因為經濟環境之變遷，事務所不僅提供客戶審計服務，亦同時提供非審計服務；然而同時提供非審計服務是否會影響事務所獨立性之問題，一直是爭議的議題。2001年安隆案的爆發，使得事務所是否能同時提供非審計服務，更加受到關注。我國證管會因應安隆案，於2002年修訂「證券發行人財務報告編製準則」第22條，要求符合下列條件之一時（一）公司給予簽證會計師、簽證會計師所屬事務所及其關係企業之非審計公費佔審計公費之比率達四分之一以上，（二）非審計公費達新台幣五十萬元以上者，公司必須在財務報告揭露審計與非審計公費之金額及非審計服務的內容。因此本研究即根據上述之規定下，取得公司之審計與非審計公費金額，藉此探討公費對事務所獨立性之影響。 本研究根據Frankel et al. (2002)、Chung and Kallapur (2003)、Reynolds et al. (2004)與Ashbaugh et al. (2003)之研究，探討我國上市、上櫃、興櫃公司之審計、非審計公費是否會影響審計人員之獨立性。 研究結果發現，以客戶之審計公費來衡量客戶對事務所之重要性時，客戶重要性高低，並未與盈餘管理程度有顯著之關連。以非審計公費金額衡量客戶對事務所之重要性時，發現當客戶之非審計公費越高時，審計人員容許客戶增加盈餘之裁量性應計數越多，顯示會計師之獨立性受到非審計公費金額高低之影響。此外，本研究另以客戶之公費結構來探討非審計公費對事務所之影響，發現客戶之非審計公費佔其總公費比率越高時，客戶增加盈餘之裁量性應計數亦越大。

本研究旨在探討會計師公費與財務報表重編之關聯性，並進一步檢視不同重編特質是否反應於審計公費上，以及檢視審計公費的調整是否為重編經濟後果之一。實證結果顯示，審計公費與財務報表重編呈顯著正相關，而這種關聯主要係由於未預期公費部份所導致；非審計公費與財務報表重編呈顯著正相關，表示會計師與客戶間之經濟依存度會降低會計師獨立性，使得審計品質下降。本研究進一步發現不同的重編特質(屬年報之重編、損益向下調整之重編、重編原因涉及盈餘管理動機)會反應於審計公費上。最後，本研究發現重編公司其後續審計公費提高的幅度顯著高於未重編公司，此結果顯示審計公費的增加為重編的經濟後果之一。

美國在2001年10月爆發了安達信(Anderson)-安隆（Enron）案，對整個企業界造成極大的衝擊，提供非審計服務究竟是否會影響財務報表品質引起廣泛討論。 因證期會於民國九十二年一月三十日新修正「證券發行人財務報告編製準則」第二十二條，使得資訊相對過往較易取得，雖因研究限制使得樣本不具良好代表性，但在某種程度上仍能提供一定的參考價值，故本研究擬仿效Frankel et al. (2002)之研究，探討在台灣會計師提供非審計服務及審計服務是否會對財務報表品質造成影響；本研究以Threshold（公司實際每股盈餘-分析師預測每股盈餘）及裁量性應計(discretionary accrual)做為財務報表品質之代理變數。 本研究發現上市公司並未因審計公費及非審計公費較高而有進行盈餘管理，但上櫃公司卻會因審計公費及非審計公費較高而進行盈餘管理。 / The collapse of Enron and the conflict of interest surrounding their auditors Arthur Anderson, particularly the effect non-audit fees on the quality of the audited financial statements, have resulted in numerous changes to the regulations effectively limiting the level of non-audit service accounting firms can offer to their clients. The Taiwan SEC enacted new regulations forcing public companies that meet certain criteria, to disclose the level of audit and non-audit fees paid to accounting firms. This resulted in the availability of information that was previously unobtainable. However, concerns still remain, as research is restricted because the number of companies reporting represents a small percentage of the companies in Taiwan. Nonetheless, this research hopes to use the data from the reporting companies to examine the relationship between the quality of the financial statement and the level of fees paid to accounting firms. We intent to use an adaptation of the Frankel et al. (2002) model to study the companies in Taiwan. Using data provided by the companies we intend to demonstrate a causal relationship between the level of non-audit fees and the quality of the accounting statement. We used Threshold and discretionary accrual to represent the quality of the financial statement. We found that for the companies listed on the TAIEX there was no relationship between the quality of the financial statements and the level of audit and non-audit fees; however for companies trading on the OTC market we found there was a causal relationship.

過去有關審計公費定價模型的決定因素，多數以受查客戶所揭露的財務資訊以及內部治理制度，並考量會計師事務所屬性。然而，審計公費的決定是透過會計師與受查客戶高階管理階層的協商過程，過往文獻對於此影響要素卻少有著墨。本研究以日本企業所揭露之獨立董事資訊做為樣本，探討獨立董事的產業專長對於審計公費定價決策的影響。實證結果顯示，當企業董事會裡擁有財務相關產業專長（在銀行、企業主要往來銀行、證券公司以及保險業任職之資歷）之獨立董事時，相較於沒有聘用此類專長之獨立董事之企業，其審計公費較高；當企業相互派遣獨立董事至其他企業時，或企業獨立董事來自其關聯企業時，相較於沒有聘用此類型獨立董事之企業，其審計公費亦較高。此外，本研究亦衡量董事會成員的年齡對於審計公費之關聯性，研究結果顯示董事會成員的平均年齡對於審計公費價格之影響呈正相關。

為降低資訊不對稱下企業管理階層與資金提供者間之代理問題，公司須設計有效之治理機制以降低代理成本，如聘任外部董監、設置審計委員會及聘任會計師查核等。而當董監事所具備的獨立性及專業性越高，基於維護專家信譽及降低訴訟成本的考量下，將需要會計師投入較多的查核人力及時間，以降低資訊不對稱現象，並減少會計師與公司管理階層間經濟依存度，以獲得較高品質的審計服務。然目前公司治理議題多著重於公司內部監理機制與公司經營績效間的關係，較少觸及內部董監事會監督功能對外部會計師監督功能的影響，是以本研究嘗試以公司治理的角度出發，探討台灣上市、上櫃及興櫃公司董監事獨立性與專業性對於審計公費以及非審計公費之影響。 本研究實證結果發現，目前我國上市櫃及興櫃公司董監事獨立性對於審計公費及非審計公費尚未有統計上顯著之影響，唯董監事兼任其他公司董監事職位數與非審計公費間存有負向關係。不同於 Carcello et al. (2000)的結論，本研究發現台灣公司董監事會之專業性對審計公費及非審計公費之影響較董監事獨立性大，其原因可能是公司治理在台灣始見萌芽，社會大眾對公司治理及董監事功能之概念不深，一方面股東會欠缺聘任獨立董監之誘因，一般公司設置獨立董監多半僅為符合表面規定，所選出之獨立董監亦未必與管理階層維持實質獨立，而無法收實質監督之效；一方面董監事對其職權之行使並未擴及會計師聘任之實質決策，而多僅接受管理當局推薦，獨立董監亦無法對審計及非審計公費進行審議。反是董監事平均兼任其他公司董監職位數越多，代表其所享之專家信譽越高，會為維護自身信譽且降低訴訟風險，藉由限制管理階層向會計師所購買的非審計服務種類及金額，以降低會計師與管理階層間的經濟依存度。 / To reduce the agency problem between management and capital suppliers, the business should design an effective corporate structure to reduce agency cost, including hiring outside board members and/or the establishment of an audit committee. The board members with higher independence and expertise will ask the auditors to put in more audit time to reduce information asymmetry. And they will expect to lessen the auditor’s economic dependency on the management by restricting non-audit services the company will purchase from the independent auditor firm. Most researches recently focus on the relation between characteristic of the board and business operation results. This research attempted to examine the relation between board characteristics and audit/non-audit fees paid to the independent auditors. This study found there’s no significant relation between board independence and audit fees or non-audit fees, but a negative relation existed between the board expertise and non-audit fees. Opposite to the conclusion of Carcello et al. (2000), this result indicated that the effect of board expertise on fees is greater than that of board independence. It could be due to the initial development of corporate governance in Taiwan. Most companies hire outside board members and set up an audit committee just to meet the regulation stipulated by law. On the other hand, the greater expertise a board processes, the less non-audit fee it will pay to the auditor in order to reduce the economic dependency of the auditor on the management.

Chen et al.(2010)以中國審計市場為調查對象，研究會計師對簽證客戶的經濟依存度(以資產衡量)對審計品質的影響。他們發現在2001年以前經濟依存度會傷害審計品質；然而在2001年至2004年間，因中國法律規範的改善，而未發現經濟依存度的負面影響。基於近年中國資本市場的長足發展且審計公費成為公眾可取得之資訊，本文延伸他們的研究樣本期間(至2008年)並以實際的審計公費計算經濟依存度。實證結果發現，無論以整體事務所或合夥會計師來計算經濟依存度，Chen et al.(2010)的結論並未改變。 / Chen et al.(2010) examine how the legal and regulatory changes in China affect the relationship between client economic importance (measured by assets audited by audit firm ) and audit quality. They find that audit quality is negatively correlated with client importance from 1995 to 2000. Therefore, when the institutional environment became more investor friendly, started from 2001 to 2004, they do not find that audit quality negatively correlated with client importance anymore. Following Chen et al.(2010), this study extends the sample period to 2008 and I use ratio of client’s total audit fees to audit firm’s total revenue as proxies for client importance to examines whether the client importance affect audit quality in china. Based on the data for firms listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2004 to 2008, I do not find that audit partners compromise independence for economically important clients, no matter at the firm or the partner level.

本研究探討中國國務院國有資產監督管理委員會(國資委)，實施統一委託審計之規範對於中央國有企業審計品質及審計公費的影響。國資委於2004年發布有關統一委託審計的規定，要求中央國有企業的年度財務決算審計須由國資委統一委託會計師事務所進行，並規定會計師事務所的審計年限必須介於2~5年之間，本研究欲探討此規定對中央國有企業審計品質及審計公費的影響。具體而言，本研究以異常應計數作為審計品質的代理變數，並使用差異中的差異法檢驗統一委託審計的影響，研究樣本為2001~2009年中國滬深A股上市公司。實證結果顯示，就審計品質而言，實施統一委託審計後中央國有企業的審計品質有提升，但其中會計師事務所的審計年限規定並未對審計品質造成明顯影響；就審計公費而言，實施統一委託審計後中央國有企業的審計公費下降，且在市場發展程度愈低的地區效果愈明顯。 / This paper examines the effect of regulations on audit quality and audit fees in China. China’s State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) issued some rules in 2004 to improve audit quality for state-owned enterprises controlled by the central government (CSOEs), such as SASAC Order No. 5 and SASAC Rule No. 173. Under these rules, SASAC mandatorily assign auditors for CSOEs, and CSOEs’ managers have to retain auditors for at least 2 years and at most 5 years. This paper investigates listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchange from 2001 to 2009, and uses abnormal accruals as proxy for audit quality and a difference-in-differences design to examine the effect of these rules on audit quality and audit fees. The empirical results suggest that after the enactment of these rules, the audit quality for CSOEs relative to other companies improves and the audit fees for CSOEs relative to other companies reduce.

審計公費係影響審計品質之一大因素，且中國事務所家數眾多，更易產生低價攬客的惡性競爭行為，再者，中國上市公司重編狀況近來層出不窮，因此本文以2004-2008年中國大陸A股上市公司為研究對象，欲研究重編事件對中國企業審計公費之影響。財務報表重編事件可以分為三個時間點：財務報表錯誤年度、財務報表執行重編年度以及重編後的次一年度。就財務報表發生錯誤年度而言，本研究發現該事件會伴隨較高的審計公費，但是無論是執行重編年度或次一年度，均未發現顯著提高公費的證據。除此之外，本研究也未能獲得審計委員會之設立與審計公費有統計關聯性的證據。具體而言，除了傳統審計公費的解釋變數之外，本文未能發現財務報表重編及審計委員會與審計公費有關之證據。 / Audit fees is one of the major factors affecting quality, and there are many audit firms in China, so it is easier to produce vicious competition . Furthermore, the number of Chinese listed company which has restated financial report is increasing in recent years. So, with a sample of A-share listed corporations in China from 2004 to 2008 , this dissertation develops a conceptual model for studying the relationship between financial restatement and audit fees. Financial restatement can be divided into three time points: the year when an error occurred in the financial report , the year when the financial report is restated ,and the year after the financial report is restated .In terms of the year when an error occurred in the financial report , this dissertation find the event associated with higher audit fees ,but in other two time point , this dissertation doesn’ t find the evidence of significantly increased audit fees. Moreover ,there is no statistical significant relationship between setting up an audit committee and audit fees. Specifically, in addition to the traditional explanatory variables, this dissertation can’t find the evidence that financial restatement and setting up an audit committee are related to audit fees.

Jensen(1998)認為，當公司有過多的自由現金流量時，經理人基於自利動機，較有可能從事非最大化主理人的行為，加劇代理問題的產生。Jensen也認為，發行長期負債可以降低公司多餘的自由現金流量，進而減緩代理問題的產生。因此，本研究即由此一觀點出發，探討是否可藉由長期負債的發行，減緩代理問題的產生？以及當經理人持股比例低，代理問題較嚴重時，負債可否做為監督機制，以減緩代理問題？ 本研究以審計公費做為衡量代理問題之替代變數。當代理問題愈嚴重，即意味著公司有較高的固有風險，因此將增加查核努力，進而收取較高的審計公費。換句話說，當代理問題愈嚴重，審計公費將愈高。實證結果發現，低成長高自由現金流量的公司，發行長期負債可以降低自由現金流量，進而減緩代理問題。而在經理人低持股比例時，長期負債可做為替代的監督機制，以減緩代理問題的產生。故本研究認為，負債確實可做為減緩代理問題之機制。 / Jensen(1986)argued that when company own more free cash flow, based on the self-serving motivation, managers will tend to pursue his benefit rather than principal’s. In such situation, agency problem will become more serious. Jensen also point out that issuing long-term debt can reduce the free cash flow in the company, therefore, ease the agency problem. This study is based on the free cash flow theory, examining whether issuing long-term debt can reducing the free cash flow, therefore reducing the agency problem? Besides, we will examine when managers hold fewer stocks, whether issuing long-term debt can be a substitute monitor mechanism or not? Using audit fee as a variable to measure the agency problem. In auditing, serious agency problem means higher inherent risk and, in turn, audit fees. In other words, more serious agency problem means higher audit fee. The result finds that in low growth firm with higher free cash flow, issuing long-term debt can reduce free cash flow and, in turn, mitigate agency problem. Besides, when managers hold fewer stocks, long-term debt can be a substitute monitor mechanism. As a conclusion, debt can be a mechanism to mitigate agency problem.

本研究利用問卷調查內部稽核人員與外部審計人員兩者對於內部稽核功能之認知、雙方互動之情形、以及內部稽核功能與審計公費之關係。研究結果發現外部審計人員對於國內內部稽核功能能否有效發揮，仍有所保留，特別是在獨立性的部分，但對於內部稽核人員的專業能力則表示肯定。另外，大多數的填答者皆有與對方互動之經驗，但互動的程度並不高，以「偶而會」及「偶而詢問」為主。縱使互動程度不高，但是雙方皆認為互動對於外部查核工作或內部稽核工作是有助益的。此外，大多數的外部審計人員認為，內部稽核功能的好壞與審計公費有一定的關係存在，但其影響的比例以5%以下居多，這可能也是間接造成雙方互動不密切的重要因素之一。 / This thesis uses questionnaires to examine the external auditors’ perceptions of the internal auditing function, the level of co-operation between the internal and external auditors, and the relationship between internal audit function and external audit fees. The empirical findings indicate that external auditors expressed concern about the internal auditing function, independence especially. And the questionnaire responses show the lack of a close relationship between the internal and external auditors. They just occasionally co-operate with each other, but they consider that it is helpful to them. In addition, most external auditors are convinced of the existence of a direct link between internal audit function and external audit fees. But the percentage of external audit fee affected by internal audit function is below 5 percent, this may be one of the reasons why they lack a close relationship between each other.