本研究旨在針對中國審計市場探討財務報表品質是否受到註冊會計師事務所的品牌聲譽(reputation)、產業專業化(indusrty specialist)，及客戶重要性(client importment)之影響。 單變量結果顯示，國際四大會計師事務所查核之財務報表品質較佳，然而，在控制其他影響財務報表品質之因素後，本研究無法發現四大所查核之財務報表品質優於非四大所查核之公司。此外，在額外考慮客戶議價能力且僅對四大會計師事務所的客戶分析當中，本研究發現在特定衡量方式下，相對於議價能力高的客戶而言，國際四大會計師事務所在面對議價能力低的客戶時，較能抑制其管理當局操縱盈餘，因此在中國，客戶議價能力在某程度上，的確傷害四大所的審計品質。 在產業專家方面，本研究也未能發現產業專家事務所查核之公司，其財務報表品質優於非產業專家查核公司的證據。此外，本研究也無法發現客戶議價能力會對產業專家事務所造成影響。造成此結果之可能係因掛靠制度及政府之尋租行為所造成之區域性分割使得上市公司對事務所的選擇並不重視其審計品質的高低，而是更看重會計師事務所的掛靠單位，再加上中國審計市場集中度不高，使事務所無發展產業專家之誘因。 至於客戶重要性方面，研究結果顯示當客戶支付之公費金額愈高時，即使其公費佔事務所總公費之比例並不高，仍使會計師允許客戶操弄盈餘的幅度愈大，且此現象主要反映於管理當局操弄盈餘減少時。 / In this study, we examine how auditor’s brand name reputation, industry specialization, and client importmance affect the quality of financial statements in China. Using three kinds of abcdrmal accruals to proxy for earnings quality, our empirical results are as follows: First, univariate results suggest that fiancial statemenets audited by Big 4 are better than those audited by non-Big 4. But after controlling for variables established in prior work to be related to abcdrmal accruals, we find no evidence that clinets of Big 4 have lower abcdrmal accruals than clients of non-Big 4. Besides, we find that when we use discretionary accruals (DAC) to proxy for earnings quality, evidence shows that DAC are lower when clients of Big 4 are small and have little bargaining power. Therefore, client bargaining power indeed impairs audit quality in some extent in China. Second, we don’t find a statistically significant association between abcdrmal accruals and industry specialization. We also find no evidence that client bargaining power will affect industry specialization. Third, we use total fees and ratio of client’s total fees to audit firm’s total revenue as our two proxies for client importance. Evidence shows that total fees are positively associated with magnitude of abcdrmal accruals, especially when abcdrmal accruals are negative.