2001年底，中國大陸加入WTO，2006年12月11日屆滿五年，從這一天開始中國大陸兌現了入世的承諾。為了因應入世之後的金融發展，中國大陸陸續在2006年11月頒布了「中華人民共和國外資銀行管理條例」及「中華人民共和國外資銀行管理條例實施細則」並規定從進入WTO滿五年的同一天開始施行。也就是說中國大陸的銀行業將從這一天開始完全開放市場給外資銀行，世界各主要國家的銀行業也早就準備好了進入中國大陸這個被看作是二十一世紀新的經濟強國。 中國大陸從1978改革開放到現在己經跨越了29個年頭，其金融體系從人民銀行的「統存統貸」一元化管理逐步開放，外資銀行也從當時僅有的渣打銀行、匯豐銀行、東亞銀行和華僑銀行四家自國民政府時代即已存在的代表處快速增加，到2006年底在中國註冊的外資獨資銀行和合資的法人銀行機構共有14家，下設19家分支行及附屬機構；22個國家和地區的74家外資銀行在中國大陸的25個城市設立了200家分行和79家支行；42個國家和地區的186家外資銀行在中國大陸的24個城市設立了個242代表處。 從1980年代台灣開放赴大陸探親之前，台商就陸續透過各種管道進入大陸市場發展，根據經濟部的統計，經核准對中國大陸的投資從1996年的12.29億美元增加到2006年的76.42億美元，這還不包括未經正式管道進入大陸市場的投資在內。台灣的銀行業也視大陸為未來不得不進入的市場，但由於兩岸特殊的政治環境，雖然目前己有彰化銀行、國泰世華銀行、合作金庫、華南銀行、中國信託銀行、第一銀行和土地銀行七家銀行在大陸設有代表處，兩岸的金融往來仍然極不明確。早在七家銀行進入大陸之前就有上海商業儲蓄銀行運用其兩岸三地長期經營的關係建構了上海商業儲蓄銀行模式運作，此一模式到目前為止仍可能是運作最有成效的模式之一；其他如華一銀行模式則屬於大陸註冊銀行，可能面臨股改問題；富邦銀行(香港)模式則是想利用大陸與香港簽訂CEPA的途徑進入，但仍未能如願；至於建華銀行模式則更為迂迴，期望藉由在美國的子銀行建立兩岸四地的環太平洋金融圈，目前仍在持續發展中。 本研究期望就台灣銀行業的競爭優劣勢和可能面對的機會與挑戰，探討各種可能進入大陸市場的方式。經本研究探索發現台灣銀行業進入大陸市場的最大障礙為政治面的意識型態，由於意識型態的影響，金融面的可行方案變得困難重重，這使得對台灣銀行業最有利的直接進入方式，包括設立代表處、分行、子行等方式受到嚴重的局限，更嚴重的是目前已在大陸設有代表處的七家銀行，明(2008)年將陸續面臨換照問題，如果因政治面的影響而喪失換領新許可的機會，對台灣銀行業的影響將更為鉅大。而以迂迴模式進入則宜避開外資銀行競爭激烈的地區進行策略聯盟，或採行對大陸城市商業銀行、農村商業銀行、可能面臨股改的銀行等進行參股，可能是比較可能採行的途徑。 此外，本研究除就探索發現的情形，對政府提供建議，設法儘速簽訂金融監理備忘錄(MOU)，讓台灣銀行業能及早進入大陸市場發展外，也期望台灣銀行業能增強其核心業務、大陸金融管理人才及系統化的台商資料庫，以利加強在進行參股或策略聯盟談判時的優勢，讓台灣銀行業未來的發展能在較為有利的位置。因為，經濟面的發展對政治面議題要求有極重要的影響力。 / As of December 11, 2006, China had become a member of World Trade Organization (“WTO”) for five years since she entered the WTO in the end of 2001. As of the date, China started exercising to fulfill her promises on joining the WTO. Among all her endeavors, Chinese administration promulgated “Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Administration of Foreign-funded Banks” in November, 2001, in order to adapt to the new development of the financial service industry after entering the WTO. The law went in effect on December 11, 2006. China, abide by the law, opened her domestic financial market to foreign banks. In the meantime, major foreign banks had prepared to compete in, and benefit from, Chinese market, the most fast-growing market in the 21st century. It has been 29 years since China adopted the “reform and opening up” policy in 1978. The Chinese financial institution has gradually transformed from the “monopolistic lending-and-deposit” by The People’s Bank of China to a more pluralistic one. The number of foreign-funded banks has drastically increased from four in the year 1949, Standard Chartered Bank, Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited (“HSBC”), The Bank of East Asia, and OCBC Bank, to a much larger number. In 2006, 14 wholly foreign-funded or Chinese-foreign joint venture banks were registered in China; 74 foreign-funded banks from 22 different countries found 200 branches and 79 sub-branches in 25 cities in China; 186 foreign-funded banks from 42 countries set up 242 representative offices in 24 cities in China. Even prior to the 80s, the era in which Taiwanese administration first allows its citizens to visit families in Mainland China, Taiwanese business persons have undertaken various kinds of measures to enter the Chinese market. According to Ministry of Economic Affairs, Taiwanese investment on Mainland China has increased from 1.229 billion USD in 1996 to 7.642 billion USD in 2006. This number does not take into account the informal/unauthorized investments. Certainly, Taiwanese financial service industry considers Mainland China an imperious market to enter. Nonetheless, due to special political circumstances between Taiwan Strait, the commerce of financial industries between the two sides is uncertain; though seven Taiwanese banks, Chang Hwa Bank, Cathay United Bank, Taiwan Cooperative Bank, Hua Nan Bank, Chinatrust Commercial Bank, The First Commercial Bank, and Land Bank of Taiwan, have set up their representative offices in Mainland China. In fact, even before the entry of the seven banks, The Shanghai Commercial and Saving Bank Ltd. took advantage of its long-term business relation between and among Mainland China, Hong-Kong, and Taiwan to establish and practice a model which has been proven one of the most successful models regarding banking business in the “greater China economic sphere”. There are other banks that experiment different models and encounter different hardships. For instances, First Sino Bank registered in China, and therefore recently faced the demand for share ownership structure reform. Fubon Bank (HK) attempted to enter the Chinese market through China-Hong-Kong CEPA, but it has not been successful. Bank SinoPac took a circuitous path by which it expected its sub-bank in the USA to establish the financial sphere around the Pacific Rim that included Mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and USA, though this model is still under development. This study investigates kinds of potential paths for Taiwanese banks to enter the Chinese market, with an emphasis on the discussion on the competitive strength, weakness, opportunity, and threats of the Taiwanese banks. It was found that the major obstacle for Taiwanese banks to enter the Chinese market would be the political ideology, which rendered difficulty for Taiwanese financial service industry to practice banking business in Mainland China. The most advantageous way for Taiwanese banks, direct entrance, including founding representative offices, branches, and sub-branches, was therefore seriously limited. Worse, the seven banks which have set up representative offices in Mainland China will need to renew their licenses starting from next year (2008). If the renewal is spited for political reasons, the adverse impact on Taiwanese banks will be huge. A more feasible way might be somehow circuitous, by which Taiwanese banks build strategic alliance with, or invest in, domestic urban commercial banks, rural commercial banks, and banks reforming their share ownership structure, avoiding competitive regional markets where foreign-funded banks have already taken root. Lastly, this study not only provide tangible suggestions to the Taiwanese government, including signing the Memorandum of Understanding on supervision and regulation of the financial services and allowing Taiwanese banks to enter the Chinese market as soon as possible, but anticipate Taiwanese banks to improve their own profession and core business, and establish the database of their customers who have already established businesses in Mainland China, and promote their managerial skills of international banking. These are feasible measures to bring Taiwanese banks an advantageous position in future development in China while negotiating for shares or strategic alliances. After all, demands come from economic development can alter the political will.

國內的金融市場在1990年政府提倡開放金融自由化後，新銀行如雨後春筍般的設立，台灣的金融體系面臨內部結構的改變，金融機構自由競爭化，而外部環境的惡化更衝擊台灣的金融體系，造成銀行業逾期放款比率屢創新高，損害銀行資產品質，轉銷呆帳損失或出售不良債權嚴重影響獲利與資本，因此金融業者與政府當局皆重視逾期放款比率的重要影響性。 本文的研究目的在於探討影響國內銀行業逾期放款比率的因素，以1999年至2010年期間共16家本國銀行的資料，建立長期追蹤資料模型進行迴歸實證分析，以估計出影響逾期放款比率因素之具體效果，提供主管機關及金融業者在未來相關政策與策略上之參考。 經由實證分析結果發現，資產總額規模與逾期放款比率呈顯著負相關。資本適足率與逾期放款比率呈顯著負相關。存放比率與逾期放款比率呈顯著負相關。存放款利差與逾期放款比率呈顯著正相關。關係人放款比率與逾期放款比率呈顯著正相關。失業率與逾期放款比率呈顯著正相關。發生重大經濟事件與逾期放款比率呈顯著正相關。

隨著兩岸金融政策的開放，國內銀行將會面臨新的局勢。中國大陸經濟崛起是台灣銀行業者的發展契機，同時因為兩岸在經濟與金融發展脈絡上的不同，亦會造成雙邊交流的阻礙，在機會與困境的新局中，國內銀行要如何找出因應之道將會格外重要。 本文透過文獻回顧、SWOT與個案分析的方式描繪出，未來可能出現的交流新貌。首先在文獻回顧上，台灣目前面臨銀行家數過多的問題，雖然歷經多次改革但是成效仍舊相對有限，未來銀行在中國大陸拓展事業版圖後，有機會改善國內的金融環境。 其次在SWOT分析中，台灣銀行產業發展得較早，所以培養出不少優秀的人才，而且銀行也擁有成熟的金融技術，此為國內銀行交流的優勢，不過國內銀行面對大陸銀行的競爭，規模與營業據點不足卻是發展上的劣勢。 最後在個案分析中，外資金融機構赴大陸發展，其業務經營方向越來越偏向當地市場，不僅各國逐漸轉型為獨資外資銀行，而且也開始經營本地業務，未來國內銀行也應該把目光從台商轉到大陸市場。 兩岸金融談判持續進行，期盼雙方可以透過了解降低雙邊交流可能造成的摩擦，更希望兩岸在互信互利的基礎下，共同創造出繁榮的大中華經濟圈。 / Open cross-strait financial policy has led to domestic banks are facing a new situation. China market is an opportunity for banks in Taiwan,but different financial environment will result in communication barriers. In this situation, how to find the solution is an important issue. We have gone through ‘Literature Review’,’ SWOT analysis’,’ Case Studies’ and reached conclusion. In the literature review, Taiwan faces overbanking problems in recent years. Although domestic reform several times but the effect is relatively limited. Banks enter the Chinese mainland market, overbanking will be improved. In the SWOT analysis. talent and technology is the development advantages.Industry of bank started early, so the country has many excellent financial professionals. Taiwan has also been leading in the financial technology. It’s the bank's strength. However, domestic banks face competition from mainland banks, lack of scale and business units are the disadvantages of the development. In the case studies, foreign financial institutions enter the Chinese market, more and more close to the local business direction. Foreign Capital Bank not only transformed into wholly foreign funded commercial bank, but also operating a local business. Domestic banks should also target customers from Taiwan enterprises into local enterprises in the future. In the ECFA framework, the Government will continue to conduct financial negotiations. Hope that through exchanges across the Taiwan Strait to reduce cross-strait friction. Taiwan and China Construction China Economic Circle.

銀行為資金融通的中介，在經濟體中佔有舉足輕重的地位。過去多使用Malmqusit 總生產力指數來衡量生產力的變化，然而Malmquist 總生產力指數雖易於分解，卻不具相乘完整性（multiplicatively complete），可能產生偏誤的情況，因此本文採用具有相乘完整性之Hicks-Moorsteen 總生產力指數，並根據O’Donnell所提出的分解方式，將生產力變動分解為技術變動、效率變動、規模效率變動與組合變動，同時總生產力指數與交易條件指數的乘積為利潤力指數，有助於了解在交易條件改變時會如何影響廠商的生產決策。 本文研究發現台灣銀行業在追求產出極大、投入極小，以提升經營績效時，卻因交易條件逐年惡化，導致利潤力呈現衰退，因此相對於總生產力，台灣銀行業的交易條件及利潤力還有待改善。生產力指數的各拆解項在2004-2005年交易條件指數大幅成長時呈現衰退，2008-2009年交易條件指數衰退時，產出技術效率指數、產出組合效率指數及殘餘組合效率指數為成長，其中產出組合效率、剩餘產出組合效率的變動與產出、投入數量有關，因此也與交易條件指數關係密切。最後根據統計檢定結果顯示Hicks-Moorsteen總生產力指數及Malmquist 總生產力指數具有顯著的差異性。

自2010年6月我國與中國大陸簽署《ECFA》後，我國銀行業者開始將其在中國大陸的辦事處升格為分行，截至目前(2015年5月底)為止，已有6家台資銀行在中國大陸的分行開始營業，此為兩岸金融業交流的重大突破，但不可否認的是，我國銀行業在登陸時程上已落後其他外資銀行許多，要想急起直追，除了透過我國政府在後續《ECFA》談判中替台灣銀行業者爭取到更有利的條件外，台灣銀行業者也要積極尋找在中國大陸市場中業務突破的機會，如何善用我方同文同種、廣大台商客群以及過去金融服務業發展經驗等競爭優勢，以及如何把握住中國大陸政府未來的發展方向，這些都有待深入之探討。 本研究首先說明外資銀行在中國大陸的發展現況，並將普華永道會計師事務所2010年5月出版的「外資銀行在中國」之內容作一整理，從中國大陸外資銀行業者的角度觀察目前中國大陸市場所面臨到的挑戰與機會，接著針對2007到2009年外資銀行在中國大陸的財務數據作績效分析，當作台資銀行業登陸之借鏡，然後彙整出兩岸對台灣銀行業登陸之相關法令，同時整理出目前台灣銀行業的登陸情形，並利用外資銀行在中國大陸的發展經驗，探討台灣銀行業登陸後的業務發展機會以及未來可能發展，最後做出結論與建議。

本文利用可以同時捕捉到銀行增加意欲產出、減少投入與減少非意欲產出的方向距離函數，評估台灣銀行業與個別銀行在民國93年至97年的無效率值與生產力變化。設定逾期放款為銀行生產放款時的非意欲產出，以考量銀行的放款品質，也考慮到銀行都會付出成本來提供服務給存戶，因此以交易性存款作為銀行提供服務的替代變數，使銀行的服務包含在效率評估內，並以固定的方向向量作為無效率值加總的基礎，來衡量台灣整體銀行業的無效率。實證結果是台灣銀行業的無效率值隨著雙卡風暴的遠去，有逐年遞減的趨勢，生產力的變化則是退步的情況較多。 / In this paper we estimate Taiwanese banks’ efficiency and productivity change during 2004-2008. The estimates are derived from the directional distance function. We treat non-performing loans as an undesirable output arising from the production of loans to measure the quality of loans. Considering every bank would make costs to serve customers, we choose transaction deposits as an alternative variable to capture the service provided by banks. The way we set the directional vector allows the aggregation of individual bank inefficiency and productivity change to the industry level. Our findings indicate that inefficiencies of Taiwanese banking industry were decreasing after the over of credit and cash card debts. And Taiwanese banking industry experienced productivity regress during this period.

本研究發展新的計量方法，運用隨機邊界法將單調性和曲度條件等性質納入迴歸模型，使用聯立迴歸模型進行估計，藉此讓係數估計值不易出現違反經濟理論的情況。 採用台灣2002年至2015年，51家商業銀行進行實證分析，發現本研究方法估計產出方向距離函數時，僅有5%以下的樣本點不符合單調和曲度等性質，用於估計產出面距離函數時，僅有2%以下的樣本點不符合。進一步探討台灣銀行業之非意欲產出--逾期放款--對估計技術效率的影響，顯示不考慮此非意欲產出造成整體銀行業、非金控本國銀行與外商銀行的技術效率被高估，而金控本國銀行的技術效率則被低估，此外，分析2007年金融風暴前後銀行業經營效率變化，顯示考慮非意欲產出銀行業經營效率顯著提升，然而，未考慮非意欲產出銀行業經營效率卻下降，兩者結果有著極大的差異。 / The aim of the paper is to develop a new approach, which is stochastic frontier analysis imposing monotonicity and curvature conditions, then using simultaneous regression model to estimate. By the approach, it can solve the problem of most of the coefficient estimates violating the economic theory. The study uses the data of 51 commercial banks in Taiwan from 2002 to 2015 to conduct the empirical analysis. It indicates that by output directional distance function, less than 5% sample points violate the monotonicity and curvature conditions; by output distance function, less than 2% sample points don’t obey the restricted conditions. Further, the paper discusses the effect of commercial banks’ undesirable output- non-performing loan- on estimating technical efficiency. The results show that ignoring the undesirable output cause the technical efficiency of overall banks, non-finance holding banks and foreign banks are overvalued, and the technical efficiency of finance holding banks are undervalued. Furthermore, analyze the change of business efficiency after financial crisis in 2007. It points out that using the model consider the undesirable output, the banks’ efficiency rises. However, using the model no consider the undesirable output, the banks’ efficiency decreases. There is an extremely conflict between two approach.