當我們提到一國經濟發展之情況時，多半是以該國之產出成長率與就業率這兩大經濟 指標來衡量，而欲企進此兩大指標之改善，技術進步所扮演之角色是相當重要的。本 文之目的，即欲以循次漸進的方式，由生產函數引出技術進步理論，再將技術進步放 入生產函數中，導出勞力吸收模型，以了解技術進步、勞力吸收與經濟發展之關係。 其中並利用新近發展出之理性預期理論來解釋有關貨幣面之實質變數。最後將以台灣 為例做實證研究，並因之對台灣經濟發展提供數項政策建議。 全文共分五章。第一章指出個人研究動機及方法，細分三節。第二章探討技術進步理 論，分三節論之。第三章則為勞力吸收理論與模型之建立，共有四節。第四章為台灣 實證研究，亦有三節。第五章則為結論與建議。

We investigate the trading strategy of the insider and propose two models to describe the insider’s behavior. Comparing with previous studies, we add insider stockholdings as a variable to the extension of information asymmetry. In our setting with information asymmetry between outside investors and the insiders, the insiders could obtain more inside information via increasing their stockholdings. When the insider with large stockholdings purchases more shares, outside investors would take this as a positive signal that the insiders regard the performance of the company in the future as optimistic. On the other hand, when the insider stockholdings is large, outsiders would worry that inside trading may become more. The insider would deliberate upon the quantities traded at period one and two, which have different impact in stock price. If the insider buys more stocks at period one, he could improve his information precision. However, if the insider buys large stocks, the market makers would take into account the insider’s function of information precision and thus the insider may impact on the stock price. Therefore the insider would evaluate market makers’ pricing rule. Since increasing stockholdings enhances precision information, intuitively, earlier stage the insider submits a large order. Nonetheless, our study shows that when the insider stockholding is extremely large, then the increasing of information precision is limited because the information precision is increasing with insider stockholding at a decreasing rate. Besides, when the insider stockholdings is large enough at period one, he would place a small order at period two.