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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.

A lower level developmental account of infant "false belief" reasoning

Stack, James Andrew January 2010 (has links)
In a groundbreaking empirical study Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) developed a nonverbal version of Wimmer and Perner's (1983) unexpected transfer false belief task based on Woodward's (1998) violation-of-expectation methodology in order to assess 15-month-olds preferential looking times. The findings from this study demonstrate that infants looked less when an agent reached for a target object where the agent last . . . ..- saw it when it had been moved to a different location in her absence. Onishi & Baillargeon and others have interpreted these data as providing the first empirical demonstration of an implicit and innate meta-representational understanding of beliefstates within infancy (the rich accounts). Alternatively, these data have been interpreted at a mentalistic level as demonstrating no more than infants' understanding of the agent's ignorance (Southgate et aI, 2007; Wellman, in press) or at a basic non-mentalistic level involving an understanding of actions based on associationist strategies and behavioural rules (the lean accounts of Perner & Ruffman, 2005). I suggest that the rich and lean accounts are problematic in that both provide a non-developmental and excessively adult-like conception of task performance on this measure. This masks the emergence of, as yet unconsidered, lower level and developmentally sensitive precursor competences. I argue that infant false belief data can be better understood if situated within such a lower level developmental framework which emphasises (a) infants' understanding of goal-directed actions and (b) key differences between the levels of perceptual awareness demonstrated by infants and older children in the verbal and non-verbal versions of the unexpected transfer task. At a wider level I argue that the types of competence demonstrated on both verbal and non-verbal false belief tasks can be situated within a second person I .~------------ -- r relational framework (e.g., Gallagher, 2005; Reddy, 2003 , 2008). With specific reference to Onishi and Baillargeon's (2005) non-verbal 'false belief' task I argue that infant social competence is framed in terms of what 'we' saw (a first-person plural explanation) rather than what 'I' saw 'you' see (a third-person explanation). In order to test these assertions five cross-sectional empirical studies were conducted on infants between the ages of 10- and 22-months. The findings from at least four of these studies (Studies 1-, 2-, 3-, and 5) were inconsistent with both the rich and lean accounts. In contrast, the findings from at least three of these studies (Studies 1-, 3-, and 5) were consistent with my own lower level action-perception account. These findings suggest a reconceptualisation both in terms of how we assess and how we interpret infant false belief data.

Advancing an understanding of belief bias through an analysis of individual differences

Pitchford, Melanie January 2012 (has links)
The work presented in this thesis aimed to advance an understanding of belief bias in human reasoning. What are the factors that cause people, when engaged in reasoning, to be influenced by their prior beliefs and knowledge rather than apply logic to an argument to arrive at a normatively correct outcome? To address these issues three experiments were undertaken that focused on cognitive ability measures (specifically working memory capacity) as well as evidence from response time data and individual differences in measures of thinking dispositions. Experiment 1 examined the role of working memory in the belief bias paradigm, considering both endorsement rates and processing times. Experiment 2 built on the findings from Experiment I and investigated more thoroughly the role of working memory capacity and the evidence from the chronometric data. This was achieved by using materials with stricter controls and through increased test power via a larger participant sample. Experiment 3 aimed to ascertain exactly what it is that drives successful reasoning with belief-oriented problems. To address this issue the experiment involved a measure of abstract reasoning as well as measures of thinking dispositions, one assessing people's proclivity to engage in open-minded thinking and the other assessing their tendency towards rational and experiential thinking styles. Overall the findings suggest that reasoners who apply open-minded thinking have a greater ability to override the effects of belief bias and perform in a more normative manner when logic and belief are in conflict. A higher working memory capacity is only associated with reasoners demonstrating longer processing times with conflict problems, but plays no role in successful reasoning in the belief bias paradigm. With respect to processing times across problem types, the data revealed some support and some challenges to previous models of belief bias.

Does executive functioning training improve mentalising ability?

Stylianou, Maria Savvas January 2007 (has links)
No description available.

Cortical cognition : associative learning in the real world

Morse, Anthony Frederick January 2006 (has links)
No description available.

Electrophsysiological and chromatic investigations of cognitive processing during singal and multiple task performance

Suguy, Susan M. January 2006 (has links)
No description available.

Objectivity, reasoning and interdisciplinary : making the links

McNulty, Lisa January 2010 (has links)
Both the production of knowledge and the product, knowledge itself, are social phenomena. This generally accepted fact is generally thought to require relativism, scepticism, and Kuhnian incommensurability, as well as casting serious doubt on the potential of our cognitive traditions to provide us with objective knowledge about an objective world. This thesis exposes and critiques the presuppositions about the nature of reasoning and objectivity which underlie these fears. Combining a Nietzschean, perspectivist account of objectivity with a conception of reasoning drawn from Lockean epistemology and pedagogy, I build a new account of cognitive optimality, dubbed 'Linkmaking'. The phrase deliberately encompasses several meanings. We 'make links' by noticing connections between objects in the world, by linking ideas together to form a theory or a curriculum; by forming social connections, and by developing interdisciplinary practices. I defend the view that we cannot fully address any of these kinds of Link without reference to all of the others. I further show that out best means to critically assess our cognitive groups is to evaluate the extent to which those groups encourage Linkmaking practices. The major potential challenge to Linkmaking is Kuhnian incommensurability. Having demonstrated the flaws inherent in Kuhn's account, this thesis defends the weaker, Doppeltian form of incommensurability, which grants us insight into the genuine problems which can occur in interdisciplinary research. We then see that the Strong Programme in the sociology of knowledge, inspired by the strong, relativistic version of the Kuhnian incommensurability thesis, has held sway among sociologists because they do not generally study interdisciplinary practices, which highlight scientists' (perspectivist) objectivity. Furthermore, social scientists who accept Kuhnian constructivism doubt their own potential for objectivity, presuming the presence of strong incommensurability where there is none. Undertaking Linkmaking practices both cures this illusion, and improves the cognitive optimality of the group.

The dynamics of conflict in reasoning

Travers, Eoin January 2016 (has links)
This thesis explores conflict in reasoning using a mouse-tracking paradigm that measures participants' instantaneous attraction towards competing response options. It focuses on two kinds of conflict: between competing sources of information in inductive reasoning, and between "Type 1" and "Type 2" processes in Dual Process accounts of reasoning. The mouse-tracking data reveal under what circumstances conflict occurs, at what points in time participants are influenced by different factors, and something of the qualitative nature of this conflict.

The mechanisms underlying incubation in problem solving

Sio, UtNa January 2010 (has links)
No description available.

A multidimensional scaling analysis of individual differences in responses to visual art

O'Hare, David January 1978 (has links)
No description available.

Exploring intuition in clinical psychology : a grounded theory

Tovey, Heather January 2008 (has links)
Intuition is a concept that can provoke different reactions. It has been well researched in the field of cognitive psychology, but has been viewed with apprehension by clinical psychology. Research in the field of nursing has established a role for intuition in important aspects of clinical practice such as decision making, assessment, planning and implementing interventions. However no such investigation of intuition in clinical psychology has been made. The aims of this study were to explore how clinical psychologists construct intuition in their talk, specifically relating to clinical practice. Individual interviews were conducted with eight clinical psychologists. A grounded theory approach was used to develop three main categories from the interview data. The first category described how this group of clinical psychologists talked about 'doing' intuition. The second described participants' attempts to define intuition in context and the third category described how their views and use of intuition related to their 'being' a clinical psychologist. The findings of this study illustrate that participants constructed intuition as a valid concept with a significant role in clinical psychology practice. It was most readily discussed as a process, and participants found a notable difficulty in providing a concrete definition of intuition. Core elements of intuition and its use were located within a variety of contexts of the individual and system, the relationships to which were complex and diverse. The implications and limitations of this study are discussed along with suggestions for further research.

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