The fundamental question of private law’s remedies is how do subsequent remedial actions rationally address prior failures. This question can be approached either intrinsically or extrinsically. While the former justifies and explains the remedial action from within the original plaintiff-defendant relationship, the latter welcomes external principles and goals. The arguments of this thesis fit within an intrinsic approach to private law’s remedies. To this end, several arguments are levied against the extrinsic perspective, and, in particular, its confidence in the separation of rights and remedies. For positive inspiration, it looks to two leading intrinsic theoretical accounts—those of Ernest Weinrib and John Gardner, respectively—with an eye to revealing what, if any, meaningful differences there are between the two. Using the language and logic of practical reasons and reasoning, this dissertation suggests that remedies can be understood in one of two ways. First, the remedy is just the same as the original reason. If I fail to pay my debt on the date it is due, my subsequent remedial action in paying it later is carried out because of the original reason, namely, that I owe a debt to someone. Second, the remedy is a reflection of certain second-order reasons that are part of the original (operative) reason. These are reasons not to act for certain other reasons that counsel against the performance of the first-order reason to do the obligatory action. These reasons stick around and tell you to do something; that doing nothing is not optional. If I break your toe, I can no longer satisfy the original reason not to break your toe; however, I can and must do something to address my initial failure. The content of this reparative action is constrained by the original reason not to break your toe. While its first-order strength is no longer available—one can no longer act for the reason it recommends—it can nonetheless provide guidance with respect to what the next-best thing might be.

As a result of the Supreme Court’s broad definition for ‘best interests of the corporation’ in recent decisions, the author examines to whom managers ought to owe their fiduciary duties normatively and what role managerial discretion has in this debate. The author argues that the lack of clarity offered by the judiciary, in this area of corporate law, has led to the adoption of a wide discretion being afforded to managers. An examination of several rationales fails to justify this continued adoption of a broad discretion. The author argues that granting managers with wide discretionary powers is problematic because the interests of constituencies will not be adequately protected. At the very least, statutory reform is necessary to protect the most vulnerable stakeholders. The author recommends that the law be amended to require that managers, in performing their fiduciary duties, regard the interests of employees and shareholders.

The Human Rights Act 1998 incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights. With incorporation, Parliament and the government of the United Kingdom believed that human rights would reflect British values, there would increase support for human rights and a human rights culture would develop. However, the goals of incorporation did not occur. One reason for the failure of the Human Rights Act 1998 is the UK courts interpretation of section 2(1). Courts in the United Kingdom have been unwilling to provide more extensive and less extensive protection of rights than Strasbourg. The effect of the court’s interpretation has been public, political and media backlash. Consequently, to resolve this problem, there must be a reinterpretation of section 2(1).

The fundamental question of private law’s remedies is how do subsequent remedial actions rationally address prior failures. This question can be approached either intrinsically or extrinsically. While the former justifies and explains the remedial action from within the original plaintiff-defendant relationship, the latter welcomes external principles and goals. The arguments of this thesis fit within an intrinsic approach to private law’s remedies. To this end, several arguments are levied against the extrinsic perspective, and, in particular, its confidence in the separation of rights and remedies. For positive inspiration, it looks to two leading intrinsic theoretical accounts—those of Ernest Weinrib and John Gardner, respectively—with an eye to revealing what, if any, meaningful differences there are between the two. Using the language and logic of practical reasons and reasoning, this dissertation suggests that remedies can be understood in one of two ways. First, the remedy is just the same as the original reason. If I fail to pay my debt on the date it is due, my subsequent remedial action in paying it later is carried out because of the original reason, namely, that I owe a debt to someone. Second, the remedy is a reflection of certain second-order reasons that are part of the original (operative) reason. These are reasons not to act for certain other reasons that counsel against the performance of the first-order reason to do the obligatory action. These reasons stick around and tell you to do something; that doing nothing is not optional. If I break your toe, I can no longer satisfy the original reason not to break your toe; however, I can and must do something to address my initial failure. The content of this reparative action is constrained by the original reason not to break your toe. While its first-order strength is no longer available—one can no longer act for the reason it recommends—it can nonetheless provide guidance with respect to what the next-best thing might be.

As a result of the Supreme Court’s broad definition for ‘best interests of the corporation’ in recent decisions, the author examines to whom managers ought to owe their fiduciary duties normatively and what role managerial discretion has in this debate. The author argues that the lack of clarity offered by the judiciary, in this area of corporate law, has led to the adoption of a wide discretion being afforded to managers. An examination of several rationales fails to justify this continued adoption of a broad discretion. The author argues that granting managers with wide discretionary powers is problematic because the interests of constituencies will not be adequately protected. At the very least, statutory reform is necessary to protect the most vulnerable stakeholders. The author recommends that the law be amended to require that managers, in performing their fiduciary duties, regard the interests of employees and shareholders.

The Human Rights Act 1998 incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights. With incorporation, Parliament and the government of the United Kingdom believed that human rights would reflect British values, there would increase support for human rights and a human rights culture would develop. However, the goals of incorporation did not occur. One reason for the failure of the Human Rights Act 1998 is the UK courts interpretation of section 2(1). Courts in the United Kingdom have been unwilling to provide more extensive and less extensive protection of rights than Strasbourg. The effect of the court’s interpretation has been public, political and media backlash. Consequently, to resolve this problem, there must be a reinterpretation of section 2(1).

The quality of Nigerian Legal Education is fast deteriorating and in addition, the current structure of monitoring the training of lawyers is grossly ineffective. This thesis discusses steps that can be taken in reforming the current structure of Nigerian legal education to revert this trend. This thesis proposes a sytem of internal institutional assessment by law faculties in Nigeria. Financial, social-cultural constraints and politicl economy interference are obstacles to reforming Nigerian legal education, but institutional assessment can mitigagte these obstacles. Using Mariana Prado's concept of institutional bypass as a solution to overcoming these obstacles and also as a means of advancing reforms in the training of lawyers in Nigeria, this thesis proposes the adoption of institutional assessment as a strategy to create an avenue for stimulating reforms and promoting quality in Nigerian legal education.

This thesis seeks to examine the military culture of obedience and the standards that exist relating to the defence of superior orders. It will explore laws and practices for this defence that have been adopted nationally and internationally. It will also propose guidelines for differentiating legal from illegal orders.

This thesis not only seeks to demonstrate the requirements of and procedures for recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in the Republic of China (ROC), but also explores whether ROC’s legislation and practices regarding recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards comply with international ‘best practice’ standards as contained in the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention) and the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (UNCITRAL Model Law. Even though ROC’s former legislation and practices did not conform to these standards, the present legislation and practices do comply with the New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law. Although ROC and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) both insist on a ‘one China’ policy and each claims that it represents the whole of China, each has its own legal system. Nonetheless, ROC adopted the ‘regional conflict of laws’ theory based on the concept of ‘one country, two regions’ to deal with cases relating to recognition and enforcement arbitral awards rendered in PRC. In the context of that theory, this thesis explores the requirements of and procedures for recognition and enforcement of PRC arbitral awards in ROC, and whether there are any deficiencies in this regard. The thesis concludes that the ROC legislation and practices regarding recognition and enforcement of PRC arbitral awards in ROC are consistent with the New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law. The government of PRC resumed the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong and Macao from 1 July 1997 and 20 December 1999 respectively. However, PRC adopted the principle of ‘one country, two systems’. PRC authorizes the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Hong Kong SAR) and the Macao Special Administrative Region (Macao SAR) to exercise a high degree of autonomy and to enjoy executive, legislative and independent judicial, including that of final adjudication. Thus, the ROC legislation deems that Hong Kong and Macao arbitral awards are foreign arbitral awards in ROC. So, the legislation and practices regarding recognition and enforcement of Hong Kong arbitral awards and Macao arbitral awards also are in conformity with the New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law. Moreover, the legislation and practices regarding recognition and enforcement of foreign, PRC, Hong Kong, and Macao arbitral awards go further than international standards set out by the New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law. Applying for recognition or enforcement of a foreign, PRC, Hong Kong, or Macao arbitral award, an original arbitration agreement or an original arbitral award can be substituted by an electronic format, which was made originally and can show the whole text as well as can be downloaded for examination. Furthermore, the courts of ROC construe the limitations regarding recognition or enforcement foreign, PRC, Hong Kong, or Macao arbitral awards narrowly. In addition, even though the ROC legislation regarding recognition and enforcement of foreign, Hong Kong, and Macao arbitral awards adopts the principle of reciprocity, the ROC Courts adopt the notion of comity. The thesis clarifies recognition and enforcement of PRC arbitral awards in Hong Kong, and recognition and enforcement of Hong Kong arbitral awards in PRC as well. Hong Kong arbitral awards are enforceable in PRC, and PRC arbitral awards also are enforceable in Hong Kong in accordance with the Arrangement Concerning Mutual Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Between Mainland and the Hong Kong SAR 2000 (PRC) and the Arbitration (Amendment) Ordinance 2000 (Hong Kong SAR) respectively based on the principle of ‘one country, two systems’. Both the provisions of the Arrangement Concerning Mutual Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Between Mainland and the Hong Kong SAR 2000 (PRC) and the Arbitration (Amendment) Ordinance 2000 (Hong Kong SAR) comply with the international standards set out in the New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law.

This thesis examines common-law and civil-law jurisdictions in order to find differences between them. These differences are then being qualified as either relevant or irrelevant for the categorisation of individual jurisdictions. This reflects the argument that only features occurring in only one of the legal families can be relevant when categorising jurisdictions. Only such features can be, from the author’s point of view, specific and typical for their legal family and inherent features of them.The first thing to be considered under this premise is the respective sources of law (Chapter 1). These are in civil-law jurisdictions traditionally statutes and in commonlaw jurisdictions predominantly courts’ decisions. There are, of course, statutes also in common-law jurisdictions and previous courts’ decisions play an important role also in civil-law systems. The differences are not inherent. Furthermore, there are fundamental legal concepts, that is important concepts underlying the respective rules. These concepts may explain differences between the rules. The examination of sources of law, altogether, does not reveal any distinguishing factors.Chapters 2–5 discuss the issue of attitudes of common-law and civil-law judges to statutory interpretation. Chapter 2 examines the respective methods of statutory interpretation. This does not reveal any differences as to common-law and civil-law judges’ attitudes; for instance, greater adherence of common-law judges to the literal meaning of rules arguably does not exist. As shown in Chapter 3, this is true also in the area of Criminal Law under the special safeguards this subject provides. Chapter 4 asserts terminology causes differences between the systems; this is true even in case of identical terminology which is sometimes being interpreted in a diametrically different way. Moreover, differences can also be compensated for elsewhere in the legal system. Altogether, Chapter 4 does not reveal any inherent differences between the systems. As Chapter 5 shows, there is an ongoing process of convergence between common-law and civil-law systems, which means the categorisation into legal families becomes even less plausible.Chapter 6 shows that the categorisation into legal families is not only incorrect but also highly misleading and that there are numerous scholarly statements relying incorrectly on the family concept. The proposition (Chapter 7) is that it may nevertheless be feasible to structure comparative-law texts according to the wellknown legal families, as these show a common historical background. However, for conducting research into particular foreign legal rules (micro-comparative research), the family concept becomes a misleading starting-point. Insofar the concept should be abandoned or, at least, used only together with an appropriate warning.