The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the relation between the traditional Socialist principles of foreign policy developed by the Labour Party before 1945 and the principles actually employed by the Labour Government from 1945-51, and to consider how members of the Party challenged the Government's foreign policy in the nane of traditional values and how the Government successfully resisted these challenges. (Chapter I) The most significant events influencing the development of Labour foreign policy were: the outbreak of World War I; the Russian revolution; the reaction against war and balance of power politics; the creation of the League of Nations and the achievements of the two minority Labour governments there; the rise of Fascism; the Spanish Civil War; and the co-operation of the Big Three during World War II. From the Party's responses to these and other situations one can abstract the following as its basic principles: international co-operation, class-consciousness in foreign affairs, supra-nationalism end anti-militarism. In the following four chapters these principles are related to specific problems faced by the 1945-51 Labour Government. (Chapter II) The idea that since the peoples of all nations have essentially the same interests their governments could co-operate was tested by the Government and proved a failure. In the case of German reparations, the Government from the first held that its differences with Russia were irreconcilable. Russia wanted reparations payments immediately; this would create deficits in Germany that the British would have to pay. In Anglo-Russian relations from 1945 until 1948, Bevin pursued a dual policy. He worked simultaneously to secure co-operation with Russia and to safeguard British interests without regard to Russia, by agreement with America and other nations. Finally, Russian intransigence and threats of aggression drove the Government to abandon all efforts at co-operation. In Palestine, the Government sought to co-operate with the United States in arranging a settlement, because of their similar economic and military interests. The United States, in spite of its close alliance with Britain in Europe, would not co-operate. Britain solved this problem by unilateral action. (Chapter III) The principle of class-consciousness meant that a Labour Government would work especially well with other governments representative of the common people, and oppose reactionary governments. The Labour Government consistently refused to admit ideological affinity as a ground for closer diplomatic relations with Russia; after the Communist purge of Eastern European Socialists, it made Russian Communism its major ideological enemy. A minority in the Party pressed for a continued close association with Russia, but without success. A larger group of MPs attacked the Government for its close association with capitalist America. The Government did notlet this criticism prevent it from strengthening the Anglo-American alliance. The critics, by rapid shifts in their assessment of America, showed it was not American capitalism that they disliked, but certain aspects of American foreign policy. The Government was recurrently pressed by some of its supporters to organise a "third force", so that Socialism would provide an alternative allegiance for nations wishing to disengage from the cold war between Russia and America. In Spain the Labour Government consistently opposed strong diplomatic action against Franco and worked to eaxpand trade. In its treatment of Communist China, the Government wae careful not to take sides in the battle between the forces of social revolution and reaction. Government leaders carefully refrained from associating themselves with the International Socialist Conference. This job was done by people who were only Party officials. (Chapter IV) The internationalism of the Labour Party was not maintained once the government of Britain came into its hands. At the United Nations it did make an effort to establish a supra-national organisation for atomic energy, but the failure was more significant than the proposal. The inability of the International Court of Justice and of the Security Council to defend British interests made the Government conclude that using the machinery of international government was not the way to secure the peaceful settlement of disputes between major nations. The varied negotiations and proposals for European unity tested the Government's attitude towards ceding sovereignty in a limited area. The Government consistently opposed all such proposals, although the Party gave lip-service to the idea of a United Socialist Europe. Its reaction to the Schuman plan for a supra-national coal and steel authority showed how the nationalisation of British industry stimulated the nationalisation of Labour's foreign policy. (Chapter V) Traditionally the Labour Party opposed the use of military force and balance of power politics as immoral and unsuccessful; it relied primarily upon moral, economic and diplomatic influence. Economic difficulties following the end of World War II made the Government a recipient, rather than a distributor, of large-scale economic assistance. The Government's desire to protect vital interests by military force led it to continue conscription in peace-time. The opposition to this bill produced the one partially successful back-bench revolt on foreign affairs in this period. The signing of NATO marked the Government's full acceptance of the balance of power system, which Socialists had traditionally abjured. In the Korean War, the Labour Government supported plans for the re-unification of Korea by military force -- until Communist China intervened. At the same time as the Government was denying the advisability of settling the Korean dispute by military force, it was making its final and greatest commitment to rearmament in Europe. In spite of criticism on socialist, on pragmatic and on economic grounds, the Government continued its large-scale rearmament programme. The traditional anti-militarism within the party greatly strengthened Aneurin Bevan politically when he resigned in April 1951, because it provided a principle to justify his attack upon the Government and to attract support to his group. In its final diplomatic problem, the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute, the Government did act upon the belief that military force would not enable it to get its own way, and when negotiations failed, it left Abadan, in spite of severe criticism from the Conservatives. (Chapter VI) Many Socialists had criticised British diplomats because they were recruited from a relatively small and privileged social group and not from the classes which formed the great bulk of the Labour movement. Bevin rejected the idea that diplomats should be judged by their social origins; instead, he applied standards of business efficiency. The charge that Bevin's mind was made up for him by the Foreign Office was used by some critics to explain why the Labour Government abandoned its traditional Socialist principles. The charge was developed without regard to the power that Ernest Bevin's personality, his understanding or foreign affairs and his position as head of a department gave him. (Chapter VII) Policy-making in the Labour Party was radically altered by the sudden creation of a Labour Government, with sources of strength and responsibility that extended far beyond the active membership of the Labour Party. Within the Cabinet Bevin was the strongest political figure. Because representatives of all sections of the Labour movement were in the Cabinet, and were thus bound by the rule of collective responsibility to uphold its decisions, the Cabinet became the place where Party foreign policy was effectively determined. The Party machinery was used to support the Government, rather than to apply pressure to it.

The thesis, "Anti-Socialism in British Politics, 1900-1922," is an attempt to combine the approaches of intellectual and political history in explaining the development of Conservative Party politics at a crucial period of social and political change. It pays particular attention to the relationship between political thought and action through the medium of 'ideology.' It attempts to illuminate this process with an extended case-study of the ideological opposition to 'Socialism' between 1880s and 1920s; it then traces the impact of these ideas to the strategic calculations and policy programmes of the Conservative party. It concludes by arguing that the ideological character of inter-war Conservatism can be best understood by reference to its resistance to Socialism, and it is through this doctrinal prism that the transformation of the Party into one dedicated to protecting the interests of industrialists and the middle-class, suburban salariat can be best understood. The thesis examines the processes of ideological innovation and operationalisation by which these interests were appealed to, and also reveals the political constraints which prevented Conservatives making too overt an appeal to the property-owning classes. The first half of the thesis is concerned with various intellectual and ideological responses to 'Socialism'; the contents of these critiques are treated as interesting in their own right, but are also related to the demands of a wider political culture, particularly as they were constructed with political needs in mind. The second half examines the political impact of Anti-Socialism in British politics at local and national level after 1906. It concludes by arguing that the relationship between Conservatism and the free market, limited government ideal of 'liberal' Individualism was closer than sometimes argued, that 'Anti-Socialism' brought the two creeds together, but in the end it was the 'common sense' Conservative modification of the Individualist creed which dominated political rhetoric and helped overcome many of the hidden tensions present in creating a Party for the 'property-owning democracy.'

This thesis examines the manner in which a policy objective is qualified in execution by the requirements of interministerial collaboration in Cabinet, and the pressures of individual departmental interest. Housing policy in England and Wales from 1945 to 1951 serves as the central focus of the study. Wherever possible, the events surrounding the policy are presented and considered in chronological order. In the first section, the allocation of responsibility for housing and the development of the policy are considered. The thesis then examines some specific problems encountered during the implementation of the policy. Next, it provides an account of the factors which lead to the adoption of cuts in the housing programme and the imposition of greater central control. Finally, the thesis examines the means employed by the Ministry of Health to re-establish its autonomy and restore the housing programme to its previous level. The thesis concludes that the postwar housing policy was adversely effected by both the design of the policy and the means of implementation. There were several erroneous assumptions and unresolved issues in the policy designed by the Coalition Government. The effects of these were exacerbated by the action or inaction of Labour. The inability of the Labour Government to coordinate the activities of departments during the implementation of the housing and reconstruction policies resulted in an overloaded building industry. There was a requirement for housing starts and other construction activity to be related to the availability of the factors of production. This, in turn, implied a decrease of departmental autonomy to allow for the necessary central coordination. For a number of reasons, the Labour Government did not introduce the measures necessary to ensure that this coordination took place until late in 1947. Even at this juncture, with the economy and the housing programme in a critical state, the limitations of central control were evident. The study is based on material contained in the government documents of the period. This was supplemented by interviews with government officials and the biographies of the major participants in the Labour Government.

The thesis deals with Britain's early Cold War history and the political history of the Church of England. It mainly uses primary sources, and contributes to our growing understanding of the early Cold War, especially in its cultural/religious elements. It explores how the Church of England dealt with the development of the early Cold War in Britain. It argues that in order to understand better the Church of England's role, an account of its perspective on issues of state modernisation dating back to at least the 1930s is necessary. It was then, during a decade of authoritarianism, and especially at the Oxford Conference of 1937, that the Church' standpoint towards secularisation was established, while the transnational agenda of the ecumenical movement was also adopted and internalized by Church of England. The thesis also examines the agencies which it built and worked with: in particular the British Council of Churches and the World Council of Churches. As the Church is the Established Church, its relationship with specific government agencies, especially the British Foreign Office and the Ministry of Information also became increasingly important. The thesis reveals the Church of England's lack of autonomy in time of crisis and the importance of key individuals for the institutional leadership of the Church. Its ecumenical agenda had played an important role, but this was under pressure after the War, as a Europe-wide Christian community was increasingly challenged by 'Western Union' plans for a Cold War Western, Christian community and bloc. By 1948 the Church had been enrolled in the Cold War between East and West which was apparent in its alignment with British government policies and its withdrawn role in the ecumenical community. The thesis adds to our understanding of the Church of England's relationship to the state in these years, and contributes to the cultural dimension of the early Cold War in Britain.

This thesis examines the regulation of naval competition between the major naval powers, and especially between Britain and the United States, under the regime of the Washington and London naval treaties, and the attempts to extend and maintain naval limitation in the period 1927 to 1936 in the face of Anglo-American rivalry and, later, the threats from Japan and Germany. Based upon British and American public and private sources, it traces the interaction of the two nations, and their relationships with other naval powers, from 1927 - when Anglo-American relations reached a nadir after the failed 'Coolidge Conference' in Geneva and the subsequen abortive 'Anglo-French Compromise' - to 1936, when naval limitation ende but by which time Anglo-American antipathy was fading in the face of mut external threats. The naval conferences of Geneva (1927) and London (19 and 1935-36), and the parallel naval side of the long-running Disarmamen Conference and its Preparatory Commission are reviewed with their attend preparations in London and Washington, and the influence of domestic factors - public opinion, financial stringency, and personal and politic prejudice - are examined. The central role of the naval balance in the relationship between the interward Great Powers is stressed, and the importance of the naval negotiations to both governments and public opinion echoes our contemporary concern for the preservation and management of the strategic balance. While the Washington-London naval system failed to halt naval rival it achieved the unforeseen consequences of permitting Britain to gracefu cede naval supremacy to the United States, under the guise of conceding 'parity', with a minimum of friction or indeed recognition of the fact. Additionally, it demonstrated by its breakdown the vulnerability of an arms limitation system that was neither geographically nor technically comprehensive.

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This thesis is a study of the racial equality proposal at the Paris Peace Conference. It explores Japanese motivations for submitting the proposal, and the responses of the British and American governments which eventually defeated it. The thesis uses an analytical framework based on five categories of possible explanations for the proposal: immigration, universal principle, great power status, peace conference politics and bargaining, and domestic politics. The thrust of the analysis contained in the thesis is as follows. For Japan, the proposal meant three things: a means of reaffirming its great power status by securing racial equality with the western great powers in the League of Nations; a justification for Prime Minister Hara whose pro- League position was maintained by a fragile domestic consensus against sceptics in the government and the wider public; and a means of resolving Japanese immigration problems in the United States and British Dominions. But for Japan the proposal was not originally intended as a demand for universal racial equality. For Britain, the proposal was unacceptable because it meant "free immigration" of non-white immigrants into the Dominions. In particular, Australia adamantly opposed it also because of its political significance for Australian public opinion. For the United States, Wilson's determination to create the League of Nations at almost any cost led him to impose a unanimity ruling at the crucial vote on llth April 1919. Other explanations worked in the background. The proposal highlighted the importance of the link between race and great power status for Japan, Japan's insecurity concerning the League of Nations and the West, and Japan's different approach to international relations. Moreover, the failure of the proposal revealed the limits of Wilsonian idealism in that neither Britain nor the United States at that time seriously considered the possibility of universal racial equality.

This thesis traces the evolution and emergence of the new-vice regal woman during a high point of the British Empire. The social, political and economic forces of the age, which transformed British society, presented different challenges and responsibilities for all women, not least those of the upper-class. Aristocratic women responded to these challenges in a distinctive manner when accompanying their husbands to the colonies and dominions as vice-regal consorts. In the last years of Queen Victoria’s reign a unique link was established between the monarchy and her female representatives throughout the Empire. The concept of the new vice-regal woman during the period 1884-1914 was explored through three case studies. The imperial stores of Lady Hariot Dufferin (1843-1936), Lady Ishbel Aberdeen (1857-1939), and Lady Rachel Dudley (c.1867-1920), establishes both the existence and importance of a new breed of vice-regal woman, one who was a modern, dynamic and pro-active imperialist. From 1884-1914 these three new vice-regal women pushed established boundaries and broke new ground. As a result, during their vice-regal lives, Ladies Dufferin, Aberdeen and Dudley initiated far reaching organisations in India, Ireland, Canada and / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Anglo-American relations throughout the Second World War and the years that followed, were at times coloured by the history of Zionism. This was the result of transfer of the Zionists' main effort from London to Washington in the hope of capitalizing on, and increasing, Zionist pressure there. The Zionists, faced with abandonment of British support for their aspirations in Palestine, due to strategic considerations, hoped that American intervention in British Palestine policy might cause Britain to resume that support. But no serious American attempt was made to prevent the introduction, in May 1939, of the British anti-Zionist White Paper policy. This lack of American pressure continued throughout the war. But as soon as the war ended, active American intervention began. The result, according to the evidence of the British Foreign Minister of the time (Bevin), was Britain's decision to abandon Palestine. This thesis endeavours to show the course of these Anglo-American relations, and to describe the development of the forces that prompted and perpetuated this American intervention. The thesis shows how in a first phase, which lasted until the beginning of 1943, the Government of the United States was reluctant to intervene for virtually the same reasons as governed the change in British policy that dates from 1938, when in face of the Axis threat they abandoned their attempt to impose the partition of Palestine and sought to maintain relations with the Arabs that would be good enough to suit their strategic ends. Consequently, throughout the war, world Jewry was faced with a grim combination of Nazi persecution of the Jews in Europe--later to become their total extermination --and the closing of the asylum of Palestine by the British. This combination had two main effects on the Jews: in America it enhanced the recruitment of the majority of Jews to the ranks of the Zionist movement, while in Palestine it reinforced Jewish determination to fight the White Paper, even by resort to violence. The common characteristic of both developments was the increase in Zionist impatience and Zionist militancy. In the course of that development, American Zionists, inspired by visitors from London and Palestine, pursued a dream that realists considered impossible of fulfilment. Before anyone in America knew the full dimensions of the holocaust and before victory in the war seemed in any way assured, the American Zionists illustrated their belief that "the hour of redemption would soon strike," and produced the "Biltmore" programme. These American Zionists believed that a Jewish State in the whole of Palestine, should be given to them "by the world", at the end of the war, and that this was going to be the true outcome of Jewish suffering. In the second phase, which ran between the beginning of 1943 and the end of the war, their Messianic dream gradually turned into a political programme. 1943 was the year in which the German threat to the Middle East came to an end. As the Allies' victory loomed in sight, not only the Zionists, but both the British and the United States began to consider the future of Palestine. The British Cabinet, largely under the influence of Churchill, saw the final phase of the war as providing it a better chance to tackle the problem than the post-war era was likely to be. Before long, it reached the conclusion that the White Paper must be replaced by a partition and accordingly drew up concrete plans. Significantly, however, the Cabinet decided to make its stand secret, until implementation of its plan was possible. It decided to exclude even the United States from knowledge of it. In consequence, an asymmetric relation developed between the two powers in which the British were told of American schemes and proposals for Palestine (most of which were merely random improvisations) but did not tell the Americans their own. The relationship amounted to a dialogue of the deaf. When, for reasons that this thesis will explain, the chance to implement partition was missed, Britain appeared to the Americans, as well as to the rest of the world, as doggedly adhering to the White Paper policy. This impression both increased Zionist beligerency, helping to make the post-war British position in Palestine impossible, and hardened the attitude of President Truman, causing him to start intervening. After 1943, two conflicting tendencies developed simultaneously in America, both affecting Middle Eastern policy. On the one hand, a scare about oil shortage and about other American interests in the Middle East, awakened an American wish to win Arab goodwill. On the other hand, mounting Zionist and (through Zionist effort) American public pressure on the Administration, brought about growing support for Zionist aspirations, particularly in Congress. This coincidence of pressures became a source of profound embarrassment to United States foreign policy makers. Since the British were at the same time disturbed by the prospects of growing difficulties in Palestine, springing from growing Jewish militancy, the one sense in which the two governments co-operated during the war in regard to Palestine was in an attempt to damp down Zionist agitation. This attempt gave birth to plans for a joint statement, condemning this agitation as impeding the Allied war effort; but the Zionists and their supporters managed to defeat this move. The result of the inner embarrassment caused to Americans was an ambiguous policy, according to which soothing statements were simultaneously made both to Jews and to Arabs only the former received these reassurances publicly; the latter learned of them in secret. This "two-way-talk" policy reached its peak towards the end of the war. Before Roosevelt's death, in April 1945, he had reached the conclusion that a Zionist solution in Palestine was impossible to implement and to maintain without resort to force. This conclusion led him to abandon his earlier support for it and to seek solutions of a different character. He, however, did not have the time or the readiness to develop his ideas much further. In his last year in office, Roosevelt struggled to stem the mounting Zionist pressure on his administration. After his failure to issue the Anglo-American statement, he scored a temporary success by managing to shelve pro-Zionist resolutions in Congress. But he was ail-but completely disarmed during the 1944 election campaign. This campaign was marked by a flood of pro-Zionist utterances, made by both political parties and their candidates for the Presidency, as a result of skilful Zionist tactics; in this election campaign, as they were again to do in the future, the Zionists instead of adhering to one Party, as they had done in the past, put their vote up to auction. Nevertheless, politically, the American Zionists achieved very little during the war. Their only impressive success was the mass recruitment of Jewry itself. All their other seeming achievements, in the form of platforms and statements and promises, seemed, when the war ended, to have vanished into thin air. But the same happened to all the plans and schemes proposed during the war by Britain and the United States. Palestine was not discussed at Yalta and formed no part of mutual post-war arrangements. The secret partition plan of the British Cabinet lay in ruins and all the other alternatives looked just as unpalatable. What remained intact was the White Paper. In the third phase, which ran from the end of the war until early 1947, American intervention began and developed. But it did not take the form for which the American Zionists had hoped; nor did it in the end bring about the results they desired.