This Terrible Silence is a collection of nineteen stand-alone stories. The work largely focuses on characters on the fringe of society—alcoholics, gamblers, thieves, liars, cheaters, and loners, who feel trapped or destined to repeat their troubles. In the struggle to break free, either by self-fulfillment or outside interference, these stories showcase the characters’ hearts and wills in the face of often daunting or insurmountable desperation. The stories in this collection are influenced by the work of Raymond Carver, and the Dirty Realism of Larry Brown, Breece DJ Pancake, Jayne Anne Phillips, and others. With minimal exposition, the characters are laid bare with cutting dialogue and active, scenic description. In the title piece, the narrator intends to tell a man vs. nature story of his encounter with a cougar, but quickly dissolves into a battle with his own slipping mental health in the face of a failing relationship. In the first-person point of view, the act of telling the story holds its own exigency for the narrator’s need to understand his or her motives and desires, as is most evident in Carver’s work, such as “Cathedrals.” In theme and style, I’ve sought to put together a collection that might allow readers to find truth and empathy from common, low, sometimes immoral, but largely human characters.

In Re realism is the two-pronged view that, first, when this and that have the same color, this color and that color are identical. There is just one color, the universal. Second, on the view, this color exists just in case something has it. Say my cat has the same color as the dog I owned when I was a child. Since the dog existed before the cat, and precedence being irreflexive, it seems plausible to infer that the dog and the cat are distinct. Now take the colors. Since the colors are allegedly in re, and thus perhaps somehow elements of the cat and dog, it seems plausible to infer that the dog's color also preceded the cat's color. And therefore that the cat's color cannot be identical with the dog's. Finally, since the in re realist understands the sameness of properties in terms of identity, it follows that the cat's color cannot be the same as the dog's. The problem generalizes: What is the relationship between universals and time? Ignoring the temporality of that which constitutes time, to be temporal is to have a temporal "feature." These "features" are of three kinds: precedence, times, and being present, past, etc. The fundamental question in each case is whether universals have the feature. Do universals precede? Are they at times? Are they present? Time, I argue, is essentially the field in which things happen. To happen, I argue, is for one thing to do something. For one thing to do something is for the thing to exemplify a property. Such exemplifications of properties by objects I call "states of affairs." Only states of affairs precede, are at times, or are present. Universals, not being states of affairs, are not temporal. But, by the same argument which shows that running is not temporal it can be shown that Jack is not, even though Jack's running obviously is. So far I have defined what it is to be temporal; primitive temporality. But since Jack is a constituent of something temporal, he may be justly thought of as derivatively temporal.

The Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) saw China transition from the medieval to the early modern period. This transition was marked by rampant piracy, a boom in book publishing, and other developments that challenged traditional social and economic habits, thereby forcing China to evolve. Buddhism during the time was similarly stressed, facing government suppression early in the Ming, and facing steeper competition for donations and patronage throughout the dynasty. In response, Ming Buddhism adapted itself to the changing times in numerous ways: the rise of lay societies and an increase in devotional practice being two important examples. One of the most prominent figures of late Ming Buddhism is Yunqi Zhuhong (1535-1615). In 1587 Zhuhong wrote the "Fanwangjing xindipin pusajie yishu fayin," a commentary on the Brahma Net Sutra, which contains a list of ten major and forty-eight minor "bodhisattva precepts" taken by both lay and monastic Buddhists in East Asia. Therefore, Zhuhong's commentary allowed him to interpret the common moral framework of all Buddhists in his local and extended community. This dissertation offers a translation and analysis of key portions of Zhuhong's commentary on the Brahma Net Sutra in order to understand his philosophy of violence. By unearthing Zhuhong's arguments regarding when killing is or is not acceptable this dissertation aims to begin bringing Chinese philosophies of violence into conversation with western just war thought. Additionally, Zhuhong's philosophy of violence demonstrates what I term "Chan realism," which is an amalgam of moral and political realism. Understanding Zhuhong's philosophy of violence therefore also allows us to better understand the competing religious and political loyalties faced by those living in the late Ming. Lastly, by translating Zhuhong's philosophy of violence and analyzing his realism, this dissertation aims to increase our understanding of the novelty and innovation occurring within Chinese Buddhism during the Ming Dynasty.

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Abstract not available

[No Abstract]

Interviews were held with 126 Year 10 and 23 Year 11 students to obtain a description of the knowledge that students had about the way they were assessed. Data was obtained about the grades the students received, or expected to receive. The students also completed the same attitude scales in both sets of interviews. The most suitable criterion for analysing the Year 11 interview data was found to be the changes in assignment grades between Year 10 and Year 11. The criterion was verified by analysing the attitudinal data. Changes in attitude, based on relative grade changes, showed that the most negative attitude changes occurred with students who had obtained higher grades in Year 10 than they had in Year 11. The differences in grading practices between the high schools and the secondary college meant that the majority of students obtained lower grades in Year 11 than they did in Year 10. Students were found to have a selective knowledge of the assessment system with the most "academically successful" students knowing more about the assessment system than the "academically less successful". Two underlying constructs, communication and realism, are used in an attempt to explain the data. The approach of asking students about assessment is recommended for use an evaluative tool in curriculum development.

One of the most interesting developments in recent psychological theorising has been a growing appreciation of the need for a viable theory of mental causation. Hitherto, the prospects for reconciling what seems to be the uniquely rational character of human thought and action with the non-rational mechanistic workings of the natural world have appeared to be limited or even illusory, and the pursuit of reconciliation of this sort has therefore formerly been dismissed as being either impossible of completion or inappropriate for contemplation. Much of the scepticism concerning the role of causal processes in human thought and action was dispelled, however, by the philosopher Donald Davidson, who argues that not only is human action capable of being caused by the actor�s thoughts and desires, but that only when such action is so caused, can it be rational. Davidson�s proposal for the reconciliation of human rationality with causal necessitation is articulated in his theory of Anomalous Monism. According to this theory, there exists what may be termed an ontological-conceptual distinction between events themselves and the characters or properties that are attributed to events by human observers, and it is through recognition of this distinction that one discovers how mental events, that is, events that are amenable to description in the psychological vocabulary, are causally efficacious yet free from the constraints typically associated with the necessity and sufficiency of causal laws. Anomalous Monism, if it were workable, would therefore resolve the paradox according to which human mentality is at once integrated in, and yet unconstrained by, the mechanistic natural world, by demonstrating the compatibility of the facts of causation with the intuitions of folk psychology. However, close examination of Anomalous Monism reveals it to rely on logically flawed anti-realist principles concerning the characters of events, properties and causation. It follows from this that the theory itself must be rejected, but the task that it was devised to undertake, the formulation of a viable theory of mental causation, need not be similarly discarded. Rather, what remains is the challenge of delineating an alternative theory, one that withstands logical scrutiny whilst addressing what is characteristic of human mental processes, and thereby what is characteristic of mental causation. The theory of Direct Realism that is derived from the broader philosophical realism of John Anderson provides the materials for meeting this challenge. According to Direct Realism, mental phenomena are relational situations obtaining between certain organisms (including humans) and their environments. As such, mental phenomena are included in the range of phenomena occurring in the natural world and they are therefore subject to all of its ways of working, including its deterministic mechanisms. The particular challenge that a Direct Realist theory of mental causation faces, that of demonstrating that relational situations can be causal, is revealed upon examination of the character of causation to be unproblematic. Furthermore, the seeming incompatibility between human rationality and natural necessitation is resolved when it is acknowledged that, rather than be an inherent feature of thought and action, logical structure is a characteristic of the natural environment that organisms are at times sensitive to, as revealed by its effects on the characters of their thoughts and actions. Far from being remote or illusory, the prospects for reconciling human mentality with the causal mechanisms of the natural world are discovered in the present thesis to be favourable when a realist approach to the characters of both mental events and causation is adopted.

Chronic pain has been identified as a major and underestimated health care problem, with extensive individual, social and economic ramifications. It has been estimated that the annual economic cost of chronic pain in Australia exceeds AU$34 billion. The available epidemiological evidence suggests chronic pain is a relatively common health problem in Australia which is a significant public health issue. Chronic pain is a complex phenomenon which is not easily defined. However, it is important to consider the ways in which chronic pain is conceptualised, as this can have significant implications for the individual in terms of how they think about their pain, and the way they are treated within the health care system and the broader society. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, pain was predominantly considered a symptom of a biological problem in the body. Absence of physical disease was thought to indicate pain was the result of aberrant psychological processes. However, chronic pain proved resistant to this ‘mind-body’ approach, and the lack of efficacy of many biomedical interventions, combined with an apparently increasing prevalence of chronic pain, pointed to the inadequacy of purely biomedical approaches to pain treatment. The latter part of the twentieth century saw the recognition of pain as a multidimensional experience influenced by the interaction of numerous biological, psychological and social factors. Consequently, the biopsychosocial model of health, which emphasised such a ‘holistic’ perspective, gained substantial recognition in the pain management domain, and was endorsed as the preferred model of pain management. This has contributed to the development of new approaches to chronic pain treatment, particularly in the area of cognitive behavioural therapy and the establishment of multidisciplinary pain centres. There is evidence, however, that the ‘promise’ of the multidimensional conceptualisation and treatment of chronic pain has not been realised in the daily lives of people with chronic pain. Review of the literature indicates a tendency for research and practice to focus on the biological and psychological aspects of chronic pain, while minimising social environmental factors, such as the health care system and cultural belief systems regarding pain, which may also be significant. This thesis proposes that in order to more comprehensively respond to the complex phenomenon of chronic pain, it is necessary to further develop the social domain of the biopsychosocial model. A study was conducted to explore and describe individual experiences of living with chronic pain, as a basis for improving knowledge about the influence of the social environment on the individual. The thesis focuses not only on the individual descriptions of living with chronic pain, but also on the inter-relatedness between the individual and their social environment. Further, this thesis uses a process of critical interpretive analysis to identify aspects of the social environment which can exert a constraining or enabling effect on the individual with chronic pain. The thesis draws on critical realism theory, particularly the morphogenetic approach developed by Archer (1995), to guide the analysis process and to develop potential strategies for addressing identified social disadvantages. The integration of the individual stories of living with chronic pain with an interpretive analysis process, and the underlabouring philosophical perspective of critical realism, provided the framework to investigate the influence of the social environment on individual experience of living with chronic pain. In this thesis, a journey metaphor is used as an overarching framework to tie together the three principal themes identified through the analysis of the interview transcripts. The themes focused on the biomedical, psychological and cultural paths that participants followed in search of understanding and cure for their pain; the social suffering they experienced through lack of understanding and legitimation of their condition; and the identification and development of strategies for living with chronic pain. The thesis highlights the critical importance of focusing not only on the individual with chronic pain but also on the social environment within which the individual lives, and the ways in which these domains intersect and influence each other. The social environment was found to condition the individual and others in society, including health care practitioners, in relation to how they think and behave regarding pain, which in turn can have enabling or constraining consequences for the individual with pain. In particular, cultural beliefs about ‘normal’ pain, and the material structures of the health care system and employment and work places, were found to have a potentially negative impact on the individual with pain. It is concluded that these aspects of society will continue to exert constraining influences on people’s lives until the focus of policy and practice is expanded to include not just the individual with pain, but also the social environment in which they live. To address this, a number of policy and practice improvements are suggested.

<p>Finns det värdefakta? Kan vi ha kunskap i moralfrågor? Finns det över huvud taget rätt och fel i moralfrågor? Med dessa frågor i bakhuvudet vill författaren undersöka ett vanligt argument mot moralisk realism i allmänhet, och Michael Huemers variant av moralisk realism i synnerhet. Detta antirealistiska argument säger att det är så pass vanligt med oenigheter i moralfrågor och att den bästa förklaringen till detta är att moralen är subjektiv. Argumentet säger vidare att etiken lider av bristande konvergens beträffande upplösta etiska oenigheter över tid, jämfört med exempelvis naturvetenskapen. Detta faktum verkar, menar vissa antirealister, ytterligare tala emot att det existerar värdefakta. Med detta som utgångspunkt tar uppsatsförfattaren reda på varför argumentet misslyckas med att skada Michael Huemers moraliska realism.</p>