Intuition is a concept that can provoke different reactions. It has been well researched in the field of cognitive psychology, but has been viewed with apprehension by clinical psychology. Research in the field of nursing has established a role for intuition in important aspects of clinical practice such as decision making, assessment, planning and implementing interventions. However no such investigation of intuition in clinical psychology has been made. The aims of this study were to explore how clinical psychologists construct intuition in their talk, specifically relating to clinical practice. Individual interviews were conducted with eight clinical psychologists. A grounded theory approach was used to develop three main categories from the interview data. The first category described how this group of clinical psychologists talked about 'doing' intuition. The second described participants' attempts to define intuition in context and the third category described how their views and use of intuition related to their 'being' a clinical psychologist. The findings of this study illustrate that participants constructed intuition as a valid concept with a significant role in clinical psychology practice. It was most readily discussed as a process, and participants found a notable difficulty in providing a concrete definition of intuition. Core elements of intuition and its use were located within a variety of contexts of the individual and system, the relationships to which were complex and diverse. The implications and limitations of this study are discussed along with suggestions for further research.

Aims. This thesis aimed to investigate the relationships between social problem-solving, defeat, entrapment and other cognitive risk factors (rumination, goal adjustment) for suicidal ideation and behaviour. The investigation was carried out using the framework of the Integrated Motivational-Volitional Model of Suicidal Behaviour (IMV; O’Connor, 2011) and this thesis aimed to test aspects of this theoretical model. In addition, this thesis also aimed to critically evaluate the measures of social problem-solving employed in suicide research. Method. Five empirical studies across five chapters were conducted. In order to achieve the study’s aims, a systematic review was conducted first which informed the selection of the social problem-solving measures employed within the thesis (Chapter 3). The review also identified the need to update the original Means End Problem-Solving task (MEPS; Platt and Spivack, 1975). A series of focus groups were conducted to revise and update the measure (Chapter 6), two studies were then conducted to test the revised measure (MEPS-R; Chapter 7). A further two studies investigated the relationship between social problem-solving and suicidal ideation and behaviour. The first empirical study was prospective (Chapter 5) and the second was experimental in design (Chapter 8). All studies employed both student and general population samples. Results. The Social Problem-Solving Inventory (SPSI-R; D’Zurilla, et al, 2002) and the MEPS were identified as the most common measures employed in suicide research (Chapter 3). The SPSI-R was employed in all studies and the original MEPS was revised and tested. The MEPS-R was found to be a reliable measure, both inter-rater and internal consistency were good although the MEPS-R scores did not correlate with established risk factors of psychological distress (Chapter 7). However, in the experimental study the MEPS-R was found to correlate with psychological distress (Chapter 8). Dysfunctional social problem-solving was found to be the most pernicious of the SPSI-R subscales and individuals who reported a history of self-harm were found to score higher in dysfunctional problem-solving than individuals who reported no history of self-harm (Chapter 5 and 8). Dysfunctional social problem-solving was found to mediated the defeat-entrapment relationship and rational problem-solving moderate this relationship. Defeat had no discernible impact on social problem-solving performance (Chapter 8). Conclusion. This research makes a novel contribution to the understanding of the relationships between social problem-solving, defeat, entrapment, rumination, goal adjustment and suicidal ideation/behaviour. It also highlights the importance of the dysfunctional aspect of social problem-solving. The IMV model was a useful framework for understanding these relationships. In addition, the revised MEPS (MEPS-R) is a reliable measure of social problem-solving, which is more applicable for use in today’s society but it requires further testing, especially in clinical populations.

No description available.

Although human causal reasoning is widely acknowledged as an object of scientific enquiry, there is little consensus on an appropriate measure of progress. Up-to-date evidence of the standard method of research in the field shows that this method has been rejected at the birth of modern science. We describe an instance of the standard scientific method for modelling causal reasoning (causal calculators). The method allows for uniform proofs of three relevant computational properties: correctness of the model with respect to the intended model, full abstraction of the model (function) with respect to the equivalence of reasoning scenarios (input), and formal relations of equivalence and subsumption between models. The method extends and exploits the systematic paradigm [Handbook of Logic in Artificial Intelligence and Logic Programming, volume IV, p. 439-498, Oxford 1995] to fit with our interpretation of it. Using the described method, we present results for some major models, with an updated summary spanning seventy-two years of research in the field.

Earlier research has shown that certain fluctuations are characteristic of mental work curves. Other investigations have revealed changes in muscular tension during mental work. The aim of the present experiment was to follow simultaneously these changes in output and in tension throughout a simple mental task. As the variations were likely to be rapid, recordings were made over short intervals of time˙ Two methods were employed to modify and thereby illuminate the relationship discovered between the two variables: (1) Muscular tension was induced during work. (2) An attempt was made to change the mental set of the subjects towards the work. Ten female subjects took part in the experiment and worked at addition sums under the three conditions: 1˙ N type when addition was performed at an easy steady speed which could be kept up for ten minutes. 2. P type when addition was performed as above while a spring balance was pulled at half maximum effort. 3 M type when subjects worked at maximum speed. The addition sums were of three lengths, 6, 11, and 21 figures per sum, and subjects added three sums of each length under each condition (27 sums in all). In order to prevent a possible slowing down due to the progressive increase in -ii-the size of the addend, addition in pairs was employed. Subjects added aloud and each verbalization was recorded on a tape and a later check made for errors. Electrodes were placed on the chin and the dorsal surface of the right forearm and leads taken to an electromyograph which recorded by "pen" on Teledeltos paper. The chin electrodes gave an indication of the moment of speaking and the arm electrodes a measure of tension in the forearm. It was thus possible to correlate the speed of work, indicated by the distance between clusters of spikes on the chin record, and the level of muscular tension, indicated by the mean height of the waveform from the forearm during the period between the verbalizations. In this way variations in output and tension could be followed during the course of work. It was found that a high negative correlation occurred between speed and tension under all three conditions. Starting and end spurts occurred over short time intervals in all sums in both time and tension curves. The longer sums led to slower work and tended to lead to more tension. These results can be interpreted to support the hypothesis that tension facilitates work of this kind, a suggestion which is reinforced by the results from the induced tension conditions. Subjects worked more quickly under P conditions and became more tense under M conditions. Large individual differences were noted but not examined in detail. The ways in which tension may facilitate mental processes and the relevance of this work to the peripheral theory of thought are briefly discussed.

In psychology as well as behavioral economics, it is well established that our choices and judgments are not just a function of the available options, but also of the context surrounding them. Several models have been brought forward to explain these context effects. We use the decision by sampling model (DbS; Stewart, Chater, & Brown, 2006) and investigate possible mechanisms that might lead to the relativity of judgment and choice. Stewart, Reimers and Harris (2015) demonstrated that shapes of utility and probability weighting functions could be manipulated by adjusting the distributions of outcomes and probabilities on offer. Chapter 2 reports a multi-level replication where we find that these effects are robust, but that DbS is unlikely to be the (sole) explanation for its origins. We conclude that problems with revealing utility functions from expected utility fits may be responsible for biasing the shapes of utility functions. Chapter 3 shows that reduced working memory capacity, as manipulated by cognitive load, does not reduce the effects found in Chapter 2. This further points away from a DbS explanation of the above findings. In Chapter 3, we also find that cognitive load has no impact on risk aversion, but find that choice consistency is reduced when working memory capacity is reduced, which also challenges the prominent dual process theories. Still, the question where the differences in preferential functions come from, remains unexplained. Chapter 4 reviews over 20 behavioral as well as neurophysiological studies showing that even if the rank effects are an artefact of the estimation procedure, this does not question the many findings that support a model encompassing a rank-dependent evaluation of alternatives. In Chapter 5, we test this hypothesis in a new design, where a monetary outcome is evaluated in the light of another foregone outcome with a history of other foregone outcomes. In contrast to our hypothesis, we find no evidence for a rank-dependent evaluation here. In Chapter 6, we investigate how comparison processes can lead to the mutable-zero effect. In the mutable-zero effect, participants prefer an outcome entailing a “pay zero” or “lose zero” attribute over an outcome entailing a “receive zero” or “win zero” attribute. We find that the only comparisons that are made with “pay zero” are other payments and that the only comparisons that are made with “receive zero” are other receipts. This process leads to “pay zero” comparing favorably and “receive zero” comparing unfavorably, which in turn leads to “pay zero” options being preferred over “receive zero” options. Given the findings in Chapter 2 and 3 are robust, they point to a general problem with estimating preferential functions using models like expected utility theory or prospect theory. Chapter 3 and 5 were a first attempt at testing a DbS-predicted mechanism: In contrast to our predictions, cognitive load did not decrease context sensitivity. Instead, we observed a slight increase in random choices. Finally, in exploring the mutable zero effect, we added to evidence that comparisons spontaneously happen only within gains, or within losses, but not across gains and losses.

This thesis uses the Decision by Sampling model as a basis for examining effects of rank order encoding in value judgement and preferential choice. A range of experiments are reported, and these employ a variety of methodologies including behavioural paradigms, eye tracking and functional MRI. The results show that when there are a relatively small number of values used during an experiment, participants encode utility based upon the rank order of a potential outcome within these values. By introducing different decision contexts where the experienced values have a positive or negative skew, an individual’s utility curve can be made concave and risk averse or convex and risk seeking. These different utility curves can be produced within the same individual and same task simply by providing a contextual cue for each trial. Two fMRI experiments demonstrate the neural systems underlying this phenomenon. The results show that all regions of the reward network encode reward as a function of the reward’s rank order within the current context. No region of the brain was found to encode a reward’s absolute financial value. Other experiments investigated choice and valuation in more complex decision environments. It was found that when the number of experienced values is significantly larger than working memory capacity DbS is a relatively poor predictor of behaviour. The Weighted ADDitive rule proved to be more accurate throughout. However, in multi-attribute choice experiments where one attribute had a manipulated distribution, individuals use and weighting of the attribute value was determined by rank order rather than its numerical value. The specific characteristics of this were found to be incompatible with an exemplar based model of recall and binary comparison to specific items. It was instead found to be compatible with non-exemplar, fuzzy trace theories of decision making which are based upon estimates of the distribution. Eye tracking during multi-attribute choice additionally shows that participants begin to attend more to their preferred choice as they near the point at which they respond. However, they do not attend more to the attributes which they weight more highly in their choices, questioning the validity of previous eye-tracking findings.

Twenty experiments investigated how people reason about causal relations where a binary cause (present/absent) influences the continuous magnitude of a target outcome. The experimental design was based on a conceptual mapping of probabilistic influences in binary causation to deterministic influences on continuous effects. Doing so preserved the computational properties related to binary causation, and allowed me to test applicability of well-established causal reasoning strategies in continuous causation. The investigation employed three methods: the first one involved asking participants the standard causal questions on strength rating; the second method asked other participants to make judgments in accordance to counterfactual questions; and the third method required participants to identify the direction candidate cause influenced effect magnitude. Results reveal that when reasoning about binary causes that reduce a continuous outcome magnitude, the support is for proportional reasoning approach, which is conceptually equivalent to the Power PC theory of binary causation. When reasoning aboutcauses that increase a continuous magnitude, however, the results did not converge to any prominent strategy because of various moderating factors. Moreover, under certain circumstances, reasonsers also appear to adopt a strategy based on a multiplicative reasoning, which has not been documented in the literature before. The evidently low consistency of results within participant and within condition across experiments suggests that neither approach properly explains this type of reasoning.

Appendix 12 ([7] leaves) in pocket / Bibliography: leaves 319-336 / viii, 336 leaves : ill ; 30 cm. / Title page, contents and abstract only. The complete thesis in print form is available from the University Library. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Adelaide, Dept. of Psychology, 1985

Bibliography: leaves 388-403 / xviii, 403 leaves ; 30 cm. / Title page, contents and abstract only. The complete thesis in print form is available from the University Library. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Adelaide, Dept. of Psychology, 1985