本研究以1995至2004年國內曾重編財務報表之公司為研究對象，首先從重編之原因、性質與重大性分析國內企業財報重編行為，再依據重編發起者將重編樣本分為由證期局要求之強制重編與公司自行重編兩類型，探討兩類重編在重編事項特性上之差異性，並進一步分析盈餘管理誘因、治理環境特性與重編類型之關聯性。 分析國內重編事件之結果顯示，強制重編樣本在收入/利得認列、關係人交易及舞弊等盈餘管理動機較強之重編原因上，重編頻率明顯高於自行重編樣本，且在重編性質及重大性上較自行重編來得重大。 重編類型與重編事項特性之分析結果發現，相較於自行重編事件樣本，強制重編事件樣本高估營收成長率之情形較嚴重、重編影響報表期數較多、重編期間較長、重編多屬於核心事項/科目且重編對稅後淨利金額調整之影響較重大。 探討盈餘管理誘因、治理環境特性與重編類型關聯性之實證顯示，盈餘管理動機(小額正盈餘及負債條款限制)愈強、內部治理環境(最終控制者之盈餘分配權愈低、控制權偏離程度愈大)愈差、非由五大會計師事務所簽證之公司，將來發生強制重編之機率愈高。 / This thesis examines the behavior of a sample of Taiwanese companies that restated their financial statements over the period of 1995 to 2004. The reasons, properties and the materiality of the restatements are first analyzed. By separating the firms into a mandatory (the restatements are enforced by the Securities and Future Bureau) and a voluntary (initiated by firms themselves) subgroups, this thesis further explores the difference in characteristics, motivations for earnings management, and governance structure between these two restatement subgroups. The results indicate that mandatory restatements focus more on revenue recognition, related-party transactions and fraud, reasons concerned with higher motivations for earnings management. As compared to voluntary restatements, the mandatory restatements are more sever in terms of property and materiality. With respect to the difference in characteristics, the results suggest that compared to voluntary restatements, mandatory restatements involve more with overstatement of growth in sales revenue and financial statements, more core events or accounts, longer restatement period and result in more adjustments in net income. The findings also indicate that firms with higher motivations for earnings management, poorer internal governance, and audited by non-big 5 auditors are found to have higher probability of confronting mandatory restatements in the future.

本研究針對2007年至2011年的非金融產業之上市櫃公司，分析股權結構、公司特性是否為公司內部監察人設置比率及是否設置外部監察人之影響因素，並進一步探討公司監察人內部化比率與外部監察人之存在對公司之經營績效、盈餘品質及財務報導強制重編次數的影響。 實證結果顯示，若公司型態為電子公司、家族企業或集團企業、公司之企業規模、內部人持股比率越大，則該公司內部監察人席次比率越高，且不傾向設置外部監察人。而就公司監察人內部化對公司之經營績效及財務報導品質的影響，實證結果顯示，監察人內部化比率越高之公司，其公司經營績效越差，且被要求強制重編財務報表的次數也較多。但只要存在一位外部監察人，即有助於改善公司之經營績效並降低公司被要求強制重編財務報表的可能性。惟本研究並未發現監察人內部化比率或外部監察人之存在與公司盈餘品質間存在顯著關係。 整體而言，本研究之實證結果顯示公司監察人內部化將使法制上監察人制度所應有之公司治理機能無法發揮，無法提升公司經營績效及財務報導品質。故為讓公司監察人能發揮其制度上應有之功能，公司之監察人，宜由外部人擔任。 / Based on a sample of listed non-financial companies over the period of 2007 to 2011 in Taiwan, this study first investigates the impact of ownership structure and firm characteristics on the internalization of supervisors. A step further, this study examines the effect of internalization of supervisors on firm performance, earnings quality and the frequency of restatement of financial reports. The empirical evidence shows that firms operate in electronic industries, or belong to business groups or owned by families, or with greater shares held by insiders or with larger firm size, are significantly and positively (negatively) associated with the internalization of supervisors (the presence of outside supervisors). The study also finds that firms with higher degree of internalization of supervisors are associated with poorer performance and higher frequency of restating their financial reports. On contrary, we find that firms with at least one outside supervisor are associated with better performance and lower frequency of restating financial reports. However, this study fails to report any association between the internalization of supervisors (or the presence of outside supervisors) and earnings quality measured by accruals. Based on the findings, this study therefore suggests that firms should appoint outsiders to be supervisors in order to better serve the function of the institution of supervisors.