面對全球氣候急遽變遷的挑戰下，各國政府對於環境治理議題高度的重視與 關切。在1992年京都議定書制定後，國家透過彼此的規範制約，期望可減少二 氧化碳的排放與環境的破壞。然而，正式權威途徑的執行，對於經濟發展與環境 永續的趨避衝突，卻不見預期效益。爾後，森林認證概念倡議後，希冀以市場途 徑作為國際規範，進入各國的創新管道。而第一個透過非政府組織建立的FSC體系，在2001年經由WWF進入中國大陸推展認證項目。只是，西方的運作思維與原則框架，在中國大陸終究遭遇到體制與管理上的困境。2008年後，中國大陸政府除了主導國家體系CFCC外，也與PEFC在2014年正式達成互認的成果。本研究試圖從政策改變前與後，以兩個階段分析行動者協力合作的情況，網 絡互動與體系採用的擴散情況。 研究結果分為兩個部分，首先就問卷統計數據來看協力與體系採用的相關性。對於FSC而言，治理與規範性是行動者選擇採用與否的重要因素。也就是行動者選擇FSC是因為重視認證資源的獲取、非正式關係的信任度與公開透明的正式溝通管道。而對於PEFC而言，治理因素同樣重要，而受到行動者支持的是相互性因數。傘型認證體制的特性，共同分享資訊、資源，使得政策場域中的行動者支持 PEFC。然而，對於CFCC而言並沒有太大的差異性。而在協力與網絡互動的分析上，自主性成為影響的因數。代表政策場域中的行動者，重視管理協調與主導政策制定討論的過程。 第二，對於擴散因數與體系採用的相關檢定。對FSC而言，社會化是重要 的關鍵。政策制定行動者考慮的是體系鄰近性、市場偏好、企業喜好與國際組織 的支持。而採用CFCC的行動者，同樣認為社會化重要。表示，利益方瞭解這是一個市場遊戲，而CFCC得到PEFC的互認後，對國家體系保持肯定態度。然而，競爭因素與採用CFCC也具有顯著性。表示行動者瞭解在中國大陸，政府透過管制帶來的競爭情勢，因此選擇了CFCC體系。 第三，就社會網絡分析數據分析，來看組織協力與體系採用關係。以程度中 心性來看，在資源與專業知識面向，皆是從國際組織轉向政府部門。在影響力層 面，國際組織甚至在第二階段便消失。而正式途徑的合作，以政府及國際組織為 兩大群體。但在第二階段，政府集中性更高，而國際組織則愈趨降低。包括在信 任度上，國際非政府組織也是下降的情況。在結構洞分析方面，第一階段的資源 掮客是一個多元組織的分佈，到的第二階段則單一化，國際體系成為傳達訊息的 角色。在影響力方面，第二階段主要是政府的角色成為掮客，而國際組織傳達影 響力的功能消失。而在信度度方面，第二階段發現國際非政府組織與企業，反而 更突顯他們在非正式關係網絡中的掮客位置。影響信任網絡的因素，分析發現政 策制定過程的資訊分享是關鍵原因。 本論文認為國際規範不僅建立在行動者的合作上，更需要結合地方組織，透 過社區力量建立由下而上的互動網絡。尤其第一階段，中國大陸需要藉由國際力 量，協助國內政策制定。因此，給予行動一個大鳴大放的空間與環境。第二階段， 受到協商過程的困境，而形成權力收回的情況。再者，中國大陸對於非政治敏感 議題，並非完全恪守政治命令而行，來決定政策發展的方向。相反的，政府可相 對釋出部分的自主性給國際組織。然而，當遭遇話語權問題時，便會透過管制途 徑收回權力，是一種「妥協式的管制協力」。而擴散的效應則是源於政策場域中， 行動者對於政策的學習與社會化而成。本研究透過微觀的實證資料，對中國大陸 協力、擴散與網絡互動研究有興趣的學者，提供另一個角度的解釋。總結來說， 國際規範透過非政府組織的「非正式途徑」，從國外帶入國內，並同時垂直向上 與向下影響中央政府的決策，及提升草根的公民力量。以中國大陸經驗反思國際 政策治理理論，重構對於開發中國家的「迴力鏢效應 2.0」模式。 / While facing the challenge of global climate change, each country puts much emphasis on environmental governance issues urgently. Since the Kyoto Protocol declared in 1992, the effective approach to resolve environmental crisis aims to regulate environmental standards and reduce emission of carbon dioxide through various air, forest and water management. However, the management efficiency is not obvious to enhance the sustainable target by formal authorities because of the conflict of economic development and environmental sustainability. The forest certification mechanism is an innovative business strategy to implement international norms into domestic governance. Particularly, FSC is successfully getting into China to develop systems through the strong support from international organizations and enterprises. On the other hand, FSC also confronted many obstacles in regulatory institution and management difficulties from Chinese registration and standard laws. Meanwhile, Chinese governments dominated in national system (CFCC) which had recognized with PEFC in 2014. This research analysis focused on the development of collaboration, network interaction and system adoption in two stages of policy change. First, the statistical findings show that norm and governance factors are significant to actors in adoption of FSC which means that the policy makers emphasize on the resource, informal trust relationships and transparent formal communication. Also, governance is important to actors to adopt PEFC systems. Another influential factor is mutuality that actors prefer the umbrella mechanism of PEFC to share information and resources with more flexible institutions. Otherwise, the correlation of interval variable of collaboration and network interaction, the analysis shows that autonomy is the influential factor to affect the collaborative relationships among actors in policy domain. On the other side, the interactive relationship is not significantly correlated to system adoption and diffusion. Second, about the results of diffusion and system adoption, socialization is a crucial element to support FSC because of system approximation, market preferences and INGO support. To CFCC adopters, socialization is also a significant factor to them which means that they understand the certification system is a global market game. After CFCC recognized with PEFC, policy-domain actors approve CFCC. Meanwhile, competition is a considerable dimension to actors by regulatory approach by central governments. Finally, based on network analysis of centrality, the high-central actors transformed to governmental actors from international NGOs in the second stage. Meanwhile, INGOs disappeared in influential factor. As for formal collaborative relationship, the public sectors and INGOs are two main groups. However, the public sectors are more central, but INGO are more peripheral. Also, the trust centrality of INGOs descends since CFCC and PEFC recognized. Of the structural-constraint analysis, the resource brokers are multiple in the first stage, but more homogeneous to public sector then. In policy-influence dimension, the governmental organizations are still main brokers in the second stage, and INGOs disappeared. The trust brokers are INGO and private sectors that highlight their informal relationships in the broker network. The Chinese governments release the approach of “airing views freely” to INGOs and multinational corporations in the first stage, and take back the autonomous right in second one because of “political baselines”. In conclusion, this research argues that collaborative governance not only requires the legitimacy of international norms and rules implemented to domestic markets, but also integrates more local actors in policy-making process to enhance the efficiency. Chinese governmental actors are willing to cooperate with others by releasing more power and autonomy. However, they also take back the power while they lose the power of discourse which means that it is “negotiable regulation and collaboration”. Moreover, the research results reform the “Boomerang Effect 2.0” to rethink about another vertical effect of INGOs power bringing into domestic central governments and local civil society.