本研究以1995至2004年國內曾重編財務報表之公司為研究對象，首先從重編之原因、性質與重大性分析國內企業財報重編行為，再依據重編發起者將重編樣本分為由證期局要求之強制重編與公司自行重編兩類型，探討兩類重編在重編事項特性上之差異性，並進一步分析盈餘管理誘因、治理環境特性與重編類型之關聯性。 分析國內重編事件之結果顯示，強制重編樣本在收入/利得認列、關係人交易及舞弊等盈餘管理動機較強之重編原因上，重編頻率明顯高於自行重編樣本，且在重編性質及重大性上較自行重編來得重大。 重編類型與重編事項特性之分析結果發現，相較於自行重編事件樣本，強制重編事件樣本高估營收成長率之情形較嚴重、重編影響報表期數較多、重編期間較長、重編多屬於核心事項/科目且重編對稅後淨利金額調整之影響較重大。 探討盈餘管理誘因、治理環境特性與重編類型關聯性之實證顯示，盈餘管理動機(小額正盈餘及負債條款限制)愈強、內部治理環境(最終控制者之盈餘分配權愈低、控制權偏離程度愈大)愈差、非由五大會計師事務所簽證之公司，將來發生強制重編之機率愈高。 / This thesis examines the behavior of a sample of Taiwanese companies that restated their financial statements over the period of 1995 to 2004. The reasons, properties and the materiality of the restatements are first analyzed. By separating the firms into a mandatory (the restatements are enforced by the Securities and Future Bureau) and a voluntary (initiated by firms themselves) subgroups, this thesis further explores the difference in characteristics, motivations for earnings management, and governance structure between these two restatement subgroups. The results indicate that mandatory restatements focus more on revenue recognition, related-party transactions and fraud, reasons concerned with higher motivations for earnings management. As compared to voluntary restatements, the mandatory restatements are more sever in terms of property and materiality. With respect to the difference in characteristics, the results suggest that compared to voluntary restatements, mandatory restatements involve more with overstatement of growth in sales revenue and financial statements, more core events or accounts, longer restatement period and result in more adjustments in net income. The findings also indicate that firms with higher motivations for earnings management, poorer internal governance, and audited by non-big 5 auditors are found to have higher probability of confronting mandatory restatements in the future.

近二十年來，許多國內外規模大型的上市櫃公司因經濟情況的不穩定受到極大的影響，但為了使帳務好看，所以利用窗飾計巧使得報表美化。導致後續有許多財務報導重編、盈餘虛增等負面消息接連發生。這些訊息使得市場投資者感到不安，且不僅打亂原本資本市場的秩序，也使得社會大眾對整體市場的信任也相對減少，導致投資行為受到改變。過去文獻曾指出班佛法則可用來偵測財務報表數據是否盈餘管理，本研究的目的運用班佛法則針對台灣上市櫃公司之財務比率找出特徵數字，這些特徵數字是否可以偵測財報可能有誤。研究結果發現管理當局偏好於操弄淨利和 EPS 等與盈餘性值相關的會計項目；在損益表中，營業收入相關比率有高估的現象，費用類的有低估的現象；而的確形成紅旗警訊的特徵數字可以用來偵測財報有誤。 / In the last 20 years ago, many public company had larger capital were affected by the economic instability. They wanted to keep the reports in good-looking; thus, they use some skill like window dressing to achieve their purpose. This worst news like many financial reports needed to restate or inflated earnings communicate to public investors, and lead to investors feel anxious. These things result in the original market fall into disorder. General public loss their mind to believe the market and change their investment behavior. In the past, the former research found that they use the Benford’s Law to detect whether the financial reports have earnings management. The purpose of this study was to investigate whether the feature figure obtained from using Benford’s Law to measure the financial ratios from public company in Taiwan can detect the misstatement. The result is the managers prefer manipulate the account which has surplus nature like the net income and earnings-per-share. In the income statement, you will note the ratios are relative to income or earnings will be overestimate; on the other hand, the ratios are relative to cost or loss will be underestimate. And the flag made from the feature figure can detect whether the financial report have the misstatement.

本研究以財報重編為財報品質之代理變數，探討自由現金流量是否對內部股權結構與財報品質的關係具有調節效果，期望藉助對於自由現金流量調節效果之了解，以利報表閱讀者更適當地解讀財報訊息，瞭解財報之品質。 實證結果顯示，自由現金流量對內部股權結構與財報品質間確實具有顯著的調節效果，尤其是董、監持股率與董事兼任經理人這兩項因素對於財報品質之關係，很受到自由現金流量之影響。自由現金流量本身與財報重編呈顯著負相關，自由現金流量愈高，財報重編的可能性愈低。但自由現金流量所引發的代理問題，反而可能對董、監持股率、董事兼任經理人與財報品質間的關係產生負面的調節效果，即財報重編的可能性顯著提高。但自由現金流量對於經理人持股率與財報品質間的關係不具有顯著的調節效果。 / This study examines whether free cash flow has the moderating effect on the relation between ownership structure and financial reporting quality, using financial restatements as a proxy for financial reporting quality. This study tries to interpret earnings information more appropriately through more understanding on the moderating effect of free cash flow. The study shows that free cash flow exactly has the moderating effect on the relation between ownership structure and financial reporting quality, especially for stocks holding ratio by directors and supervisors and CEO duality. Firms having more free cash flow are less likely to restate statements. However, free cash flow might trigger agency problem, which might having negative moderating effects, causing higher possibilities to restate statements. Otherwise, the finding of this study shows that there is no significantly moderating effect on the relation between managerial ownership and financial reporting quality.