This work considers international cooperation or harmonization in patent law and analyzes the two main international patent law governance institutions: the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). A welfarist approach is adopted, proposing that international patent law should improve global welfare, subject to assumptions that the preferences of the world population are heterogeneous, that governments try to maximize the welfare of their citizens, and that international legal organization faces collective action problems. Normatively desirable patent law harmonization reconciles strong reasons for preserving diversity (including the static and dynamic satisfaction of local preferences and adapting to unpredictable change) with strong reasons for cooperation (reducing duplication in patent prosecution, and reconciling imbalanced national externalities, incentives to innovation and costs). The last reason leads to a system of national treatment and minimum standards. The risks presented by the skewed nature of invention are addressed in the international patent system through a form of regional insurance. These reasons for cooperation present two linked but separable collective action problems, supporting the existence of two international institutions to govern patent cooperation. WIPO is best positioned to address duplication in patent prosecution. The WTO is best positioned to address imbalanced national externalities, incentives and costs. However, both the WIPO and the WTO are needed to provide a comprehensive international governance system. Questions about the WTO dispute resolution system, the TRIPs Council, and the WTO’s legitimacy are addressed by advocating a trade stakeholders’ model. Whether international patent law should be seen as a multilateral obligation or a nexus of bilateral obligations is explored. Given diverse national preferences and high uncertainty surrounding the welfare effects of specific patent policies, the process of harmonization is inevitably a political process. This political aspect directly connects the topic of patent law harmonization with the institutional analysis of WIPO and the WTO. The implementation of welfare-enhancing patent law cooperation is best guarded by a process with a wide range of political inputs and transparency. Ultimately, only good international governance can deliver on the potential of the international patent system to promote international innovation, economic growth and world-wide prosperity.

This dissertation argues that the idea of constitutional rights transformed Canadian constitutional law well before the entrenchment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Specifically, it locates the origins of Canada’s twentieth-century rights revolution in the constitutional thinking of scholars, lawyers, judges, and politicians at mid-century (1930-1960). Drawing on archival documents, personal papers, government reports, parliamentary debates, case law, and legal scholarship, this work traces the constitutional thought and culture that first propelled human rights and fundamental freedoms to the forefront of the Canadian legal imagination. As a work of legal history, it also seeks to revive the dormant spirit of constitutional history that once pervaded the discipline of Canadian constitutional law. The Introduction situates the chapters that follow within the emerging Canadian historiography of rights. Chapter Two traces the origins of Frank Scott’s advocacy for constitutional rights to the newer constitutional law, an approach to constitutional scholarship sparked by the social and political upheavals of the Depression, and the influence of Roscoe Pound’s sociological jurisprudence. Chapter Three explores the varied dimensions of the Second World War’s influence on the nascent idea of Canadian constitutional rights. In particular, the rapid rise of the wartime administrative state produced a rights discourse that tended to reflect the interests of property while ignoring the civil liberties of unpopular minorities. Chapter Four examines the rise of a politics and scholarship of rights in the years immediately following the war. In response to international rights ideals and continuing domestic rights controversies, scholars and lawyers sought to produce a theory of Canadian constitutional law that could accommodate the addition of judicially-enforced individual rights. If not entirely successful, their efforts nonetheless further reoriented the fundamental tenets of Canadian constitutional law. Chapter Five reveals the influence of Canada’s emerging constitutional culture of rights on the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada, particularly Justice Ivan Rand and his conception of an implied bill of rights. Together, these chapters demonstrate the confluence of ideology, circumstance, and personality – the constitutional history – that altered the future of Canadian constitutional law.

This legal comparative study explores the nature and development of rabbinic thought on intermarriage. One could hardly phrase the query that lies at the heart of this work better than the Talmud itself: "Is she forbidden or permitted?" (bSanhedrin 82a). This challenge, posed to Moses as part of an exegetical exploration of the problem of intermarriage, asks so much more than whether an Israelite might marry a Gentile. It points to conflicts between biblical law and narrative, biblical and rabbinic law, as well as incompatibilities within rabbinic halakhah. The issues of status, national identity and gender loom large as the various legal and narrative sources on intermarriage are set on an hermeneutic collision course. In this way many rabbinic sources display a deep understanding of the complexity inherent to any discussion of intermarriage in rabbinic tradition. Considering intermarriage as a construct that lies at the intersection between identity and marital rules, we begin this study of rabbinic legal systems with an analysis of the notion of intramarriage and Jewish identity in halakhah as expressed through the system of the asarah yuchasin (ten lineages). Discussion of various systems dealing with intermarriage follows, including qiddushin (Jewish betrothal/marriage) and the status of the offspring of intermarriage, the concept of the qahal (congregation of God), the arayot (levitical incest laws) as well as the individual legal rules related to marriage and sexual relations between Jews and Gentiles. The role of narrative in the representation of case law and rabbinic engagement with these legal systems forms an integral part of our analysis of the law. The overall conclusion of the dissertation is that rabbinic approaches to intermarriage were characterized by multiplicity and diversity. Rabbinic tradition engaged with the issue of intermarriage through a wide variety of often unrelated and incompatible legal systems. Furthermore, it is apparent that conflicting attitudes towards the interpretation and implementation of these rules are represented in both tannaitic (c. 70-200 C.E.) and amoraic sources (c. 200-500 C.E.), such that several key problems related to intermarriage in early rabbinic tradition remain unresolved.

This dissertation is about the role of institutions in bridging the Digital Divide. Its thesis is that governments must encourage the consistently increased use of information and communications technology (“ICT”) if they hope to foster sustained economic growth. Superficially, the Digital Divide describes differences in ICT usage between rich and poor nations, but it is more profoundly concerned with poor nations’ integration into a global economy. Intensive academic study demonstrates that four factors are critical to the relationship between ICT usage and economic growth: institutions; telecommunications infrastructure; investment in ICT; and human capital. The dissertation addresses three perceived shortcomings in the literature. First, proponents of institutions’ importance use the term vaguely, often obscuring important distinctions between policies, laws and institutions, thereby inhibiting detailed analysis. Second, many writers see the institutional reform needed for growth as an exceedingly slow process due to factors beyond governments’ control. Third, the literature does not adequately address which institutions are salient to the relationship between ICT usage and economic growth or how to create them. The dissertation attributes more precise meanings to key terms and contests the view that institutional reform can only proceed at a glacial pace. Its primary goal, however, is to identify specific institutions that help mediate the relationship and to suggest how they might be built relatively quickly. Good institutions can create the enabling environment that allows for the building of telecommunications infrastructure, investment in ICT goods and services and the development of human capital to lead to economic growth. The analysis of institutions identifies several salient institutions and concludes that the manner in which they are designed often determines their effectiveness. Case studies of Singapore and Malaysia examine their successful, but divergent, development paths. Their different rates of development can be attributed, in part, to the quality of their institutions.

The law too often avoids or misuses statistical evidence. This problem is partially explained by the absence of a shared normative framework for working with such evidence. There is considerable disagreement within the legal community about how statistical evidence relates to legal inquiry. It is proposed that the first step to addressing the problem is to accept Bayesianism as a normative framework that leads to outcomes that largely align with legal intuitions. It is only once this has been accepted that we can proceed to encourage education about common conceptual errors involving statistical evidence as well as techniques to limit their occurrence. Objections to using Bayesianism in the legal context are addressed. It is argued that the objection based on the irrelevance of statistical evidence is fundamentally incoherent in its failure to identify most evidence as statistical. Second, objections to the incompleteness of a Bayesian approach in accounting for non-truth-related values do place legitimate limits on the use of Bayesianism in the law but in no way undermine its normative usefulness. Lastly, many criticisms of the role of Bayesianism in the law rest on misunderstandings of the meaning and manipulation of statistical evidence and are best addressed by presenting statistical evidence in ways that encourage correct understanding. Once it is accepted that, put in its proper place, a Bayesian approach to understanding statistical evidence can align with most fundamental legal intuitions, a less fearful approach to the use of statistical evidence in the law can emerge.

This dissertation argues that the novels of Henry James offer a conception of personhood and of human freedom better able to explain and unify private law than the conceptions currently dominant in private law theory. I begin by laying out the two conceptual frameworks that now dominate private law theory: Kantian right and the feminist ethic of care. I argue that Kantian right‟s exclusive focus on respect for freedom of choice makes it unable to explain private law doctrines founded upon concern for human well-being, including unjust enrichment, unconscionability, and liability for negligence. However, feminism‟s ethic of care, which can be understood as a response to the Kantian abstraction from considerations of well-being and need, is also incomplete, because its understanding of the person as essentially connected to others fails to respect human separateness. I then offer readings of James‟ novels—The Portrait of a Lady, What Maisie Knew, and The Ambassadors—that show how vindicating individual worth requires both respect for abstract agency‟s separateness and freedom to choose, on the one hand, and concern for the dependent individual‟s well-being and autonomous flourishing, on the other. I argue that these two ideas are complementary parts of a complete understanding of human dignity and freedom. Finally, I argue that this understanding illuminates doctrines of private law that remain mysterious on the Kantian account while avoiding feminism‟s tendency to immerse private law in public law.

It is the purpose of this Thesis to start an analysis of metaconstitutional review, understood as the process through which an entity such as a Constitutional Court or Supreme Court reviews the compliance of the acts of the Constituent with superior values or fills constitutional gaps with such values. This, in order to explain its separate nature from constitutional review, to determine whether it is compatible with the traditional conception of popular sovereignty as the ultimate source of power and the legitimizing element of the constitutional system and to determine whether or not metaconstitutional review could prevent social change by entrenching certain values.

Currently there are no mechanisms under international criminal law to hold corporations accountable for their role in the commission of human rights abuses. A primary problem with establishing corporate liability under international law, is that it is unclear how to attribute liability to corporations for international crimes. This paper examines the strengths and weaknesses of domestic principles of corporate attribution utilized in Canada, the United States, Britain and Australia. The domestic principles are then reconciled with current international law principles and enumerated crimes of international criminal law. It is argued that a flexible approach is optimal for the imposition of corporate liability under international law. While some of the domestic principles work better than others at first glance, ultimately all can and should be used at international law to end impunity for corporate crimes.

This paper argues that “enlightened shareholder value” (“ESV”) offers a “third way” between the shareholder primacy and stakeholder theories of the corporation; one that maintains the creation of shareholder value as the corporation’s primary function, but requires directors to take into account the environmental impact of the corporations’ operations. ESV requires directors to “have regard to”, among other things, “the impact of the company’s operations on…the environment.” The obligation to “have regard to” should be interpreted as a procedural duty requiring directors to inform themselves as to the environmental impact of the corporation’s operations, which may in itself cause directors to reallocate corporate resources to environmental protection. ESV may also improve corporations’ environmental disclosure and impact social norms of corporate behaviour with respect to the environment. Any negative impact of ESV on present shareholder returns is justified by the obligation to avoid imposing foreseeable severe or irreparable environmental harm on future generations.

This thesis examines legislation that creates a “safe habour” for apologies by making them inadmissible as evidence of liability in a civil action. In recent years, jurisdictions across North America and Australia have enacted such “apology legislation” in an effort to encourage apologies. This is allegedly done to assist victims, who often benefit from full and sincere apologies. Legislators are also motivated, however, by the perception that apologies can induce victims to settle or forgo legal action, thereby reducing litigation rates. Whether such a correlation exists, particularly for apologies given under apology legislation, has not been firmly established, and attempting to use apologies in this manner may prove harmful to victims and the state. Apologies are powerful, and if legislators are not careful, they may enact legislation that alters apologies so that they become a source of harm to victims, the legal system, and even society as a whole.