本研究以2005年勞退新制為例，探討資遣費對資遣率之影響。在勞退新制實施之後，資遣費的給付額度不僅大幅減少，還多了上限，因此，基於資遣費往往被視為雇主所直接面對的資遣成本，資遣率是否會受到勞退新制中資遣費改變的影響，為本研究欲探討分析的議題。本研究資料來源為人力運用擬-追蹤調查資料庫，研究方法使用差異中之差異法(difference in differences)，並依據員工是否適用於勞基法，將樣本劃分為實驗組與對照組進行分析。實證結果顯示，資遣費對於資遣率並無顯著的影響力，因此政府若希望資遣費制度能有預防雇主任意資遣員工的效果，則現行的資遣費制度可能無法達到此目標，而未來是否需要針對資遣費進行修法仍有討論空間。 / This study uses the 2005 Labor Pension Act (LPA) in Taiwan as the quasi-experiment to analyze the impact of severance pay on the layoff rate. After implementation of LPA, severance pay is reduced significantly and constrained by an upper boundary. Since severance pay is often considered as the firing cost, whether the layoff rate is affected by the largely reduced severance pay is what this study expects to analyze. Data used in this study are drawn from the Manpower Utility Quasi – Longitudinal Survey (MUQLS). In order to apply the difference in differences method, the observations are divided into the treatment group and the reference group according to the coverage of the Labor Standards Act (LSA). The empirical results suggest that severance pay has no significant impact on the layoff rate. Therefore, if severance pay is expected to prevent the arbitrary layoff, the current severance pay system might not achieve this goal and some modifications of this system might be necessary.