This thesis develops a multidisciplinarily grounded account of the cultural causes of environmental problems discussed as a question in philosophical and sociological theory of social action. The approach is articulated by an original reading of Ludwig Wittgenstein's later philosophy. Part 1 of the thesis critically discusses a prominent view of the cultural causes found in environmentalism and environmental history with significant popular appeal. In this view, labelled the ideological approach, the human nature relationship is characterised essentially by our culture's alleged disrespectful, manipulative and materialistic attitude to nature that is said to have been internalised by the modern human being and to fundamentally drive our ecologically consequential activities. An alternative organisatory approach is suggested based on the view that due to division of labour of culturally and geographically dispersed masses, as well as the everyday character of activities in terms of which we collectively cause environmental problems in global industrial market society, no general ideological source of social action can plausibly be posited. An organisatory approach to the human environmental burden as a function of the collective performance by masses of a shared organisation of activity on a recursive, everyday basis is a more realistic account of the intensity of human environmental impact. Part 2 argues that the ideological approach in environmentalism and beyond can be seen to imply a form of collectivism also found in many classics of Wittgensteinian philosophy and social theory, an important common denominator being their ontological focus on the mental source of social action in shared conceptual schemes, normative orientations and the like. By contrast, in the Wittgenstein reading developed in this thesis, his perspective was non-ontological, viewing social activity as developing processes not defined by their mental source in shared conceptions but by their organisation. Social life is viewed as being based on agreement in form of life, that is, in organisation of human activity. The thesis is a rare and original attempt to make philosophy relevant in the discussion of a pressing contemporary problem that also advances Wittgenstein-scholarship to a novel area.

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This study is an attempt to trace a particular theme of analysis throughout John Stuart Mill's economic theory and to discover what light such a procedure sheds on our knowledge of Mill's work and on our understanding of his historical role. The main concern of the study is with Mill's system of analysis as such, and not, except incidentally, with the history of the ideas which found expression in his work. After a preliminary examination of Mill's position in the evolution of economic theory, a first step is taken towards establishing what were the properties and assumptions of the model of the economic system adopted by Mill in his major work in the field, the Principles of Political Economy (1848). The assumptions necessary for a consistent model are outlined and the argument then proceeds with a detailed discussion of Mill's four fundamental propositions on capital. These theorems are taken to be the principal foundation on which the remainder of Mill's analysis of production, distribution and capital accumulation is based. An attempt is made to show that these theorems are to be considered as an interdependent group which have relevance only for the system in which they stand.

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This thesis examines the development of Francis Bacon’s (1561-1626) religious views and their impact on his programme for the advancement of learning. It aims to address the largely misguided body of scholarly literature on Bacon’s beliefs by situating his understanding of religion within the complexity of its Elizabethan and Stuart contexts, and to show how Bacon steered his own considered course between the emergent pillars of Puritanism and Conformism. To the latter end, it evinces how he drew upon the Christian humanism of his parents, Nicholas and Anne Bacon, as well as the political thought of Niccolò Machiavelli, Francesco Guicciardini, and Justus Lipsius. Guided by the same intellectual commitments, he subsequently came to develop his own ideas about the reform of knowledge and the character of nature within the broader context of Christian humanism, Florentine political thought, and the Magisterial Reformation in England. It argues that, contrary to modern categories of thought, Bacon had no difficulty being both a Reformed Christian and a statesman for whom religion was often little more than a social or political currency. This he achieved through a position he set out early in his career; namely, that religion had two ‘partes’: an eternal and a temporal. Christianity could, in this way, be divided into the mysteries of faith, beyond time and the reach of human reason, and civil religion, temporal, political and, in its subjection to natural reason, entirely fair game. This allowed him to anticipate a number of positions that would become central to the religious climate of the later seventeenth-century, including irenicism, religious toleration, and civil religion. It was also through this division that Bacon came to explain the relationship between God and Nature and, in turn, between religion and natural philosophy. In the 1610s, he would develop a theory of the universe which rested upon the division between the eternal and the temporal, the created and the creating. As a result, this thesis offers an examination and contextualization of the relationship between ‘science’ and ‘religion’ within Bacon’s commitment to a twofold vision of religion.

This thesis describes an investigation of the complex gamma-ray spectra accompanying the decay of iridium 192 and iridium 194. Precision energy measurements of twenty-one gamma-rays in Ir 192 and fourteen gamma-rays in Ir 194 have been made using the 50 cm. double focusing beta-ray spectrometer. In addition, the angular correlation function for the cascade gamma-rays of Ir 194 has been determined. A number of new radiations have been found In each spectrum and decay schemes are proposed for each nuclide. / Thesis / Master of Science (MS)

This thesis will inquire into the practicable strategies that Thomas Hobbes described in his major works of political philosophy, on the one hand, to allow his sovereign to ensure civil peace, and on the other, to enable his sovereign to defend the commonwealth. In terms of civil peace, the exercise of Hobbes's sovereign's 'absolute' authority is tempered by, and contingent on, its practical efficacy for securing and maintaining a peaceful commonwealth. To that end, I will argue that Hobbes's sovereign is obliged to rule according to the natural laws, and entailed in this obligation are coinciding liberties which Hobbes believed that subjects must perceive themselves to possess, and which sovereigns must respect, in order for peace to be realised. However, rather than situating the purpose of Hobbes's project in terms of civil peace alone—as the vast majority of his interpreters have—I consider alongside the purpose of civil peace, and contrast it with, the purpose of defence. Evident from this comparison is that the means by which Hobbes's sovereign must ensure the capability of the commonwealth to defend itself from foreign nations simultaneously undermines and counteracts his otherwise proto-liberal system. Distinct from other prominent interpretations, I will argue that this ambivalence is not a result of an imbalance between subjects' rights contra sovereign's rights, nor yet of an unsupervised agonistic counter-balance between the two. Instead, the affirmation of subjects' inalienable rights are depicted by Hobbes as a practically ineffective means by which to ensure defence. There exists a necessary ambivalence within Hobbes's theory of sovereignty itself and is to be managed solely according to the sovereign's ideally prudent and practicable judgment. Ultimately, I will characterize Hobbes as arguing that the unfortunate necessity of preparedness for foreign defensive wars is best mitigated by the sovereign's prudent and minimal exercise of the commonwealth's power in carrying out this intended purpose.