本文利用連續Cournot 寡占模型分析垂直相關市場中，產能限制如何幫助垂直整合廠商提高對手成本，並檢視歐盟執委會非水平結合準則中對於此議題規範的妥適性。結果顯示，垂直整合廠商提高對手誘因與攫取市場分額無直接關係，且與無產能限制情況相比，在相當範圍內，垂直整合廠商反而偏好自己產能受到限制。當垂直整合廠商受到產能限制時，獨立上游競爭廠商將減少中間財生產，使得垂直整合廠商可以藉由少量中間財購買，大幅提高對手成本，增加利潤。 / This paper analyzes the impact of capacity constraint on vertically integrated firm and other independent downstream in a Cournot Duopoly market. The result shows that vertically integrated firm may prefer to be constrained in its capacity since it could raise rivals’ cost with fewer cost after supply shrink of other upstream suppliers. Aside from EC Guideline, 2004, the research proves no direct relevance between market share captures and raising rival’s cost of a vertically integrated firm. Vertically integrated firm with capacity constraint may as well further raise rival’s cost even such may reduce its market share or revenue as the tremendous reduction cost on strategic buying. Moreover, as the fringe downstream expands to three, the profit gap of vertically integrated firm between constrained and unconstrained capacity will be wider.

本文將探討當一販售耐久財的獨佔廠商面臨到商品產量限制以及市場上存在著個人需求不確定性時的最適訂價模式。此外本文也透過分析不同時期消費者所面臨的每期使用價格變化來說明當消費者存在個人需求不確定性時，廠商於兩期使用價格的設定會出現異於Coasian耐久財模型的兩期使用價格設定。當商品效用在第二期出現壞結果時低於一定標準時，廠商兩期使用價格訂價模式將出現第一期使用價格下降而第二期使用價格反而上升的現象，甚至可能出現第二期使用價格高於第一期使用價格的現象。而這與Coasian耐久財模型所呈現的兩期使用價格訂價模式是大不相同。 我們發現當廠商採取非價格承諾的訂價策略且廠商產能處於一定的數值時，廠商採取讓消費者面臨限量風險的訂價策略可獲得較Coasian耐久財模型更高的利潤。由此可見產能限制將可使廠商在採取非價格承諾的訂價策略下仍能透過讓消費者面臨限量的風險來保有獨佔力並且賺取較高利潤。 / This paper will investigate the best pricing strategy for durable goods monopolist with capacity constraint and individual demand uncertainty. We also introduce the concept of “per-period usage price” and illustrate the difference between traditional Coasian durable goods pricing strategy and ours. When the product utility turns out to be a bad outcome and its value is lower than the certain standard, first period’s per-period usage price will decrease while second period’s per-period usage price will increase simultaneously. This consequence is totally different from Coasian durable goods model. When monopolist use non-commitment pricing strategy and face capacity constraint, monopolist will set the price for exerting the risk of rationing to consumers which will help monopolist gain higher profit than Coasian durable goods model. This shows that capacity constraint will help monopolist keep monopoly power and gain higher profit.