分析師扮演著公司與投資大眾之間的資訊中介者角色。本文旨在探討企業研發支出對分析師預測品質的影響，以及企業聘雇屬於產業專家會計師是否能夠緩和研發支出所引發的盈餘管理及代理問題，並進而改善分析師預測品質。本文援引Balsam (2003)之定義，計算會計師事務所於各產業之市場佔有率(auditor industry market share)。作為產業專家之代理變數。實證結果發現：(1)分析師離散性與整合分析師間私有利益的程度，與公司研發費用多寡有關。研發費用愈高的公司，分析師的離散程度及整合分析師間的私有利益也愈高；(2)透過產業專家查核，可以緩和研發費用支出所引發的盈餘操縱及代理問題，因此研究發展費用透過產業專家會計師查核，可以提升企業的會計盈餘資訊品質，以降低分析師盈餘預測的離散程度及降低分析師間整合私有資訊的利益。 / Analysts, as an informational intermediary, produce research reports that include forecasts of future earnings, thus fulfill an important role in capital market. The objective of this paper is to investigate the association between analyst forecast’s quality and firm’s R&D expenditure. Recent work has hypothesized that intangible assets affect analyst forecast’s quality. Extending this literature, we hypothesized that firm seek to reduce the degree of earnings’ management and agency’s cost from R&D expenditure by retaining high quality auditor firms, auditor industry expertise, and then increase analyst forecast’s quality. We measure auditor industry expertise based on Balsam (2003). We find that more R&D expenditure increases analyst forecast’s dispersion and enhances the benefits of aggregating individual analysts’ forecasts. Consistent with our hypothesis, we document that auditor industry expertise can mitigate the degree of earnings’ management and agency’s cost from R&D expenditure. We also find that firms retaining auditor industry expertise are more likely to enhance the accounting information quality, decrease analyst forecast’s dispersion, and eliminate the benefits of aggregating individual analysts’ forecasts.

本研究主要探討產業專家會計師事務所對其受查企業管理當局自願性盈餘預測品質之影響，文中自願性盈餘預測之品質分別就盈餘預測之發布意願、揭露盈餘預測方式之精確性、盈餘預測之準確性、盈餘預測之穩健性四部分來探討。本研究係以2009年之S&P 500公司作為研究對象，樣本期間為2000年至2009年。實證結果顯示：產業專家會計師事務所之受查企業相較於非產業專家會計師事務所之受查企業，較有意願去發布管理當局自願性盈餘預測，也傾向於以較具體精確之方式去揭露盈餘預測，且其盈餘預測之準確性亦較高，但其與受查企業管理當局自願性盈餘預測之穩健性則無顯著關聯性。顯示產業專家會計師事務所與其受查企業管理當局自願性盈餘預測之間存在關聯性，產業專家會計師事務所能提升其受查企業管理當局自願性盈餘預測之品質。 / This paper examines the effects of auditor industry specialization on voluntary management earnings forecasts. This paper uses the incidence of issuing voluntary management earnings forecasts, forecast specificity, forecast accuracy, and forecast conservatism to measure the quality of voluntary management earnings forecast. Based on the sample of 2009 S&P 500 companies spanning from 2000 to 2009, the results indicate that firms audited by industry specialist are more likely to issue earnings forecasts, and their forecasts are more specific. In addition, these forecasts tend to be more accurate. Taken together, the empirical evidence is consistent with the prediction that the auditor industry specialization is associated with voluntary management earnings forecasts; that is, auditor industry specialization helps to enhance the quality of voluntary management forecasts.

若盈餘資訊之時效性具有不對稱的特性 – 會計資訊認列壞消息的速度較認列好消息的速度更為及時，則會計實務將此稱之為具穩健原則特性之盈餘屬性。本研究檢視我國盈餘的穩健程度，以及就審計功能的角度而言，我國盈餘穩健程度的影響因素，主要發現如下：首先，我國早期的會計盈餘並不具備穩健原則的特性，但是近期的會計盈餘則已經具備穩健原則的特性。換言之，就穩健特性而言，我國的財務報告品質的確有明顯的進步。其次，就審計功能的角度而言，本研究未能發現會計師的品牌聲譽對盈餘穩健程度有具體增額影響的證據。第三，本研究發現產業專家對盈餘穩健程度有正面影響的證據，其中經由進一步的分析，本研究發現，同時為產業專家會計師事務所與產業專家合夥會計師簽證的客戶，其盈餘的穩健程度最高。但是，單獨僅為產業專家會計師事務所，或僅為產業專家合夥會計師所簽證的客戶，其盈餘數字的穩健程度，與一般既非產業專家會計師事務所且並非產業專家合夥會計師簽證客戶的盈餘穩健程度，其間的差異並不明顯。第四，若追蹤至會計師事務所，查核的最終年度，對會計盈餘具有增額的穩健影響。然而，在相同會計師事務所內的會計師更換而產生的最後一年任期，則對盈餘的增額穩健程度並無顯著的影響。最後，無論係早期或近期，若客戶重要性係追蹤至會計師事務所的層級，本研究完全未能發現客戶重要性對於盈餘的穩健程度有負面影響的證據。但是，若客戶重要性係追蹤至合夥會計師的層級，本研究發現，就早期而言，客戶重要性對於盈餘穩健程度的確有不利影響的證據；但是，若就國近期的資料而言，則客戶重要性對於盈餘穩健特性之影響，僅為方向上的負面影響，未能達傳統的顯著水準。

本研究以我國1994年至2003年由四大會計師事務所查核簽證之上市上櫃公司為研究對象，探討會計師之產業專精與任期及其交互作用對於查核品質之影響，其中以裁決性應計數作為查核品質之代理變數，並同時採用會計師事務所及合夥會計師在特定產業之市場佔有率，作為產業專家之衡量指標。實證結果發現，產業專家可以限制受查客戶透過裁決性應計數從事盈餘管理，而以合夥會計師為基礎所計算之市場佔有率較會計師事務所為基礎所計算之市場佔有率，更能解釋審計品質的差異。在任期方面，研究結果顯示，會計師任期愈長愈能限制盈餘管理，而任期對於裁決性應計數絕對値之影響係反映於任期較長會計師之查核年資。但進一步檢測會計師對管理當局操弄盈餘向上或向下的態度是否隨著任期之增長而有所不同時，本研究發現，當管理當局操弄盈餘使其降低時，會計師任期增長愈能抑制管理當局向下操弄盈餘以預留未來盈餘空間；而在管理當局操弄盈餘使其增加時，會計師任期增長則沒有理由支持具查核品質。此外，在產業專家與任期之交互作用對查核品質影響方面，實證結果發現，產業專家會計師抑制盈餘管理的能力較非產業專家好，所以較不須要透過任期的增加來提升其偵測盈餘管理的能力。 / This study uses the sample comprised of listed and OTC firms in Taiwan during 1994-2003 and examines the effects of auditor industry specialization, auditor tenure and the interaction on audit quality. I use discretionary accruals as proxies for audit quality and industry specialization is measured in terms of both audit firm market share in an industry and auditor market share in an industry. My empirical results provide evidence that industry specialist auditors can restrict accruals-based earnings management and explain the differentiation of audit quality more than industry specialist audit firms. About auditor tenure, I find that absolute discretionary accruals decline with auditor tenure and tenure traced at the longer auditor tenure is superior to shorter auditor tenure. The results show that longer auditor tenure enhances audit quality. In addition, a further analysis shows that the clients have motivations on income-decreasing earnings management, auditors can limit management’s ability to create reserve to manage future earnings. But the clients have motivations on income-increasing earnings management, the study did not provide sufficient evidences to explain that audit quality is improved with tenure. Besides, the result of empirical analysis support my estimation about the interaction between auditor industry specialization and auditor tenure. The industry specialist auditors mitigate earnings management more than nonspecialist auditors and don’t enhance audit quality through extending auditor tenure.

本研究旨在針對中國審計市場探討財務報表品質是否受到註冊會計師事務所的品牌聲譽(reputation)、產業專業化(indusrty specialist)，及客戶重要性(client importment)之影響。 單變量結果顯示，國際四大會計師事務所查核之財務報表品質較佳，然而，在控制其他影響財務報表品質之因素後，本研究無法發現四大所查核之財務報表品質優於非四大所查核之公司。此外，在額外考慮客戶議價能力且僅對四大會計師事務所的客戶分析當中，本研究發現在特定衡量方式下，相對於議價能力高的客戶而言，國際四大會計師事務所在面對議價能力低的客戶時，較能抑制其管理當局操縱盈餘，因此在中國，客戶議價能力在某程度上，的確傷害四大所的審計品質。 在產業專家方面，本研究也未能發現產業專家事務所查核之公司，其財務報表品質優於非產業專家查核公司的證據。此外，本研究也無法發現客戶議價能力會對產業專家事務所造成影響。造成此結果之可能係因掛靠制度及政府之尋租行為所造成之區域性分割使得上市公司對事務所的選擇並不重視其審計品質的高低，而是更看重會計師事務所的掛靠單位，再加上中國審計市場集中度不高，使事務所無發展產業專家之誘因。 至於客戶重要性方面，研究結果顯示當客戶支付之公費金額愈高時，即使其公費佔事務所總公費之比例並不高，仍使會計師允許客戶操弄盈餘的幅度愈大，且此現象主要反映於管理當局操弄盈餘減少時。 / In this study, we examine how auditor’s brand name reputation, industry specialization, and client importmance affect the quality of financial statements in China. Using three kinds of abcdrmal accruals to proxy for earnings quality, our empirical results are as follows: First, univariate results suggest that fiancial statemenets audited by Big 4 are better than those audited by non-Big 4. But after controlling for variables established in prior work to be related to abcdrmal accruals, we find no evidence that clinets of Big 4 have lower abcdrmal accruals than clients of non-Big 4. Besides, we find that when we use discretionary accruals (DAC) to proxy for earnings quality, evidence shows that DAC are lower when clients of Big 4 are small and have little bargaining power. Therefore, client bargaining power indeed impairs audit quality in some extent in China. Second, we don’t find a statistically significant association between abcdrmal accruals and industry specialization. We also find no evidence that client bargaining power will affect industry specialization. Third, we use total fees and ratio of client’s total fees to audit firm’s total revenue as our two proxies for client importance. Evidence shows that total fees are positively associated with magnitude of abcdrmal accruals, especially when abcdrmal accruals are negative.

本篇論文的主要目的是檢測會計師是否會影響其客戶投資效率。本研究以2007至2016年間的中國上市公司為樣本，實證結果顯示:（1）事務所層級的產業專家對客戶投資效率有積極影響。（2）會計師個人、事務所皆為產業專家時相對於非產業專家可以提高其客戶的投資效率且其對客戶的投資效率的影響大於單一產業專家。（3）會計師個人、事務所皆為產業專家時，對於國有企業投資效率的影響小於非國有企業。綜上會計師在提高客戶的投資效率方面起著至關重要的作用。 / The objective of this thesis is to examine whether the auditors affect the investment efficiency of its client. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms during 2007~2016, I find that: (1) Audit-firm-level industry expert is positively associated with its clients’ investment efficiency. (2) Industry expert at both firm and partner levels has stronger effect on investment efficiency than industry expert, either at firm-level alone, or at partner level alone. (3) When auditors are industry expert at both firm and partner levels, the effect of industry expertise on investment efficiency is more pronounced for non-state-owned enterprises than state-owned enterprises. In sum, auditors play a critical role in enhancing firm’s investment efficient.

過去研究說明具產業專長之會計師仍能在客戶財務資訊不完整情況下，利用其行業特定知識與較高技術能力執行完善的審計工作(Thibodeau 2003; Moroney 2007; Hammersley 2006)。本論文定義資訊不確定性為客戶之財務資訊無法幫助預測公司的價值(Zhang 2006; Autore et al. 2009)。本論文推論若公司的財務報表具有不確定性會需要聘請產業專長會計師以減緩資訊不確定性的程度，並進一步研究具資訊不確定性公司若由非產業專長更換為產業專長會計師是否能提升其審計品質。由於審計工作目的在於提供資訊品質的確認(Dye 1993; Knechel et al. 2008)，審計人員會依據審計客戶的環境，設計和執行適當的審計計劃以減輕資訊不確定性情況。本論文以會計師角度建立一資訊不確定性架構，進一步將資訊不確定性分為基本價值波動不確定性與資訊品質不確定性，並推論產業專長會計師比較能在資訊品質不確定性中發揮其價值。本論文分為兩部分：第一部分檢驗資訊不確定性是否會影響產業專長會計師之選任，第二部分則檢測具資訊不確定性之審計客戶若選擇產業專長會計師之後，其審計品質是否會提升。 / Previous studies establish that a specialist auditor has more industry-specific knowledge and higher technological capability that can pertinently benefit situations in which client financial information is incomplete (Thibodeau 2003; Moroney 2007; Hammersley 2006). In this paper, we define information uncertainty as the ambiguity with respect to the implications of new information concerning a firm’s value (Zhang 2006; Autore et al. 2009). Because some financial statements present information in uncertain terms, we infer that companies whose financial statements provide uncertain information demand specialist auditors to alleviate the extent of information uncertainty. We further examine the improvements on audit quality made by those companies under information uncertainty which chose to switch from non-specialist auditors to specialist ones. As an assurance of information quality (Dye 1993; Knechel et al. 2008), an auditor, based on his knowledge of the auditee and its environment, will alleviate the uncertainty level of the auditee’s financial information through designing and executing an appropriate audit plan. We build a framework of information uncertainty and develop comprehensive measurements of information uncertainty from the auditor’s point of view. Moreover, this study disentangles the information uncertainty effects into fundamental volatility uncertainty and information quality uncertainty, and proposes that specialist auditors manifest their merits more under information quality uncertainty than under fundamental volatility uncertainty. In the first part of this study, we examine the auditors chosen by companies whose financial statements are characterized by information uncertainty. Previous studies on auditor choice address many reasons why companies switch their auditors (Lennox 2000; Carcello and Neal 2003; Blouin et al. 2007). Information uncertainty makes stakeholders lower their reliance upon company financials and even downgrade the filers, triggering negative stock price reactions (Merton 1987; Beneish et al. 2005; Beneish et al. 2008; Hammersley et al. 2008). Based on prior research, we can infer that a company under information uncertainty chooses to hire a specialist auditor to signal the credibility of the financial statements and improve market perception. We hypothesize that companies suffering uncertainty demand specialist auditors to alleviate their information uncertainty. The auditor’s information role is to ensure the reliability of financial information, and a specialist auditor is equipped with superior audit knowledge and technology. Therefore, we further infer that a company whose specific information uncertainty is attributable to information quality issues (rather than fundamental volatility issues) is more inclined to choose a specialist auditor. This is because a specialist auditor improves the credibility of financial information instead of being involved with the client’s business decisions. We use an auditor switching sample of U.S. companies from 2001-2009 to examine whether the information uncertainty is an issue of auditor choice or not. Consistent with our conjecture, companies under information uncertainty prefer to hire specialist auditors. Evidence partially supports that relative to companies under fundamental volatility uncertainty, companies suffering information quality uncertainty are more inclined to choose specialist auditors. In the second part of this study, we find evidence for the economic consequences of upgrading switches to a specialist auditor when the company is experiencing information uncertainty. After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (hereafter, SOX), many companies began to take the cost-effect issue into consideration; they ultimately decided to go private (Zhang 2006; Engel et al. 2007) in order to avoid the high-cost of Section 404 or switch to a non-Big N audit firm (Calderon et al. 2007). There's no such thing as free lunch; the specialist auditor usually has greater ability and concomitant higher charges (Craswell et al. 1995; DeFond et al. 2000; Francis et al. 2005; Cahan et al. 2008). It is natural to question whether every company needs to engage specialist auditors if it has to pay high audit fees. In this paper, we attempt to determine in which circumstances specialist auditors can make a significant difference in improving audit quality. We investigate the relationship between auditor specialization and audit quality in an information uncertainty setting using an auditor switching sample taken from 2001 to 2009 in the United States. We examine ex post facto whether (1) specialist auditors improve audit quality more than their non-specialist counterparts; and (2) specialist auditors manifest their merits more under information quality uncertainty than the fundamental volatility uncertainty. Since the value of auditor industry specialization is reflected by the perceived and actual audit quality (Balsam et al. 2003; Nagy 2005), we examine both earnings response coefficient (ERC) and accruals quality to proxy audit quality (DAC). In both models, the audit quality of companies that suffer fundamental volatility uncertainty along with comprehensive uncertainty is not enhanced substantially following upgrade switching to a specialist auditor. We find strong empirical results that demonstrate companies under information quality uncertainty show significant improvements in audit quality after switching to specialist auditors. However, specialist auditors are significantly more capable of mitigating the information quality uncertainty than the fundamental volatility uncertainty. That is, auditor specialization is a critical solution when companies encounter information quality uncertainty.

本研究檢測審計品質與經理人能力對於分析師盈餘預測行為之相對有用性。根據Compustat 及 I/B/E/S所蒐集之1996至2011年資料，本研究發現，相對於非四大會計師事務所或非產業專家，當公司被四大會計師事務所或產業專家查核時，分析師預測之準確度較高，且離散度較小。此外，本研究發現當公司經理人能力較高時，分析師預測之準確度亦愈高，而離散度亦愈小。最後，為探討沙賓法案對分析師預測行為之影響，本研究將樣本區分為沙賓法案前及沙賓法案後兩組。實證結果顯示，相對於沙賓法案前，在沙賓法案後，分析師較重視審計品質與經理人能力。整體而言，審計品質與經理人能力皆會為分析師的盈餘預測帶來正面影響，而經理人能力之影響較為顯著。 / This study examines the relative usefulness of audit quality and managerial ability on financial analysts’ earnings forecast behavior. Based on data collected from Compustat and I/B/E/S from 1996 to 2011, the empirical results show that analysts' earnings forecast accuracy is higher and dispersion is smaller when firms are audited by a Big 4 auditor or an industry specialist. Similarly, analysts' earnings forecast accuracy is also higher and dispersion is also smaller when firms employ more capable managers. To investigate whether SOX affects analysts’ behavior, sample is divided into pre-SOX and post-SOX groups. The regression results from both groups show that analysts take audit quality and managerial ability into their earnings forecasts after SOX. Overall, the results suggest that both audit quality and managerial ability are associated with analysts’ earnings forecast properties. Importantly, the effect of managerial ability appears to be larger than the effect of audit quality.

近來陸續爆出的舞弊案件已連帶引起了社會大眾對關係人交易行為的注意。本文先探討審計品質與關係人交易之關聯性，而實證結果顯示關係人銷貨、進貨、應收款項與應付款項交易與審計品質皆呈負向關係，足見關係人交易之查核是困難的。因此本文期望透過外部審計人員的專業屬性來降低關係人交易對審計品質產生的不良影響，提升投資人對公司財務報導的信任。過去文獻針對會計師專業屬性部分，指出會計師事務所規模愈大以及產業專精程度愈高者，具備較佳的查核品質。研究結果顯示當關係人銷貨、進貨及應收款項交易係由四大會計師事務所或產業專家會計師事務所查核時，因大型會計師事務所或產業專家會計師事務所具備較佳會計師專業屬性，能抑制或減少關係人交易對審計品質之負面影響，而提升財務報表之審計品質。 / Numerous financial reporting frauds over recent years have made related party transactions the center of public attention. We first investigate the association between related party transactions and audit quality (proxied by discretionary accruals), and find that four kinds of related party transactions (including sales to related parties, purchases from related parties, accounts receivable from related parties and payable to related parties) all have negative impacts on audit quality. We posit that (1) external auditing is a monitoring mechanism to reduce audit quality decline caused by related party transactions, and (2) auditor attributes including big 4 audit firms and industry specialist audit firms can mitigate the audit quality decline thereof. Empirical results show that companies audited by big 4 or industry specialist audit firms, whose sales to related parties, purchases from related parties and accounts receivable from related parties show significantly smaller negative impacts on audit quality than companies not audited by big 4 or industry specialist audit firms.

本文旨在探討關鍵查核事項與會計師事務所特性之關聯性。其中，會計師事務所特性係指其獨立性與專業能力，並分別以任期與產業專家衡量之。 　　本文實證研究結果如下：其一，主查會計師之任期對關鍵查核事項幾無影響。其二，產業專家會計師事務所與關鍵查核事項之數量及品質僅有部分試驗呈正相關。其三，產業專家主查會計師其對關鍵查核事項之數量及品質均有正面影響。 　　在增額測試的部分，結果如下：其一，對產業專家主查會計師而言，任期對關鍵查核事項有正面效果。其二，會計師事務所與主查會計師俱為產業專家的會計師對關鍵查核事項之正面影響力大於僅有會計師事務所為產業專家的會計師。最後，會計師的專業能力使其更有能力以簡明扼要的文字呈現關鍵查核事項。 / The objective of this thesis is to investigate the relationship between key audit matters (KAMs) and audit firm characteristics. In this study, audit firm characteristics are focused on their independence and ability, and are measured by tenure and industry expertise, respectively. The empirical results can be summarized as follows. Firstly, lead partners tenure has little effect on KAMs. Secondly, partial evidence is found on the association between firm-level industry specialist auditors and KAMs. Thirdly, partner-level industry specialist auditors have positive effects on both the quantity and quality of KAMs. In further examinations, the results are as follows. Firstly, tenure has positive effects on KAMs when the auditors are partner-level industry specialist. Secondly, industry experts at both firm- and partner-levels have stronger positive effects on KAMs then industry experts at firm-level alone. Lastly, auditors’ capacity allows them to present KAMs more concisely.