The attraction effect reveals that people do not compare alternatives independently of one another. Instead, they make comparisons, such that preferences between two alternatives can be reversed by adding or removing otherwise irrelevant alternatives. This behaviour is particularly difficult for rational models of decision making to explain since such models require the independent evaluation of alternatives. As such these models describe preference reversal behaviour as irrational. This thesis examines what rational decision making should look like once a person's cognitive bounds have been taken into account. The key finding is that contextual preference reversals like the attraction effect, far from being irrational, actually result from people making better decisions than they would if they assessed alternatives independently of one another. The research was grouped into three objectives concerning the attraction effect and the rationality of human cognition. The first of these was to identify under what conditions people exhibit the attraction effect, and what consequences the behaviour has for the outcomes they experience. Two experiments revealed that the effect is only exhibited in choice sets where alternatives are approximately equal in value and therefore hard to tell apart. This finding also means that the potential negative consequences of exhibiting the attraction effect are very small, because it only occurs when alternatives are similar in value. The second objective was to develop a computationally rational model of the attraction effect. Computational rationality is an approach that identifies what the optimal behaviour is given the constraints imposed by cognition, and the environment. Our model reveals why people exhibit the attraction effect. With the assumption that people cannot calculate expected value perfectly accurately, the model shows that in choices between prospects, the attraction effect actually results in decisions with a higher expected value. This is because noisy expected value estimates can be improved by taking into account the contextual information provided by the other alternatives in a choice set. The final objective was to provide evidence for our model, and the computational rationality approach, by making a novel prediction. We conducted an experiment to test the model's prediction that the attraction effect should be much reduced in the loss domain. We replicated existing attraction effect studies and extended them to the loss domain. The results replicated previous results in the gain domain and simultaneously revealed the novel finding that people did not exhibit the effect in the loss domain. People exhibit the attraction effect as a result of making the best decision possible given the cognitive resources they have. Understanding decision making as computationally rational can provide deep insights into existing phenomena. The method allows us to ascertain the causal link between cognitive mechanisms, a person's goal, and their decision making.

High quality decision-making can be produced through a sophisticated analytical process in addition to an intuitive process. A high quality intuitive process is dependent on an extensive repertoire of previous patterns generated by decision outcomes. Intuition is frequently poorly understood and often dismissed as unreliable and irrelevant. Yet there is a noteworthy sector within the literature that suggests otherwise (Glöckner, 2009; Smith, 2007). Termed dual-process (Evans, 2010), the combined strength of intuition and analysis forms the basis of how expert ski guides make decisions in avalanche terrain. Typically, the quality of the decision process is described as being contingent on the evolved expertise of the decision maker. Deliberate practice (Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Romer, 1993) aimed at the development of context specific expertise provides the foundation. Ski guides are charged with the role of conducting guests through a constantly changing, hazardous environment with the goal of maximizing the guests’ rewards, within a risk envelope that does not eliminate the potential for a fatality. The challenge for ski guides is to formulate an operational context within a feedback environment that is plagued with inconsistencies and burdened with massive negative consequences. The ski guide decision process is influenced by the depth and breadth of expertise, with rapid pattern recognition generating a sense of confidence. However misleading environmental feedback can complicate the perception of decision quality. When nothing bad happens, poor decisions can masquerade as good ones. This may support the development of a faulty pattern recognition process. Research that helps to describe the innovative practices and extant knowledge of mountain guiding will help to harmonise theory and practice. There is considerable knowledge entrenched within the daily activities of the Canadian mechanized ski industry, as the average annual fatality rate is just under one and a half fatalities per 100,000 skier days. However it is arguable that even this number of fatalities is too many and all efforts should be made to reduce the number of fatalities. Data were contributed over two seasons (2008/09 and 2009/10) by a self-selected group of 35 heli-ski and snowcat-ski guides working in British Columbia. Mixed methods were used to analyse three sources of data. An initial quantitative analysis of the participants’ background experience and 96 event reports (62 good day reports and 34 near-miss reports) was used to provoke qualitative questions of interview data. The findings of this study address the issue of how and when intuition plays a role in ski guide decision-making. Decision-making in avalanche terrain is a complex process and professional guides have well developed strategies to help them manage the challenges. Years of training in analytical decision processes are supported by a wealth of available snowpack and weather information. Guiding teams provide a valuable peer support network to further the sophistication of the decision process. Yet despite the wealth of information available to support an analytical decision, most decisions are influenced by an intuitive factor.

“After the group had played [improvisation] game[s]…colours became brighter, people and spaces seem of a different size, focus is sharper. Our normal thinking dulls perception…” Keith Johnstone (1979, pg. 131) Improvisation is considered to be both the process and product of creativity. It involves the creation of new ideas, on the spur of the moment that are novel and unplanned. Spontaneity, the ability to do something on the spot with no prior preparation is seen as a key element of improvisation and distinction in relation to creativity. The process of improvisation involves thinking in different ways and as a result, could influence our thought processes. It is important to note here that while we are interested in the process of improvisation, it is only possible to measure this through the product. The product is therefore seen as a direct outcome of the process of thinking that occurs during improvisation. It has been suggested that improvisation could relate to cognitive processes (Karakelle, 2009; Schmidt, Goforth & Drew, 1975; Scott, Harris & Rothe, 2001). This program of research therefore aims to identify the cognitive changes in relation to the process of improvisation. This is measured by looking at cognitive tasks pre and post improvisation. Several studies were therefore conducted investigating the effects of improvisation on various cognitive abilities, with a focus on differences between divergent and convergent thinking; (i) the Effect of Verbal Improvisation on Mood, Creativity and Cognition; (ii) verbal improvisation in relation to divergent and convergent thinking; (iii) dance improvisation in relation to divergent and convergent thinking; (iv) Divergent thinking; Differences among expert and novice improvisers and (v) length of Treatment; Cognitive effects following a shorter improvisation treatment length. As a result of the above experiments, results were extended to a clinical sample of Parkinson’s disease. An extensive investigation was also carried out investigating the scoring of method of the Alternative Uses Task (AUT; Guilford, 1957b). Furthermore, the level of cognitive load as a result of improvisation was investigated by observing gesture in improvisation. Taken together, results showed that after a series of verbal improvisation activities, participants improved in scores of divergent thinking tasks. However, this was not observed in scores of convergent thinking tasks. Issues surrounding reliability of the scoring method of the AUT were also discussed. However, this did not affect the consistency of the results observed in this program of research. A theory of schemas was applied to the process of improvisation as a result of the cognitive changes that occured, such that improvisation helps people think in more original and flexible ways by improving access to schemas and working memory.

This thesis is concerned with pragmatic factors of deontic reasoning, namely scale of violation, aggravating and mitigating circumstances and power of source. Nine experiments are reported investigating deontic reasoning and judgement revision. Experiment 1 established scale of violation as a modifying factor of a working rule with an inferential reasoning task, however, the effects were not transferred to a deductive reasoning task in Experiment 2. Scale of violation and circumstances were found to influence the reasoning of motoring violations with a major offence and aggravating circumstances being rated as more serious and receiving greater fines than a minor offence or mitigating circumstances (Experiments 3 & 4). These effects were also observed with a judgement revision task (Experiment 5). Power of source was included as an additional pragmatic factor and was found to influence the reasoning of conditional statements (Experiment 6), inducements (Experiment 7) and ratings of credibility and probability of outcomes (Experiment 8). The final study (Experiment 9) found significant effects for scale of violation / compliance and power of source within a judgement revision task. However, no difference was observed in the reasoning of superordinate and non-superordinate statements. The findings are explained in terms of the conditional probability hypothesis.

This thesis presents a series of experiments where endorsement rates, latencies and measures of cognitive ability were collected, to investigate the extent to which people search for counterexamples under necessity instructions, and alternative models under possibility instructions. The research was motivated by a syllogistic reasoning study carried out by Evans, Handley, Harper, and Johnson-Laird (1999), and predictions were derived from mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). With regard to the endorsement rate data: Experiment 1 failed to find evidence that a search for counterexamples or alternative models took place. In contrast experiment 2 (transitive inference) found some evidence to support the search for alternative models under possibility instructions, and following an improved training session, experiment 3 produced strong evidence to suggest that people searched for other models; which was mediated by cognitive ability. There was also strong evidence from experiments 4, 5 and 6 (abstract and everyday conditionals) to support the search for counterexamples and alternative models. Furthermore it was also found that people were more likely to find alternative causes when there were many that could be retrieved from their everyday knowledge, and that people carried out a search for counterexamples with many alternative causes under necessity instructions, and across few and many causal groups under possibility instructions. .The evidence from the latency data was limited and inconsistent, although people with higher cognitive ability were generally quicker in completing the tasks.

L'évaluation d'un objet est intrinsèquement liée à la définition que l'on pose de celui-ci. Si à un certain niveau de généralité, ce qu'est comprendre un texte semble aller de soi, une recension des travaux en psychologie cognitive, du développement, en didactique, en sociolinguistique, montre au contraire le caractère polymorphe de cet objet qu'on peine à définir. Dès lors, comment évaluer ce que l'on peine à circonscrire, même par exclusion ? Toujours dans le but de cerner ce qu'on entend par compréhension, nous avons mené quatre enquêtes. La première repose sur des entretiens avec des enseignants autour d'une épreuve (texte + questions), en vue de décrire leur manière de se représenter la compréhension et ses difficultés. La deuxième, centrée sur l'analyse des questions repose sur la constitution et une première analyse d'un corpus d'environ 200 questions proposées lors d'évaluations nationales sur la compréhension de textes narratifs. Analyser les questions ne pouvant se faire sans prendre en compte l'activité de réponse, nous avons proposé ensuite deux expériences. La première procède d'une sorte de raisonnement par « l'absurde »: peut-on répondre à des questionnaires de compréhension sans le texte y afférant ? La seconde a pour but de cerner les spécificités des épreuves, en proposant aux mêmes élèves quatre tâches (rappel, reconnaissance, jugement d'importance et QCM) sur deux textes différents. Ces analyses convergent pour montrer que chaque tâche donne un portrait différent de la compréhension et que l'on passe parfois rapidement d'une compréhension d'un texte à la compréhension de textes. / The evaluation of an object is intrinsically linked to the way one defines it. In seeking to define narrative texts comprehension, we have educed multiple facets of this process: cognitiv psychology, psychology of development, didactics, sociolinguistics, which each in their way clarifies an aspect of texts comprehension. This being the case, how can an object so polymorphous be evaluated? To properly understand the functioning of MCQs, the most common method for evaluating texts comprehension, we have undertaken four separate investigations. The first was based on interviews with teachers about a given examination (text plus questions), with the aim of being able to formulate how one depicts texts comprehension and its difficulties. The second investigation, centered on the analysis of questions, was based on the constitution of a corpus of about 200 questions used in nationwide tests of narrative texts comprehension , and a first-level analysis. Analyzing questions necessitates taking into consideration the activity of replying to questions, so we developed two further experiments. The first proceeded from a sort of "reasoning by the absurd": can one reply to questions without cognizance of the corresponding text? The second aimed to identify the specificities of tests, by proposing to the same students four tasks (recall, recognition, relative importance judgments and QMCs) for two different texts. These analyses converge to demonstrate that each kind of task generates a specific profile view of texts comprehension, and that sometimes one passes rapidly from the comprehension of a given text to the general texts comprehension reading competencies.

Les bébés ont-ils des pensées sur leurs propres pensées? L'objet de cette thèse était d'examiner cette question en se concentrant sur le développement de la métacognition, cette capacité que nous avons d'observer et de réguler nos propres processus cognitifs. Les recherches antérieures ont documenté un développement tardif de la métacognition. Cependant, cette question a essentiellement été étudiée en demandant aux enfants de rapporter verbalement leurs propres états mentaux. En nous appuyant sur des méthodes issues de la littérature comparative, ici nous avons étudié la possibilité que même les bébés pourraient démontrer des capacités métacognitives dans des situations qui ne requièrent pas de rapport verbal. Dans une première étude, nous avons trouvé que les bébés de 12 et 18 mois détectent leurs erreurs, évaluent la confiance qu'ils peuvent avoir dans leurs décisions, et utilisent ces informations pour réguler leur comportement. Dans une deuxième étude, nous montrons que les bébés de 20 mois sont même capables de communiquer leur propre incertitude non verbalement. Cela suggère que les tout petits peuvent consciemment représenter leur propre incertitude, même si ils sont incapables de la verbaliser convenablement avant bien plus tard pendant l'enfance. Nos résultats indiquent qu'il y a une dissociation importante entre les capacités de régulation métacognitive, déjà présentes chez le bébé, et les aspects plus explicites de la métacognition, qui se développent lentement pendant l'enfance. De façon plus générale, nos résultats suggèrent que les bébés, en plus d'analyser leur environnement physique et social, peuvent aussi examiner leurs propres processus cognitifs. / What do infants know about themselves? Do they have thoughts about their own thoughts? The aim of this thesis was to investigate this issue by focusing on the early development of metacognition, our capacity to monitor and regulate our own cognitive processes. Previous research essentially relied on verbal reports, and showed that reflecting upon their own mental states is difficult for preschoolers. Yet, these observations might reflect children’s limited capacities in explicitly reporting their own mental states, rather than limitations in metacognition per se. Here, by relying on methods coming from the comparative literature, we investigated the possibility that even infants could demonstrate rudimentary forms of metacognition in non-verbal settings. In a first study, we found that 12- and 18-month-olds can evaluate decision confidence, monitor their errors, and use these metacognitive computations to regulate subsequent behaviour. In a second study, we further show that 20-month-olds are able to share their own uncertainty with others in order to regulate behaviour. This last aspect of our results suggests that infants can consciously access metacognitive representations, although they remain unable to manipulate them verbally until much later during childhood. Taken together, our results highlight an important dissociation between core metacognitive capacities, already present in infancy, and more explicit aspects of metacognition, developing through an effortful process during childhood. More generally, the present work provides some evidence that infants not only consider their physical and social surroundings, but also, reflect upon their own cognitive states.

Notre capacité à anticiper les événements futurs sur base de notre expérience nous permet d'interagir adéquatement avec notre environnement. Depuis presque deux siècles, cette observation a constitué une question centrale pour deux traditions de recherche différentes, à savoir la théorie idéomotrice de l'action et la théorie de l'apprentissage par renforcement. Alors que la première s'est concentrée sur les effets sensoriels associés avec une action donnée, la seconde tend à considérer que le comportement peut uniquement être influencé par les récompenses et punitions potentielles. Cette thèse de doctorat vise à lier ces deux approches, sur la base du modèle prédictif de la perception. À cette fin, nous avons conduit une série de six expériences explorant différents aspects de la relation entre les prédictions sensorielles et les prédictions de récompense au moyen de méthode de mesure comportementales, de techniques d'électroencéphalographie (EEG) et d'oculométrie. Nos résultats indiquent que (1) les contenus sensoriels et émotionnels appartenant à des stimuli complexes sont évalués ensembles, que (2) les différences inter-individuelles influencent la manière dont nous formons des prédictions et que (3) la mesure de la taille des pupilles est un outil prometteur pour l'étude des prédictions sensorielles. / Our ability to anticipate future events based on prior knowledge about our environment is shaping the way we engage with it. For almost two centuries, this observation has been a central topic for two different research traditions, namely the ideomotor theory and the reinforcement learning literature. Whereas the former focussed is inquiries on the sensory effects associated with a given action, the latter considered that behaviour was only influenced by potential rewards or punishments. This dissertation constitutes an attempt to bridge these two approaches, based on the predictive model theory. For this purpose, we conducted six experiments exploring various aspects of the relationship between reward and sensory prediction using classical behavioural and EEG methods, but also pupil size measurements. Our results suggest that (1) sensory and emotional features of complex stimuli are processed together, that (2) inter-individual differences influence prediction mechanisms and (3) pupil size measurement is a useful tool for sensory prediction.

The aim of this dissertation was to address a theoretical debate on belief bias. Belief bias is the tendency for people to be influenced by their prior beliefs when engaged in deductive reasoning. Deduction is the act of drawing necessary conclusions from premises which are meant to be assumed as true. Given that the logical validity of an argument is independent of its content, being influenced by your prior beliefs in such content is considered a bias. Traditional theories posit there are two belief bias components. Motivated reasoning is the tendency to reason better for arguments with unbelievable conclusions relative to arguments with believable conclusions. Response bias is the tendency to accept believable arguments and to reject unbelievable arguments. Dube et al. (2010) pointed out critical methodological problems that undermine evidence for traditional theories. Using signal detection theory (SDT), they found evidence for response bias only. We adopted the SDT method to compare the viability of the traditional and the response bias accounts. In Chapter 1 the relevant literature is reviewed. In Chapter 2 four experiments which employed a novel SDT-based forced choice reasoning method are presented, showing evidence compatible with motivated reasoning. In Chapter 3 four experiments which used the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) method are presented. Crucially, cognitive ability turned out to be linked to motivated reasoning. In Chapter 4 three experiments are presented in which we investigated the impact of cognitive ability and analytic cognitive style on belief bias, concluding that cognitive style mediated the effects of cognitive ability on motivated reasoning. In Chapter 5 we discuss our findings in light of a novel individual differences account of belief bias. We conclude that using the appropriate measurement method and taking individual differences into account are two key elements to furthering our understanding of belief bias, human reasoning, and cognitive psychology in general.

The general purpose of this study was to determine the relationship between cognitive styles and personality types in order to gain insight into the placement of leaders within the context of current and future organisational demands. The study was conducted among 123 managers within the information technology environment of a South African financial institution. Data was collected by means of the Cognitive Process Profile (CPP) and the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI). Supporting evidence, although not sufficient, indicates a probable relationship between cognitive styles and personality types. The assumption can therefore be made that the relationship between cognitive styles and personality types will be more pronounced among a more geographically distributed sample group which includes sufficient diverse respondents regarding the different cognitive styles and personality types. / Industrial and Organisational Psychology / MCOM (Industrial Psychology)