財務報表為制訂授信決策之重要資訊來源，而穩健會計可增加公司財務報表的資訊品質。本研究實證探討當公司採行穩健會計時，是否可降低銀行融資超貸之可能性，使銀行願意為了穩健財務報表的效益，而降低公司需支付的債務融資成本。 本研究以1997至2008年之5,507筆觀察值為研究樣本，依Beaver and Ryan（2005）之分類，將穩健會計衡量指標分為非條件式穩健會計與條件式穩健會計，分析公司會計穩健程度對銀行融資利率的影響，並探討公允價值會計是否會影響條件式穩健會計與銀行融資利率之關聯性。 本研究之主要實證結果顯示，非條件式穩健會計與條件式穩健會計皆與銀行融資利率呈負向關係；公允價值會計之採用與銀行融資利率呈負向關係，且正向影響條件式穩健會計與銀行融資利率之關聯性。非條件式穩健會計與銀行給予融資超貸之風險呈負向關係，但條件式穩健會計與銀行給予融資超貸風險之關聯性並不一致。額外之測試顯示，主要實證發現不因改採其他方式衡量銀行融資利率，或以稅前息前淨利取代稅前息前折舊前淨利衡量超貸風險而有改變。 / Financial statement is one of important resources to credit decisions making. Conservatism increases the quality of financial statement. Based on the definition of types of accounting conservatism, unconditional and conditional, proposed by Beaver and Ryan (2005), and the use of a sample of 5,507 firm-year financial data from 1997 to 2008, this study investigates conservatism effects on the over-loan risks from borrowers through bank loan pricing. The primary empirical findings indicate that a significantly negative association exits between unconditional (conditional) conservatism and bank loan pricing. In addition, a significantly negative association exits between fair-value accounting and bank loan pricing, and the adoption of fair-value accounting affect the association between conditional conservatism and bank loan pricing. Moreover, the result also shows that a significantly negative association exits between unconditional conservatism and the over-loan risks. The analysis of additional tests indicates that the primary findings held when alternative measurements of interest rates are used for proxy variables for bank loan pricing and EBIT is used for proxy variables for EBITDA.

本論文之研究目的係驗證銀行管理當局是透過盈餘平穩化，增加盈餘對於未來盈餘的訊息，抑或是操控會計數字從而降低盈餘品質。本文採用兩種指標衡量盈餘平穩化：裁決性的貸款損失準備與公允價值第二等級與第三等級輸入值。以美國銀行作為本論文的樣本標的，經由實證結果發現，盈餘平穩化程度較高的銀行其股價能反映更多未來盈餘的資訊，顯示著平穩化程度會增加銀行當期盈餘對於未來盈餘的預測能力。除此之外，本文依照銀行規模與業務特性，分別比較大小銀行;商業銀行與儲蓄機構，個別探討盈餘平穩化和盈餘資訊性間的關聯。 / This paper investigates whether bank income smoothing is due to communication of future earnings or opportunism to garble accounting numbers. I adopt two measures of bank income smoothing, i.e., discretionary loan loss provision and Level 2&3 fair value inputs. Using a sample of U.S. banks, I find that higher-smoothing banks’ current stock prices capture more information about their future earnings to a larger extent than those of lower-smoothing banks. Moreover, I separate the bigger banks from the small banks and differentiate commercial banks from saving institutions to particularly investigate the association between income smoothing and earnings informativeness.

本研究探討台灣於2011年依據IAS 39進行34號公報之第三次修訂實施，採用已發生損失模型後的兩項議題：（1）放款壞帳費用之提列與盈餘波動性以及資本適足率波動性之關聯性，（2）以歷史成本評價之期末金額及以公允價值評價之期末金額，究竟何者對於未來之帳款沖銷與不良債權較具有關聯性。 實證結果顯示，自2011年採用已發生損失模型後盈餘波動性無顯著之變化，且壞帳費用對於盈餘波動性無解釋能力；而自2011年後資本適足率波動性亦無顯著變化，但壞帳費用對於資本適足率波動性有顯著的影響，顯示銀行明顯透過壞帳費用之提列進行資本管理而非盈餘管理。在未來信用損失預測之部分，以歷史成本評價之期末放款金額對於未來之帳款沖銷及不良債權有顯著的負相關，而以公允價值評價之期末放款金額對於未來之帳款沖銷及不良債權卻無解釋能力，可能係因未來帳款沖銷與未來不良債權之發生與放款之帳齡有顯著的關聯性，而與未來可收取之現金流量無顯著之相關。 / This study aims to investigate how Incurred Loss Model affects the recognition of loan loss provisions and the valuation of loans due to the third revision of SFAS No. 34 which was revised based on IAS 39 in 2011. For the recognition of loan loss provisions, it focuses on the relationship with earnings volatilities and capital adequacy volatilities, and for the valuation of loans, it specializes on whether credit loss predicting is related to historical cost accounting or fair value accounting. The result shows that, since the implementation of Incurred Loss Model in 2011, both the adoption of Incurred Loss Model and the loan loss provisions have no significant impact on earnings volatilities. For capital adequacy volatilities, implementing Incurred Loss Model has no effect on capital adequacy volatilities neither. However, the loan loss provisions since 2011 significantly enhance the volatilities of capital adequacy. It reveals that banks use loan loss provisions to manage capitals instead of earnings. For credit loss predicting, loans evaluated with historical cost accounting have significant negative relations with future charge-offs and non-performing loans while loans evaluated under fair value accounting do not have any explanation power. It may suggests that future charge-offs and non-performing loans are related to the aging of loans, but not the future payoffs of loans.