2001年底，中國大陸加入WTO，2006年12月11日屆滿五年，從這一天開始中國大陸兌現了入世的承諾。為了因應入世之後的金融發展，中國大陸陸續在2006年11月頒布了「中華人民共和國外資銀行管理條例」及「中華人民共和國外資銀行管理條例實施細則」並規定從進入WTO滿五年的同一天開始施行。也就是說中國大陸的銀行業將從這一天開始完全開放市場給外資銀行，世界各主要國家的銀行業也早就準備好了進入中國大陸這個被看作是二十一世紀新的經濟強國。 中國大陸從1978改革開放到現在己經跨越了29個年頭，其金融體系從人民銀行的「統存統貸」一元化管理逐步開放，外資銀行也從當時僅有的渣打銀行、匯豐銀行、東亞銀行和華僑銀行四家自國民政府時代即已存在的代表處快速增加，到2006年底在中國註冊的外資獨資銀行和合資的法人銀行機構共有14家，下設19家分支行及附屬機構；22個國家和地區的74家外資銀行在中國大陸的25個城市設立了200家分行和79家支行；42個國家和地區的186家外資銀行在中國大陸的24個城市設立了個242代表處。 從1980年代台灣開放赴大陸探親之前，台商就陸續透過各種管道進入大陸市場發展，根據經濟部的統計，經核准對中國大陸的投資從1996年的12.29億美元增加到2006年的76.42億美元，這還不包括未經正式管道進入大陸市場的投資在內。台灣的銀行業也視大陸為未來不得不進入的市場，但由於兩岸特殊的政治環境，雖然目前己有彰化銀行、國泰世華銀行、合作金庫、華南銀行、中國信託銀行、第一銀行和土地銀行七家銀行在大陸設有代表處，兩岸的金融往來仍然極不明確。早在七家銀行進入大陸之前就有上海商業儲蓄銀行運用其兩岸三地長期經營的關係建構了上海商業儲蓄銀行模式運作，此一模式到目前為止仍可能是運作最有成效的模式之一；其他如華一銀行模式則屬於大陸註冊銀行，可能面臨股改問題；富邦銀行(香港)模式則是想利用大陸與香港簽訂CEPA的途徑進入，但仍未能如願；至於建華銀行模式則更為迂迴，期望藉由在美國的子銀行建立兩岸四地的環太平洋金融圈，目前仍在持續發展中。 本研究期望就台灣銀行業的競爭優劣勢和可能面對的機會與挑戰，探討各種可能進入大陸市場的方式。經本研究探索發現台灣銀行業進入大陸市場的最大障礙為政治面的意識型態，由於意識型態的影響，金融面的可行方案變得困難重重，這使得對台灣銀行業最有利的直接進入方式，包括設立代表處、分行、子行等方式受到嚴重的局限，更嚴重的是目前已在大陸設有代表處的七家銀行，明(2008)年將陸續面臨換照問題，如果因政治面的影響而喪失換領新許可的機會，對台灣銀行業的影響將更為鉅大。而以迂迴模式進入則宜避開外資銀行競爭激烈的地區進行策略聯盟，或採行對大陸城市商業銀行、農村商業銀行、可能面臨股改的銀行等進行參股，可能是比較可能採行的途徑。 此外，本研究除就探索發現的情形，對政府提供建議，設法儘速簽訂金融監理備忘錄(MOU)，讓台灣銀行業能及早進入大陸市場發展外，也期望台灣銀行業能增強其核心業務、大陸金融管理人才及系統化的台商資料庫，以利加強在進行參股或策略聯盟談判時的優勢，讓台灣銀行業未來的發展能在較為有利的位置。因為，經濟面的發展對政治面議題要求有極重要的影響力。 / As of December 11, 2006, China had become a member of World Trade Organization (“WTO”) for five years since she entered the WTO in the end of 2001. As of the date, China started exercising to fulfill her promises on joining the WTO. Among all her endeavors, Chinese administration promulgated “Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Administration of Foreign-funded Banks” in November, 2001, in order to adapt to the new development of the financial service industry after entering the WTO. The law went in effect on December 11, 2006. China, abide by the law, opened her domestic financial market to foreign banks. In the meantime, major foreign banks had prepared to compete in, and benefit from, Chinese market, the most fast-growing market in the 21st century. It has been 29 years since China adopted the “reform and opening up” policy in 1978. The Chinese financial institution has gradually transformed from the “monopolistic lending-and-deposit” by The People’s Bank of China to a more pluralistic one. The number of foreign-funded banks has drastically increased from four in the year 1949, Standard Chartered Bank, Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited (“HSBC”), The Bank of East Asia, and OCBC Bank, to a much larger number. In 2006, 14 wholly foreign-funded or Chinese-foreign joint venture banks were registered in China; 74 foreign-funded banks from 22 different countries found 200 branches and 79 sub-branches in 25 cities in China; 186 foreign-funded banks from 42 countries set up 242 representative offices in 24 cities in China. Even prior to the 80s, the era in which Taiwanese administration first allows its citizens to visit families in Mainland China, Taiwanese business persons have undertaken various kinds of measures to enter the Chinese market. According to Ministry of Economic Affairs, Taiwanese investment on Mainland China has increased from 1.229 billion USD in 1996 to 7.642 billion USD in 2006. This number does not take into account the informal/unauthorized investments. Certainly, Taiwanese financial service industry considers Mainland China an imperious market to enter. Nonetheless, due to special political circumstances between Taiwan Strait, the commerce of financial industries between the two sides is uncertain; though seven Taiwanese banks, Chang Hwa Bank, Cathay United Bank, Taiwan Cooperative Bank, Hua Nan Bank, Chinatrust Commercial Bank, The First Commercial Bank, and Land Bank of Taiwan, have set up their representative offices in Mainland China. In fact, even before the entry of the seven banks, The Shanghai Commercial and Saving Bank Ltd. took advantage of its long-term business relation between and among Mainland China, Hong-Kong, and Taiwan to establish and practice a model which has been proven one of the most successful models regarding banking business in the “greater China economic sphere”. There are other banks that experiment different models and encounter different hardships. For instances, First Sino Bank registered in China, and therefore recently faced the demand for share ownership structure reform. Fubon Bank (HK) attempted to enter the Chinese market through China-Hong-Kong CEPA, but it has not been successful. Bank SinoPac took a circuitous path by which it expected its sub-bank in the USA to establish the financial sphere around the Pacific Rim that included Mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and USA, though this model is still under development. This study investigates kinds of potential paths for Taiwanese banks to enter the Chinese market, with an emphasis on the discussion on the competitive strength, weakness, opportunity, and threats of the Taiwanese banks. It was found that the major obstacle for Taiwanese banks to enter the Chinese market would be the political ideology, which rendered difficulty for Taiwanese financial service industry to practice banking business in Mainland China. The most advantageous way for Taiwanese banks, direct entrance, including founding representative offices, branches, and sub-branches, was therefore seriously limited. Worse, the seven banks which have set up representative offices in Mainland China will need to renew their licenses starting from next year (2008). If the renewal is spited for political reasons, the adverse impact on Taiwanese banks will be huge. A more feasible way might be somehow circuitous, by which Taiwanese banks build strategic alliance with, or invest in, domestic urban commercial banks, rural commercial banks, and banks reforming their share ownership structure, avoiding competitive regional markets where foreign-funded banks have already taken root. Lastly, this study not only provide tangible suggestions to the Taiwanese government, including signing the Memorandum of Understanding on supervision and regulation of the financial services and allowing Taiwanese banks to enter the Chinese market as soon as possible, but anticipate Taiwanese banks to improve their own profession and core business, and establish the database of their customers who have already established businesses in Mainland China, and promote their managerial skills of international banking. These are feasible measures to bring Taiwanese banks an advantageous position in future development in China while negotiating for shares or strategic alliances. After all, demands come from economic development can alter the political will.