本研究以1995至2004年國內曾重編財務報表之公司為研究對象，首先從重編之原因、性質與重大性分析國內企業財報重編行為，再依據重編發起者將重編樣本分為由證期局要求之強制重編與公司自行重編兩類型，探討兩類重編在重編事項特性上之差異性，並進一步分析盈餘管理誘因、治理環境特性與重編類型之關聯性。 分析國內重編事件之結果顯示，強制重編樣本在收入/利得認列、關係人交易及舞弊等盈餘管理動機較強之重編原因上，重編頻率明顯高於自行重編樣本，且在重編性質及重大性上較自行重編來得重大。 重編類型與重編事項特性之分析結果發現，相較於自行重編事件樣本，強制重編事件樣本高估營收成長率之情形較嚴重、重編影響報表期數較多、重編期間較長、重編多屬於核心事項/科目且重編對稅後淨利金額調整之影響較重大。 探討盈餘管理誘因、治理環境特性與重編類型關聯性之實證顯示，盈餘管理動機(小額正盈餘及負債條款限制)愈強、內部治理環境(最終控制者之盈餘分配權愈低、控制權偏離程度愈大)愈差、非由五大會計師事務所簽證之公司，將來發生強制重編之機率愈高。 / This thesis examines the behavior of a sample of Taiwanese companies that restated their financial statements over the period of 1995 to 2004. The reasons, properties and the materiality of the restatements are first analyzed. By separating the firms into a mandatory (the restatements are enforced by the Securities and Future Bureau) and a voluntary (initiated by firms themselves) subgroups, this thesis further explores the difference in characteristics, motivations for earnings management, and governance structure between these two restatement subgroups. The results indicate that mandatory restatements focus more on revenue recognition, related-party transactions and fraud, reasons concerned with higher motivations for earnings management. As compared to voluntary restatements, the mandatory restatements are more sever in terms of property and materiality. With respect to the difference in characteristics, the results suggest that compared to voluntary restatements, mandatory restatements involve more with overstatement of growth in sales revenue and financial statements, more core events or accounts, longer restatement period and result in more adjustments in net income. The findings also indicate that firms with higher motivations for earnings management, poorer internal governance, and audited by non-big 5 auditors are found to have higher probability of confronting mandatory restatements in the future.

本研究主要探討財務報表重編前後會計穩健性是否有顯著差異，以瞭解財務報表重編對會計穩健性之影響。本研究以1998年至2007年發生年報重編公司為研究樣本，以T檢定檢測重編前後財務報表穩健性是否具顯著差異，研究結果顯示，重編前財務報表穩健性顯著低於重編後財務報表，證實重編公司重編前財務報表採用較不穩健之會計。此外，本研究進一步探討公司治理與重編前後穩健性之關聯，發現經理人持股比愈高及總經理異動次數愈多，重編前財務報表穩健性顯著低於重編後財務報表。 / This study examines the effect of financial restatements on conservatism. I collect restatement samples from listed companies in Taiwan between 1998 and 2007 and use T-test to validate the hypothesis. The empirical results find that conservatism is significantly lower before the restatement. In addition, this study suggest that the higher managerial ownership and CEO change, the lower conservatism before the restatement.

本研究主要在探討財務報表重編事件是否導致要求之資金成本提高。探究重編事件之經濟後果，除了彌補此議題之實證證據外，研究結果亦能提供警訊給予企業之管理當局，以抑減財務報表舞弊之發生，同時提供投資人投資決策參考。 本研究以民國86年7月至96年6月間曾重編財務報表之國內上市公司為重編研究樣本建構財務報表重編投資組合，與同期間之其他對應之上市公司投資組合，運用Fama-French三因子模型，加入財務報表重編因子，建構四因子模型，進行最小平方法(OLS)迴歸分析檢測假說。實證結果顯示，在控制市場、規模、淨值市價比因子之後，財務報表重編因子為風險因子，顯示財務報表重編，導致投資者要求之資金成本提高。此外，投資者對於財務報表重編次數之反應並無明顯的不同，而對重編變動之金額程度之反應則有顯著之差異。同時，投資者對於小規模公司發生財務報表重編之反應較大規模公司來的劇烈。最後，在事件影響存續期間研究結果顯示，財務報表重編事件對於公司之資金成本長期而言有明顯的影響，顯見財務報表重編對公司之價值影響重大。

本研究旨在探討會計師公費與財務報表重編之關聯性，並進一步檢視不同重編特質是否反應於審計公費上，以及檢視審計公費的調整是否為重編經濟後果之一。實證結果顯示，審計公費與財務報表重編呈顯著正相關，而這種關聯主要係由於未預期公費部份所導致；非審計公費與財務報表重編呈顯著正相關，表示會計師與客戶間之經濟依存度會降低會計師獨立性，使得審計品質下降。本研究進一步發現不同的重編特質(屬年報之重編、損益向下調整之重編、重編原因涉及盈餘管理動機)會反應於審計公費上。最後，本研究發現重編公司其後續審計公費提高的幅度顯著高於未重編公司，此結果顯示審計公費的增加為重編的經濟後果之一。

本研究針對台灣財務報表重編情形進行分類並對重編事件日調查資本市場的反應。就分類整理的調查而言，本論文彙總台灣1999年至2009年所有上市櫃公司發生財務報表重編的情形，依重編年度、重編原因、公司所屬產業、報表重編類型等方向予以分類。其次，本研究採用事件研究法，以對外公告之重編事件日為基準，計算該事件日之異常報酬及市值的變化，進一步依重編原因、重編類型、財報所屬季別、公司所屬產業等因素對異常報酬進行迴歸分析。 本研究參考美國政府會計責信局(GAO)在2002及2006年報告之研究架構，對台灣上市櫃公司進行研究。實證結果發現重編事件日前後一日的累計異常報酬為負數。進一步的迴歸分析顯示，企業的財務危機情況以及財務報表誤述日至重編公告日的長度均與異常報酬有關。此外，針對不同重編原因檢視重編事件對異常報酬的進一步分析顯示，造成異常報酬下降最多的原因是虛增(漏列)交易，其次是轉投資相關與會計估計及評價，使異常報酬下降最少的原因則為損益期間的歸屬。 關鍵字：財務報表重編、事件研究法、異常報酬。 / This research employs both case study and empirical approaches to investigate the causes, demeanors and economic consequences of a sample of firms that were enforced by the Securities and future Bureau to restate their financial statements over the period of year 1999 to year 2009. This study was referred to the method mentioned in U.S. Government Accounting Accountability Office (GAO) 2002 and 2006 to conduct a research in Taiwan’s capital market. Empirical results indicate that event date the cumulative abnormal return is negative. Further regression analysis showed that enterprise as well as the financial crisis in the financial statements of misrepresentation to the length of the announcement date of restatement are related to abnormal returns. In addition, different reasons restated events on the further analysis showed that abnormal returns, resulting in the largest decline in abnormal returns due to inflated (the omission of) transactions, followed by the transfer and accounting estimates related to the investments and evaluation of abnormal returns decline cause the least loss was attributable to the period. Keywords: financial restatement; event study; abnormal return

近二十年來，許多國內外規模大型的上市櫃公司因經濟情況的不穩定受到極大的影響，但為了使帳務好看，所以利用窗飾計巧使得報表美化。導致後續有許多財務報導重編、盈餘虛增等負面消息接連發生。這些訊息使得市場投資者感到不安，且不僅打亂原本資本市場的秩序，也使得社會大眾對整體市場的信任也相對減少，導致投資行為受到改變。過去文獻曾指出班佛法則可用來偵測財務報表數據是否盈餘管理，本研究的目的運用班佛法則針對台灣上市櫃公司之財務比率找出特徵數字，這些特徵數字是否可以偵測財報可能有誤。研究結果發現管理當局偏好於操弄淨利和 EPS 等與盈餘性值相關的會計項目；在損益表中，營業收入相關比率有高估的現象，費用類的有低估的現象；而的確形成紅旗警訊的特徵數字可以用來偵測財報有誤。 / In the last 20 years ago, many public company had larger capital were affected by the economic instability. They wanted to keep the reports in good-looking; thus, they use some skill like window dressing to achieve their purpose. This worst news like many financial reports needed to restate or inflated earnings communicate to public investors, and lead to investors feel anxious. These things result in the original market fall into disorder. General public loss their mind to believe the market and change their investment behavior. In the past, the former research found that they use the Benford’s Law to detect whether the financial reports have earnings management. The purpose of this study was to investigate whether the feature figure obtained from using Benford’s Law to measure the financial ratios from public company in Taiwan can detect the misstatement. The result is the managers prefer manipulate the account which has surplus nature like the net income and earnings-per-share. In the income statement, you will note the ratios are relative to income or earnings will be overestimate; on the other hand, the ratios are relative to cost or loss will be underestimate. And the flag made from the feature figure can detect whether the financial report have the misstatement.

本研究旨在探討家族公司與非家族公司在財務報表重編及法人說明會上之差異；其次，考慮家族公司本身亦存在差異性，因此進一步將家族公司按其聲譽或誠信之好壞予以分群，以檢測聲譽或誠信較差(好)之公司相較於其他家族公司在財務報表重編及法人說明會上是否具有差異。另外，本研究也探討過去受到高度重視的兩種代理問題（管理階層與股東間的傳統代理問題，控制股東與小股東間的核心代理問題）對於公司財務報表重編及召開法人說明會可能性之相對影響程度。在財務報表重編之衡量上，除了考慮發生重編的可能性外，更進一步衡量重編之嚴重程度。相較於其他家族企業之研究將家族公司視為同一族群，本研究之最大貢獻在於考慮家族公司可能具有聲譽上之異質性，而此一異質性會造成家族公司在財務報表品質及自願性揭露上之差異。本研究有下列發現：(1)相較於非家族公司而言，家族公司發生財務報表重編事件之可能性並未較高，然而誠信或社會觀感較差之家族公司相較於其他家族公司比較容易發生財務報表重編事件；(2)雖然家族公司召開法人說明會可能性較高、召開頻率也較多，然而進一步將家族公司分組後，發現聲譽或誠信較差之家族公司較其他家族公司傾向不召開法人說明會且召開頻率亦較低；(3)當公司存在兩種代理問題時，不論是單獨存在或是同時存在，皆會增加財務報表重編之可能性；(4)單獨存在傳統代理問題並不影響公司自願性揭露之意願，然而當公司採用控制權擴增機制時，則會降低公司召開法人說明會之意願與召開之頻率。

本文主要換討SOX之後宣告重編公司之經濟後果。探討如下議題:(1)信用評等是否/如何反應公司的重編資訊;(2)重編內涵與經理人異動之關聯性;(3)經理人異動、信用評等改變以及重編嚴重性三者之關聯性。 / Following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), the increasing occurrence of accounting restatements has drawn considerable attention concerning the financial statement quality and adverse consequences of accounting restatements from investors, regulators, auditors and business communities. The primary purpose of this research is to investigate the economic consequences of accounting restatements announced after SOX based on their relations with credit ratings and management turnover. To examine the following research issues of (1) whether and how the credit rating reacts to companies’ restatements, (2) whether restatement characteristics are associated with management turnover, and (3) what the association among management turnover, credit ratings, and restatement severity is, I gather data on 1,838 companies that restated financial statements between 1997 and 2005. In the first part of the study, my results provide empirical evidence consistent with the conjecture that higher severity restatements are more likely to be followed by subsequent unfavorable ratings. Furthermore, rating agencies using accounting-based measures to predict the probability of bankruptcy perform better in assessing ratings in the post-SOX period. Moreover, rating agencies give auditor changes a “fresh-look” after SOX. In the second part of the study, the likelihood of CEO/CFO turnover significantly increases for companies with higher restatements of severity, and a CEO is more likely to be terminated if the company credit rating following restatements is downgraded. The results show that there is no “cop a plea” effect and when restatements are prompted by companies, management turnover appears to be more concerned with the dollar amount of overstatement on income and/or restatements affecting core earnings. In addition, when executives window-dress earnings to portray a more favorable earnings picture, they are more likely to be terminated following subsequent financial restatements. Moreover, results also indicate that after SOX companies seem more likely to blame their auditors for restatements of higher severity and dismiss their auditors afterwards to maybe avoid the replacements of management.

審計公費係影響審計品質之一大因素，且中國事務所家數眾多，更易產生低價攬客的惡性競爭行為，再者，中國上市公司重編狀況近來層出不窮，因此本文以2004-2008年中國大陸A股上市公司為研究對象，欲研究重編事件對中國企業審計公費之影響。財務報表重編事件可以分為三個時間點：財務報表錯誤年度、財務報表執行重編年度以及重編後的次一年度。就財務報表發生錯誤年度而言，本研究發現該事件會伴隨較高的審計公費，但是無論是執行重編年度或次一年度，均未發現顯著提高公費的證據。除此之外，本研究也未能獲得審計委員會之設立與審計公費有統計關聯性的證據。具體而言，除了傳統審計公費的解釋變數之外，本文未能發現財務報表重編及審計委員會與審計公費有關之證據。 / Audit fees is one of the major factors affecting quality, and there are many audit firms in China, so it is easier to produce vicious competition . Furthermore, the number of Chinese listed company which has restated financial report is increasing in recent years. So, with a sample of A-share listed corporations in China from 2004 to 2008 , this dissertation develops a conceptual model for studying the relationship between financial restatement and audit fees. Financial restatement can be divided into three time points: the year when an error occurred in the financial report , the year when the financial report is restated ,and the year after the financial report is restated .In terms of the year when an error occurred in the financial report , this dissertation find the event associated with higher audit fees ,but in other two time point , this dissertation doesn’ t find the evidence of significantly increased audit fees. Moreover ,there is no statistical significant relationship between setting up an audit committee and audit fees. Specifically, in addition to the traditional explanatory variables, this dissertation can’t find the evidence that financial restatement and setting up an audit committee are related to audit fees.

This study first examines whether equity-based compensation (i.e., stocks and options) is associated with audit committees’ oversight failures. I then examine whether this association between equity-based compensation and oversight failures is affected when firms initiate the clawback provisions in their compensation contracts. I use the likelihood of restatements, the incidence of internal control weaknesses (ICW), and earnings management measures to proxy for audit committees’ oversight failures. Based on a sample of 129 firms that voluntarily adopt the clawback provisions during 2003-09 and a matched sample created from the propensity score matching technique, I find several important results. First, larger amounts and portions of stocks and options are associated with higher restatement and ICW likelihood and greater earnings management. Second, equity-based compensation appears to harm audit committees' oversight effectiveness. However, the adoption of the clawback provisions significantly mitigates such negative effect. Finally, the clawback provisions are effective in reducing restatements, ICW, and earnings management only when these provisions are triggered by "bad faith" rather than restatements. Overall, my empirical results bear policy implications on audit committees’ compensation practice and the mandatory adoption of the clawback provisions.