The general paradigm which spans this research has perhaps best been summarised by Mark Johnson when he wrote that; 'Meaning and thought emerge from our capacities for perception, object manipulation, and bodily movement'. (2007: p.113) Knowledge, in all its forms, is a category of meaning and thought, and therefore also figures within these capacities. The main purpose of this writing with be the detailed unpacking of this central idea with particular reference to the blog The Conference Report. A major argument that I will be developing is that the particular forms of knowledge that we think of as 'objective' are thought of in that way for specific reasons, and that these reasons appear through the embodied capacities that Johnson specifies. That is, through our capacities for perception, object manipulation, and bodily movement, a trilogy of factors to which I will be adding the fourth of 'space' (implied in his use of the term 'capacities'). I will suggest that the phenomenological notion of the 'object', which underpins the abstract concepts of 'objectivity', is more complex that might be immediately apparent, as are its relations with 'perception' and 'bodily movement', and indeed 'space'. Whilst offering appropriate respect for scientific empiricism and logical deduction, I intend to demonstrate that the complexity of these capacities render certain aspirations toward the formulation of 'objective knowledge' problematic. By placing objective knowledge in the wider conceptual framework of embodied cognition through the application of a theoretical line which runs through phenomenology, cognitive poetics, conceptual metaphor, and image schema, I hope to provide a framework that allows for the organised consideration of forms of knowing which do not aspire to the condition of the object. These forms of knowing, it will be argued, may be instantiated and expressed through the medium of the blog from which some of this writing is drawn and to which some of it returns.

This dissertation mainly revolves around the demarcation problem. It aims to clarify the problem of how to demarcate science from other disciplines, and to solve it from a different point of view from previous ones. Firstly, it introduces the theoretical background on which the problem in question is raised. Secondly, it examines traditional approaches to the problem in history. They include not only logical approaches proposed by the logical positivists and Karl Popper individually, but also historical approaches proposed by Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Paul Thagard and Larry Laudan respectively. Moreover, by analysing them in detail, it reveals that Popper's logical approach treats science as an idealisation, which is too strict; while Kuhn's historical approach views science as a complicated activity that needs to consider lots of influencing factors, which is too loose. Thirdly, since the demarcation problem is the central problem of epistemology, and contextualism and its derivative contrastivism are epistemological approaches to sceptical doubts about knowledge, the thesis attempts to consider the problem in question from a contextual point of view and then proposes a contrastivist approach (derived from contextual ism) to it. Fourthly, two case studies will be used to test the contrastivist approach: the debate between the theory of evolution and creationism or Intelligent Design; and the debate between Western medicine and Chinese medicine. Finally, it concludes that contextual investigation better avoids the defects of the above logical and historical approaches and solves the demarcation problem to some extent.

No description available.

The book presents an argument for moral objectivity based on non-dualism, drawing on the Buddhist tradition but argued from first premises in relation to Western philosophical understandings of ethics. The first part consists of a critique both of the theoretical and practical shortcomings of views of ethics which rely on positive or negative metaphysical claims about the foundation for universal ethics or about its absence. The dualism underlying these two alternatives is understood in terms of a psychological model according to which the rational ego utilises metaphysical belief to separate itself from the remainder of the psyche and its associated alternative grounds of belief. Metaphysical beliefs are shown to be related to egoistic psychological dispositions through the use of philosophical, historical, and psychological evidence, and this account used as the basis of a criticism of all the main existing ethical theories in Western philosophy. In the second part a more positive account is provided of a non-dualistic Middle Way, which attempts to show that there is an alternative to the dualism revealed in Part 1. This Middle Way unites systematic metaphysical agnosticism in philosophy with moral practice that attempts to integrate the ego incrementally with the remainder of the psyche. Psychological integration thus becomes the basis of a new way of understanding moral (and other types of) objectivity without positive or negative metaphysical assumptions. To understand integration as a basis of ethics requires the systematic incrementalisation of the dualisms on which Western philosophy habitually relies, such as subject-object, fact-value, mind-body, and freewill-determinism. Without these dualistic prior assumptions, a balanced investigation can be made into all the conditions which influence our moral judgements. Personal and group virtue can be cultivated, and specificity of guidance on areas of moral judgement where we are ignorant imported by the balanced use of moral expertise. Supporting materials for this thesis are available on http://www.moralobjectivity.net and a published version is available on http://www.lulu.com/product/paperback/a-theory-of-moral-objectivity/15123628?showPreview .

Cette thèse a pour but d’interroger la pertinence des catégories d’objet et de sujet dans le champ politique, à la fois comme outils d’analyse, mais aussi comme support de l’action. Il s’agira ainsi de montrer que les objets, c’est-à-dire tout ce qui vient à occuper une place dans le champ politique, sont le produit d’une construction subjective, dont la mise en œuvre est à la fois individuelle et collective : le monde n’apparaît comme réalité d’objets qu’en tant qu’il est fixé à travers la perception humaine et le langage.Les processus de subjectivation seront alors envisagés selon le double critère d’opposition aux objets du monde, ou de leur utilisation stratégique. Le développement de cette thèse sera l’occasion d’adopter une approche pluri-disciplinaire : seront convoqués la psychanalytique, la philosophie, des écrits d’esthétique musicale, ainsi qu’une analyse théorico-historique de certains courants politiques, singulièrement le maoïsme chinois et sa réception française. / The aim of this thesis is to question the relevance of object and subject categories in the political field, as tool for the analysis but also as props for action. The focus will be on showing that objects, namely, everything that comes to occupy a place in the political field, are the product of a subjective construction, which is carried out both individually and collectively : the world appears as a reality of objects only insofar as it is established through human perception and language.Subjectification processes will then be considered using the double criterion of opposition to world objects or of their strategic use. The central part of this thesis will afford the opportunity to adopt a pluridisciplinary approach : it will rest on psychoanalysis, philosophy, drawn mainly from the Works of J. Derrida and A. Badiou, writings on musical esthetics, as well as a theoretico-historical analysis of a few political movements, particularly Chinese Maoism and its French reception.