中國影視產業飆速成長，已於2011年躍升全球第三大影視產業市場。1987年起，中國的經濟體制由計畫經濟逐步走向市場經濟，影視產業也逐漸國有業趨向開放企業經營。2001年中國加入WTO，須檢視影視產業相關立法，無論是各種外資企業法、電影和電視製作的准入規定和著作權相關法律等。 中國海外影視節目版權交易量逐年遞增，影視作品要能實現其經濟價值，要藉著版權制度建立其市場規則。1990年頒布的《著作權法》奠定了中國版權法律制度的基本框架，目前已因應網路發展而進行第三次修訂。中國大陸在著作權的法制發展不容小覷，無論在法規的訂定、司法解釋和智財法院的成立等。 台灣與大陸於2010年簽訂《兩岸經濟合作架構協議》(ECFA，Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement)，大陸針對台灣電影產業有大幅的准入條件放寬，也取消了配額限制。《海峽兩岸智慧財產權保護協議（IPR）》亦在同日簽署完成，代表兩岸保護智慧財產權正式步入新局。兩岸在影視產業交流實務上仍面臨若干問題，除了雙方在著作權法制的歧異之外，大陸繁複的審批許可制度，以及缺乏影視產業投資的法律、法規等的服務平台。 本論文共分成六章：第一章為緒論，為本論文的研究背景和動機、研究目的和研究方法、架構；第二章從文獻介紹影視產業的產業鏈的構成，再介紹目前中國影視市場發展的現況與未來趨勢，以及兩岸影視產業合作交流概況；第三章全面探討目前中國大陸的產業的法制環境；第四章為本論文之核心--中國大陸影視版權交易法制與管理，除了概述中國版權法律的沿革，也針對現行中國版權法律關於影 視作品的部份進行分析，最後探討中國版權保護制度的特色—司法保護與行政執法並行的雙軌體制，以及面臨版權糾紛時的爭端解決機制等；第五章則以實務經驗探討目前兩岸影視產業面臨的問題與挑戰，包括台灣與大陸在實體的著作權法的差異，同時，正值兩岸修法的時期，同時探討各自修法方向。另外，因兩岸於2010年簽訂《兩岸經濟合作架構協議》(簡稱ECFA），將進一步分析其對影視產業之利弊；第六章則對於未來台灣影視業者西進大陸市場所應關注的法制、政策等提出相關建議。

美國的少數幾家大型影視產業資本不僅主導了境內市場，也在全球市場占有領先的份額，因而對美國影視產業的批判經常出自於反壟斷、反帝反傾銷的動機，目的在保護民族市場或多元文化。然而美國是最早讓動態影像（motion picture）商業化、產業化，使資本能藉之積累擴張，而不必由政府以長期固定的財政手段支持的少數國家之一；並且不同於大量進口產品與技術的後進國，美國很早就成為影視產品的淨出口國，同時在傳播科技與生產手段上持續革新，一至如今。藉由探索美國影視產業的發展史，有助於我們理解影視產業資本的運動軌跡；也就是探討在影視產業內，資本如何剝奪剩餘價值、發達生產力、擴大生產規模的政治經濟歷程。 一般而言，個別資本為擴大利潤率而不斷地更新生產技術以提升生產力，長期卻總體地導致利潤率下降的結果。或說資本運動具有周期性：按利潤率的波動，一再地經歷危機、蕭條、復甦、高漲的循環。美國影視產業史已經說明了這些階段，然而利潤率如何變遷，以及相應生產手段的更替、生產關係的變革，還有待釐清。 藉長時段的國民所得與生產帳（National Income and Product Account, NIPA）以及產業稅務報告所登錄的資料，本文得到 1947年至1997年間電影業前後一貫可比較的利潤率計算根據。資料顯示，二十世紀下半的美國電影利潤率幾經波動，長期有明顯下降的趨勢。按Weisskopf所提的利潤率要項拆解法，就各周期利潤率作進一步分析，可知戰後利潤率轉壞主因為市場萎縮減產，七○年後利潤率轉壞則因為工資上升與資本投入過速的效果。 在回顧美國電影業百年來的流通手段與生產過程歷程後，與利潤率變遷材料與分析結果互為理解，可知晚近利潤率轉壞的主因為資本仰賴少數廠外秀異生產者，使對生產者的工資議價力降低。與早年的量產制相較，這是資本解散廠內長聘勞動隊伍，使生產外部化造成的非意圖後果。為突破量產時代的生產力發展瓶頸，資本逐漸集中到少量差異化的高質量特製電影製作上，以爭取更深更廣的流通，實現更高的利潤份額，同時節省量產所需的人力。長期下來造成資本的兩極分配，使勞動者的晉升、流動乃至於再生產出現困難。 資本因應秀異者高工資的利潤擠壓以及勞動者再生產困難的困局，是藉全球化之便作生產外逃，使產業空洞化。除了取他國低廉勞動力與製作補貼的外因以解釋晚近美國電影業深化全球分工的格局，本文試圖提供長時段資本運動的內因，作為理解當代全球好萊塢構造的另一途徑。 / A few giant corporations dominate US domestic motion picture market and also play key roles in global markets. So people who criticize this situations are usually motivated by goals of anti-monopoly, anti-imperialist or anti-dumping and want to protect their own national market or pluralistic culture. However, motion pictures in US have been commercialized and traded for capital accumulation and expansion since their birth. Not like other countries' governments give stable financial support to their movie and TV industries, US motion picture industry seldom received government direct supports and US has been major exporter of video goods and new communication technology after 1910s. By exploring the history of motion picture industry we would understand the capital movement of this industry. In other words, we need to identify the political economic process of capital exploits video goods, occupies surplus value, and promotes the innovation of technology and expansion. Generally speaking, individual capital renews production technology and upgrades productivity for higher rate of profit while makes macro/total profit rate falling in the long run. It is said that the movement of capital is cyclic and production would experiences phases like crisis, recessionary, recovery, and upswing. We could identify these phases in the history of US motion picture industry, but we didn't know exactly how and why profit rate fluctuated and the mode of production, relation of production changed correspondingly. I collected raw data from National Income and Product Account published by Bureau of Economic Analysis and corporation tax reports published by Internal Revenue System which were calculated for for profit rate of motion picture industry from 1947 to 1997. The result shows that the rate of profit falling in the long run. And I used Weisskopf's method to analysis the factors of profit rate and have conclusions that the first falling rate of profit after 2nd world war was caused by market shrinking and the second one was caused by rising wage and organic composition of capital. By reviewing the history of US motion picture industry, especially the process of means of circulation and production changed, then comparing the history with trend of profit rate, I argue that the main reason of falling rate in last decades is stronger bargaining power of a few elite talents who asked for ultra-high compensations. When capital faced shrinking market and tried to saved normal cost by dismissing lots of in-house labour and production outsourcing, it could not help but rely "free" workers and accepted unexpected high wages while more and more fund and resources were concentrated on fewer and fewer production projects. A few ultra-high quality films which circulate more widely and deeply would realize more profit and save labour cost for capital. But in the long run this would polarize capital using and make upgrading, mobility and reproduction of labour more difficult. Furthermore, the accumulation of capital is difficult too as profit rate falling. Capital responded to this plight by production runaway. This is the main issue of Global Hollywood. Besides the factors of cheaper labour or subsidies from foreign governments, I try to argue the inner logic of capital movement would lead the same result. That's why global Hollywood globalized.