This research will contribute the literature of managerial ability and cost of capital. This study is the first to investigate the association between managerial ability and cost of capital to the best of our knowledge using Demerjian et al. (2012). Managerial ability is the measurement methodology which is the most commonly used method to evaluate the managerial ability in the literature. In a previous study, Mishra (2014) investigates the relation between CEO managerial ability and cost of capital by using Custodio’s (2013) CEO managerial ability methodology. This method only measures the ability of CEOs based on their experience. Those who have several experiences in different departments and other sectors are regarded as generalist CEOs, while some others who have one specific experience in a department and/or sector are regarded as specialist CEOs. Mishra shows a positive relation between generalist CEOs and cost of capital; it is regarded as the dark side of managerial ability. Mishra explains this relation by the risky behaviors of generalist CEOs. Mishra argues that generalist CEOs have lots of job opportunities. They also tend not to focus on the long-term financial soundness of the corporations—aiming to increase revenues sharply in short terms to improve their reputation. We extend Mishra’s analysis by employing firm fixed effect to its model. We find that the impact of general CEO managerial ability which is defined by Mishra (2014) as the dark side is not significant once the employ firm fixed effect is considered. This analysis assesses the effect of managerial ability on cost of capital by using Demerjian’s methodology. It was found that the impact of managerial ability on cost of capital shows a negative significant relation in line with expectations. More able managers lead to less cost of capital. This finding is in line with literature of the impact of managerial ability on company performance. We also employ firm fixed effects to our models and confirm the study’s findings. It is shown that the relation between institutional ownership and cost of capital is also significant. Further, there were many channels examined to identify possible causes of this negative relationship. It is expected that able managers disclose more information; they also help to reduce forecast error and eventually improve performance. The relationships between managerial ability and information disclosure, managerial ability and forecast error, as well as managerial ability and performance are significant. The channel effects are also explored by employing firm fixed effect, as mentioned previously. All the models present significant relationship.

Given the high level of scrutiny on top executives in recent years, particularly those at banks, examining the impact of bank managers' ability on financial reporting is of great value. This paper builds on models of bank efficiency in the banking literature to derive a measure of bank managerial ability, and examines how bank managerial ability impacts the quality of accounting information related to unique bank accounting issues. I find evidence that higher ability managers do report higher quality accounting estimates for the allowance for loan losses and fair values of securities. Additionally, I identify two settings that affect the strength of the relation between bank managerial ability and accounting quality, the Financial Crisis and when capital ratios are binding. I find evidence that this relation is stronger during the recent Financial Crisis but is attenuated when capital ratios are binding. These findings should be of interest to investors, standard setters, and particularly bank regulators tasked with monitoring the stability of banks. / text

This research will contribute to the literature of managerial ability and analyst following as well as narrative disclosure in the following ways. This study is the first to investigate the association between managerial ability and external information intermediaries such as financial analysts to the best of our knowledge. Most of the earlier studies on managerial ability focus on firms’ internal information environment such as operating and financial decisions, and limited studies examine the relation between managerial ability with external perception of the information environment and narrative disclosures. We extend this literature by examining how managerial ability impacts the firm's external information environment, affecting informational intermediaries' work processes, such as financial analysts. We find that managers' higher ability leads to better performance by financial analysts regarding their forecast error, dispersion, and willingness to provide coverage on the firm. We also step further by employing more advanced and novel measures to assess managerial ability's impact on market intermediaries’ external work and perception. Able managers impact reporting informativeness, response time, and the uncertainty of the forecasts from financial analysts. Further, we examine informational channels or mediators (i.e., analyst following and readability of narrative disclosure), highlighting how managerial ability can be linked the better performance by financial analysts. We intend to show how variables like disclosure readability and analyst following mediate between managerial ability and analyst forecast properties (i.e., error and Dispersion). In the last part of the research, we answer how analysts' better performance can be a channel to help able managers increase their firms' value (i.e., analyst’s forecast error acts as the channel from the managerial ability to firm’s performance).

We extend the model of Delfgaauw and Dur (2010) to analyze the occupation choice with the presence of the public service motivation. When the workers are purely altruistic, the lower is the acceptance rate of job application to the public sector, the higher is the possibility to have applicants with better managerial ability. In addition, when the friction cost of restarting job searching is higher, the applicants with less managerial ability tend to apply the private sector jobs from the beginning. On the other hand, when the workers are impurely altruistic, the applicants with less managerial ability will not self-select into the public sector. Finally, the highest social welfare level may not be reached if the acceptance rate in the public sector is not one hundred percent.

近年來台灣企業爆發許多食安及環境保護問題，引起社會大眾對企業的倫理行為產生高度的關切，使得政府、企業及社會也越來越重視企業社會責任相關議題，因此如何將公司與永續經營策略結合，是高階管理階層所面臨的重要課題。本研究以台灣上市櫃公司為樣本，旨在探討管理階層能力是否會影響企業社會責任之揭露及執行程度。本研究推論管理階層決定企業策略方針、管理制度及組織文化，而較有能力之管理階層較能宏觀全球趨勢，並在永續經營理念下，採行較高程度之社會責任行動。本研究之管理階層能力採用Demerjian et al.(2013)的衡量方式，以資料包絡分析法(DEA)來計算各產業下的公司效率並區分出管理階層所創造之經營效率。實證結果顯示：管理階層能力愈好，愈會揭露企業社會責任資訊，且執行企業社會責任的程度亦較高，符合本研究之推論。 / A series of food safety and environmental incidents in recent years in Taiwan had intrigued public concern about ethical activities of company. Aware of the influence of these activities on society, the government, corporates and society have further increased their attention to corporate social responsibility (CSR). Therefore, the lesson managers have to learn is to formulate corporate strategies aligned with sustainability principles. The objective of this thesis is to explore whether managerial ability is associated with CSR among Taiwan listed firms. We assume that managers are usually empowered with the authority to decide corporate strategies, policies and culture; therefore, more able managers are more knowledgeable of macro-economic trends and tend to engage more in CSR with sustainability goals. With respect to the measurement of managerial ability, we follow Demerjian et al.(2013), who conduct data envelopment analysis (DEA) to estimate firm efficiency and purge key firm-specific characteristics. The empirical results reveal that the higher quality managers are willing to disclose more information of CSR and in turn positively affects firm’s corporate social performance in accordance with our assumption.

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本研究以中國2007年至2012年的A股上市公司為研究對象，探討管理當局能力與分析師盈餘預測行為的關係，預測行為迴歸模型以分析師追蹤人數、分析師盈餘預測準確性及預測離散程度三種特性進行分析。 研究結果發現，管理當局能力與分析師追蹤人數、盈餘預測精確度皆呈現顯著正相關，與預測離散程度則為負相關，但并不顯著。這表示經理人能力較好，則分析師對該公司之追蹤意願較高，且盈餘預測誤差與預測離散度較低。本研究藉此結果推論，管理當局能力愈佳之企業，經理人愈會提供品質良好、具可靠性的財務報導，故分析師將愈信賴該公司所提供之資訊，並可幫助分析師做出更精確之盈餘預測，並降低彼此間之預測誤差。 / This study examines the relation between managerial ability and financial analysts’ earnings forecast behaviors in China from 2007 to 2012. We use several analysts’ attributes: number of analysts following, forecasts error, and forecasts dispersion. According to the empirical results, in general, analysts tend to follow firms with more ability of managers, and managers with superior ability might decrease analysts’ forecast errors and the dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts.

本研究檢測審計品質與經理人能力對於分析師盈餘預測行為之相對有用性。根據Compustat 及 I/B/E/S所蒐集之1996至2011年資料，本研究發現，相對於非四大會計師事務所或非產業專家，當公司被四大會計師事務所或產業專家查核時，分析師預測之準確度較高，且離散度較小。此外，本研究發現當公司經理人能力較高時，分析師預測之準確度亦愈高，而離散度亦愈小。最後，為探討沙賓法案對分析師預測行為之影響，本研究將樣本區分為沙賓法案前及沙賓法案後兩組。實證結果顯示，相對於沙賓法案前，在沙賓法案後，分析師較重視審計品質與經理人能力。整體而言，審計品質與經理人能力皆會為分析師的盈餘預測帶來正面影響，而經理人能力之影響較為顯著。 / This study examines the relative usefulness of audit quality and managerial ability on financial analysts’ earnings forecast behavior. Based on data collected from Compustat and I/B/E/S from 1996 to 2011, the empirical results show that analysts' earnings forecast accuracy is higher and dispersion is smaller when firms are audited by a Big 4 auditor or an industry specialist. Similarly, analysts' earnings forecast accuracy is also higher and dispersion is also smaller when firms employ more capable managers. To investigate whether SOX affects analysts’ behavior, sample is divided into pre-SOX and post-SOX groups. The regression results from both groups show that analysts take audit quality and managerial ability into their earnings forecasts after SOX. Overall, the results suggest that both audit quality and managerial ability are associated with analysts’ earnings forecast properties. Importantly, the effect of managerial ability appears to be larger than the effect of audit quality.

本研究旨在探討管理當局發佈自願性盈餘預測意願、預測精確度、預測型態與管理當局能力之關聯性，並進一步檢測能力較佳之管理當局所發佈之盈餘預測對投資人是否具增額資訊內涵。 實證分析結果顯示管理當局能力與管理當局發佈盈餘預測之機率呈顯著正相關，亦即管理當局能力愈好，發佈盈餘預測之機率愈高；再者，本研究發現能力愈佳之管理當局，其盈餘預測之精確度亦會較高；而實證結果亦顯示當管理當局能力較好時，較願意以資訊量較多之完整式財務預測型態發佈財務預測。增額測試結果則顯示市場對於能力較佳之管理當局發佈之自願性盈餘預測反應程度較高。 / The primary objective of this thesis is to explore whether the managerial ability is related to management earnings forecast, earnings forecast accuracy , and disclosure format. Additionally, this thesis investigates whether managerial ability increases the informativeness of management earnings forecast for (potential) investors. Empirical results show that managers with superior ability tend to announce management earnings forecast and when managers have better ability, they shall announce more precise management earnings forecast. About disclosure format, this thesis finds that managers with superior ability prefer to announce complete earnings forecasts than simple ones. Additionally, market reaction will be more to the informativeness of management earnings forecast which made by managers with better ability.

本研究以中國2007年至2013年盈餘預測的A股上市公司為主體。探討管理當局發佈強制性盈餘預測的預測形態、預測誤差以及市場反應與管理當局能力之關聯性，並進一步檢測管理當局能力是否影響到其對於強制性盈餘預告門檻的規避以及對於來年發佈自願性業績預測的意願。 實證的結果顯示管理當局能力越好其提供的強制性盈餘預測的形式越精準其預告資訊含量越多；再者，管理當局能力越好，其盈餘預測的誤差越低；實證結果也證明了市場對於能力較佳之管理當局所發佈的強制性盈餘預測的反應程度也較高。增額測試的結果顯示管理當局能力佳者盈餘品質較佳，具體表現為：相較於能力差的管理者，管理當局能力較好時不會通過盈餘管理去避免導因於產生增長50%或是下降50%而強制發佈盈餘預告的門檻。另外，管理當局能力越好，其在隔年度發佈自願性盈餘預測的幾率也越高。 關鍵詞：管理當局能力、強制性盈餘預測、預測形態、盈餘預測誤差、市場反應 / This thesis focuses on mandatory forecast issued from 2007 to 2013 in China and investigate whether managerial ability is related to mandatory forecasts types, forecast error and market reaction. Additionally, this thesis also examines whether managerial ability decrease the likelihood to avoid mandatory forecast thresholds. Finally, whether the managerial ability will increase the probability of issuing voluntary forecasts in the following year is an interesting but unsolved issue; I will fill the gap. Empirical results show that managers with superior ability tend to issue mandatory forecasts in the more precise type. As for the accuracy, the mandatory forecasts issued by better managers tend to have less error. I also find that managerial ability can promotes the informativeness of management earnings forecasts for the public. Additionally, high ability managers are less likely to avoid the thresholds of mandatory forecasts. Furthermore, better managers are more likely to issue voluntary forecasts in the following year of mandatory forecasts. Key Words: Managerial Ability, Mandatory Earnings Forecast, Forecast Format, Forecast Error, Market Reaction.