Thesis advisor: Patrick H. Byrne / It has been held in philosophical practice that some matters of reflection have more import than others, and that some are so significant that they may be termed "first philosophy." In contemporary Continental philosophy, the term "event" has become a watchword for a profound change in the orientation of philosophic thought. Indeed, one may say that the discourse surrounding events marks the first decisive development in philosophy since Martin Heidegger penned Being and Time. This is not to say, however, that any consensus has emerged concerning either the character of events, or more importantly what they entail for the meaning of human historical consciousness. To provide such statements, ones that have at least a relative superiority with respect to their rivals, might thus be considered the basic task for first philosophy today. It is to accomplish this double aim that the present work is devoted. These two tasks, articulating the character of events and their significance for human historical consciousness, are here assayed by a movement that is itself double, by a movement of suspicion and affirmation. In the specific case, the present work undertakes a retrieval of Heidegger's understanding of "Ereignis" (or event) after passing through a hermeneutics of suspicion, posed by the criticisms of the contemporary French philosopher Alain Badiou, and returning to an articulation of "Emergence" as a complementary hermeneutics of affirmation. The method by which I undertake this inquiry is what may be called an "infinite hermeneutics," which I intend to be opposed to "finite hermeneutics." By this latter program, "finite hermeneutics," I mean any form of philosophical hermeneutics that is committed to the thesis that human understanding (Verstehen) is finite, or that the objective of inquiry itself is finite, or both of these points. The thesis that human understanding is finite may be found in Kant's proposal that human knowing is distinct from divine knowledge in the respect that human knowing is dependent on receptive intuition, and thus finite, while infinite knowledge is founded on a productive intuition. In the relevant sense, I argue, it may also be found in Heidegger's own thought. One of the major points of the present investigation is to demonstrate in what way a commitment to finitude is highly problematic, and that human knowing, human comprehension, and even the very character of what is known is not finite in any relevant sense. The motivation for such a departure is provided by the criticisms of Badiou, which are here treated as a moment of suspicion. I begin the work with a "Prolegomenon," which reviews in detail the specific challenge Badiou has posed for phenomenological hermeneutics, or any other philosophical position that is committed to the notion that human thought or understanding is finite. As a "Prolegomenon," however, nothing positive for my own position is accomplished there; instead the net result of the study is to produce: (a) an argument against Heideggerian finite hermeneutics, (b) a summary critique of the Badiou's own position, and (c) a clear statement on the eight separate tasks that I set out to accomplish in the argument that follows. The positive aspect of the text, the beginning of the movement of affirmation, thus occurs in "Part I: Infinite Hermeneutics," in which I present a defense of phenomenological hermeneutics as a viable philosophical method. In chapter three I begin by drawing on the work of Paul Ricoeur. My argument is that he is both the very first philosopher to articulate an infinite hermeneutics, and that this account, suitably elaborated throughout his career, is able to meet most of the specific challenges Badiou poses. There does remain, however, three separate points that Ricoeur's thought does not fully explore. In order to remedy those deficiencies, and in order to demonstrate the relative advantage of my hermeneutical position with respect to its competitors, I thus move to produce a new model for hermeneutical thought. Articulating the conditions for this model is the task for chapter four. My task here resolves into three parts. First, I argue for a Galoisian Revolution in phenomenological study, which sets forth a new between hermeneutics and phenomenology study. This relation, second, requires a rearticulation of phenomenological method such that it is "impersonal," as Jean-Paul Sartre's early work suggests. Additionally this relation, third, requires that one be attentive to the structures of consciousness, which is what completes the Galoisian Revolution. In order to support my account of an impersonal phenomenology I engage the contemporary Anglo-American discussions in the philosophy of mind concerning the character of first-person consciousness. In order to specify what is intended by a structure of first-person consciousness, provide a provisional phenomenology of eros. In chapter five I move to articulate the structure of consciousness that serves as the third model for phenomenological hermeneutics. It is at this point that I engage with the work of Bernard Lonergan. My central contention in chapter five is that it is possible to retrieve Longergan's work on cognitional structure as a phenomenology of inquiry for hermeneutical purposes. Taken together, these points, the Ricoeurean defense of hermeneutics, the development of an impersonal phenomenology, and the retrieval of a phenomenology of inquiry, form the hard core of my proposal for infinite hermeneutics. "Part II: On Worlds" concerns the fruits that I can reap from the harvest sown in Part I. In particular, I aim to develop an ecological sense of worlds in response to Badiou's category-theoretic and Heidegger's (early) existential world. My argument moves from an ecological account of natural worlds (chapter six), through a signifying account human worlds (chapter seven), to an account of human historical consciousness and a consideration of catastrophes such as the Shoah and the Encounter (chapter eight). In each of these chapters I focus on developing an account of different kinds of Events, with the aim not only of providing a more serviceable account than my rivals, but also with the hopes of providing a new and better picture of world process. The final section, "Part III: The Metaphysics of Excess" expresses the central Metaphysical claims of the work, especially those concerning Events and the peculiar form I call Emergence. This chapter, in short, constitutes the moment of affirmation in response to the moment of suspicion occasioned by Badiou's criticism of phenomenological hermeneutics. Additionally, however, I produce an argument for the intelligible relation of cosmic space and time with human (lived) space and time, a statement on the new forms of causation entailed by the possibility of Events, and a new account of Truth (to rival Badiou and Heidegger's). The work closes with a summary review of what I have achieved and what yet remains to be accomplished. Though as the title of the conclusion suggests, its main aim is to provide a new statement on the world-view that I work to articulate over the course of the investigation. That world-view, and this is the justification for the subtitle of the present work, is the trans-modern condition, which articulates the existential character of our modern globalized world. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2011. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-08-29T15:08:30Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 tese_9091_DISSERTACAO DE MESTRADO - Adelmo Marcos Rossi.pdf: 712401 bytes, checksum: 618c6634a22318266ca8bec29031fec3 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-08-31 / O nosso propósito nesta dissertação é fazer uma leitura da filosofia de Alain Badiou a partir de um viés fundador: o enunciado lacaniano il y a de lun. Esse enunciado, lido pelo psicanalista Jacques Lacan na filosofia de Platão, é o termo proferido no instante em que o ser humano se depara com o súbito, um acontecimento imprevisto. Nesse instante inaugural o ser humano passa para a condição de sujeito. Alain Badiou parte do princípio de que todo ser humano é, no início, um mortal comum condicionado a repetir o saber instituído. O sujeito surge quando esse mortal comum se depara com a ausência de saber para se relacionar com o imprevisto e enuncia um novo pensamento. Nesse sentido, o sujeito é raro. Esse modo de pensar permite compreender a própria ontologia como um acontecimento: o acontecimento do Ser. Esse será para nós o acontecimento ontológico. É o instante inaugural do surgimento do primeiro nome. Para Alain Badiou, o vazio é o nome próprio do Ser. O matemático Georg Cantor foi quem criou as condições para essa nomeação. Badiou considera o vazio como ontológico e iguala esse vazio ao conjunto vazio da teoria matemática dos conjuntos. Essa teoria enquanto teoria do múltiplo puro encontra-se no fundamento da multiplicidade que reina no mundo empírico. Partindo dessa concepção é possível retomar o conceito filosófico de sujeito instituído por Descartes: o sujeito cartesiano é aquele que operou uma recusa de todo saber vindo a deparar-se com o vazio que ronda a estrutura do saber, e inventa um fundamento primeiro, o Cogito. Jacques Lacan promove a operação cartesiana de deposição do saber para a condição de método de tratamento psicanalítico. A psicanálise lacaniana apropria-se do conceito de acontecimento imprevisto para pensar a teoria do ato analítico. O psicanalista se coloca na escuta do paciente na expectativa de que o excedente de sentido que inflaciona o seu discurso seja gradualmente reduzido até que se alcance um zero de sentido, momento propício para o ato analítico. O ato analítico, sendo um acontecimento imprevisto para o próprio psicanalista, é algo da ordem de um horror: o psicanalista lacaniano tem horror ao seu ato. Pensado desse modo, o acontecimento imprevisto em geral, e o ato analítico em particular, tem função ontológica: é quando o ser humano comum advém sujeito ao encontrar o seu fundamento, a sua fórmula: o seu nome próprio. Jacques Lacan propõe o conceito de matema como aquilo que se situa no fundamento de um novo sujeito. Badiou pensa esse matema como sendo o axioma do sujeito.

The purpose of this thesis is to develop a critical reading of Badiou&rsquo / s theory of truth. Contemporary popular trends such as postmodernism and anti-philosophy champion the principles of pluralism and contingency. They use these against Hegel&rsquo / s conception of history and theory of &lsquo / relational totality&rsquo / . Badiou agrees with these trends. But he criticizes their relativist theory of truth. He wants to provide an &lsquo / objective&rsquo / foundation for &lsquo / truth&rsquo / . The question I wish to explore in this thesis is then to analyze critically Badiou&rsquo / s work to find out whether he succeeds? To do this I am presenting Badiou&rsquo / s philosophical sources in ancient and modern philosophy and his main concepts he relies on. I am analyzing in particular in depth Badiou&rsquo / s understanding of ontology and phenomenology. To explain his concept of truth, I am analyzing his concepts of &lsquo / void&rsquo / , &lsquo / plurality&rsquo / , &lsquo / infinity&rsquo / . However, to make sense of his theory of truth more fully, I am looking also at his conceptions of &lsquo / event&rsquo / and subject&rsquo / , which are the main components of his theory of truth. After having analyzed his theory of of truth, I am looking at his conception of emancipatory politics, to see how his conception of truth works in his practical philosophy.

No description available.

Syftet med denna uppsats är att undersöka på vilka sätt facklitteratur avsedd för lärare och lärarstudenter i ämnet svenska som andraspråk reproducerar den koloniala skillnadsdiskursen. Jag har med stöd i framför allt postkolonial teori gjort en textanalys av en antologi inom ämnet andraspråksforskning och funnit att den koloniala diskursen oavsiktligt reproduceras genom förmedlingen av en statisk kultursyn, förenklande dikotomier och en assimilationsideologi. Min slutsats är att detta riskerar att få kontraproduktiva konsekvenser för andraspråksundervisningen och att lärare i svenska som andraspråk behöver ett medvetet kritiskt förhållningssätt i sin hela förståelse av ämnet.

In "Badiou, Political Nihilism, and a Small-Scale Solution", I argue that Badious presentation of politics, exclusively on a large scale that of the nation-state betrays his underlying set-theoretic ontology. The consequence of presenting politics on this scale is that political events, opportunities for genuine political engagement, are extremely rare. This leaves potential political actors with little reason to believe they will have the opportunity to engage in politics. The absence of meaningful engagement, along with Badious unique conception of truth, gives rise to the problem of political nihilism. But, just as sets are both composed of sets and couched within others, situations too should be viewed as scalable. Re-presenting politics on a multiplicity of scales overcomes the worry about nihilism, while better capturing the real complexity and texture of political commitments.

This dissertation examines D.H. Lawrence’s and Wyndham Lewis’s exploration of the evental subject, and asks how their work might help us understand agency in a way that does not discount powerful forms of socio-historical determinism. Examining a variety of their critical and fictional writing from the first three decades of the twentieth century, I argue that Lawrence and Lewis explore ways of thinking about the subject’s relationship to radical novelty without occluding the constraining forces of mass culture. Challenging conventional modernist forms of novelty which seek to except themselves from forces of historical and social determination, they pursue a form of novelty that emerges from these forces, yet radically reconfigures the world that history has produced. Similarly, even though the “evental subject” is conditioned by the forms of relation encoded by society, its agency lies in the power to transfigure the modes of being that have been normalized. The evental subject is not an autonomous source of agency that is exempted from the social order, but derives its agency from reconceptualizing the nature of social embeddedness—understanding social relations as unpredictably generative rather than narrowly limiting. In this regard, the forms of subjectivity articulated by Lawrence and Lewis substantially anticipate, and are illuminated by, Alain Badiou’s theory of the event. Chapter 1 argues that Lawrence’s Study of Thomas Hardy and Studies in Classic American Literature approach the problem of the evental subject largely in terms of affect, understanding the subject not as the preexistent and stable bearer of affective experience, but as the processual product of mutually-constituting affective relationships. Chapter 2 examines Women in Love to find Lawrence negotiating love as an affective site of radical subjective possibility that reconfigures the cultural norms through which intimate relationships are coded and constrained. Chapter 3 turns to Lewis’s The Enemy to ask how his version of the evental subject largely inhabits the tension between personality and selfhood, where the former suggests social performance and the latter denotes an autonomous, ontological category. Contra the conventional turn to the autonomous self as the source of agency, he seeks to understand the subject, and its agency, as the product of social performance. Finally, Chapter 4 argues that Tarr articulates the possibilities of a radically exteriorized understanding of personality; through Lewis’s ironic portrayal of the ineluctable ways in which even the perception of choice is coded by the situation, he presents fiction and authorship as the spaces in which to imagine an evental subject.

No description available.

The predominance of post-modern thought in the latter half of the 20th century has brought philosophy to a crisis of confidence in its ability to investigate and understand our current reality. The complacent relativism that has emerged from post-modern discourse leaves us unprepared to face either the dominance of a dis-associative free-market or the emergence of regressive fundamental totalitarianism. Alain Badiou tasks philosophy with recovering the process of logical investigation into the primary forces which shape our lives, and he does so by equipping philosophy with both a means and an end: philosophy is a mathematical ontology in the endless pursuit of truth. In an attempt to address the issues of infinitely relative position and totalitarian authority, I understand Badiou to draw most significantly from Wittgenstein's (not Sartre's) notion of the situation and Heidegger's notion of Being, placing both of these insights within the mathematical framework of set theory as informed by Paul Cohen, doing so in the distinctly Platonic spirit of an appeal to truth as the antidote to the sophistry of post-modern thought. Such concerns with the intersection of authority and position are distinctly modern ones, and for Badiou we remain caught on the horns of the modern dilemma of the undisputed Master and the infinite Place. The process of overcoming such a false dichotomy, Badiou suggests, involves a return to the scene of its founding in the century's imagination, the moment of its poetic enunciation. Through an investigation of the critical and creative work of Ezra Pound and T.S. Eliot between the wars, I present their striking awareness of this problem and their attempts to overcome it, focusing on their respective moments of success and failure as understood through a critique based on Badiou's ethics and aesthetics. / English

Cette thèse a pour but d’interroger la pertinence des catégories d’objet et de sujet dans le champ politique, à la fois comme outils d’analyse, mais aussi comme support de l’action. Il s’agira ainsi de montrer que les objets, c’est-à-dire tout ce qui vient à occuper une place dans le champ politique, sont le produit d’une construction subjective, dont la mise en œuvre est à la fois individuelle et collective : le monde n’apparaît comme réalité d’objets qu’en tant qu’il est fixé à travers la perception humaine et le langage.Les processus de subjectivation seront alors envisagés selon le double critère d’opposition aux objets du monde, ou de leur utilisation stratégique. Le développement de cette thèse sera l’occasion d’adopter une approche pluri-disciplinaire : seront convoqués la psychanalytique, la philosophie, des écrits d’esthétique musicale, ainsi qu’une analyse théorico-historique de certains courants politiques, singulièrement le maoïsme chinois et sa réception française. / The aim of this thesis is to question the relevance of object and subject categories in the political field, as tool for the analysis but also as props for action. The focus will be on showing that objects, namely, everything that comes to occupy a place in the political field, are the product of a subjective construction, which is carried out both individually and collectively : the world appears as a reality of objects only insofar as it is established through human perception and language.Subjectification processes will then be considered using the double criterion of opposition to world objects or of their strategic use. The central part of this thesis will afford the opportunity to adopt a pluridisciplinary approach : it will rest on psychoanalysis, philosophy, drawn mainly from the Works of J. Derrida and A. Badiou, writings on musical esthetics, as well as a theoretico-historical analysis of a few political movements, particularly Chinese Maoism and its French reception.