本文探討美國高階經理人的股票型酬勞與公司經營績效的關聯性，如何受到景氣循環與公司特性的影響。景氣循環二分為景氣繁榮與景氣衰退時期；公司特性則分為新經濟公司與舊經濟公司。新經濟公司指新興的高科技產業，而舊經濟公司則是一般所謂的傳統產業屬之。實證結果顯示，就整體樣本而言，在景氣繁榮與景氣衰退時，公司績效指標對CEO股票型酬勞的關係有顯著的差異。但這種情況只存在股票報酬率中，會計績效指標對於景氣循環的變化並未發現有顯著的差異性。新經濟公司在景氣繁榮時，公司的資產報酬率與股價報酬率對CEO股票型酬勞的相關性均會顯著異於景氣衰退的時期。舊經濟公司在景氣繁榮時，只有公司的每股盈餘對CEO股票型酬勞的相關性會有顯著異於景氣衰退的時期。在景氣繁榮時期，新經濟公司的資產報酬率較舊經濟公司的資產報酬率對於CEO股票型酬勞有顯著的相關性。在景氣衰退時期，新經濟公司的每股盈餘較舊經濟公司的每股盈餘對於CEO股票型酬勞有顯著的相關性。綜合而言，在不同的景氣循環與公司特性下，高階經理人的股票型酬勞與公司績效的相關性不同。 / This study examines how the economic cycle and firm characteristics affect the relationship between American CEO’s stock-based compensation and performance. The economic cycle is dichotomized as expansion and recession periods while the companies are categorized as new economy firms and old economy firms. The new economy firms are high-tech companies and the old economy firms refer to traditional industries. The results indicate that based on the entire sample the relationship between performance and CEO’s stock-based compensation in the expansion period is significantly different from that in the recession period when the performance is measured as stock return, but not as accounting measures. In expansion period, the relationship between ROA and CEO’s stock-based compensation and that between stock return and the CEO’s stock-based compensation of new economy firms are significantly different from those in the recession period. In expansion period, the association between EPS and stock-based compensation for old economy firms is significantly different from that in recession period. In the expansion period, the association of ROA and stock-based compensation of new economy firms is significantly different from that of old economy firms. In the recession period, the association of EPS and stock-based compensation of new economy firms is significantly different from that of old economy firms. Accordingly, the relationship between CEO’s stock-based compensation and performance varies upon the change in economic cycle and the difference in company characteristics.

本文以美國公司為樣本，探討高階主管獎酬結構與後續經營績效之關係以及高階主管獎酬結構與盈餘結構之關係。在高階主管獎酬結構與後續經營績效之關係方面，本文以營業活動之現金流量(CFO)、經濟附加價值(EVA^R)與股票報酬率(RET)作為衡量公司經營績效之指標，並以會計績效指標之總資產報酬率(ROA）與普通股權益報酬率(ROE)作為敏感性分析。實證結果均支持預期之推論，即高階主管獎酬結構著重長期激勵之公司，其後續績效明顯優於獎酬結構著重短期激勵之公司。 　　在高階主管獎酬結構與盈餘結構之關係方面，本研究發現：(1) 盈餘結構之應計項目中，應收帳款變動數、應付帳款變動數、存貨變動數與高階主管短期激勵性獎酬呈正相關，而折舊費用則與高階主管之短期激勵性獎酬呈負相關；反之，應收帳款變動數、應付帳款變動數、存貨變動數則與高階主管之長期激勵性獎酬呈負相關，而折舊費用則與高階主管之長期激勵性獎酬呈正相關。如預期地，這說明較高的短期性盈餘應計項目會導致較高的短期激勵性獎酬，及較低的長期激勵性獎酬；而與長期性投資有關的折舊費用則與長期激勵性獎酬呈正相關。因此偏向短期激勵性獎酬之結構，易誘使高階主管利用該四項應計項目，以獲取短期激勵性獎酬；反之，若高階主管獎酬結構以長期激勵性獎酬為主，則高階主管會較重視長期獲利能力與績效，無形中減少操縱短期盈餘之誘因。(2)高階主管現金獎酬比例越高之公司，其盈餘結構中之流動裁決性應計項目比例亦越高，說明現金獎酬比例較高之獎酬結構會誘導高階主管調節流動裁決性應計項目，以達到預定之盈餘目標。 　　綜合以上研究發現，高階主管獎酬結構對於經理人之經營誘因，扮演極重要之角色。 / This study investigates the relationship between CEO compensation structure and components of earnings and that between CEO compensation structure and firm's long-term performance. The larger the proportion of long-term incentive compensation in CEO's total compensation, the better the firm's long-term performance which is measured either as CFO, EVA^R, stock return, or accounting performance measures. On the contrary, higher proportion of short-term incentive compensation in total compensation can be obtained by manipulating accrual components. Firms with larger proportion of cash compensation have higher current discretionary accruals so that managers could be motivated toward managing discretionary current accruals to achieve target earnings. Such evidence suggests that compensation structure can be an important mechanism that induces manager's efforts towards shareholders' interest.