The dissertation examines IPO underpricing and long-term performance to assess the use of industry specialization as a differentiation strategy by audit firms and underwriters. Prior studies indicate that prestigious auditors or underwriters (e.g., Big 6 auditors) are associated with IPO underpricing. I extend existing literature by incorporating market share as a refined measure of auditor (underwriter) reputation. In particular, I define a differentiated auditor (underwriter) as the market leader that possesses significantly higher market share than their competitors in the client industry. I hypothesize that the impact of auditor (underwriter) reputation in the IPO setting depends on whether the audit firm (underwriter) has successfully differentiated itself from competitors within client industries. My results show that as audit firm (underwriter) industry market share increases without differentiation, the IPO underpricing increases. It appears that this group of auditors (underwriters) intentionally engages in high-risk IPOs in order to gain fee advantages. In contrast, differentiated auditors (underwriters) are related to lower IPO underpricing because their reputation assist in reducing information asymmetry between issuers and investors. My study is important because it shows that the benefits previously thought to be attributable to a very large set of auditors and underwriters stems primary

This dissertation investigates how economically-comparable peer firms can be used to obtain inferences about a company’s accounting quality in two different research settings. The first Chapter examines whether auditor industry specialization, measured using auditor market share by industry, improves audit quality. After matching clients of specialist and non-specialist auditors according to industry, size and performance, there are no significant differences in audit quality between these two groups of auditors. In addition, this Chapter uses two analyses that do not rely primarily on matched samples. First, examining a sample of Arthur Andersen clients that switched auditors in 2002, there is no evidence of industry-specialization effects following the auditor change. Second, using a simulation approach, this study shows that client characteristics, and particularly client size, influence the observed association between auditor industry specialization and audit quality. Overall, these findings do not imply that industry knowledge is not important for auditors, but that the methodology used in extant studies examining this issue may not fully parse out the effects of auditor industry expertise from client characteristics. The second Chapter examines whether account-level expectation models for analytical audit procedures can be enhanced by using information from economically-comparable peer firms. This Chapter assesses the effectiveness of three main types of expectation models, with and without including information from peer firms: heuristic, time-series, and industry cross-sectional models. Information from peer firms improves the accuracy of all models and improves the detection power of time-series and industry cross-sectional models. Comparing between models, one-period heuristic models are generally unreliable, and industry cross-sectional models can be more effective than time-series models. These findings may help auditors of public companies and financial analysts in selecting expectation models and finding peer firms to assess the reasonability of a company’s financial information at the account-level.

This dissertation investigates how economically-comparable peer firms can be used to obtain inferences about a company’s accounting quality in two different research settings. The first Chapter examines whether auditor industry specialization, measured using auditor market share by industry, improves audit quality. After matching clients of specialist and non-specialist auditors according to industry, size and performance, there are no significant differences in audit quality between these two groups of auditors. In addition, this Chapter uses two analyses that do not rely primarily on matched samples. First, examining a sample of Arthur Andersen clients that switched auditors in 2002, there is no evidence of industry-specialization effects following the auditor change. Second, using a simulation approach, this study shows that client characteristics, and particularly client size, influence the observed association between auditor industry specialization and audit quality. Overall, these findings do not imply that industry knowledge is not important for auditors, but that the methodology used in extant studies examining this issue may not fully parse out the effects of auditor industry expertise from client characteristics. The second Chapter examines whether account-level expectation models for analytical audit procedures can be enhanced by using information from economically-comparable peer firms. This Chapter assesses the effectiveness of three main types of expectation models, with and without including information from peer firms: heuristic, time-series, and industry cross-sectional models. Information from peer firms improves the accuracy of all models and improves the detection power of time-series and industry cross-sectional models. Comparing between models, one-period heuristic models are generally unreliable, and industry cross-sectional models can be more effective than time-series models. These findings may help auditors of public companies and financial analysts in selecting expectation models and finding peer firms to assess the reasonability of a company’s financial information at the account-level.

In accordance with the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, the Securities and Exchange Commission is required to propose and adopt clawback rules. After a financial statement restatement, a clawback is utilized to recover incentive compensation that was previously paid out to a manager based on the misstatement. My study investigates financial reporting executives' (FREs) decision-making after the external auditors have proposed a restatement that will lead to a clawback. I performed a web-based experiment that was electronically distributed to sixty FRE participants (i.e., CFOs, controllers, and treasurers) and manipulated executive compensation structure (i.e., a higher percentage of total compensation based on incentives or a lower percentage of total compensation based on incentives) and auditor industry specialization (i.e., industry-specialist or non-industry specialist) in a clawback environment. I hypothesized that higher incentives or the presence of a non-specialist auditor would cause FREs to be less likely to agree with an auditor's proposed restatement, more likely to involve the external auditor's national office, and more likely to request termination of the external auditors. Further, I posited that the two factors would interact for each of the three dependent variables. As predicted, my results reveal that FREs are less likely to agree with the restatement due to loss aversion when a higher proportion of their pay is incentive-based; however, auditor specialization does act to mitigate the influence of loss aversion by increasing their likelihood to accept the restatement. Additionally, I find that FREs are highly likely to request the involvement of the national office and very unlikely to request termination of the auditors across all conditions. In consideration of the upcoming clawback rules, this is a timely study that makes important contributions. First, I find an unintended negative consequence of clawback regulation, as my results indicate that clawbacks may exacerbate aggressive financial reporting decisions by FREs during a restatement negotiation. Further, I find that specialist auditors can act as effective monitors of FREs' behaviors in a clawback environment. Last, my results provide evidence for firms regarding the influence of executive compensation structures on FREs' decision-making in a clawback setting. / Ph. D.

本研究主要探討產業專家會計師事務所對其受查企業管理當局自願性盈餘預測品質之影響，文中自願性盈餘預測之品質分別就盈餘預測之發布意願、揭露盈餘預測方式之精確性、盈餘預測之準確性、盈餘預測之穩健性四部分來探討。本研究係以2009年之S&P 500公司作為研究對象，樣本期間為2000年至2009年。實證結果顯示：產業專家會計師事務所之受查企業相較於非產業專家會計師事務所之受查企業，較有意願去發布管理當局自願性盈餘預測，也傾向於以較具體精確之方式去揭露盈餘預測，且其盈餘預測之準確性亦較高，但其與受查企業管理當局自願性盈餘預測之穩健性則無顯著關聯性。顯示產業專家會計師事務所與其受查企業管理當局自願性盈餘預測之間存在關聯性，產業專家會計師事務所能提升其受查企業管理當局自願性盈餘預測之品質。 / This paper examines the effects of auditor industry specialization on voluntary management earnings forecasts. This paper uses the incidence of issuing voluntary management earnings forecasts, forecast specificity, forecast accuracy, and forecast conservatism to measure the quality of voluntary management earnings forecast. Based on the sample of 2009 S&P 500 companies spanning from 2000 to 2009, the results indicate that firms audited by industry specialist are more likely to issue earnings forecasts, and their forecasts are more specific. In addition, these forecasts tend to be more accurate. Taken together, the empirical evidence is consistent with the prediction that the auditor industry specialization is associated with voluntary management earnings forecasts; that is, auditor industry specialization helps to enhance the quality of voluntary management forecasts.

In the first essay, I examine the association between auditor industry specialization and earnings management choices. Prior research suggests that industry specialist auditors constrain accounting-based earnings management. But such actions may cause client companies to seek alternative means to manage earnings. Specifically, companies that hire industry specialist auditors may alter operating decisions to meet earnings targets, referred to as real activities manipulation. This essay investigates whether clients of industry specialist auditors that have an incentive to manage earnings are constrained from managing earnings through accruals manipulation and, therefore, are more likely to engage in real activities manipulation. Further, I examine whether operating performance declines for firms suspected of real activities manipulation. My findings indicate that clients of industry specialist auditors with incentives to manage earnings have lower absolute value of accruals relative to firms with incentives to manage earnings that do not hire industry specialist auditors. These clients of industry specialist auditors are also more likely to engage in real activities manipulation, suggesting this is a possible unintended consequence of hiring an industry specialist auditor. I also document evidence that firms suspected of real activities manipulation have lower future operating performance relative to firms not suspected of real activities manipulation. In the second essay, I examine the association between the tightness of accounting standards and earnings management choices. Prior studies suggest that managers switch from accounting-based earnings management to real activities manipulation in response to tightening accounting standards. My study investigates this line of reasoning. I develop an analytical model and conduct an experimental examination of the effect of flexibility of accounting standards under different institutional environments. I find that managers switch from accounting-based earnings management to real activities manipulation with tightening accounting standards only when the institutional investors have a short-term investment horizon. In contrast, when managers are monitored by institutional investors with a long-term investment horizon, they do not engage in such behavior.