Wittgenstein’s mention of the term “phenomenology” in his writings from the middle period has long been regarded as puzzling by interpreters. It is striking to see him concerned with this philosophical approach, generally regarded as being foreign to the tradition of Russell and Frege, in which Wittgenstein’s thought is taken to have primarily developed. On the basis of partially unpublished material from Wittgenstein’s Nachlass , this thesis provides a reconstruction of the rationale and fate of his peculiar notion of phenomenology, which he developed after his return to Cambridge in 1929. On the one hand, this notion is tributary to Wittgenstein’s longstanding task of the philosophical clarification of language. On the other hand, Wittgenstein’s concern with phenomenology develops against the background of his reconsideration of the resources for clarification provided by his early philosophy. His 1929 paper “Some Remarks on Logical Form” is elucidatory in this respect. The paper expresses a dissatisfaction with the Tractarian account of logical grammar and pleas for a “logical investigation of the phenomena themselves”. This plea echoes Wittgenstein’s conception of a “phenomenological language” in the manuscripts from the same period. The thesis discusses the intricacies of this conception and the reasons for Wittgenstein’s criticisms of it. By contrast to the prevalent view in the secondary literature, the discussion shows that he did not fully endorse for a definite period, and then suddenly abandoned, the idea of phenomenological language. Wittgenstein rather attempts to develop a viable means of clarification and philosophical expression through phenomenological language, while critically exploring the implications and consequences of this attempt at the very same time.

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The often discussed but never defined “Adam Smith Problem” is in fact several issues surrounding our understanding of the philosophical framework which underlies the two published works of Adam Smith: The Theory of Moral Sentiments and An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. In this thesis, I examine the secondary literature and argue that this is not in fact one problem, but a set of three inter-related issues which require clarification: (1) What principles of human nature are the works committed to and do they contradict one another? (2) What role does the invisible hand play, and according to Smith, to what extent can we rely on it to produce the greater good? (3) Can the economic man of Wealth of Nations be a virtuous man, and if so, how? Having defined this more precise Adam Smith Problem, I examine Smith’s work to understand how he would answer these three questions. To explain (1), I explain how both works are committed to the understanding of human beings as cogs in a machine, unintentionally producing an order which is designed by God. With regards to (2) I argue that the invisible hand is a metaphor for these unintended but providentially designed outcomes, and contrary to some economists, does not express equilibrium in the market or sanction morality-free economics. In order to answer (3), I adapt Russell Nieli’s “spheres of intimacy” account of Smith to show that the same mechanisms are said to underlie human behaviour in both our intimate and economic lives of individuals, and thus the economic man is in fact also the virtuous man.

This thesis examines why John Stuart Mill thought his political philosophy to be 'under the general designation of socialist' – an ideological position often thought to be antithetical to liberalism, of which Mill is regularly considered an exemplar. It suggests that in order to understand Mill's self-designation, one has to understand the changes his political theory underwent during his 'crisis', and how he developed a new, 'many-sided-radicalism' to replace the one-sided, Benthamite 'philosophical-radicalism' of his youth, in which he had lost his faith. It explains the core principles of many-sided-radicalism (happiness, liberty, equality, progress and harmony), and the institutions Mill felt would foster and uphold them. Finally, it seeks to situate Mill's many-sided-radicalism within three socialist contexts: his definition; contemporary understandings; and a conceptual definition. I utilise Mill's Collected Works to examine a wide range of his writings, bearing in mind the problems of interpretation caused by his 'crisis', in particular changes to the meaning of concepts (not least happiness); his philosophy of history; and his method of persuasion, along with writings by contemporaries, and modern historians and theorists. I conclude that Mill was a socialist on his own understanding of the word, committed to communal ownership of the means of production combined with private, unequal ownership of articles of consumption; work-place democracy; an egalitarian concept of justice; and the achievement of social harmony through co-operation. Historically, although sometimes linked to utopian socialism, he is a co-operative socialist, akin to Edward Vansittart Neale, William Thompson, Louis Blanc, and Phillipe Buchez and his followers. Conceptually, he is a liberal socialist, equally committed to core principles of liberty, equality and community. Recognising Mill's socialism should make us re-evaluate Mill, and the relationship between liberalism and socialism. It also hints at possible answers to questions of social justice which are neither totalitarian nor illiberal.

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In order to make space for the possibility of falsity, Russell switches in 1906 from the idea of judgment that it is a dual relation to a fact to the theory that it is a multiple relation to the several, separate elements of a fact. In so doing, Wittgenstein however thinks, Russell comes to have us 'stop short of the fact with what we think' (Philosophical Investigations 95). Specifically, Russell's theory has us stop w ith what we think at the collection of the elements of the truth-making fact (the objective) and so short of the unity of those elements which is the objective itself. A principle ambition of Wittgenstein's Tractarian theory of judgment ('the picture theory') is to redress this Russellian shortfall whilst allowing still for the possibility of falsity. Its idea is this: that we can stop with what we mean in thought or language at nothing short of a connection of things (a fact) - even if when that connection does not exist - by connecting up in that very same w ay our representatives of those things. The explicit insistence of Wittgenstein's that in a thought/proposition the elements are connected together in the same May as are the elements in the fact there represented is something many interpretations have struggled to embrace. Typically, such interpretations involve serious misunderstandings concerning the nature of fact-elements (objects), of proposition-elements (names), and of their (shared) manners of combination: Wittgenstein's objects are assimilated in logical role to those of Frege, and there is a failure properly to distinguish sign from symbol. This thesis offers an account of the atomic metaphysics and philosophy of language of the Tractatus in which is fully and centrally embraced the idea of an identity of modes of combination across the independently constituted domains of thought/language and reality.

Hume's first work, A Treatise of Human Nature, has traditionally received the lion's share of scholarly attention, at the expense of his later and more polished texts. The tide has started to shift in recent years, with the result that Hume's two Enquiries - his mature investigations of the understanding and morals - are now recognised as important works in their own right (though most commentators still continue to prefer the Treatise). With regard to Hume's work on the passions, however, Book~2 of the Treatise still commands all of the attention. In this thesis, I defend two important claims. The first is that Hume has a mature philosophy of emotion, significantly different - indeed, significantly improved - from that of the Treatise. Most strikingly, it is anti-egoist and anti-hedonist about motivation, where the Treatise had espoused a Lockean hedonism and egoism. In parts it is also more cognitivist, and although Hume remains as opposed to moral rationalism as he ever was, his arguments in support of this opposition are very different. The second claim is that Hume's mature philosophy of emotion is to be found, not in the Dissertation on the Passions, but rather in the full set of Four Dissertations in which this work first appeared, including also the Natural History of Religion, Of Tragedy, and Of the Standard of Taste. The passions, I argue, form the unifying theme of this collection, which is in effect Hume's Enquiry concerning the Passions. I maintain that they are profitably studied together on this understanding, and my thesis is offered as the first such study.

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This thesis is concerned with John Stuart Mill’s democratic theory. In chapter I, I examine the relations between political philosophy and political theory and science before providing a detailed outline of the aims of the dissertation. In chapter II, I argue that in order to reconcile the concepts of progress and equality within a utilitarian theory, a Millian political system needs to devise institutions that promote general happiness, protect individual autonomy, safeguard society from mediocrity. Chapter III discusses what different authors have said about Mill and liberty, then explores James Mill’s theory of education and Coleridge’s influence on John Stuart Mill’s thought. I conclude by criticising Richard Arneson’s interpretation according to which the Considerations and On Liberty are inconsistent, and some of Gregory Claeys’ conclusions on Mill and paternalism. Chapter IV explores the methodology of the social sciences and the philosophy of history as found in Mill’s writings; then it considers Mill’s thought in regard to his father’s Radical proposals. I also discuss at some length the idea of the tyranny of the majority. Chapter V begins with a discussion of Hanna Pitkin’s theory of representation. I then provide a critical account of Richard Krouse and Nadia Urbinati’s interpretations of Mill. I conclude by arguing that, in a Millian democracy, the higher is the degree of complexity or the need for expertise in dealing with affairs, the greater is the bearing of the principle of competence in assessing whether a representative should act as a trustee or a delegate. I also introduce the idea of rational debate as a sort of ‘influence multiplier’, arguing that this would help to make a democracy rational and effective along Millian lines. In the last two chapters, I stress the relevance of Mill’s political philosophy as for some contemporary issues (nationalism, European federalism, current social and economic changes) while suggesting some potential further investigations, and summarise my conclusions.