I speculate that imbued in interdisciplinary cross cultural perspectives of mythical, socio-economic, literary, pedagogic and psychoanalytical representations, two archetypal, creative, developmental inheritance laws interact as 'twins': Eros (fusion containment/safety) and Thanatos (division/separation/risk) as dividers, multipliers and mixers of cultural heritable forms. By 'twins' I include the intra-psychic domain. ·1 hypothesize these 'twin' laws as matrilineal (Eros) and patrilineal (Thanatos): matrilineal as communal/horizontal inheritance belonging to earlier kin clan forms; patrilineal, hierarchical/conical inheritance, coinciding with the Genesis Creation Myth c. 3000 BCE in the Middle East to rationalize the onset of primogeniture. Primogeniture gave the exclusive right of the first born male to protect property from diminution and 'fixed' gender properties, specifying 'masculine' as territorial dominance. 'Feminine' specificity became subjugated, losing all heritable value. I show how a study of 'twins' on macro and micro levels reveals why cross-cultural forms including gender traits are not fixed but influenced by earlier flexible matrilineal forms. I argue that implicit in inheritance laws is a psychological 'twin' dilemma which developed specifically under primogeniture, namely, how can one inherit as 'first' without betraying that original source (including matrilineal) and not be blamed for treachery as inheritance passes through the generations? I suggest that this double bind is symbolically re-enacted by splitting one 'twin' aspect into 'good/safe' and the other into 'bad/divisive,' depending on cultural developmental requirements. Twins personify this dilemma so well because one twin can be saved, the 'other' damned without anyone noticing any vital loss or having to acknowledge the subtle, splitting mechanisms at play. With the movement away from the importance of patrilineal primogeniture, cultural forms have been re-defined to fit a modem landscape that now acknowledges earlier matrilineal inheritance. The study of twins offers a unique forum to show how each inheritance law competes for primacy as the 'first' and the 'other(s)': although one twin has been sacrificed, this twin simultaneously overlaps and usurps the 'first' by bringing taboo disassociated traits into the realm of conscious cultural acceptability. Index words:

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Human life is engaged in a continual process of mapping and modelling the external universe. From the immediate level of sensation to more abstract forms of emotional and cognitive mapping, the human organism builds a web of inner experience which forms the basis for the construction/perception of "reality." This act of learning forms the genetic, neural, linguistic, and social programing by which individual and collective subjectivity is constructed. Theories in philosophy and science are simply more abstract higher- level models of reality akin to our neuro-semantic mappings. They are similar to cultural, artistic, and religious stories in that their modelling includes not only process but the organized gestalt of content which endows the model with meaning in inner experience. If we move to a higher level of modeling by metamodeling we can understand how various theories of human life have mapped reality. The transversal linking of various theories or models allows us to create clearer maps about process and to transcend the differences resulting from content which supply meaning to inner subjectivity and which organize theories, disciplines, and practices like religious belief systems. Schizoanalytic metamodeling engages this transversal process of communication by which two or more different perspectives of the real - two or more subjectivities or realities - are transcended by moving to the next higher logical level in a nested hierarchy of organization. Schizoanalysis was one of the names Felix Guattari and Gilles Deleuze gave to their lifelong project of reinventing psychoanalysis and therapeutic practice and extending it into the material and social field. By giving a name to this practice and outlining its essence they began to gather together the work of various clinicians, artists, philosophers, and scientists who - though isolated - were already engaged in such a project of transforming human experience and whose history has just begun to be told. The present work continues the development of schizoanalysis as a clinical and cultural practice.

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This thesis proposes a new philosophical reading of the work of the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan. In particular, it is argued that it is Lacan's concept of the 'Real', one ofhis three registers of the Real, Symbolic and the Imaginary, that provides the crucial conceptual horizon for La can' s work, early and late, against those who would locate the emergence of the centrality of the Real only late in Lacan's teaching. The thesis sets out to establish the conceptual genesis and multiple instantiations of the concept of the Real in both Lacan's articles and seminars, arguing that, far from being a hypostatized 'outside' to the Symbolic and Imaginary, the Real is to be understood as immanent to both. Further, Lacan's theory of language is highlighted as revealing the particularity of the Real, especially through the concept of the material signifier. In developing a novel typology of the 'signifier-in-relation' and the 'signifier-in-isolation', the thesis underscores the singularity of Lacan's theory of language and its transcendence of its roots in Saussure's linguistics. Finally, the Real is shown to have a central pertinence to the novel theory of the body proposed in Lacan' s final seminars, a theory of the body that is itself shown to be intimately connected to Lacan' s theory of language, and to his revision of Freud's theories of primary narcissism.

C'est à partir d'un questionnement suscité par la clinique en hôpital de jour pour enfants et adolescents que s'est construite la recherche intitulée Guérir du temps commun. Notre culture contemporaine considère en effet comme "retardés" - c'est-à-dire en retard sur le "temps commun" (sur un temps saisi comme linéaire, d'abord, et devant obéir à une chronologie commune à tous, ensuite)- certains enfants ne présentant pas les capacités ou performances attendues à tel ou tel "moment" précis. Or il s'avère que c'est bien lorsque ces enfants viennent à se nomme et à nommer l'autre, d'une part, et en viennent à "parler le temps" et à se retrouver dans les termes usuels du "temps commun", d'autre part, que s'engage alors le travail psychique leur permettant tout simplement de se reconnaître comme sujets. Il s'agit en somme, pour ces enfants, de s'approprier les repères nécessaires à la nomination de l'autre et au découpage du temps (à sa scansion), pour que puisse émerger du sens, c'est-à-dire pour que s'embraye un "temps subjectif" propre où ils arrivent à trouver place, à se construire une histoire, et à bénéficier d'une forme de transmission. C'est ce que ce travail de recherche se consacre à démontrer, exemples et situations cliniques à l'appui, et dont il s'emploie à tirer les conséquences, en particulier sur les plans éthique, thérapeutique et institutionnel. / The research entitled « safe out common temporality » is raised from a clinical issue in day hospital for children and adolescents. Our contemporary culture indeed considers « delayed » those children who don’t present expected capabilities relativelly to their age range. It is a matter of time taken as both common linear chronology and standards. But it is mainly when those children come to name themselves and others around that they reveal the psychic work consisting in using common temporality terms. They thus open a sharable meaning of their world from the recognation of themselves as a person. The research is then about how some of those « delayed » children appropriate « subjective temporality » and build out a begenning of an historical time where they can take place and share the world inside and around them, by using common words in common meanings. That is the point developped in the paper, with clinical situations. Related ethical, institutional and therapeutical consequences are also deployed

Les neurosciences actuelles ont apporté, ces dernières décennies, des découvertes majeures sur les phénomènes d’inconscient, de la conscience et de la métacognition. En s’appuyant sur cette actualité scientifique d’une part et les connaissances accumulées depuis les premiers écrits de Freud d’autre part, il apparaît désormais possible d’entamer une articulation dialectique entre le modèle neuroscientifique et le modèle psychanalytique. Pour se faire, il convient de ne pas se contenter des définitions respectives de ces phénomènes : il faut en passer par l’analyse précise de ce sur quoi chacune des deux approches s’appuie pour les décrire.Concernant plus spécifiquement l’inconscient, quatre concepts sont inévitablement convoqués de part et d’autre : la perception, la mémoire, le temps et le langage. Néanmoins, le prolongement de la réflexion, vers la conscience et la métacognition, offre des perspectives plus larges encore : il permet d’aborder d’autres axiomes ou hypothèses comme, entre autres, l’espace de travail neuronal global, la résistance, le refoulement, l’équivoque ou l’incubation. A cela, s’ajoutent les récentes théories générales du cerveau qui, en neurosciences, supportent les questions autour de la subjectivité. Subjectivité qui, in fine, interroge sur ses dimensions conscientes et inconscientes. L’éclairage, possiblement réciproque entre neurosciences et psychanalyse, permet l’émergence de questionnements et de perspectives nouvelles. Aussi, une mise en tension dialectique de ces deux approches ouvre à l’enrichissement des connaissances sur ces phénomènes, voire à un renouvellement de ces notions fondamentales de la psychologie. / Currents neuroscience have made in recent decades, major discoveries about the unconscious, the consciousness and the metacognition. Based on this scientific news on the one hand and the knowledge accumulated since the early writings of Freud on the other hand, it now appears possible to start a dialectical link between the psychoanalytic and neuroscientific model. To do so, the respective definitions of these phenomena are insufficient: we must make an accurate analysis of the main concepts of those approaches. Concerning more specifically the unconscious, four concepts are inevitably convened on both sides: perception, memory, time and language. Nevertheless, the continuation of the reflection, toward consciousness and metacognition, offers wider prospects : it allows to address other axioms or assumptions such as, among others, the Global workspace, strength, repression, equivocation or incubation. To this are added the general theories of the brain, which approach the question of the subjectivity. But subjectivity finally asked about his conscious and unconscious aspects. Lighting, possibly reciprocal between neuroscience and psychoanalysis, allows the emergence of questions and new perspectives. Also, a dialectic exchange between both approaches open to the enrichment of knowledge about these phenomena or even a renewal of those basic concepts of psychology.

Lacan fait de Socrate l’antécédent historique du psychanalyste. Dans son séminaire sur le transfert, il prend appui sur le Banquet de Platon pour démontrer comment Socrate opère une manœuvre digne d’un analyste : quand Alcibiade lui déclare son amour, il le renvoie à Agathon. On peut ainsi dire que l’«interprétation» de Socrate lui dévoile le véritable objet de son désir, en lui prouvant aussi qu’il faut être trois pour aimer : telle serait l’éthique socratique, qui devancerait Freud quand ce dernier formule que «l’exemple est la chose même». Mais ce dialogue de Platon nous intéresse aussi parce qu’il met en relief ce que Lacan appelle la «métaphore de l’amour», à savoir le renversement à travers lequel l’aimé, celui qui se trouve être le centre et l’objet du désir des autres, devient aimant, manifestant ainsi un manque et abandonnant du coup sa position confortable. Ainsi, Lacan se sert de Platon pour comprendre la manière dont opère la psychanalyse : dans toute analyse digne de ce nom s’opère un renversement, une permutation de places, qui permet au sujet de se tourner vers l’inconscient, vers le désir de l’Autre. On peut en dire plus : il n’y a pas d’inconscient à proprement parler avant que ce changement de places énonciatives ne se produise. / Lacan makes Socrate the historical antecedent of the psychoanalyst. In his seminar about the transfer, he bases on Plato's Symposium to demonstrate how Socrate makes a maneuver worthy of an analyst: when Alcibiade declares his love to him, he send him back to Agathon. Thus, we can say that the "interpretation" of Socrates reveals the true object of Alcibiade's desire, proving to him that it takes three to love: such is the Socratic ethics. But Plato's dialogue is also interesting as it highlights what Lacan calls the "metaphor of love", namely the reversal through which the loved one, which is the center and the object of the other's desire, becomes the lover, expressing a lack and abandoning his comfortable position. Thus, Lacan uses Plato to understand how the psychoanalysis operates: in any analysis worthy of the name is effected a reversal, a permutation of places, which allows the subject to turn to the unconscious, to the desire of the Other. We can say more: there is no unconscious strictly speaking before a change of enunciative places occurs.

Nous travaillons la question de l’énonciation chez l’enfant, dans une perspective psychanalytique orientée par l’enseignement de Jacques Lacan. Deux questions fondamentales guident notre parcours : Quelle est l’originalité de la conception lacanienne de l’énonciation ? Quelles sont ses particularités chez l’enfant ? À travers un parcours dans différents moments de son enseignement, nous analysons l’élaboration de la notion d’énonciation, en considérant principalement son articulation avec le graphe du désir. En tenant compte des contributions de Jules Séglas, Roman Jakobson, Jacques Damourette et Édouard Pichon, nous précisons la spécificité de cette notion par rapport à celle introduite par Émile Benveniste dans la linguistique: sa relation avec la négation, son articulation avec le désir, sa dimension pulsionnelle, sa proximité avec le surmoi et sa fixation au fantasme. Bref, on spécifie les aspects qui produisent la discordance fondamentale de l’énonciation dans l’être parlant. Sur la base de ces conceptualisations, nous abordons la question de savoir quelles sont les particularités de l’énonciation chez l’enfant. En considérant la tension entre structure et temporalité qui se dégage de l’enseignement de Lacan, nous présentons ses différentes conceptualisations sur l’enfant, ainsi que quelques débats récents concernant sa position dans la cure. À partir de l’analyse de quelques vignettes, on propose de mettre à l’épreuve de la clinique la thèse de la localisation de l’enfant entre le niveau de l’énoncé et le niveau de l’énonciation. De cette manière, on essaye de préciser des incidences et des emplois possibles de cette catégorie dans la clinique psychanalytique avec des enfants. / In this research we analyse the problem of the enunciation in the child, from a psychoanalytical perspective oriented by Jacques Lacan’s teaching. Two central questions guide our work: What is the originality of the enunciation in Lacan’s theory? What are the particularities of the enunciation in the child? To address the first question, we study the elaboration of this notion in different moments of Lacan’s teaching, by considering especially his sixth seminar (1958-1959). Taking into account the contributions of Jules Séglas, Roman Jakobson, Jacques Damourette and Édouard Pichon, we indicate the specificity of this notion in psychoanalysis in comparison with a linguistic approach: its relation with the negation, its articulation with the desire and the pulsion, its closeness to the superego and the fundamental ghost. On the basis of these conceptualizations, we address the second question, concerning the particularities of the enunciation in the child. Considering the tension between structure and temporality in Lacan’s teaching, we study his perspective of the child, as well as recent discussions about its place in psychoanalytical treatment. By analysing some clinical extracts, we propose to test the thesis of the child localisation between the level of the enunciated (or content) and the level of the enunciation. In this way, we try to specify the incidences and the possible uses of this category in psychoanalytical clinic with children.