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This project is about the distinction between universals and particulars. The fundamental claim I defend is this: The distinction between universals and particulars can be vindicated via the fact that universals are identical if indiscernible while particulars are not identical if indiscernible. This way of "making" the universal-particular distinction is "extensionally" adequate--it (by and large) gets the pre-theoretical extensions of 'universal' and 'particular' right. The entities that one would ordinarily classify as universals get classified as universals, and the entities that one would ordinarily classify as particulars get classified as particulars. Furthermore, this way of making the distinction is "intensionally" adequate--it situates smoothly in the theory of universals and particulars motivated independently of the need to vindicate the distinction. The natures that universals and particulars must have if they are to play their respective theoretical roles require that universals are identical if indiscernible and that particulars are not. No more can reasonably be asked of a proposed universal-particular distinction. / text

This thesis deals with one of the essential problems in epistemology, that is, the foundation and variety of universal concepts. The classical controversy on universals is baseless if we do not consider different kinds of universal concepts. In this thesis, universal concepts are examined as classified into three groups: first intentions, logical second intentions and philosophical second intentions. / We elaborate these three kinds of concepts from two perspectives. First, we have a journey in the history of Islamic philosophy from Farabi to contemporary philosophers in order to see what they mentioned in this regard. We found that the origin of the distinction between first and second intentions in Ibn Sina; however, he does not mention the philosophical second intentions, rather this kind of intentions is added sometime after Suhrawardi and Tusi We also examined William of Ockham's theory for the purposes of a comparative approach. Second, we discussed this threefold division based on our own understanding and analysis in the light of both Islamic and Western philosophy.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2008. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Alberta, 2009. / Title from pdf file main screen (viewed on July 24, 2009). "A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, University of Alberta." Includes bibliographical references.

Thèse--Paris. / Description based on print version record. Xerox copy.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Iowa, 2004. / Supervisor: Richard Fumerton. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 155-164).

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Thesis advisor: Margaret Thomas / This research paper aims to compare fictional languages, in particular those created in works of science fiction, to natural languages. After an introduction to conlangs in general, and to Quenya, Klingon, Dothraki and Na’vi specifically, Greenberg’s linguistic universals will be used to test their resemblance to natural languages, and suggest a taxonomy of fictional languages. / Thesis (MA) — Boston College, 2016. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Linguistics.

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