企業之股價崩跌對企業本身以及投資人都會造成嚴重的影響，企業之經理人可能因為了私人利益而暫時延後揭露壞消息。在此情況下若企業財務報表品質較差、資訊透明度不佳，於公司有壞消息時管理階層便同時具有動機及機會隱藏或延後公布此壞消息使企業之股價短暫的被高估，當過了某特定時點企業發布壞消息或壞消息累積至一定的程度無法再隱瞞而突然公開時，企業之股價就會有較高的崩跌風險。 財務報表中存有重大錯誤時，代表較差的財報品質且資訊透明度不佳，因此本研究針對財務報表中存有重大錯誤與股價崩跌風險之關係進行探討。由於過去在政治關聯性企業與股價崩跌風險之文獻呈現不一致的研究結果，因此本研究採用與過去研究不同的政治關聯性定義研究其與股價崩跌風險之關係，期望能得出進一步的結論。最後，本研究欲探討重大會計錯誤與政治關聯性之交互影響，以企業當財務報表中存有重大錯誤，且該企業具有政治關聯性時，是否會有較高之股價崩跌風險進行研究。 研究結果發現，以NCSKEW_F1作為股價崩跌風險之衡量時，企業財報中存有重大錯誤時股價崩跌風險較高，表示當財務報表中有重大錯誤時代表財務報表品質較差，無法有效地降低內部人與一般投資人之資訊不對稱問題，財務資訊透明度較差，企業會有較高之股價崩跌風險。在企業之政治關聯性方面結果顯示，以NCSKEW_F1作為股價崩跌風險之衡量時，具政治關聯性企業可能有較高之股價崩跌風險。最後，本研究未發現當企業財務報表存有重大錯誤且此企業具政治關聯性與股價崩跌風險之關係。

本研究以財務長與審計委員會相對任期作為財務長與審計委員會相對影響力之指標，探討財務長與審計委員會相對影響力對財務報表重編之影響。利用2007至2014年間中國滬深A股為樣本，本研究發現，財務長之任期較審計委員會長時，財務報表越有可能重編，顯示財務長相對於審計委員會影響力較大時，會降低財務報表品質。本研究亦發現，前述情況並不因為客戶重要性較高而更加明顯，顯示財務長與審計委員會相對影響力與財務報表重編之關係，不會受到客戶重要性的影響。 / This thesis uses the relative tenures of CFO and audit committee as an indicator of the relative power between CFO and audit committee, and examines the relation between the relative power of CFO versus audit committee and the probability of financial restatement. Based on a sample of A-share stocks listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen during 2007-2014, the empirical result shows that when CFO has relative higher tenure than audit committee, the incidence of financial restatement increases. This result suggests that CFO who has more power than audit committee tends to compromise the quality of financial statement, at least in terms of financial restatement. The empirical result also shows that the effect of the relative power of CFO and audit committee does not vary among clients’ importance.

財務報表重編雖不若財務報表詐欺舞弊，但對於財務報表使用者而言，仍代表財務報表資訊品質不佳。因此公司應建立有效的監督治理機制，以防止財務報表重編情形發生，提高財務報表資訊品質。 本研究針對35家財務報表重編公司及35家財務報表未重編公司之董事會、監察人之獨立性、專業性進行研究，獲得以下結論： 一、發生財務報表重編的公司董事會中外部董事比率低於未發生財務報表 重編公司董事會外部董事比率 二、發生財務報表重編的公司董事會中獨立董事比率低於未發生財務報表 重編公司董事會獨立董事比率。 三、發生財務報表重編的公司董事會中法人董事席次比率高於未發生財務 報表重編公司法人董事席次比率。 四、發生財務報表重編的公司法人監察人席次比率高於未發生財務報表重 編公司法人監察人席次比率。 五、發生財務報表重編的公司董事會中關聯性法人董事比率高於未發生財 務報表重編公司關聯性法人董事比率。 / The restatement of financial statements does not equal to a financial statement fraud. However, it can reflect inferior quality of information disclosed in financial statements. Consequently, companies should establish an effective mechanism for supervision and governance in order to prevent the occurrence of financial statements restatements and to improve the quality of information disclosed in financial statement. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development（OECD） proposed five principles of corporate governance including strengthening the responsibility of the board of directors. It also required that the board of directors should function effectively. Independent and professional outside directors should be engaged to protect the interest of all shareholders. The study was conducted to investigate the independence and professionalism of the board of directors and supervisors. The sample included 35 companies which restated their financial statements at the time. Another 35 companies of comparative sizes were selected as the comparison group. The following results were conducted. 1.Firms that restated financial statements had significantly lower percentages of outside directors on the board than those which did not restate their financial statements. 2.Firms that restated financial statements had significantly lower percentages of independent directors on the board than those which did not restate their financial statements. 3.Firms that restated financial statements had significantly higher percentages of institutional directors on the board than those which did not restate their financial statements. 4.Firms that restated financial statements had significantly higher percentages of institutional supervisors than those which did not restate their financial statements. 5.Firms that restated financial statements had significantly higher percentages of affiliated institutional directors on the board than those which did not restate their financial statements.

介面設計是重要的議題，好的介面減低使用者與介面互動所需的時間及認知資源，進而樂於使用該功能。近年來互動式數位電視的使用漸增，卻未有既定的使用介面。本研究試圖探討應如何呈現該功能選單，較能有效與介面互動。 本研究共三個實驗。實驗一採單因子參與者間實驗設計，獨變項為「提示項目類型」，含「圖示」、「文字」、「圖示加文字」三種；以強迫選擇再認作業，比較以不同方式呈現初次接觸的提示項目，是否造成學習上的差異；達相同學習程度後，不同呈現類型是否導致各組間行為反應有所差異。 實驗二排除了使用者接收文字或圖示刺激時，各組別的參與者形成不同程度的雙重編碼；操弄目標項目類型，即「文字」或「圖示」。以強迫選擇再認作業觀察同時呈現「文字」、「圖示」兩提示項目，使用者初次接觸時較傾向以何種訊息作判斷。除紀錄反應時間及正確率外，亦計算眼動反應指標。 實驗三欲探討「經驗效果」，依呈現項目類型分為三組，觀察各組參與者與不同熟悉程度之介面互動時，表現是否會有所差異。採三因子混合設計，「呈現項目類型」為參與者間變項，可分為「圖示」、「文字」及「圖示加文字」三種；「時間變項」及「區段變項」則是參與者內變項，前者指本實驗中的不同日期；後者則為各次實驗中的不同區段。依變項則為參與者完成作業的反應時間、反應正確率及眼動資料。 研究結果顯示在實驗一中，學習新的功能項目時，具文字敘述之組別表現會較佳；達相同學習程度後，具圖示訊息的組別之反應較只有文字的組別佳。實驗二中，參與者與陌生功能項目互動初期，同時呈現圖示及文字兩種形式的提示項目時，使用者會較傾向以文字訊息判斷。實驗三則顯示在互動時普遍依賴圖示訊息，呈現圖示項目的組別整體而言皆表現得較好；但在互動前期同時呈現「圖示加文字」組的表現與「文字」組較相似，互動後期則與「圖片」組較相似。以上研究結果，可供未來電視功能選單呈現方式設計之參考。

本研究主要探討盈餘重編宣告如何影響重編公司之供應商的股價評價與實質投資決策。首先，本研究假設並發現，盈餘重編宣告除了導致重編公司的股價顯著下跌外，亦誘發其上游供應商的股價顯著下跌。實證進一步發現，供應商的股價依盈餘重編之資訊內涵而調整，促使投資人關注重編事件對上游供應商的預期盈餘之影響，也提醒投資人去關心上游供應商的財務報表品質。其次，本研究假設，盈餘重編宣告傳遞有關重編公司未來前景不佳及財務報表不實的資訊，將影響其供應商對投入特定關係資產所能獲得收益之預期，進而影響其對重編公司所投入的特定關係資產投資決策。實證結果支持前述假說，重編公司之供應商於重編宣告年度後將減少其研究發展支出，且此研究發展支出之變動與重編宣告所引起的股價變動具顯著關聯性。最後本文假設，重編公司扭曲其實際盈餘數字將影響供應商的投資決策，進而影響供應商的投資效率性。研究發現，供應商在重編公司財務報表誤述期間有顯著超額投資之現象。然而，此供應商之超額投資現象在盈餘重編宣告年度後不再顯著。 / This dissertation extends prior research on earnings restatements by examining the effects of earnings restatements on valuation and investment decisions of restating firms’ suppliers. First, this paper hypothesizes and finds that earnings restatements that adversely affect stock price of the restating firms also induce their suppliers’ stock price declines. These stock price declines are related to changes in analysts’ earnings forecasts and seem to reflect investors’ financial reporting quality concerns. Second, I hypothesize that earnings restatements contain information about the value of relationship-specific investments by suppliers. This information causes suppliers to revise their belief about the value of relationship-specific investments, and therefore affects their subsequent relationship-specific investment decisions. Consistent with my prediction, I find that changes in suppliers’ relationship-specific investments after restatement announcements are related to information in the restatements. Finally, I predict and find that a restating firm misreporting financial results induces its suppliers to make excess investments during the misreporting period, while excess investment is no longer positive after the restatement announcement.

本研究針對2007年至2011年的非金融產業之上市櫃公司，分析股權結構、公司特性是否為公司內部監察人設置比率及是否設置外部監察人之影響因素，並進一步探討公司監察人內部化比率與外部監察人之存在對公司之經營績效、盈餘品質及財務報導強制重編次數的影響。 實證結果顯示，若公司型態為電子公司、家族企業或集團企業、公司之企業規模、內部人持股比率越大，則該公司內部監察人席次比率越高，且不傾向設置外部監察人。而就公司監察人內部化對公司之經營績效及財務報導品質的影響，實證結果顯示，監察人內部化比率越高之公司，其公司經營績效越差，且被要求強制重編財務報表的次數也較多。但只要存在一位外部監察人，即有助於改善公司之經營績效並降低公司被要求強制重編財務報表的可能性。惟本研究並未發現監察人內部化比率或外部監察人之存在與公司盈餘品質間存在顯著關係。 整體而言，本研究之實證結果顯示公司監察人內部化將使法制上監察人制度所應有之公司治理機能無法發揮，無法提升公司經營績效及財務報導品質。故為讓公司監察人能發揮其制度上應有之功能，公司之監察人，宜由外部人擔任。 / Based on a sample of listed non-financial companies over the period of 2007 to 2011 in Taiwan, this study first investigates the impact of ownership structure and firm characteristics on the internalization of supervisors. A step further, this study examines the effect of internalization of supervisors on firm performance, earnings quality and the frequency of restatement of financial reports. The empirical evidence shows that firms operate in electronic industries, or belong to business groups or owned by families, or with greater shares held by insiders or with larger firm size, are significantly and positively (negatively) associated with the internalization of supervisors (the presence of outside supervisors). The study also finds that firms with higher degree of internalization of supervisors are associated with poorer performance and higher frequency of restating their financial reports. On contrary, we find that firms with at least one outside supervisor are associated with better performance and lower frequency of restating financial reports. However, this study fails to report any association between the internalization of supervisors (or the presence of outside supervisors) and earnings quality measured by accruals. Based on the findings, this study therefore suggests that firms should appoint outsiders to be supervisors in order to better serve the function of the institution of supervisors.

本文以三篇論文討論三個與財務報表向下重編盈餘公司有關的議題：（1）宣告財務報表重編後的長期股票績效；（2）重編公司內部人交易行為；（3）重編公司如何操弄盈餘以及操弄動機為何？ 本文樣本是從1984年1月至2000年12月，557家因為財務報表違法、舞弊或錯誤而宣告需要重編以前財務報表的公司。 第一篇論文討論公司宣告重編後三年長期股票績效。在不同配對組合下，實證結果顯示，三年長期持有異常報酬（buy-and-hold abnormal return）達-34％。文中也討論公司宣告重編時以及後續分析師預測行為。結果發現，分析師對於重編資訊有反應不足的現象，而且三年的盈餘預測修正與長期異常報酬有顯著正相關。 第二篇論文探討盈餘品質與內部人交易行為。本文假設內部人擁有重編公司盈餘品質不良的私有資訊，內部人會利用此私有資訊從事異常交易。實證結果顯示，內部人早在重編前兩年就已經開始異常出售持股，但是為了避免被發現，愈接近重編期間則交易量愈少，而且內部人異常交易與重編金額成正相關。 第三篇論文採取應計項目分項的方法（disaggregate approach）探討重編項目與特定應計項目的關連性以及重編公司違反一般公認會計原則的動機。實證結果顯示，特定重編項目公司的總應計項目比特定應計項目更顯著。很可能是管理當局為了避免操弄特定項目以致於被發現，所以操弄各種應計項目以達到總金額的目標。尤其在不同盈餘管理動機的成本效益的考量下，如果操弄主要應計項目的效益大於成本，管理當局還是會操弄特定應計項目以達到操弄的目的。因此，應計項目分項的方法可以作為進一步探討盈餘管理的方法。 / This dissertation examines three different aspects of downward earnings restatements in three essays: (1) the long-run stock performance of restatement firms following the announcements of restatements; (2) insider trading activities of earnings restatement firms; and (3) how earnings manipulations of restatement firms are effected and what are the incentives for earnings manipulations? Using extensive keyword (i.e., “restatements,” “restate,” “restated,” “restates,” and “restating”) searches over the period from January 1, 1984 through December 31, 2000, 557 firms are identified as having restated their previously published or filed financial statements due to accounting irregularities, fraud, or errors. The first essay examines the post earnings restatement announcement of long-term stock performance. Using various benchmark portfolio formulation strategies, I document an average buy-and-hold abnormal return of -34% over the 36-month horizon. I then investigate analysts’ forecast behavior around and after the restatement announcements. I find that market underreactions are associated with a sluggish forecast revisions by financial analysts. This study sheds light on how restatement information is transmitted to the capital markets and provides evidence that the market under reacts to externally initiated corporate events. The second essay examines the relationship between earnings quality and insider trading. Using downward earnings restatement firms to identify low-quality earnings, I find that insiders outsell non-earnings restatement firms of their holdings over the period from two years before to one year before the beginning of the restatement period. In addition, the amounts of restatement are positively associated with the excess insider selling. I also provide evidence that excess insider selling predicts excessive earnings manipulations that eventually lead to GAAP violation. In the third essay, I take advantage of the disclosed manipulation of items and approach the earnings manipulation issue by a disaggregate approach. Given that management considers cost/benefits of specific accruals to be manipulated, I examine whether management chooses different items to manipulate under different goals. Overall, the empirical results support the equity offering hypothesis and weakly support the meeting earnings threshold hypothesis. However, the results fail to support the avoidance of debt covenant violation hypothesis, indicating that manipulation under certain monitoring conditions can be conducted in a very subtle manner.

本研究以財報重編為財報品質之代理變數，探討自由現金流量是否對內部股權結構與財報品質的關係具有調節效果，期望藉助對於自由現金流量調節效果之了解，以利報表閱讀者更適當地解讀財報訊息，瞭解財報之品質。 實證結果顯示，自由現金流量對內部股權結構與財報品質間確實具有顯著的調節效果，尤其是董、監持股率與董事兼任經理人這兩項因素對於財報品質之關係，很受到自由現金流量之影響。自由現金流量本身與財報重編呈顯著負相關，自由現金流量愈高，財報重編的可能性愈低。但自由現金流量所引發的代理問題，反而可能對董、監持股率、董事兼任經理人與財報品質間的關係產生負面的調節效果，即財報重編的可能性顯著提高。但自由現金流量對於經理人持股率與財報品質間的關係不具有顯著的調節效果。 / This study examines whether free cash flow has the moderating effect on the relation between ownership structure and financial reporting quality, using financial restatements as a proxy for financial reporting quality. This study tries to interpret earnings information more appropriately through more understanding on the moderating effect of free cash flow. The study shows that free cash flow exactly has the moderating effect on the relation between ownership structure and financial reporting quality, especially for stocks holding ratio by directors and supervisors and CEO duality. Firms having more free cash flow are less likely to restate statements. However, free cash flow might trigger agency problem, which might having negative moderating effects, causing higher possibilities to restate statements. Otherwise, the finding of this study shows that there is no significantly moderating effect on the relation between managerial ownership and financial reporting quality.

本研究針對國內1996至2003年68筆受證期局強制重編財報事件為研究對象，採個案與實證兼具之研究方法，探討財報強制重編之成因、外顯徵兆與經濟後果。 就財報強制重編之成因而言，本研究發現盈餘管理誘因亦適用於財報強制重編之情形；公司治理機制中控制權與所有權偏離程度的縮小、外部審計品質的提升與關係人交易之透明與簡單化，皆可以降低財報強制重編之機率。就財報強制重編之外顯徵兆，則發現會計師出具無保留以外之意見與損益品質的下降，為公司錯誤報導財務報表之重要指標。就財報強制重編之經濟後果，實證顯示財報強制重編與財務困難間具有顯著的關聯性。此外，本研究並發現財報重編影響的報表數愈多、金額幅度愈大、涉及業外非核心盈餘與投資損益之重編時，公司發生財務困難的可能性將顯著增加。 / This research employs both case study and empirical approaches to investigate the causes, demeanors and economic consequences of a sample of firms that were enforced by the Securities and future Bureau to restate their financial statements over the period of year 1996 to year 2003. The analysis of the causes of mandatory restatements shows that the motivations of earnings management also apply to the context of financial restatements. The firms with smaller deviation of control rights from the cash flow rights, higher audit quality and more transparency in related-party transactions help alleviate the probability of restatements. The results also indicate that unclean audit opinions and decrease in quality of earnings are important demeanors of misstatement of financial statements. In addition, firms are enforced to restate their financial statements are found to be significantly related to the occurrence of financial difficulties in the future. The findings show that the severer the materiality of the restatement in terms of the length of period, dollars, and the nature of the restatements, the higher the possibility of firms will experience financial difficulties.

本研究以台灣上市櫃公司及分析師投資報告為研究對象，探討會計師忙碌程度與審計品質之關聯性，以及產生學習或互斥效果。審計品質以裁決性應計項目、財務報表重編及迎合或擊敗分析師預期三種特性進行分析。 研究結果發現，會計師忙碌程度與裁決性應計項目、財務報表重編及迎合或擊敗分析師預期皆呈現顯著負相關。此結果表示，會計師忙碌程度愈高，受查公司管理當局進行盈餘管理之可能性愈低。本研究藉此結果推論，會計師忙碌程度愈高，透過累積查核經驗，促進知識改善，產生正向的學習效果，進而提高審計品質。 / This thesis examines the association between the busyness of auditors at partner level and audit quality and whether the association stems from learning effect or crowding-out effect, by using the listed firms’ data and the analysts’ reports in Taiwan. I use the following three measures of audit quality to examine my hypotheses: discretionary accruals, financial restatement, and meet or beat analyst forecast. The empirical results indicate that firms experience lower discretionary accruals, are less likely to restate financial statements and have lower likelihood of meeting or beating analysts’ expectations when auditors are busier. The results are consistent with the notion that auditor busyness is positively related to audit quality. Taken together, the findings provide strong evidence in favor for learning effect rather than crowding-out effect of auditor busyness. Further analyses reveal that the results remain unchanged, regardless of lead auditor busyness or concurring auditor busyness.