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This work is a study of Russell's neutral monism with special emphasis on the stages of its development. Two distinct phases are recognised; these are called 'partial neutralism' and 'complete neutral monism'. The first is advocated in 'The Analysis of Mind' and the second in his later works. The work is mainly interpretative. This involves comparison and criticism of the views expressed at different stages and the interpretations given by critics and commentators and Russell's replies to them, as also clearing up certain ambiguities and misunderstandings. In this respect it is a critical exposition of Russell's theory. The discussions begin with a historical sketch of the development of neutral monism in general with brief reproduction of the views of its early propounders (Chapter I). Russell's theory is discussed in several chapters. First, a preliminary account is given snowing how he comes to adopt it at first partially and then completely from the position of logical atomism (Chapter II). The theories of the neutral stuff, matter, and mind are then discussed separately in some detail indicating in each case the important changes made at different stages (Chapters III, IV, V). Finally, some questions concerning body, mind and person are considered, and reference is made to the modern 'Identity Hypothesis' and Strawson's views on persons (Chapter VI). The final version of Russell's theory seems to attain a sort of theoretical completeness and to avoid certain difficulties involved in the earlier theory of partial neutralism. The Identity Hypothesis is found to be originally Russell's idea, and to be tenable as an aspect of neutral monism rather than in its present physicalist form. Strawson's arguments for the 'primitiveness' of the concept of a person seem unsatisfactory; Russell's theory may be wrong, but Strawson's position does not prove that it is so.

This thesis is an examination of three main aspects of Hume's moral philosophy: the distinction between ths natural and artificial virtues, the operation of sympathy, and the notion of the general point of view. It begins with an examination of Hume's concept of a virtue, concluding that a virtue is to be analysed as a disposition to have certain kinds of motives. The natural virtues and the artificial virtues are then examined separately, the motives underlying both are analysed, and it is decided that these motives must be described in terms of purposes. Although the motives underlying the natural virtues are seen to fulfill two criteria that Hume sets forth, the motives underlying the artificial virtues are seen to meet neither. The artificial virtues are shown to be distinct virtues, rather than redirected natural virtues. The chapter on sympathy outlines the mechanics of this operation with reference to four different classes of virtues. It also deals with a disagreement between Ingemar Hendenius and Pall Ardal, two commentators on Hume's moral philosophy, as to whether the operation of sympathy is a necessary condition of all moral evaluation. It is argued that if the operation of sympathy is considered without reference to the taking of a general point of view, Hendenius' argument appears to be valid, but that in the end Ardal is actually correct. The notion of a general point of view is then analysed, is shown to be a necessary condition of all moral evaluation, and is than related to the distinction between the natural and the artificial virtues. It is finally concluded that the concept of an artificial virtue, the operation of sympathy and the notion of a general point of view between them give an account of the requirements for being a moral agent.

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This thesis seeks to demonstrate the continuing relevance of Wittgenstein’s approach to the problem of freedom of the will, primarily as expounded in his “Lectures on Freedom of the Will” (LFW). My overall aim is to show how Wittgenstein works to reconfigure the debates about freedom of the will so that it can be confronted as the kind of problem he thinks it ultimately is: an ethical and existential problem. Not published until 1989, the LFW have received scant critical attention. I argue that Wittgenstein’s approach is highly distinctive in a way that makes it significantly less vulnerable than its closest cousins to certain powerful lines of critical attack. Chapter One brings out the distinctiveness of the LFW, especially vis-à-vis a putatively Wittgensteinian form of compatibilism, exemplified by Kai Nielsen. Albeit in different ways, Wittgenstein and Nielsen are both concerned to show why being caused to act, e.g. by the laws of nature, does not equate to being compelled to act, e.g. against one’s will. Unlike Nielsen, however, Wittgenstein further recognises that showing the compatibility of freedom and natural laws establishes no more than the logical consistency of holding people responsible, given determinism, and so cannot itself constitute a defence of our practices. Chapter Two introduces, as a still closer comparison with Wittgenstein, P. F. Strawson’s practice-based defence of interpersonal, ‘reactive’ attitudes (e.g. feelings of resentment, gratitude, etc.). I argue that the same correlation between a belief in freedom of the will and the primitive expression of ‘reactive’ attitudes/feelings is central also to the LFW. However, I further argue that certain major lines of criticism of Strawson’s practice-based defence of our current practices, familiar in the critical literature, do not in the same way threaten Wittgenstein’s defence of a broader practice-based approach, one that encompasses both reactive and non-reactive attitudes. Chapters Three and Four deal with the difficulties arising from the recognition that our most entrenched and ‘natural’ attitudes are non-reactive rather than reactive, including attitudes that are properly called ‘fatalistic’. Chapter Three develops a response to Galen Strawson’s criticism that if reactive and non-reactive attitudes are both equally expressive of human nature, then any merely descriptive approach to these attitudes will be incapable of resolving the fundamental question of which of these sorts of attitude we ought to adopt. Finally, Chapter Four examines Wittgenstein’s sustained interest in forms of life, especially religious forms of life, which appear to give equal weight to both reactive and non-reactive attitudes.

My overall aim in this thesis is to elucidate the precise nature of Russell's mature 'neutral monist' metaphysic. I show how an understanding of it has been hampered by pervasive misunderstandings. The approach I take is an historical one, and my account reveals that, after his adoption of neutral monism in 1918, there were no radical changes in his worldview, and certainly no lurch from a supposed quasi-phenomenalistic system prior to 1921, to a causal theory of perception after 1927. Instead, the earlier system is not as phenomenalistic as is sometimes supposed and his later philosophy is a development, not a repudiation, of the themes in the earlier. Russell sought to show how his metaphysic dovetails with the outcome of modern physics in his 1927 book The Analysis of Matter. I seek to show how a proper understanding of modern physics indeed leads to Russellian conclusions. I also discuss the implications of quantum mechanics for metaphysics – a task which Russell could not have performed when he wrote The Analysis of Matter, since QM was still very much in a state of flux. I show how Russell moved from empiricism to a naturalistic position in the theory of knowledge,and in doing so supplied a definitive solution to Hume's scepticism. Once again, the usual perception of him as an “empiricist” fails to do justice to the complexity and subtlety of his philosophy. Finally, I argue that Russell's solution to the mind-body problem is the only one with any chance whatsoever of being true. In all this I seek to show how Russell's philosophy has been unjustly neglected in contemporary debates and how it can provide elegant solutions to contemporary philosophical puzzles in the philosophy of science, epistemology and the mind-body problem.

The objective of this dissertation involves the application of the philosophy of Karl Popper to Christian systematic theology. Its intent is three-fold: first, to give reasons for considering the possibility of such an application in the face of potential objections; second, throughout its discussion, to demonstrate the form that a theological appropriation of Popper might take; and, third, to argue that several benefits arise from such a critical grafting of Popper into dogmatics (where appropriate). The possibility of applying Popper to theology is secured by taking realism as the proper parallel between science and theology and critical rationalism as a realist model amenable to metaphysical theorisation. The actuality and benefit of such an appropriation from within theology is demonstrated by the four-fold exposition of how a Popperian critical epistemology – in particular his solution to the ‘problem of induction’, his relating of good and better theories with the concept of approximation to the truth, his critical strategies for establishing preference, and his notion of ideas as objective – can assist the Christian systematic theologian as he works to resolve the problems of theology for the benefit of the Church and to the glory of God.

This thesis proposes a consideration of Berkeley's thought from the standpoint of its roots, rather than (which is the prevalent perspective in today's Berkeley scholarship) from the point of view of the developments that this thought has brought about in modern philosophy. Chapter One deals with a number of specific introductory issues, and then delineates a theoretical context within which my own approach will reveal its scholarly significance. In Chapter Two I advance the idea that there is in Berkeley's early writings an entire network of Platonic features, attitudes, and mind sets, prefiguring his speculative and openly Platonic writing Siris. Chapter Three is a systematic attempt at considering Berkeley's immaterialist philosophy in close connection to the topic of liber mundi, with the twofold objective of pointing out those of the medieval implications of the topic that Berkeley preserved, and the "novelties" he brought forth in his use of the topic. The central idea around which Chapter Four is clustered is that, in Siris, Berkeley comes to make use of one of the most ancient "spiritual techniques": alchemy. Berkeley’s arguments and notions in Siris will be discussed by constant reference to alchemic notions, writings and authors. Chapter Five is an attempt at considering Berkeley’s thought from the standpoint of the Christian apologetic tradition, and its objective is to show that one of the roots of Berkeley's thought could be found precisely in this tradition. In Chapter Six I will show that even when designing such a practical project as the "Bermuda scheme" Berkeley was under the modeling influence of the past. More precisely, the chapter purports to offer a discussion of Berkeley's "Bermuda scheme" in light of the Western representations of the "happy islands", "earthly paradise", ''eschaton". The last chapter (Chapter Seven) purports to undertake a comparative analysis of some of the ideas professed by medieval Catharism, and George Berkeley’s denial of the existence of matter. The central notion around which my comparative approach is articulated is the idea that, in both cases, matter is regarded as the source of evil. What I will try to show is that Berkeley's attitudes to the material world echoed certain Cathar theological anxieties and patterns of thought.

Gilbert Ryle claimed that intelligent actions and activities are not merely the external signs of inner mental workings but rather that such actions and activities are the workings of the mind itself. In this thesis I propose an interpretation and defence of sich claim, against a common an, in my view, mistaken way of understanding Ryle's position. In chapter [1]. I introduce the argumentative thread of this thesis and a more detailed overview of the chapters. In chapter [2], I criticise Stanley and Williamson's understanding of Ryle's argument and position. In chapters [3]-[5] I examine Ryle's position and provide a way of understanding his view against what I take his main opponent, INTELLECTUALISM, to be. Chapter [6] offers an argument against INTELLECTUALISM as a way of motivating a Rylean account intelligent actions and activities. I conclude in chapter [7] with a response to purported counter-examples to the view I propose.