若盈餘資訊之時效性具有不對稱的特性 – 會計資訊認列壞消息的速度較認列好消息的速度更為及時，則會計實務將此稱之為具穩健原則特性之盈餘屬性。本研究檢視我國盈餘的穩健程度，以及就審計功能的角度而言，我國盈餘穩健程度的影響因素，主要發現如下：首先，我國早期的會計盈餘並不具備穩健原則的特性，但是近期的會計盈餘則已經具備穩健原則的特性。換言之，就穩健特性而言，我國的財務報告品質的確有明顯的進步。其次，就審計功能的角度而言，本研究未能發現會計師的品牌聲譽對盈餘穩健程度有具體增額影響的證據。第三，本研究發現產業專家對盈餘穩健程度有正面影響的證據，其中經由進一步的分析，本研究發現，同時為產業專家會計師事務所與產業專家合夥會計師簽證的客戶，其盈餘的穩健程度最高。但是，單獨僅為產業專家會計師事務所，或僅為產業專家合夥會計師所簽證的客戶，其盈餘數字的穩健程度，與一般既非產業專家會計師事務所且並非產業專家合夥會計師簽證客戶的盈餘穩健程度，其間的差異並不明顯。第四，若追蹤至會計師事務所，查核的最終年度，對會計盈餘具有增額的穩健影響。然而，在相同會計師事務所內的會計師更換而產生的最後一年任期，則對盈餘的增額穩健程度並無顯著的影響。最後，無論係早期或近期，若客戶重要性係追蹤至會計師事務所的層級，本研究完全未能發現客戶重要性對於盈餘的穩健程度有負面影響的證據。但是，若客戶重要性係追蹤至合夥會計師的層級，本研究發現，就早期而言，客戶重要性對於盈餘穩健程度的確有不利影響的證據；但是，若就國近期的資料而言，則客戶重要性對於盈餘穩健特性之影響，僅為方向上的負面影響，未能達傳統的顯著水準。

Chen et al.(2010)以中國審計市場為調查對象，研究會計師對簽證客戶的經濟依存度(以資產衡量)對審計品質的影響。他們發現在2001年以前經濟依存度會傷害審計品質；然而在2001年至2004年間，因中國法律規範的改善，而未發現經濟依存度的負面影響。基於近年中國資本市場的長足發展且審計公費成為公眾可取得之資訊，本文延伸他們的研究樣本期間(至2008年)並以實際的審計公費計算經濟依存度。實證結果發現，無論以整體事務所或合夥會計師來計算經濟依存度，Chen et al.(2010)的結論並未改變。 / Chen et al.(2010) examine how the legal and regulatory changes in China affect the relationship between client economic importance (measured by assets audited by audit firm ) and audit quality. They find that audit quality is negatively correlated with client importance from 1995 to 2000. Therefore, when the institutional environment became more investor friendly, started from 2001 to 2004, they do not find that audit quality negatively correlated with client importance anymore. Following Chen et al.(2010), this study extends the sample period to 2008 and I use ratio of client’s total audit fees to audit firm’s total revenue as proxies for client importance to examines whether the client importance affect audit quality in china. Based on the data for firms listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2004 to 2008, I do not find that audit partners compromise independence for economically important clients, no matter at the firm or the partner level.

本研究旨在針對中國審計市場探討財務報表品質是否受到註冊會計師事務所的品牌聲譽(reputation)、產業專業化(indusrty specialist)，及客戶重要性(client importment)之影響。 單變量結果顯示，國際四大會計師事務所查核之財務報表品質較佳，然而，在控制其他影響財務報表品質之因素後，本研究無法發現四大所查核之財務報表品質優於非四大所查核之公司。此外，在額外考慮客戶議價能力且僅對四大會計師事務所的客戶分析當中，本研究發現在特定衡量方式下，相對於議價能力高的客戶而言，國際四大會計師事務所在面對議價能力低的客戶時，較能抑制其管理當局操縱盈餘，因此在中國，客戶議價能力在某程度上，的確傷害四大所的審計品質。 在產業專家方面，本研究也未能發現產業專家事務所查核之公司，其財務報表品質優於非產業專家查核公司的證據。此外，本研究也無法發現客戶議價能力會對產業專家事務所造成影響。造成此結果之可能係因掛靠制度及政府之尋租行為所造成之區域性分割使得上市公司對事務所的選擇並不重視其審計品質的高低，而是更看重會計師事務所的掛靠單位，再加上中國審計市場集中度不高，使事務所無發展產業專家之誘因。 至於客戶重要性方面，研究結果顯示當客戶支付之公費金額愈高時，即使其公費佔事務所總公費之比例並不高，仍使會計師允許客戶操弄盈餘的幅度愈大，且此現象主要反映於管理當局操弄盈餘減少時。 / In this study, we examine how auditor’s brand name reputation, industry specialization, and client importmance affect the quality of financial statements in China. Using three kinds of abcdrmal accruals to proxy for earnings quality, our empirical results are as follows: First, univariate results suggest that fiancial statemenets audited by Big 4 are better than those audited by non-Big 4. But after controlling for variables established in prior work to be related to abcdrmal accruals, we find no evidence that clinets of Big 4 have lower abcdrmal accruals than clients of non-Big 4. Besides, we find that when we use discretionary accruals (DAC) to proxy for earnings quality, evidence shows that DAC are lower when clients of Big 4 are small and have little bargaining power. Therefore, client bargaining power indeed impairs audit quality in some extent in China. Second, we don’t find a statistically significant association between abcdrmal accruals and industry specialization. We also find no evidence that client bargaining power will affect industry specialization. Third, we use total fees and ratio of client’s total fees to audit firm’s total revenue as our two proxies for client importance. Evidence shows that total fees are positively associated with magnitude of abcdrmal accruals, especially when abcdrmal accruals are negative.

本研究以財務長與審計委員會相對任期作為財務長與審計委員會相對影響力之指標，探討財務長與審計委員會相對影響力對財務報表重編之影響。利用2007至2014年間中國滬深A股為樣本，本研究發現，財務長之任期較審計委員會長時，財務報表越有可能重編，顯示財務長相對於審計委員會影響力較大時，會降低財務報表品質。本研究亦發現，前述情況並不因為客戶重要性較高而更加明顯，顯示財務長與審計委員會相對影響力與財務報表重編之關係，不會受到客戶重要性的影響。 / This thesis uses the relative tenures of CFO and audit committee as an indicator of the relative power between CFO and audit committee, and examines the relation between the relative power of CFO versus audit committee and the probability of financial restatement. Based on a sample of A-share stocks listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen during 2007-2014, the empirical result shows that when CFO has relative higher tenure than audit committee, the incidence of financial restatement increases. This result suggests that CFO who has more power than audit committee tends to compromise the quality of financial statement, at least in terms of financial restatement. The empirical result also shows that the effect of the relative power of CFO and audit committee does not vary among clients’ importance.

在市場競爭不斷加劇之環境下，會計師事務所究竟要如何因應？削價競爭固然為一種經營策略，但並非長久之計。過去文獻指出，會計師事務所可藉由發展產業專業化以因應市場競爭，且會計師產業專精對審計公費有正向之影響。然而，過去文獻亦指出客戶產業特性對審計公費訂價有一定之影響力，故本研究目的乃在探討會計師產業專精對審計公費影響力之大小，及是否會計師產業專精對審計公費之影響力會大於客戶產業特性對審計公費之效果。實證結果顯示會計師產業專精與客戶產業特性兩者對審計公費皆有相當之影響力，但客戶產業特性對審計公費訂價之影響較大。另外，在將樣本區分為高科技產業與傳統產業後可發現，會計師在高科技產業之專長對客戶而言較具有價值，產業專精會計師在高科技產業對審計公費訂價之影響力較大、能夠收取較高之審計公費。 / How can accounting firms build up competitive advantages when they face increased competition? One way is to cut costs and decrease prices, but this may not be the best strategy in the long run. Casterella et al.(2004) suggest that product differentiation based on industry expertise may be a more sustainable solution because auditor specialization shows a significantly positive association with audit fees. Prior researches also indicate that client industry characteristics influence audit fees. Therefore, the main objective of this study is to examine whether auditor specialization and client industry characteristics influence audit fees and which one has greater effect. We find evidence that auditor specialization and client industry characteristics both have an influence on audit fees, while client industry characteristics exhibit even greater impacts. Furthermore relative to conventional industries, auditor specialization in high technology industries demonstrates greater value, and contributes to higher audit fees.