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The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that John Rawls’s conception of social justice should be revised to include duties that will require individuals to uphold social equality. Social equality, as I describe it, is characterised by the values of, at a minimum, respect-for-persons, civility and toleration. Informal social equality occurs when these values are upheld outside of a legal or official institutional context, such as through personal choice and within civil society. Rawls’s conception of justice, which focuses primarily on institutional justice, does not include fair personal choice as a requirement of justice. As choice, I will argue, affects the distribution of primary social goods such as the social basis of self-respect, if we want to describe a fair society, we should include a description of fair choice. If informal social equality is upheld, justice in choice will also be upheld. To correct the neglect of justice in choice, we can thus describe a fair society as one where (1) institutions would be fair and (2) individuals would fulfil duties of social equality. In the context of current debate on the role of individual behaviour in social justice, my thesis can be distinguished from what I refer to as the original ‘personal choice argument’. According to this argument, advocated by G. A. Cohen and Liam B. Murphy, for example, Rawls’s principles of justice for institutions should be applied to individuals so that fair personal choice becomes a requirement of distributive justice. Cohen and Murphy’s arguments are unconvincing, however, because (i) we could apply principles other than the institutional, for example, principles for individuals, to choice and (ii) we have good reason not to apply the institutional principles to choice, for example, because they do not properly address interferences with self-respect. Instead of applying the institutional principles of justice to individuals, I argue that Rawls’s principles for individuals should be revised according to the values of social equality: 1. the duty of mutual respect needs to be revised to include requirements for individuals and associations to comply with the demands of social equality, which are (i) respect-for-persons, (ii) civility and (iii) toleration; and 2. the duty of justice should be adapted to specify that individuals are required to help establish and to uphold informal (not merely formal) justice, thus to uphold justice in personal choice.

My DPhil submission consists of a series of papers on related topics on the moral philosophy of scarce benefit distribution. It focuses on two types of scarce benefit distribution case. The first type occurs when which all potential beneficiaries of a good each have an equally strong moral claim on an equal benefit from the resource but scarcity or indivisibility prevents us from benefiting all potential beneficiaries. Call these cases equal conflict cases. In 'Anti-Majoritarianism', I argue against the view defended by both utilitarians and non-utilitarians that in equal conflict cases you always ought to give the benefit to as many people as possible. I argue that doing so is neither morally right nor fair. In 'Weighing Up Weighted Lotteries', I argue that the philosophical debate between unweighted and weighted lottery benefit distribution procedures has been misconceived and that fairness requires us to use a new kind of weighted lottery that I call the exclusive composition-sensitive lottery. In 'Can't Get No Satisfaction', I defend a new view that I call the dual-structure view about how lotteries satisfy potential beneficiaries' claims in equal conflict cases and highlight the implications of that view for the distribution of donor corneas to those who have suffered corneal degeneration. The second type of this distributional problem occurs when we can either benefit a very large number of potential beneficiaries with a very small benefit (call these the many) or a very small number of potential beneficiaries with a very major benefit (call these the few). In "Valuing the Few Over the Many" I argue that there are cases where not only ought we to benefit the few over the many no matter how numerous the many are, but it is also better to do so. However, this conclusion can be shown to conflict with a number of widely held tenets of value theory. I evaluate different ways of accommodating these intuitions and argue that in some contexts, benefits are not of finite value. The view I defend in 'Valuing the Few Over the Many', combined with some intuitively plausible axiological claims, is inconsistent with the transitivity of the 'better than' relation. In 'Making Betterness Behave' I argue that for what I call the conditional non-coextensive thesis: if 'better than' is not transitive, one ought to take the position that 'more reason to bring about rather than' is transitive. I argue that one can generate a transitive 'more reason to bring about rather than' deontic ordering from a non-transitive axiological ordering in a principled way. This deontic ordering avoids the major practical objections (money pumps, moral dilemmas and threats to practical reasoning) to non-transitivity of the 'better than' relation.

Public Administration / M. Admin. (Public Administration)

This study was encouraged by the fact that the theoretical terrain of ethics in public administration and management posits that, despite the existence of a code of conduct that regulates the conduct of municipal functionaries and councillors at local government sphere, the ethics in practice in general are still illusive. All this revolves around the main guiding research objective for this study which was to examine the reception of a code of conduct by municipal functionaries and councillors at the Capricorn District Municipality in the Limpopo Province. In exploring the main question of this study, the researcher developed an understanding of the concept ethics in Public Administration by selecting ethics theories namely: consequentialism, deontology and virtue theories. From the lesson learnt, it is evident that throwing around charges about which theory is truly ethical and which one should be followed or should guide municipal functionaries and councillors in making policy decisions is pointless. There is no ethical system which appeals to all people, or even to the same person in different situations. It is undoubtedly the case that consequentialists, deontologists and those who stand by virtue theories can each be sincere in believing their system embodies goodness and morality. The formulation of the Code of Conduct for the South African local government indicates the commitment of the South African government to enhancing ethical conduct. This Code contains a uniform set of ethical guidelines and applications for use throughout local government. It is also clear that the Code of Conduct has been drafted so as to be as clear as possible, but a detailed standard of conduct and disciplinary measures are not provided. This is a great challenge as it poses concerns about the accountability of municipal functionaries and councillors, and about how disciplinary measures on unethical conduct of politicians and officials should be handled. Chapter 3 forms an understanding of how culture, religion and language have ethical significance for community and tradition particularly when municipal functionaries and councillors make decisions. The promotion of an appropriate local government culture posits that, in order for a municipal manager and a mayor to make better decisions, they must take the need to understand the diversity of the local government into consideration. The most important point to be drawn from chapter 4 is that, besides legal instructions, the nature and influence of human behaviour through leadership and ethics infrastructure such as appointing an ethics officer and using whistle blowing as a system to enhance ethical conduct is important. In outlining the statutory and regulatory framework that directs public officials and politicians’ ethical conduct in South Africa, it was identified that South Africa is highly conscious of differences between individuals; therefore it is unlikely that legislation and current initiatives will suffice to enforce ethical behaviour among public officials, councillors and municipal functionaries. Another finding of this study is that the only official document available as the Code of Conduct for local government can be found in the Local Government Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 in Schedule 1 and 2, and also in the Local Government Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 in Schedule 5. This finding is an indicative that South African local government does not have an official Code of Conduct as a separate document for ethical conduct. Following this finding, the recommendation is therefore that a separate document should be designed, formulated and emphasised. / Public Administration and Management / D. Litt. et Phil. (Public Administration)

Public Administration and Management / M. Admin. (Public Administration)