A strong version of the Humean theory of motivation (HTM) that includes two theses is defended here. First, desire is necessary for action, and no mental states are necessary for action other than a desire and an appropriate means-end belief. Second, desires can be changed as the conclusion of reasoning only if a desire is among the premises of the reasoning. Those who hold that moral judgments are beliefs with intrinsic motivational force cannot accept HTM, even as a contingent truth, since HTM implies that no beliefs have intrinsic motivational force. Many of them argue that there are cases where HTM fails to explain how we deliberate. The response is to develop a novel account of desire and show that HTM provides superior explanations even in their cases. On this account, desire necessarily motivates action when combined with an appropriate means-end belief. Desire necessarily causes pleasure when our subjective probability of satisfaction increases or when we vividly imagine satisfaction, and likewise causes displeasure when the subjective probability of satisfaction decreases or when we vividly imagine dissatisfaction. It is contingently true that desire directs attention towards things one associates with its object, is made more violent by vivid sensory or imaginative representations of its object, comes in the two flavors of positive desire and aversion, and satisfies the second principle above. This account of desire helps HTM provides superior explanations of deliberation even in the cases that its opponents offer as counterexamples. In response to Darwall’s proposed counterexample to the second principle and some 20th century writers discussing the feeling of obligation, it is shown that Humeans can provide superior explanations of agents’ emotions in their cases. In Searle’s case of akrasia, Scanlon’s case of bracketing, and Schueler’s case of deliberation, it is shown that Humeans can build the structures of deliberation more simply than their opponents can. Against Korsgaard, it is argued that agents cannot choose the aims for which they act. / text

The eighteenth-century natural philosopher Mikhail Vasil'evich Lomonosov (1711-1765) has long been represented by Russian writers and scholars as an encyclopedic figure who not only pioneered the dissemination of a scientific ethos in Russia, but whose own innumerable contributions to science make him eminently worthy of inclusion in a pantheon among the greatest scientific minds. A robust mythology extolling Lomonosov's role in Russian science and culture formed in the years immediately following his death, and would increase in vigor while adapting to changing historical circumstances until well into the twentieth century. This dissertation explores the evolution of Lomonosov's imposing stature in Russian thought from the middle of the eighteenth century to the first decades of the Soviet period. It reveals much about the intersection in Russian culture of changing attitudes towards the meaning and significance of science, as well as about the rise of a Russian national identity of which Lomonosov became an outstanding symbol. / The processes by which myths can be used to create and shape historical memory are highlighted throughout this inquiry. At first, Lomonosov was depicted very generally as the pioneering Russian natural philosopher; later his contributions, still broadly framed, were conflated with select institutional agendas; finally historians of various disciplines appropriated his life in order to reinforce their own professional strategies. Even as the myth of Lomonosov grew more elaborate, however, it was the inspiring idea of Lomonosov's heroic determination to propagate science, culture, and education within Russia and his successful struggles against myriad obstacles to achieve this end that remained the primary and enduring biographical element. It is this image with which my study is principally concerned.

In recent years there has been an explosion of writing on David Hume. His scepticism, his writings on morality, politics, and religion, have all received substantial attention. What I attempt to do in this thesis is to suggest that his revolutionary contributions in all these fields can be better understood if we consider his attempt to found the sciences on the imagination. What little work there is on the imagination in Hume's writings is almost all concerned with Book I of the Treatise. As regards Book I, I suggest that Hume's overarching problem is to argue that belief is dependent on the imagination, whilst still keeping a contrast with the whims of the 'fancy'. He wants to disabuse us of the idea that we believe on account of reason; but he wants to distinguish the claims of science from the claims of poets. But I also examine why he thinks his explanation of the production of passions support his conclusions about belief. And I argue that his former account guides conclusions found in other genres. So for example, I examine certain essays and letters about politics, and his explanation of religious events in the History of England. Why do men falsely believe that they are distinguished from the animals through possessing reason? On the one hand Hume tries to explain the origin of the sciences; on the other hand, he tries to show how men have come to have a false conception of themselves. A central aim of the thesis is to bring out these themes through showing the use Hume makes of principles of the imagination. I pay special attention to Hume's attempt to argue that Christianity plays a major role in the sustaining of the false view.

In his Treatise of Human Nature, published in 1739, David Hume set out to scientifically comprehend human understanding, action, and personality in terms of the "experimental method of reasoning." He presented a naturalistic portrait of man which represented him as fundamentally determined to avoid pain and embrace pleasure. In this portrait a substantial place is provided for reason, but only as the "servant" of the passions. Only the passions were considered by Hume to be practical; they alone are the effective source of every impulse to act. Reason is merely theoretical; it is solely concerned with the provision of information for the passions. Hume recognized that his account of human nature must face two related problems. First, there is the matter of the common belief that reasoning is a practical activity; a belief not in keeping with Hume's conception of reason as merely theoretical. Second, the fact that persons' actions are influenced by moral ponsiderations implies that they often act in ways not designed to gratify their personal passions. Thus, moral phenomena seem to pose a threat to the hedonistic basis of Hume's theory of human nature. These two problems are related insofar as it is precisely in the case of moral actions that the common notion of practical reason traditionally operates. Hume sought to preserve the essential impracticality of reason in morals with the provision of a complex notion of "sympathy." l£ is the central purpose of this thesis to show that Hume's concept of "sympathy" fails to resolve the problems that it is addressed to. SECTION I: HUME'S THEORY OF ACTION IN THE TREATISE This section provides a sympathetic reading of Hume's account of the role of the passions and reason in the determination of human action. Two difficulties in this account—the concept of a "promptive" function of reason, and the notion of a "calm passion"—are critically considered and found to cohere with the general theory of the faculties in the Treatise. SECTION II: NATURALISM, DETERMINISM, AND VOLITION The naturalism of Hume's account of action has direct reference to the philosophical problems which cluster around the question of the freedom of the will. This section considers the implications of Hume's psychological determinism with a view to understanding more perfectly the detail of his theory of the faculties and action. Close attention is paid here to Hume's view that actions are "artificial," and it is concluded that he allowed a large and influential role for reason without directly threatening the purely theoretical function of the understanding. SECTION III: NATURALISM AND MORALS Hume regarded his theory of morals in the third book of the Treatise as a test and confirmation of his theory of action developed in the first two books. This section explicates Hume's view that moral judgments are affective perceptions rather than conclusions of reason. It is shown that the principle of "sympathy" operates at the center of the process of moral judgment. SECTION IV: SYMPATHY Hume designed the principle of sympathy to explain, in a manner consistent with his general theory of action, how persons can be naturally concerned for the interests of others with whom they have no prior affective connection. The central claim made is that persons are attuned to one another in such a way that there is an easy communication of passion between them. Thus, what is commonly interpreted as a moral "judgment" is really a peculiar feeling precipitated by a sympathy with the passions of others. It is this special feeling which issues from a process of sympathy which Hume identified as moral praise or blame. This final section of the thesis provides an extensive analysis of Hume's concept of "sympathy," and presents an argument aimed at demonstrating the failure of the concept to fulfill its intended role. It is suggested, in conclusion, that Hume fails to show that moral judgments and actions could be possible without the practical involvement of reason. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

No description available.

Desde sua primeira obra, David Hume anuncia ao leitor o projeto de constituição de uma ciência da natureza humana. O principal objetivo deste trabalho consiste em examinar os argumentos utilizados por Hume para construir as condições de possibilidade desse saber. / Since his first work David Hume announces his intentions to constitute a science of human nature. The main target of this thesis is to examine the arguments used by Hume to build the conditions of possibility of this field of knowledge.

何鳳琴. / "2010年12月". / "2010 nian 12 yue". / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2010. / Includes bibliographical references (leave 148-151) / Abstract in Chinese and English. / He Fengqin. / Chapter 第一章、 --- 硏究述評及本文硏究進路 --- p.1 / Chapter 第二章、 --- 王士禛的生平´ؤ´ؤ以在揚詞事爲中心 --- p.6 / Chapter 一、 --- 王士禛的名號：淡泊性情的流露 --- p.6 / Chapter 二、 --- 新城王氏的家學門風：少無宦情而應試入仕的原因 --- p.9 / Chapter 三、 --- 揚州推官時期：王士禛塡詞的契機 --- p.12 / Chapter 第三章、 --- 《阮亭詩餘》及《衍波詞》二集考辨 --- p.20 / Chapter 一、 --- 序 論 --- p.20 / Chapter 二、 --- 《阮亭詩餘》及《衍波詞》主要版本源流槪況 --- p.21 / Chapter 三、 --- 《阮亭詩餘》及《衍波詞》二集的先後關 係 --- p.26 / Chapter 四、 --- 王士稹詞集評注的「著作權」問題 --- p.40 / Chapter 五、 --- 結語 --- p.43 / Chapter 第四章、 --- 王士禛詞的分類硏究 --- p.45 / Chapter 一、 --- 和韻詞作：早年學詞的習作 --- p.46 / Chapter 二、 --- 閨情艷情：「旖旎穠麗」與「芊綿俊爽」的風調 --- p.55 / Chapter 三、 --- 山水清音：「情與境會」的創作特點 --- p.59 / Chapter 四、 --- 詠史抒懷：少年狂豪一面的流露 --- p.67 / Chapter 第五章、 --- 王士禛詞學觀的時代意義 --- p.72 / Chapter 一、 --- 論明詞特推雲間詞派，而對其取徑偏狹有所修正 --- p.74 / Chapter 二、 --- 崇¯‘ة《花間》、《草堂》 --- p.79 / Chapter 三、 --- 論詞講求神韻天然 --- p.82 / Chapter 四、 --- 論詞不以正變分優劣 --- p.84 / Chapter 第六章、 --- 餘論 --- p.90 / 附錄 / 附錄一、《阮亭詩餘》收錄詞作敍錄 --- p.92 / 附錄二、留松閣本《衍波詞》較《阮亭詩餘》多收詞作敘錄 --- p.93 / 附錄三、《阮亭詩餘》及《衍波詞》集評 --- p.96 / 附錄四、王士禛詞作補遺 --- p.145 / 參考書目 --- p.146

No description available.

Desde sua primeira obra, David Hume anuncia ao leitor o projeto de constituição de uma ciência da natureza humana. O principal objetivo deste trabalho consiste em examinar os argumentos utilizados por Hume para construir as condições de possibilidade desse saber. / Since his first work David Hume announces his intentions to constitute a science of human nature. The main target of this thesis is to examine the arguments used by Hume to build the conditions of possibility of this field of knowledge.

No description available.