循著時光的隧道，自二十世紀初以來，全球企業併購的熱潮方興未艾，時至今日「併購」已為一般人所熟知，併購的型態更演變出多種樣貌。本文以敵意併購為基調，蒐集全球2000年至2015年樣本，研究結果顯示，敵意併購之宣告對主併公司股東短期有不利之影響，若目標公司採取防禦策略時，對主併公司股東而言亦不利。故如果一公司欲發動敵意併購時，需考量目標公司是否有防禦措施的設置，惟此結果未達顯著水準。 此外本研究亦針對敵意併購下主併公司股東的異常報酬，探討影響股東異常報酬的原因，實證結果得知，併購溢價越高，對於主併公司股東顯著不利，驗證「贏家的詛咒」理論，亦即併購溢價越多，將使得主併公司持股人的財富移轉至目標公司身上，對主併方股東有不利之影響。 / The trend of Merger and Acquisition is booming as of 20th century and the pattern has become variable and complicated. In this study, hostile takeover, one of the focal point on the subject of M&A, is to be discussed. Samples are collected from 2000 to 2015 globally by SDC platinum. Result shows that hostile takeover activity does not benefit shareholders’ interest of the acquiring firm. If the target firm adopts defensive tactics, situation will be worse. Therefore, as the bidding firm, it has to considered whether there are defensive tactics against hostile takeover in the target. While these aren’t significant result. Furthermore, this paper attempts to find the factors which would affect shareholders’ abnormal return under hostile takeover, and result shows M&A premium significantly does. The higher of M&A premium, the more unfavorable to the shareholders’ interest of the acquiring firm. It supports the theory of “winner’s curse”. That is, as M&A premium increases, shareholders’ wealth of the acquiring company is expected to transfer to the targets more which is adverse to the shareholders of the acquiring one.