近期許多針對中國大陸的研究顯示，關聯交易除了是一個重要的盈餘管理工具外，也同樣是控制股東挹注與挪用公司資源的主要手段，此外中國與關聯方有關的資訊披露規定在近年來也有非常明顯的變化。基於前述兩項原因，本文首先整理相關法規的延革，接著引用一家上市企業的年度報告做為個案分析。此項個案分析的結果顯示上市公司很可能因控制股東的安排，而將資源輸往與控制股東有關的關聯方或形式上獨立的非關聯方。換言之，控制股東可藉隱匿關聯交易資訊或關聯交易隱形化的方式進行對上市企業的掏空行為。 / Recently, many studies have shown that related party transaction in China is an important tool of earnings management, and it also has been approved to be a primary mean for controlling shareholders propping up or tunneling the company. Therefore, because of the two reasons given above, the thesis studies and systematizes changes of related party disclosure requirements in China, and does analysis on a selected listed company’s annual report as an example of related party transaction disclousure. The analysis finds that, through related party transactions, controlling shareholder may tunnel the listed company and benefit the selected parties which are directly or indirectly controlled by controlling shareholder. That is, controlling shareholder can tunnel through invisible related party transactions or through concealment of transaction information from stakeholders.