy Charter Treaty cannot be considered as a reliable mechanism, as Russia withdrew from it more than 8 years ago. The reasons of the withdrawal and the Yukos case as an illustrative example are discussed in this paper. In order to avoid uncertainty in such strategic area as gas investment relations and unpredictable decisions between the states represented by the commercial entities, there is a need to design a substantive legal basis, and a need to consider on the adequate dispute resolution body. In this thesis, key...