因為經濟環境之變遷，事務所不僅提供客戶審計服務，亦同時提供非審計服務；然而同時提供非審計服務是否會影響事務所獨立性之問題，一直是爭議的議題。2001年安隆案的爆發，使得事務所是否能同時提供非審計服務，更加受到關注。我國證管會因應安隆案，於2002年修訂「證券發行人財務報告編製準則」第22條，要求符合下列條件之一時（一）公司給予簽證會計師、簽證會計師所屬事務所及其關係企業之非審計公費佔審計公費之比率達四分之一以上，（二）非審計公費達新台幣五十萬元以上者，公司必須在財務報告揭露審計與非審計公費之金額及非審計服務的內容。因此本研究即根據上述之規定下，取得公司之審計與非審計公費金額，藉此探討公費對事務所獨立性之影響。 本研究根據Frankel et al. (2002)、Chung and Kallapur (2003)、Reynolds et al. (2004)與Ashbaugh et al. (2003)之研究，探討我國上市、上櫃、興櫃公司之審計、非審計公費是否會影響審計人員之獨立性。 研究結果發現，以客戶之審計公費來衡量客戶對事務所之重要性時，客戶重要性高低，並未與盈餘管理程度有顯著之關連。以非審計公費金額衡量客戶對事務所之重要性時，發現當客戶之非審計公費越高時，審計人員容許客戶增加盈餘之裁量性應計數越多，顯示會計師之獨立性受到非審計公費金額高低之影響。此外，本研究另以客戶之公費結構來探討非審計公費對事務所之影響，發現客戶之非審計公費佔其總公費比率越高時，客戶增加盈餘之裁量性應計數亦越大。

本研究旨在探討會計師公費與財務報表重編之關聯性，並進一步檢視不同重編特質是否反應於審計公費上，以及檢視審計公費的調整是否為重編經濟後果之一。實證結果顯示，審計公費與財務報表重編呈顯著正相關，而這種關聯主要係由於未預期公費部份所導致；非審計公費與財務報表重編呈顯著正相關，表示會計師與客戶間之經濟依存度會降低會計師獨立性，使得審計品質下降。本研究進一步發現不同的重編特質(屬年報之重編、損益向下調整之重編、重編原因涉及盈餘管理動機)會反應於審計公費上。最後，本研究發現重編公司其後續審計公費提高的幅度顯著高於未重編公司，此結果顯示審計公費的增加為重編的經濟後果之一。

美國在2001年10月爆發了安達信(Anderson)-安隆（Enron）案，對整個企業界造成極大的衝擊，提供非審計服務究竟是否會影響財務報表品質引起廣泛討論。 因證期會於民國九十二年一月三十日新修正「證券發行人財務報告編製準則」第二十二條，使得資訊相對過往較易取得，雖因研究限制使得樣本不具良好代表性，但在某種程度上仍能提供一定的參考價值，故本研究擬仿效Frankel et al. (2002)之研究，探討在台灣會計師提供非審計服務及審計服務是否會對財務報表品質造成影響；本研究以Threshold（公司實際每股盈餘-分析師預測每股盈餘）及裁量性應計(discretionary accrual)做為財務報表品質之代理變數。 本研究發現上市公司並未因審計公費及非審計公費較高而有進行盈餘管理，但上櫃公司卻會因審計公費及非審計公費較高而進行盈餘管理。 / The collapse of Enron and the conflict of interest surrounding their auditors Arthur Anderson, particularly the effect non-audit fees on the quality of the audited financial statements, have resulted in numerous changes to the regulations effectively limiting the level of non-audit service accounting firms can offer to their clients. The Taiwan SEC enacted new regulations forcing public companies that meet certain criteria, to disclose the level of audit and non-audit fees paid to accounting firms. This resulted in the availability of information that was previously unobtainable. However, concerns still remain, as research is restricted because the number of companies reporting represents a small percentage of the companies in Taiwan. Nonetheless, this research hopes to use the data from the reporting companies to examine the relationship between the quality of the financial statement and the level of fees paid to accounting firms. We intent to use an adaptation of the Frankel et al. (2002) model to study the companies in Taiwan. Using data provided by the companies we intend to demonstrate a causal relationship between the level of non-audit fees and the quality of the accounting statement. We used Threshold and discretionary accrual to represent the quality of the financial statement. We found that for the companies listed on the TAIEX there was no relationship between the quality of the financial statements and the level of audit and non-audit fees; however for companies trading on the OTC market we found there was a causal relationship.

為降低資訊不對稱下企業管理階層與資金提供者間之代理問題，公司須設計有效之治理機制以降低代理成本，如聘任外部董監、設置審計委員會及聘任會計師查核等。而當董監事所具備的獨立性及專業性越高，基於維護專家信譽及降低訴訟成本的考量下，將需要會計師投入較多的查核人力及時間，以降低資訊不對稱現象，並減少會計師與公司管理階層間經濟依存度，以獲得較高品質的審計服務。然目前公司治理議題多著重於公司內部監理機制與公司經營績效間的關係，較少觸及內部董監事會監督功能對外部會計師監督功能的影響，是以本研究嘗試以公司治理的角度出發，探討台灣上市、上櫃及興櫃公司董監事獨立性與專業性對於審計公費以及非審計公費之影響。 本研究實證結果發現，目前我國上市櫃及興櫃公司董監事獨立性對於審計公費及非審計公費尚未有統計上顯著之影響，唯董監事兼任其他公司董監事職位數與非審計公費間存有負向關係。不同於 Carcello et al. (2000)的結論，本研究發現台灣公司董監事會之專業性對審計公費及非審計公費之影響較董監事獨立性大，其原因可能是公司治理在台灣始見萌芽，社會大眾對公司治理及董監事功能之概念不深，一方面股東會欠缺聘任獨立董監之誘因，一般公司設置獨立董監多半僅為符合表面規定，所選出之獨立董監亦未必與管理階層維持實質獨立，而無法收實質監督之效；一方面董監事對其職權之行使並未擴及會計師聘任之實質決策，而多僅接受管理當局推薦，獨立董監亦無法對審計及非審計公費進行審議。反是董監事平均兼任其他公司董監職位數越多，代表其所享之專家信譽越高，會為維護自身信譽且降低訴訟風險，藉由限制管理階層向會計師所購買的非審計服務種類及金額，以降低會計師與管理階層間的經濟依存度。 / To reduce the agency problem between management and capital suppliers, the business should design an effective corporate structure to reduce agency cost, including hiring outside board members and/or the establishment of an audit committee. The board members with higher independence and expertise will ask the auditors to put in more audit time to reduce information asymmetry. And they will expect to lessen the auditor’s economic dependency on the management by restricting non-audit services the company will purchase from the independent auditor firm. Most researches recently focus on the relation between characteristic of the board and business operation results. This research attempted to examine the relation between board characteristics and audit/non-audit fees paid to the independent auditors. This study found there’s no significant relation between board independence and audit fees or non-audit fees, but a negative relation existed between the board expertise and non-audit fees. Opposite to the conclusion of Carcello et al. (2000), this result indicated that the effect of board expertise on fees is greater than that of board independence. It could be due to the initial development of corporate governance in Taiwan. Most companies hire outside board members and set up an audit committee just to meet the regulation stipulated by law. On the other hand, the greater expertise a board processes, the less non-audit fee it will pay to the auditor in order to reduce the economic dependency of the auditor on the management.